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Preface
The first summer study at IIASA brought together a cross-section of individ-
uals from different disciplines and nationalities. All the participants have had
an interest in the role of risk analysis given the institutional arrangements
which guide decision making for new technologies. This book contains edited
versions of the papers presented at the meeting as well as a transcript of the
discussions which took place. It provides the ingredients for a broader framework
fcr studying the problems associated with technology and society where risk is
representative of a much wider set of concerns than simply the probability and
consequences of a hazardous accident.
The Bundesministerium fuer Forschung und Technologie has an interest in
promoting risk and safety research because of these new developments in society
over the past ten years. In particular, there has been a diminished confidence
in experts' statements on risk and a realization that many of the events which are
being examined are not subject to detailed scientific analysis. There has also
been an increasing recognition that distinctions must be made between analysis of
the risk associated with an event and people's values and preferences. Another
important development is the concern by the public that they participate more
fully in the decision process on these issues. These concerns were articulated in
both the papers and the open discussions at the summer study. The volume does not
produce any definitive answers to the dilemmas facing society on how to deal with
these new developments. Rather, it raises an important set of questions which
need to be considered while at the same time providing a catalog of research
needs. These suggested research topics reflect several of the objectives of the
current program on risk at the Bundesministerium fuer Forschung und Technologie.
In particular, there has been an interest in research on potential costs and
benefits associated with new technologies. There was also considerable discussion
related to the interaction between technology and society regarding attitudes
toward risk, another theme of the current research program. The summer study
offered an opportunity for an international exchange of ideas. I hope this volume
stimulates future interchanges which address the important issues associated with
risk and societal decision making.
Dr. Werner Salz
BMFT
June 1982
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

Overview
Howard Kunreuther and Eryl Ley
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
SETTING THE STAGE
The term risk analysis has generated considerable controversy in recent years
as to its meaning and importance with respect to societal decision making. The
papers and especially the discussions included in this volume illuminate different
aspects of this risk debate. The participants represent diverse disciplinary back-
grounds, but all of them have an interest in the decision process and institutional
aspects of risk.
The five-day meeting held during the early part of the summer of 19S1 was an
integral part of a two-year study at IIASAon"Liquefied Energy Gases (LEG): Siting
Decisions", supported by the Bundesministerium fur Forschung und Technologie of the
Federal Republic of Germany. It formed the basis for mUch of the research and dis-
cussions that subsequently took place among researchers at IIASA concerned with
problems of risk. We therefore labeled the meeting a summer study to indicate its
intended spillover effects. The problems of interest are those which have potential
economic benefits to individuals and society, but also have environmental, health,
and safety risks associated with them. The siting of large-scale technologies such
as energy facilities is a representative example.
Several features of such risk problems can be underscored. First there are
many different individuals and groups in society who are affected by a particular
decision, each of which has its own goals and objectives, databases and constraints.
Each party is also likely to focus on several attributes (e.g., risk to life, envi-
ronmental risk, costs) and assign different relative importance weights to each of
these components.
A second feature of most of these problems is that there is a limited statis-
tical database on which to determine the risk associated with a specific project or
activity. Wynne points out that there is a myth of an ideal objective scientific
knowledge to deal with policy issues surrounding these problems, while the reality
of the situation is that probabilities and losses associated with different events
are very ill-specified. As a result, each interested party can interpret data as
it sees fit to estimate different risks, and to justify its position.
A third feature of risk problems is the dynamic and sequential nature of the
decision process. Different interested parties enter the debate at different stages
of the process depending upon the relevant issues being discussed. Allison (1971)
points out that at each stage of the process the different parties have different
degrees of power and responsibility, as well as conflicting preferences. In order
to determine how a particular decision emerges, it is necessary to identify the
various issues which were deemed important, to indicate what bargains and comprom-
ises were agreed upon, and "to convey some feeling for the confusion".
The sequential nature of the process is also due to the limited time and at-
tention that can be devoted by any subset of the participants to a whole set of
different issues and deadlines facing them. As Simon (1967) succinctly put it:
" ... influence over the direction of attention of the political organs is
a principal means for effecting action. The notion of power as a tug-of-
war between alternatives yields to a notion of power as influence on a
sequential decision process, in which actions must be generated as well
as chosen and in which attention is a scarce resource" (pIGS).
These three features of societal problems considered during this Summer Study
required us to focus on how institutions and decision processes impact on the
4treatment of risk. A useful background to this is an understanding of the differ-
ent meanings attached to the word "analysis". Raiffa in his paper indicates that
the US National Academy of Sciences Committee on Risk and Decision Making devoted
considerable attention to the role that different types of analysis can play with
respect to problems involving risk.
Analysis can simply mean the assessment of the risks related to an activity.
Vaupel (1981) indicates that the need for this type of analysis arises because
various facts uncovered by natural social science research are often insufficient
or not well enough established to remove uncertainty. This type of analysis in-
volves the synthesis of disparate and indirectly relevant evidence, both objective
and judgmental, in order to assess the probability distribution estimates for the
factors of primary concern in the decision problem. Experts with backgrounds in
statistics and decision analysis are often called in to undertake these types of
assessments. The papers by Mandl and Lathrop and by Lathrop in this volume, focus
on this definition of analysis.
Analysis can signify an attempt to understand how the exlsiting institutional
structure deals with problems involving risk. In this interpretation of analysis
one has to specify the different interested parties and their roles, the impact of
different legislation and legal constraints as it affects the interaction among
these parties, and the different cultural biases and styles between groups or be-
tween countries dealing with specific problems. The three papers by Wynne, Ronge,
and Thompson and Wildavsky address these issues.
A third descriptive definition of analysis is an understanding of the actual
decision making process for dealing with problems where risk is involved. This
involves questions on how information is processed by each of the interested par-
ties, the resulting conflicts which emerge in the policy debate, and the way in
which final outcomes evolve. The papers by Kasperson and Gray, Dooley and Oseredko,
Larichev and Mechitov investigate the decision process in real case study situations.
In a prescriptive context, analysis can mean the types of policies that are
proposed for dealing with specific outcomes. In particular, the main theme of the
papers and discussions was methods whereby one can provide better information for
making decisions, the role of standards and regulations, and also of developing
compensation and insurance schemes. The papers by Drake and Long and Fairley con-
centrate on issues of policy design.
Finally, the word analysis can refer to ways of improving the decision process
in order to resolve conflicts. Here one considers mechanisms for resolving con-
flicts due to disparate evidence (e.g., differences between risk assessments) as
well as ways to improve group decision processes. The paper by Kleindorfer and one
of the lively interchanges during the discussions were devoted to this definition
of analysis.
We will now elaborate on each of these five meanings of analysis, interweaving,
where appropriate, the ideas presented in the papers as well as the discussions
among the conference participants.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Due to the lack of statistical data and standards that assessments must meet
in order to be used as evidence, experts have few guidelines for restricting how
they undertake risk assessments. Such broad degrees of freedom have created con-
siderable problems for societal decision making processes.
Oseredko et al. indicate that in pipeline siting decisions in the USSR, experts
only provide qualitative estimates of many of the parameters and such approximations
are influenced by their past experience with a particular feature or attribute.
In their study of a number of different risk assessments, Mandl and Lathrop
show how experts use different definitions of risk for the same problem. For ex-
ample, some estimates of risk focus on a probability of a disaster or accident
occurring, and no mention is made of the consequences of the event. The other
extreme is that a risk assessment might focus on a maximum credible accident with-
out assigning any probability to its occurrence. Even if all experts were using
the same definition of risk, each of them might make a different set of assumptions
,
5as to how to estimate the probability or consequence of an event. Hence, two ex-
perts focusing on the same situation and using the same definition of risk may
arrive at radically different conclusions as to whether it is above or below some
specified acceptable level. For these reasons, there was general agreement by the
participants that political and social processes greatly influence consideration
of risk and that risk should not be looked at in a vacuum.
For example, private consulting firms who undertake risk analyses can have a
built-in bias telling the contracting party what they want to hear. Hence the
estimates may reflect the different goals and objectives of the relevant interested
parties. Linnerooth investigates the implication of several different risk assess-
ments with conflicting estimates concerning the siting process for an LEG terminal
in California. She points out that these types of analyses are designed to persuade
or support a party argument rather than simply to report results in a statistically
meaningful manner.
Finally, we should point out that risk assessments are affected by external
events such as accidents. For example, Kasperson and Gray note that following the
Three Mile Island accident the Nuclear Regulatory Commission substantially shifted
its risk research program toward higher probability/lower consequence events.
Similar changes also occurred in the electric power research institutes program in
the US.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The focus of attention concerning institutional arrangements was on how anal-
ysis is utilized for coping with specific problems in the context of the structure
of society. When one looks at risk in this context, it is no longer determined by
estimating certain parameters, but rather by a social process. Risk in this sense
is viewed as a function of the way different groups in society feel about the prob-
lem and interact with each other. In their paper, Thompson and Wildavsky stress
the importance of different cultural styles as they affect the group interaction
process. Each of the interested groups or parties perceive risk as they want to
see it, independent of its physical measurement.
An illustration of how different groups react to the same risk is provided
by the analysis of the institutional response to the TMI accident (Kasper son and
Gray). The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission was anxious to maintain the status
quo, despite the fact that the Kemeny Report (the Report of the President's Com-
mission after TMI, 1979) recommended a number of substantial changes in its organ-
izational structure. On the other hand, the electrical utilities who managed the
operation of the nuclear power plant used the accident as an opportunity to modify
their existing operations. Here two parties analyzed the same situation from their
own perspectives and responded to the disaster very differently.
During the meeting considerable attention was devoted to different cultural
styles of risk across countries. For example, the USSR attempts to resolve differ-
ences between groups through some form of compromise (Oseredko et al. ), whereas the
United Kingdom has more of a hierarchical and consensual style (Wynne), and the US
style of societal decision making is more adversarial in nature (Linnerooth). In
West Germany, traditional political processes of compromise may have broken down,
so that institutions are not functioning in the way they have been in the past
(Ronge). Thus, we cannot assume that standard risk analysis techniques that were
useful to justify decisions in the past will be able to iron out differences today
in West Germany.
DECISION MAKING PROCESSES
This view of analysis stresses the limited ability and desire of decision
makers to collect information on which to base their preferences. Interested par-
ties thus attempt to satisfice rather than optimize (Simon 1967). For this reason,
there is a tendency to use simplistic rules for dealing with particular problems.
6This situation is particularly acute after a crisis or accident when many actions
have to be taken in a very short space of time (Dooley).
An example of the use of simplified decision rules is provided by Oseredko et
a l. in "The Siting of Pipelines in the USSR" , who point out that simple pairwise
comparisons were made on separate attributes across alternatives rather than
weighting all of the components simultaneously through some type of multi-attribute
utility function. One reason for using this type of simplified rule in societal
decision making is that the data on which to estimate different attribute values
are not very good so that decision makers are hesitant to use sophisticated tech-
niques. In addition, when there are limited alternatives, as in the pipeline case,
pairwise comparisons are relatively simple to make. Given that time is an impor-
tant constraint in these problems, these types of heuristics may be appropriate
for the given situation.
Another critical feature of the sequential decision making process is the im-
portance that accidents and random events play. The small statistical database
coupled with systematic biases of individuals dealing with uncertainty (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974) increase the importance of these exogenous events. Frequently,
a disaster jolts the interested parties into action and leads to new regulations
or standards to "prevent" future accidents. Kasperson and Gray illustrate this
point by detailing new siting regulations which were promulgated after TMI with
respect to population density near a nuclear power plant. Drake and Long provide
a number of examples of new codes and standards that were triggered by specific
accidents and, subsequently used for siting, designing, and operating liquefied
natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) facilities.
In his paper, Wynne points out that human error or incompetent staff are
frequently blamed for the cause of a specified accident, whereas in reality, the
event may have been due to lack of relevant information and/or faulty organiza-
tional procedures. He provides illustrations of these phenomena using examples
from the Windscale fire of 1957 and the TMI accident.
A pervasive problem regarding the societal decision process is the conflict
among the different interested parties. The analyses utilized by each of the
parties to defend their objectives are generally not based on tested assumptions,
nor are they easily challenged in hearings or public enquiries. The resolution
of these conflicts will depend on the nature of the problem, the degree and timing
of public participation, as well as the relevant style of risk management.
Recently, the Risk Group at IIASA has developed a framework of the decision
making process for problems such as the siting of facilities based on new technol-
ogies. This multi-attribute, multi-party (MAMP) approach considers the role of
many interested parties in this specific concern (Kunreuther et al. 1982). It em-
phasizes the potential for conflict emerging among the interested parties as a re-
sult of their different objectives, mandates, and information sources. Linnerooth
illustrates the use of the MAMP framework in the context of the siting decision of
an LNG terminal in California.
POLICY DESIGN
Market-based solutions for dealing with risk are of limited usefulness in
dealing with the types of societal decision making problems covered in this summer
study. One reason is that the lack of a good statistical database to estimate
risk makes it difficult to determine the expected costs and benefits associated
with different programs.
Kleindorfer suggests three additional reasons why such policies will not work
well. The first relates to the fact that these problems are classified under the
heading of public goods or public bads where individuals are involuntarily exposed
to certain risks. A second factor that we have already alluded to is the informa-
tion collection and processing difficulties facing all interested parties. Thirdly,
at the level of the firm, the catastrophic loss potential associated with particu-
lar risks makes it difficult for enterprises to obtain protective measures such as
insurance.
The principal pur-
industry, government)
appropriate share of
to property and life.
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For these reasons, social institutions for dealing with these types of prob-
lems have emerged. Therefore a critical factor is a thorough understanding of the
political and social processes associated with particular problems. We will now
briefly review the policies which were proposed in the papers and discussions dur-
ing our meeting. The potential success of any of these proposals depends on the
problem context, the existing institutions and decision processes of the relevant
interested parties. We will provide examples of where certain programs have worked
well in specific countries.
Providing better information. One way that analysis can help to improve
decision making is to provide better information to all the parties who are affec-
ted by particular programs. One very positive example of this is in Sweden, where
the government financed a program to inform the public about energy and nuclear
power. The program involved 8000 study circles each consisting of approximately
ten members who came together to discuss those energy-related questions they felt
to be most important. The expectation on the part of the Swedish government was
that this type of interchange would create a more favorable attitude toward govern-
ment policy. However, the reports from these groups suggested that there was a
continued uncertainty and ambivalence which resulted in lack of consensus on the
issue of nuclear power (Nelkin and Pollack 1979).
Another way of providing information to different parties is through certain
types of decision aids which can be used to help determine the relative merits of
different alternatives (e.g., whether to site a facility at location A, B, C, or
not at all). Lathrop feels that one can broaden traditional risk analysis from
looking only at an expected number of fatalities, to one covering a broader set of
attributes (e.g., expected health effects, catastrophic potential and unequity of
impacts). He contends that this information can be incorporated through an ex-
panded multi-attribute utility model so that the decision maker has a better appre-
ciation of the social and political factors that may impact on final outcomes.
Although this approach may be useful for a single decision maker, it still does
not address the problems of conflict resolution when the different parties have
not been able to reach a consensus.
In their papers, Dooley and Kleindorfer both recommend computer-aided decision
support systems which will enable policy makers to determine the impact of differ-
ent policies on physical phenomena under a set of scenarios that they create. For
example, assume the policy maker was interested in the consequences of a fire to
an LNG storage tank which was proposed for a given location. Based on models of
vapor cloud dispersion he could investigate the potential destruction and fatal-
ities under different assumptions with respect to the way the wind blows. Further-
more, he could place the LNG terminal at different points within the community or
at different sites to investigate the potential catastrophic impact under different
wind conditions. This type of interactive analysis enables different interested
parties to see the effect of alternative assumptions and physical models (e.g.,
vapor cloud dispersion models) on outcomes.
Developing standards and regulations. Another class of policies relates to
specific codes and standards which make structures safer or which impose restric-
tions on where projects can be located. These types of regulations serve many
different interested parties simultaneously. Residents, for example, may feel
safer if a facility is sufficiently far away from their homes. At the same time,
the government may wish to avoid the higher prices of a potentially catastrophic
accident in a densely populated area. As Drake and Long point out, industry is
also frequently in favor of certain standards and regulations because it prevents
the less responsible firms from damaging the industry's reputation. One of the
open questions with respect to standards and regulations is how to estimate the
potential costs and benefits of these measures to the different interested parties.
In addition, there is then a need for a regulatory body to monitor, control, and
enforce these measures.
Instituting insurance policies and compensation measures.
pose of these programs would be to force those parties (e.g.,
who stand to benefit from particular programs also to bear an
the costs should there be damage to the environment or losses
8Insurance programs and compensation schemes directly address the distribution of
gains and losses from specific programs. Such distribution questions are critically
important in political decision processes. As Robert Behn (1981) argues:
"In contrast to the analyst, the politican is most interested in distri-
bution. Political influence is exercised not by individual citizens but
through the intermediation of organized constituencies, as an elected
official or political appointee of one, the policy politician is respon-
sive to constituencies--not to the analysts' abstract notion of aggregate
public welfare. The politician is deeply concerned about how much his
constituents will benefit and how much they will pay."
One example of an institutional response in this direction is the self-
regulation measures adopted by the public utilities following the TMI accident.
Kasperson and Gray point out that the utilities have cooperated to create an insur-
ance pool to protect themselves against the potential extraordinary cost which would
accrue to any utility following a future major nuclear accident. Fairley recommends
that producers who benefit from specific projects be made liable for all the costs
they impose upon others. He points out that this can take the form of self-
insurance, commercial insurance, industry risk pooling (as in the TMI example) andl
or government-managed compensation funds. The previous history of societal risk
bearing in most countries suggests that these schemes would be difficult to imple-
ment if there are catastrophic risks which tax the reserves of private industry.
The Fairley proposal does suggest the importance of allocating responsibility prior
to a disaster rather than determining who will pay after the event occurs.
Much of the opposition to the proposed high-risk projects comes from relatively
small groups of individuals, often residents of the area, who feel that they would
suffer losses in property values and would have to bear the costs of health and
environmental risks. O'Hare (1980) has characterized this general problem as "not
in my backyard". He has proposed a particular type of compensation scheme whereby
each community considered as a potential site, determines a minimum level of per
capita compensation, and it would be willing to make a legal commitment to have the
project in their backyard if the compensation is paid. The applicant would include
such compensation as relevant in calculating the siting costs associated with lo-
cating the facilities in community A, B, or C. The final decision would then be
made by the applicant taking into account the amount of compensation he would have
to pay residents in each of these three localities.
Whether or not such a compensation scheme is a useful policy description de-
pends on the specifics of the situation and the cultural differences in risk manage-
ment style. In this connection, it would be interesting to ask what types of pay-
ments would have been required to please the citizens of Oxnard, California, so
that an LNG terminal could have been located there. What would the Sierra Club re-
quire in payments for them to support a site which might have adverse environmental
effects? As indicated in the papers and discussions at the meeting, these ques-
tions can only be answered in a real world problem context. They do reflect an
increasing concern of social scientists and policy analysts in dealing with wind-
falls or wipe-outs from specific accidents which involved the public sector.
Kunreuther and Lathrop (1982) point out that the final outcome is likely to repre-
sent a balance between the political restraints and economic criteria. They refer
to a quote by Wildavsky (1981) which states:
"The criterion of choice in politics and markets is not being right or
correct as in solving a puzzle, but agreement based on interaction
among partially-opposed interests" (p131).
DESIGNING ANALYSES FOR IMPROVING PROCESS
Wynne points out in his paper that there is a myth that consensus between dif-
ferent interested parties is possible because there is only one objective truth.
9He contends that the reality is quite different since there is no single scientific
truth. If consensus occurs, it is due to default rather than agreement. Much of
the discussion at the meeting revolved around the question "How do we improve the
decision process given that there is not a single scientific truth? We will now
briefly summarize the major points coming out of the papers and the discussion.
Establishing Credibility of Analyses
In general, existing institutions in most countries are inadequate to deal
with problems of conflicting evidence and polarized expert opinion with respect to
questions such as risk assessments. One of the recommendations of the CORADM Re-
port is that one should report honestly on the basis for disagreements among ex-
perts in the assessment process and then have policy makers determine what to do
with the data in their evaluation process (Raiffa). The commi~tee pointed out that
experts will disagree due to their different experiences, their different paradigms,
and the different types of information they utilize.
One way of dealing with this problem is to establish rules of evidence where
one can better understand the differences in experts' risk analyses. Lathrop and
Linnerooth (in press) suggest a set of guidelines establishing these rules of evi-
dence. In particular, they stress the importance of defining the risk being asses-
sed, clarifying the assumptions and error bounds, and indicating the conditional
nature of specific analyses which were undertaken.
A principal problem which currently exists in implementing these guidelines
is the lack of an institutional mechanism for reviewing different risk assessments.
Ackerman et a~. (1974) point out that the traditional approaches such as legal re-
sponses, agency hearings and judicial reviews have inherent limitations with respect
to evaluating these conflicting assessments. Such evaluations are especially dif-
ficult for classes of problems where there are no statistically based measures of
risk. These authors propose the establishment of a review board to examine differ-
ent assessments. Under their proposed procedure members, all of whom would be
trained in subjects fundamental to technical analysis, would provide a written re-
port evaluating the impact of specific assessments for specific issues (e.g., pop-
ulation risk, environmental impact). Particular attention should be given to
identify the empirical basis of the set of findings and to determine how well the
analysis is grounded in scientific theory.
Group Procedures for Facilitating Collective Action
When different interested parties disagree on a preferred set of alternatives
for specific projects, there is a need for each to understand the other side's de-
cision. Kleindorfer points out that this is particularly important when there are
conflicts of values (e.g., the importance of safety or environmental impact on a
project) or conflicts of fact (e.g., different risk assessments). In his paper he
outlines a number of approaches for dealing with this problem. Particular atten-
tion is given to strategic planning models when one tries to mesh an ideal state
with the status quo through scenario generation.
It may also be possible to involve the different participants in role-playing
activities. Holling and his colleagues at the Institute of Resource Ecology have
conducted workshops on role-playing where each of the participants specifically
takes on the role of one of the relevant actors in a societal problem. Prior to
the workshop, each participant interviews a particular individual whom he is repre-
senting so that he can understand his objective and relevant information being con-
sidered in evaluating different alternatives (see Holling 1981).
Institutions for Resolving Conflicts
There was considerable interchange in the discussion on different proposed
review mechanisms for helping to resolve conflicts among different interested
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parties. There was general consensus among the group that the type of procedure
is critically dependent on the specific problem being considered and the social
and cultural environment. For example, reference was made to the Canadian experi-
ment in which the Berger Commission was created to assess the Mackenzie Valley
Pipeline controversy. As part of this project, intervener groups were given finan-
cial support to develop their case. The Dutch Science Shops were also cited as an
example of a public enquiry which evaluates the reaction of the interested parties
who are affected by projects that impact on the environment.
These examples are elaborated upon in the discussions which appear in Chapter
5. Finally, we should point out that to understand risk decision making one has
to consider the cultural milieu. Thompson and Wildavsky in their paper put forward
a theory as to why different types of people in the same situation react differ-
ently. One of the stimulating features of the Summer Study was the different re-
actions of the participants (from seven different countries both East and West)
when we discussed various issues.
ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPERS
The first paper by Linnerooth outlines a descriptive framework of the decision
making process for problems such as siting facilities. The approach, developed
here at IIASA is a multi-attribute multi-party (MAMP) framework of choice in a dy-
namic setting. It considers the potential for conflict emerging between interested
parties as a result of their differing objectives, mandates, and information
sources. On the prescriptive side the approach explores the roles that analyses,
including risk analysis, and decision theory can play in providing a more systematic
basis for making decisions. The framework is illustrated in terms of a specific
problem, that of the LNG siting decision in California, USA.
Raiffa, in his paper, describes the work of the US National Academy of Sciences
Committee on Risk and Decision Making (CORADM). The objectives of this committee
were very similar to those of our Summer Study. Much of the attention of the com-
mittee was spent on the role of analysis in dealing with problems which have adverse
effects on health, safety, and the environment. In particular, the paper addresses
the difficulty of decomposing risk assessment from risk evaluation, a theme which
is stressed in other papers as well as in the dicussions.
Chapter 2 deals with "Risk Assessment in a Problem Context". The first paper
by Mandl and Lathrop examines the assessment of risk to life in catastrophic acci-
dents due to a large-scale technology (LNG) facility. Two primary goals are to
present and compare various procedures of risk assessment and to quantify and com-
pare risks at four facilities. The paper concludes that there are disagreements
between the experts as to how to quantify risk, which models to use, and what to
include and exclude in risk assessment. This is due to new technology (limited
data), new techniques of risk assessment for LEG terminals (new approach), as well
as the different needs of the client.
Kasperson and Gray, in their paper, report on the response and changes which
occurred after TMI and the impact of the Kemeny Report on nuclear safety. Each of
the interested parties reacted to the accident and report in different ways, re-
flecting their own goals and objectives. The authors point out that the media had
considerable coverage of the Kemeny Report prior to its being issued as well as
immediately thereafter. However, they exhibited lack of sustained analysis and
the subsequent societal response. Industry undertook a number of reforms in manag-
ing nuclear power plant safety even before the recommendations of the Kemeny Com-
mission. In contrast, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's response to both TMI
and the Kemeny Report has "been more delayed and uneven". The paper concludes that
the long-term response to TMI and the report may be to further self-regulation in
nuclear power.
Dooley's paper was stimulated by the organizational and institutional response
to the Missassauga, Ontario, accident where 24 cars of a train derailed, 19 of
which carried hazardous material. It looks at the characteristics of crises and
then suggests ways of improving decision making. In particular, Dooley points out
in a crisis seems to be described by Simon's procedural ration-
individuals have limited time to deal with the situation and
Decision makers will take actions based on past experience in
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that decision making
ality model in which
sparse information.
similar situations.
Oseredko et al. describe the site selection process for locating gas pipelines
in the USSR where there are many different attributes to be considered. Each of the
interested parties in the debate considers a subset of these attributes so that at
the outset there is no consensus on which one of the several alternatives to choose.
The paper illustrates the sequential nature of the decision process, the use of
heuristics for arriving at a final state through compromise, and the limited role
that experts play in arriving at a final solution.
The final paper in Chapter 2 by Drake and Long, discusses the development of
codes and standards used for siting, designing, and operating hazardous facilities
such as LNG and LPG plants. Drake indicates the importance of unexpected accidents
in triggering regulations and points out that standards will continue to evolve as
accidents indicate weaknesses in present requirements.
Chapter 3 focuses on "Institutional Aspects of Risk". Ronge, in his paper,
indicates that the traditional political processes of compromise in bargaining have
broken down and hence one has to re-evaluate the role that analysis plays in the
societal decision making process. In particular, the author focuses on West Germany
and points out that parties that lose in the policy debate frequently resort to
violence. He offers as reasons for these changes the ecological movement, the
"small is beautiful" philosophy leading to opposition of large technologies, and
the general antipathy to social institutions. The paper concludes that risk re-
search needs a framework grounded on theoretical principles which incorporates
political processes.
The following paper, by Wynne, is concerned with myths regarding the operation
of institutions and the use of scientific rationality in risk assessment. Society
is operating under the myth that there is objective scientific knowledge which can
be used to deal with policy issues associated with risk. The reality is we cannot
achieve this ideal. By striving to reach it we may create more problems than we
solve. The paper argues that there is a need to study how scientists, organiza-
tions and institutions function in the context of the political process so that we
can replace the set of current myths with a more realistic picture of the world.
Chapter 3 ends with "A Proposal to Create a Cultural Theory of Risk", by
Thompson and Wildavsky, who attempt to answer the question as to why different
types of people facing a similar societal problem react in different ways. A cul-
tural theory of risk is developed which characterizes five different groups on the
basis of the intersection of two dimensions: groups (the extent to which an in-
dividual is involved in social groups) and grids (the extent to which an individual
is involved in hierarchical arrangements). Each of the five resulting cultural
categories has its own rationality which is likely to be contradictory. Risk de-
bates are likely to differ between cultures because of different constellations of
groups in each culture. On the basis of this theory, one can give policy makers
insights into why there are profound disagreements over risk, and under what situ-
ations one can hope to resolve conflicts between parties.
Chapter 4 is concerned with "Decision Processes and Prescriptive Aspects of
Risk". The principal theme of Lathrop's paper is that there are two perspectives
on risk: the technical and psychological, each of which looks at the societal and
decision making problem in different ways. The technical perspective focuses on
a single index, the expected number of fatalities from a given alternative. The
psychological perspective looks at a variety of different factors in evaluating
the risk. At the prescriptive level, the paper proposes an expansion of a multi-
attribute utility function so that it recognizes political realities in social
concerns which affect risk management.
In his paper, Kleindorfer indicates the information and process difficulties
associated with market-based solution and regulatory mechanisms for solving soci-
etal decision making problems. The key challenge in risk management is to find
ways of reconciling conflicts between the parties because of the different assump-
tions, goals, and objectives, as well as the knowledge base on which each group
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operates. The paper proposes the use of group processes for reconcilling differ-
ences building on the work of Ackoff et al. on strategic planning. The approach
relies on scenario generation towards an ideal state which requires stating the
necessary assumptions which each group has made to achieve this ideal state. By
coupling this approach with specific methods (e.g., Saaty's analytic hierarchy
approach, computer-based decision support systems, role playing) one may be able
to get the decision maker to see differences in the assumptions. In this way in-
terested parties may be able to achieve consensus through compromise solutions.
In the concluding paper, Fairley argues for market-based solutions to problems
of societal risks so that risk producers are liable for the costs they impose on
others. By shifting the responsibility for catastrophic accidents from society
to producers, the author feels that risk producers will undertake thorough risk
assessments since they have a stake in the accuracy of the data. In this way risk
assessments will focus on a number of other attributes besides loss of life, such
as injury and property damage.
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Siting an LNG Terminal in California:
A Descriptive Framework
Joanne Linnerooth
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
1. BACKGROUND
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is, as the name suggests, a gas that is liquefied
for purposes of transportation. To liquefy natural gas, its temperature is reduced
to -160 oC, at which point the volume of the gas is reduced to approximately one-
six hundredth of its original volume. presently, there are 16 receiving plants in
the world, primarily in Japan, in Western Europe, and in the US. A typical tank
has a volume of 80 000m 3 ; there are usually from two to four of these tanks at a
receiving terminal. The early ships had a capacity of something around 27 000m 3 ,
present ships as high as 130 000m 3 • It was estimated that in 1981 there would be
at least 57 LNG carriers operating in the world with a combined capacity of over
5.21 million m3 •
The capital costs of a typical operation include the costs of the export termi-
nal, the receiving terminal, and the ships. The cost of a typical export terminal
is around $750 million; a receiving terminal with four tanks costs somethinq in
the order of $150 million; and three methane tankers, a minimal number, add an-
other $450 million. This totals more than a billion dollars (Office of Technology
Assessment 1977). The throughput of a typical plant, as calculated from Point
Conception (see Mandl and Lathrop 1981), is approximately 15 000 megawatts (MW) of
electricity. This is approximately equivalent to the throughput of 15 nuclear power
plants. In sum, the import or export of LNG is a highly capital-intensive and
energy-intensive operation.
In the event of a ship or terminal accident, a significant amount of LNG could
be spilled, which would "boil off" into a methane cloud. Since the dispersion
characteristics of methane clouds are poorly understood there is a great deal of
uncertainty involved in predicting accident consequences. Yet, the present state
of knowledge indicates that at some very low probability an LNG accident could
result in a cloud covering several miles before igniting. Depending on the popu-
lation density of the area covered by the cloud, the possibility exists, albeit at
a low probability, for a catastrophic accident.
A liquefied energy gas terminal, therefore, promises to yielG benefits to
society, but only at a cost of potential catastrophic accidents. The siting of
these large-scale facilities presents a formidable challenge to political risk
management processes. There are two features of these problems that make them
particularly difficult to resolve. First, the gas consumers who benefit from the
terminal do not always bear the risks, which fallon a small group of people liv-
ing in the vicinity of the terminal. The problem is how to distribute the costs
and benefits. Hence, there is the potential for conflict among the interested
parties. A second feature of the siting problem is the absence of a database that
provides conclusive statistical evidence on the likely performance of the new
*The research reported in this paper is supported by the Bundesministerium fur
Forschung und Technologie, FRG, contract No. 321/7591/RGB 8001. While support
for this work is gratefully acknowledged, the views expressed are the author's
own and are not necessarily shared by the sponsor.
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technology and the probability distribution associated with potential accidents.
Each of the interested parties may thus provide different estimates of the chances
and consequences of certain events. There are no objective measures to settle
these differences.
The IIASA Risk Group is investigating how decisions with these features are
taken. For this purpose, the siting of LEG terminals in four countries--the FRG,
the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA--have been selected as case studies. The
approach taken at IIASA builds on the notion that a good understanding of how soci-
eties make siting decisions, i.e., the institutions involved and the uses made of
scientific expertise, is necessary to improve upon these processes.
2. THE DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK
In this section, I will briefly discuss the framework used to compare the sit-
ing process in the four countries under study, and will illustrate this framework
in the context of the siting process in the United States. The framework emphasizes
the involvement of many interested parties and the diverse concerns, or attributes,
of these parties. Hence we have labeled it the multi-attribute, multi-party (MAMP)
approach. In developing this structure, we have been greatly influenced by the
concepts discussed by Braybrooke (1974) where he looks upon the political system
as a machine or collection of machines for processing issues.
2.1. Rounds
The decision process can be separated into different rounds which we label by
capital letters, A, B, ... A round is simply a convenient device to illustrate a
change in the focus of discussions. This new focus or direction can be triggered
by (1) a key decision taken (or a stalemate reached due to conflicts among parties) ,
or (2) a change in the context of the discussions due to an unanticipated event,
the entrance of a new party, or new evidence brought to the debate. Rounds are
simply a convenient way of segmenting the decision process; they are not unique and
can be simultaneous or overlapping.
The problem in each round is defined by a set of issues, decision constraints
and procedures. Braybrooke (1974) refers to an "issue-circumscribing" phase where
the alternatives for discussion are bounded by generally accepted, though not nec-
essarily irrefutable, facts and values, e.g., "it is technically feasible to import
LNG to California" or "California needs LNG". As we have already noted the problem
is also formulated or defined by the decisions from earlier rounds. Clearly the
problem-defining process will have an effect on final outcomes through this latter
type of bounding constraint.
2.2. Problem Formulation
A round of more or less official discussions is initiated by a formal or in-
formal request. Informal discussions may be initiated simply by such actions as a
request for information on the part of one of the parties or a request for prelimi-
nary discussions. Because the particular form of how the round is initiated may
further define or limit the bounds of the discussion, the careful scrutiny of their
wording is important. For example, it may make a difference in the decision pro-
cess if the question is framed as "is there a site which is appropriate?" or "which
of the sites x, y, and z is appropriate?" Braybrooke (1974) refers to the first
question as a "which-question" and the second as a "whether-question". Which-
questions demand more complicated considerations and detailed thinking, while
whether questions can be approached with simpler rules of thumb and heuristics.
2.3. Interaction
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To understand a particular pattern of institutional choice it is necessary to
analyze a set of policy actors, their interactions with one another at different
stages of the process, and the information available to them. A party's evaluation
of an alternative is based on its estimation of the levels and values of each at-
tribute resulting from that option, the value of each of those levels, and the
relative importance given to each attribute. Another party might have different
estimates of the effects of an option, different costs and benefits resulting from
those effects, or may assign a different relative importance to each of the attri-
butes. Because of any of these differences one party may rank alternatives differ-
ently from another.
The interaction among the parties is represented by the main arguments each
brings to the debate in support of or in rejection of each of the alternatives at
hand. Those arguments may relate to only one or two attributes. It is not sug-
gested here that the arguments presented for or against a particular proposal nec-
essarily reflect a concern of the party making the argument. For example, a party
opposed to a site because of its concern for environmental quality may present an
argument using seismic risk as the main reason to reject the site. The argument
may be selected to maximize the effectiveness of the argument, not to reflect the
actual concern of the party. The argument reflects a strategy on the part of the
actor in support of or opposition to the proposal. The strategy of the actors can
reveal a number of underlying motives and desires of those concerned and may be
essential in understanding the interpretation and use of scientific evidence, in-
cluding risk analyses.
2.4. Concluding a Round
The round is concluded by a decision, a stalemate, a change in information
(changing the focus of the debate and hence initiating a new round), or an unantic-
ipated event aborting the discussions and requiring a new round of inquiry. Each
decision can, in turn, be described by the trade-offs implicit in the choice made.
These trade-offs may not be explicitly recognized by the decision maker, or not
explicitly analyzed in the process of making the decision:
3. APPLYING MAMP: THE SITING OF THE CALIFORNIA LNG TERMINAL
In the late 1960s, faced with projections of decreasing natural gas supplies
and increasing need, several California gas utilities began to seek additional sup-
plies. In 1974, Western LNG Terminal Company (Western), which was formed to repre-
sent the LNG interests of the gas utilities, applied for approval of three LNG
import sites on the California coast: Point Conception, located on a remote and
attractive part of the coast; Oxnard, a port city; and Los Angeles, a large harbor
metropolis. The LNG would be shipped from southern Alaska, Alaska's North Slope,
and Indonesia. At the time of writing, Point Conception, the one site remaining
under active consideration, is still pending approval. This section describes the
interested parties, procedures, decisions, and events of this lengthy process (for
a more complete review see Linnerooth 1980, Lathrop 1980, Kunreuther et al. 1981).
3.1. Interested Parties and Relevant Attributes
To structure the siting process we need to have a good understanding of the
different concerns of the interested parties. In the California case, there were
*The distinction between a "decision maker" and a decision resulting from a process
is an important one since the person responsible for the decision often cannot be
identified (see Allison 1971, Majone 1979).
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three categories of concern which are relevant: risk aspects, economic aspects,
and environmental aspects. Each of these concerns can be described by a set of
attributes. Table 1 depicts an interested party/attribute matrix showing the main
concerns of each of the relevant groups over this seven-year period.
The attributes listed have been selected to reflect the nature of debates in
the process, that is, to reflect the attributes as perceived by the parties in the
debate, rather than to characterize in some logical analytical manner the alterna-
tives. For example, population risk (X2) involves the risk to life and limb to
neighbors of the LNG terminal due to accidents including those induced by earth-
quakes. Earthquake risk (X 3 ) which involves both population risk and supply inter-
ruption risk due to earthquakes, is included as a separate attribute since it was
handled as such in the process.
The filled cells in Table 1 indicate which parties pay particular attention
to which attributes. Naturally, many of the parties care about all the attributes
listed. However, either because of the incentives directly felt by the party or
because of the role the party plays in society, each party makes its decisions
based upon a particular subset of the attributes. For example, while the applicant
is certainly concerned with environmental quality and risks to the population, its
primary responsibilities and concerns are earning profits for shareholders anddeliv-
ering gas reliably to consumers. Its actions are apt to be motivated by concerns
for profits and gas supplies, and constrained by political and legal limits set by
other parties' concerns for safety and the environment. Likewise, the Sierra Club
cares about reliable gas supplies, but receives membership dues for being primarily
concerned with environmental quality. Consequently, in a situation where a pro-
posed action increases the reliability of gas supply at the expense of environmental
quality it is reasonable for the applicant to favor the proposal and the Sierra
Club to oppose it. These differences in primary concerns may determine a great
deal of the behavior of the political decision process, and explain how that pro-
cess is apt to differ from the single decision maker postulated by normative eval-
uation approaches. The important message of Table 1 does not lie in the details
of exactly which cells are filled, but lies in the generally great differences in
the columns of the table. That is, the different parties in the process care about
different subsets of the attributes.
The applicant, Western LNG Terminal Associates, was a special company set up
to represent the LNG siting interests of three gas distribution utilities: Southern
California Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric, and El Paso Natural Gas Company.
As domestic gas supplies seemed to be diminishing in the late 1960s, the gas util-
ities perceived an increased risk of supply interruption, which could be mitigated
by additional supplies such as LNG. Quite naturally, the applicant was primarily
concerned with profitability (X 6 ) and secure supplies of gas (Xl).
At various government levels there are five principal parties. The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the Department of Energy is the principal
body at the federal level which determines whether a proposed LNG project is in the
public interest and should be allowed. In making its judgment it considers prim-
arily the following attributes: risk factors (Xl, X 2 , and X3 ), environmental guide-
lines as reflected in air quality (X~) and use of land (X s ), and the expected LNG
price (X 7 ).
At the state level, the California Coastal Commission (CCC) was created in
1976, and has the responsibility for the protection of the California coastline.
Its primary concerns with respect to LNG siting are with the use of land (X s ) and
the associated risks (X 2 and X3 ) from building a terminal at a specific site. The
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) is the principal state body involved
in power plant issues and is primarily concerned with the rate-setting process.
Hence, it focused on the provision of energy to California residents and the need
for gas (Xl) and the proposed price of the product (X 7 ). In addition, it has re-
sponsibility for evaluating the impact that a proposed facility would have on the
environment and safety. The California state legislature is ultimately responsible
for the outcomes of any siting process. It determines which state and local
agencies have final authority to rule on the feasibility of a proposed site. In
addition, it can set standards to constrain any siting process. Hence the concerns
of the legislators range over economic, environmental and safety attributes, as
shown in Table 1.
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At the local level, the city councils evaluate the benefits of a proposed
terminal in t ..eir jurisdiction in terms of the tax, business revenues, and jobs
(Xs) it p~~mises to provide. The councils try to balance this positive feature
with the impact that the facility would have on land use (X s ) and risk to the pop-
ulation (X z ). Finally, the public interest groups, represented by the Sierra Club
and local citizens' groups, are primarily concerned with environmental and safety
issues.
3.2. The Decision Process
The siting process in California (which is not yet terminated) can be charac-
terized by four rounds of discussions as shown in Table 2, which provides a summary
of how the problem was defined, the initiating event, and how the discussions were
concluded. The remainder of this subsection discusses in more detail the decision
process within each of the rounds. The main elements of round~ A, B, C, and Dare
described in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively.
Table 2. Summary of rounds in California LNG siting case.
ROUND A DATE
i.e., Does
if any, of
Problem
formulation;
Initiating
event:
Conclusion:
ROUND B
Should the proposed sites be approved?
California need LNG, and if so, which,
the proposed sites is appropriate?
Applicant files for approval of three sites. September 1974
(34 months)
Applicant perceives that no site is approvable with-
out long delay July 1977
Problem
formulation:
Initiating
event:
Conclusion:
ROUND C
How should need for LNG be determined? If need is
established, how should an LNG facility be sited?
Applicant and others put pressure on state legisla-
ture to facilitate LNG siting.
New siting process set up that essentially assumes
a need for LNG, and is designed to accelerate LNG
terminal siting.
July 1977
(2 months)
september 1977
Problem Which site should be approved?
formulation:
Initiating
event:
Conclusion:
ROUND D
Problem
formulation:
Initiating
event:
Conclusion:
Applicant files for approval of Point Conception
site.
Site approved conditional on consideration of
additional seismic risk data.
Is Point Conception seismically safe?
Regulatory agencies set up procedures to consider
additional seismic risk data.
(Round still in progress) .
October 1977
(10 months)
July 1978
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Round A began in September 1974, when the applicant filed for approval of
three sites on the California Coast--Point Conception, Oxnard, and Los Angeles--
to receive gas from Indonesia. The application raised two central questions which
defined the problem addressed in Round A: Does California need LNG, and if so,
which, if any, of the proposed sites is appropriate?
The agenda for discussion was more narrowly defined at this stage. The wheels
of the process were set into motion, not by a broadly based energy policy question
initiated in Washington, but by a proposal from industry for three preselected
sites. The importance of this process--where the initiative was taken first by
industry--in preselecting the agenda for debate cannot be overemphasized. The in-
i tiating proposal framed the problem as "Should the proposed LNG sites be approved?"
and not "Should California have an LNG terminal in view of the alternatives, costs,
risks, etc?" Setting the agenda in this manner did not preclude the "need" ques-
tion from entering the debate, but it did ensure that the question was only con-
sidered in the context of a siting application.
Table 3 also specifies the relevant interested parties who were involved in
the interaction phase of round A. Those parties which had formal decision power
are marked with an asterisk. There were four primary attributes which were uti-
lized in the ensuing debate among the parties. The need for LNG or the risk of an
interruption in the supply of natural gas (Xl) supported the locating of a terminal
in at least one of the three proposed sites. While environmental land use consid-
erations (Xs) suggested a non-remote site (Los Angeles and Oxnard), the risks to
the population (X2) argued for siting the terminal in a remote area (Point Concep-
tion). Finally, concerns about earthquake risk brought about opposition to the
Los Angeles site, which was found to be crossed by a significant fault.
Table 3. Elements of round A.
Problem
formulation:
Initiating
event:
Should the proposed sites be approved? i.e., Does California need
LNG, and, if so, which, if any, of the proposed sites is appropri-
ate?
Applicant files for approval of three sites.
Alternatives;
Interaction:
Point Conception:
Oxnard:
Los Angeles:
Any combination of:
Involved parties
Applicant
Al
A2
A3
AI, A 2 , A 3
Attributes used as arquments
FERC* P2
CCc* P3
City councils* P6
Sierra Club P7
Local citizens Ps
Xs
Xs
Xs
Key decisions;
Conclusion;
(1) CCC concerns over population risk implies that Al is preferred
over the other two sites.
(2) FERC would not approve A 2 because the seismic risk is greater
than a prescribed acceptable level.
Applicant perceives a stalemate, i.e., that no site is approvable
without long delay.
*Interested party with responsibility for decision(s).
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The interaction phase of round A (see Table 2) indicates the attributes used
as arguments by each of the major involved parties. It is important to distinguish
this listing of attributes from that in Table 1. While Table 1 specifies which at-
tributes are of primary concern to each party, Table 3 specifies which attributes
were used as arguments by each party. Thus while the applicant is concerned with
both profit considerations and supply interruption risk, its arguments in support
of each site stressed supply interruption risk.
Two key decisions were made during round A. First, the CCC, concerned about
the catastrophic potential of LNG, implied that they were likely to favor Point
Conception over the non-remote sites due to concerns over population risk. Spec-
ifically, the CCC advised Western to pursue at least one site in a remote area
since they would deny approval to any non-remote site which was not considered safe.
Second, the FERC indicated disapproval of the Port of Los Angeles as an acceptable
site because a recently discovered earthquake fault increased the seismic risk
above a prescribed acceptable level.
The round was concluded with a possible stalemate, at least as perceived by
industry (Ahern 1980). Los Angeles would not receive federal (FERC) approval,
Oxnard might not receive state (CCC) approval, and Point Conception would face dif-
ficult approval challenges at the county and state (CCC) levels because of its
adverse land-use impacts.
The stalemate of round A formulated the problem for round B. It was clear to
all the parties involved that it was difficult, if not impossible, for the appli-
cant to gain approval for a site under the existing siting procedure in California.
In particular, there were possibilities of vetoing proposals at either the federal,
state, or local level, as evidenced by the respective reactions to the three pro-
posed sites. Rather than trying to operate within the existing constraints of the
process, the interested parties in the process frequently tried to change the rules
of the game (Majone 1979).
Table 4. Elements of round B.
Problem
formulation:
Initiating
event;
Alternatives:
How should need for LNG be determined? If need is established
how should an LNG facility be sited?
Applicant and others put pressure on state legislature to facili-
tate LNG siting.
Consider offshore sites: B l
Consider remote onshore sites: B 2
Consider non-remote onshore sites: B3
One-stop licensing B4
Licensing agency: CPUC = B5 , CCC = BO, CEC = B7 *
Any consistent combination of B l through B7 •
Interaction: Involved parties Attributes used for arguments
Applicant PI Xl
CCC P3 X2 X3
CPUC P4 Xl
State legislature** P5 Xl Xz
Key decisions:
Conclusion:
(1) Initial legislation introduced which included B l , B2 , and B5 •
(2) Final legislation passed which incorporated B l , B4 , and B5 •
Passage of LNG Siting Act of 1977 (S.B.108l) which defined a
custom-tailored siting procedure for LNG. Some features:
CCC nominates and ranks sites in addition to the one applied for
CPUC selects a site from the CCC-ranked set, not necessarily the
top-ranked site.
*CEC = California Energy Commission
**Interested party with responsibility for decision(s).
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This behavior relates to the process described by Braybrooke (1978), where he
points out that the issues are frequently transformed over time. Round B is a good
illustration of this process. The problem was redefined into two new questions:
How should need for LNG be determined? If need is established, how should an LNG
facility be sited? The round was thus initiated when pressure to change the siting
procedure was brought to the state legislature by the utility companies, the busi-
ness community and the labor unions in California. Table 4 depicts the relevant
alternatives which formed the basis for the debate on the elements of proposed
legislation.
The industry and business interests saw the inevitable problem of obtaining
local approval for a project in the national interest, but with costs to the local
community. So the utility companies battled for a bill (S.B.I081) which would vest
the CPUC with one-stop licensing authority, precluding any interference from local
communities. The environmental and local interests, on the other hand, objected
to a one-stop licensing process and favored a bill which required remote siting.
The resulting legislation was a compromise between the environmentalists, who
supported consideration of offshore sites, and those who saw an urgent need for an
LNG facility to assure energy and jobs. The CPUC was chosen over the more conser-
vation minded CCC or the California Energy Commission as the agency with state per-
mit authority, pre-empting local governments. As a bow to the conservationists,
the CCC was given the mandate to choose and to rank possible sites, and to pass
these rankings on to the CPUC. It was agreed that the site would not be offshore,
as some environmentalists wished, nor could it be in a populated area, as the gas
utilities wished. Indeed, an unpopulated area was strictly defined. There could
be no more than an average of 10 people per square mile within one mile of the ter-
minal, and no more than 60 people per square mile within four miles of the terminal.
The passage of the Siting Act of 1977 (S.B.I08l) opened up a new procedure for
finding an acceptable site and led to round C with the following problem formula-
tion: Which site should be approved? The round was initiated by the CCC which,
after considering 82 sites meeting the remote siting constraint, ranked the top
four sites, Camp Pendleton, Rattlesnake Canyon, Point Conception, and Deer Canyon,
in that order, on the basis of seismic, soil, wind and wave conditions, rough cost,
and coastal resource considerations.*
These four alternatives form the background for the interaction among the in-
terested parties in round C, as shown in Table 5. The CCC passed these rankings
on to the CPUC which chose, by process of elimination, Point Conception, on the
grounds that the two higher-ranked sites would involve unacceptable delay and would
cause unacceptable risk to transients (i.e., campers, swimmers, etc.) at the nearby
beaches and public parks. The CPUC, however, could only conditionally approve
Point Conception subject to the utility company's ability to show that earthquake
faults discovered in the area presented an acceptable risk to the terminal.
At the federal level, the FERC staff determined that the risks of both Oxnard
and Point Conception were acceptably low, so that Oxnard should be preferred on
land-use grounds; however, the FERC, choosing to avoid a federal-state confronta-
tion, ruled in favor of Point Conception. After an appeal by the environmental and
local interests, the Washington, DC Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the
FERC on the ground that notall available seismic risk data were considered by the
FERC in its ruling. This decision concluded round C.
Round D is still in progress at this time. As shown in Table 6, the initiat-
ing proposal is determined by the activities in roundCwhich frame the alternatives
as simply whether or not to declare the Point Conception site seismically safe.
Only two parties, the FERC and the CPUC are currently active in the process, and
they are considering only one attribute--the seismic risk at Point Conception. A
final decision will depend upon whether the new studies show this risk to be above
or below some acceptable level.
*Point Conception was included in the candidate set because S.B.I081 required that
the applied~for site be included.
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Table 5. Elements of round C.
Problem
formulation:
Initiating
event:
Alternatives:
Which site should be approved?
Applicant files for approval of Point Conception (the only site
of the original three meeting the remote siting constraint of
S.B.I081) .
(Sites nominated by CCC plus applied-for site)
Camp Pendleton: C l
Rattlesnake Canyon: CZ
Point Conception: C3
Deer Canyon: C4
Interaction: Involved parties Attributes used for arguments
Applicant PI Xl
FERC* Pz Xl Xs
CCC P3 X3
CPUC* P4 XI Xz
Sierra Club P7 X3 Xs
Local citizens Pe Xs
Key decisions:
Conclusion:
(5) The CCC has the following preference: C l > C2 > C3 > C4
(6) The CPUC approval conditional on whether or not the seismic
risk is acceptable.
(7) The FERC consider C3 acceptable.
(8) Court requires FERC to consider additional data to determine
whether or not seismic risk at C3 is acceptable.
FERC and CPUC to consider additional seismic data.
*Interested party with responsibility for decision(s).
Table 6. Elements of round D.
Problem
formulation:
Initiating
event:
Alternatives:
Interaction:
Is Point Conception seismically safe?
FERC and CPUC set up procedures to consider additional seismic
risk data
Declare Point Conception safe: D l
Declare Point Conception not safe: D2
Currently active parties Attribute considered
FERC
CPUC*
Key decisions: None yet. Future hearings are to determine whether or not
seismic risk is acceptable for Point Conception.
*Interested party with responsibility for decision(s).
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4. INTERPRETATION OF THE MAMP MODEL: THE ROLE OF RISK ANALYSIS
A great deal of attention has been paid recently to the topic of technological
risk assessment for problems such as the siting of facilities (see Conrad 1980,
Schwing and Albers 1980). It is of interest to examine, in the context of the MAMP
framework, the role that risk assessments have played in the California LNG case.
The sequential nature of the decision procedures, as clearly demonstrated by
the increasing concreteness of the problem formulations through the four rounds of
discussions in California, limits the possibilities for comprehensive analyses.
The risk studies were carried out, not as an input to a broad energy analysis in
California, but to support a more narrowly defined problem (Should site x or site
y be approved?). Since round A in California was not defined in these narrow terms
(the question of whether the terminal was needed was yet to be resolved), the anal-
yses were ill-suited to address fully the issues on the table. In some sense, then,
analyses designed to address the question of safety were prematurely introduced
into a process that had not resolved higher-order questions of energy policy.
Though they served to focus the debate on the safety question, they could not offer
(nor were they intended to offer) a panacea for the resolution of the siting ques-
tion.*
During the course of the LNG debate in California, six studies assessing the
safety risks of the proposed terminals were conducted by the utility and local,
state, and federal government agencies (for a critical review of these studies, see
Mandl and Lathrop 1981). Several studies are of particular interest. The appli-
cant commissioned a consulting firm, Science Applications Inc. (SAl), to do a study
and the PERC produced its own risk assessment. Both reports showed very low num-
bers on various probabilistic measures of risk (expected fatalities per year and
individual probability of fatality per year). These numbers were interpreted to
mean that the risk was acceptable. A risk assessment produced by the consulting
firm Socio-Economic Systems (SES) for the Oxnard municipal government suggested
similarly low probabilistic measures of risk (though expected fatalities were 380
times higher than the applicant's assessment), but they interpreted the figures as
unacceptably high.
One explanation for these different interpretations lies in the format for
presenting the results. The SAl study described maximum credible accidents (MCAs)
without accompanying probabilities. Opposition groups interpreted these results
as evidence that the terminal was not acceptably safe. The municipal government
originally in favor of the site, began to waver in its support, probably influenced
by the apparent uncertainty of the risk and the strength of the opposition groups
(Ahern 1980). In sum, the risk assessments did not provide a single, coherent
assessment of acceptability of the risk of an LNG terminal; their results were sub-
ject to interpretation depending on party positions (Lathrop 1980). In fact, the
risk assessments were used both to promote and to oppose terminal applications.
In reviewing the technical differences between the assessments leading to
these conclusions, Lathrop and Linnerooth (1982) have shown that there are many de-
grees of freedom left to engineering and analytic judgment, including how to charac-
terize risk, what formats to use for presentation, what gaps to fill with assump-
tions, which of several conflicting models to use, how to portray the degree of
confidence in the results, and what contingencies to leave out of the analysis.
This analytic freedom helps explain the differences between the above three
Oxnard risk assessments. It can push the risk measurement in any direction. Very
conservative assumptions can drive it up; omissions of inconvenient aspects such as
terrorism can drive it down. Clear presentations of expert disagreements can de-
crease the confidence in the results; and so on. The final result may have as much
to do with the predilections of the analyst as with the physical characteristics
of the site or technology.
*It is not surprising, then, that round A ended in a stalemate. The second round,
where the state legislature took center stage, narrowed the problem (by resolving
the question whether California needed a site) to one more receptive to technical
risk studies.
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This finding takes on special significance when viewed in the context of the
policy process. The MAMP model has illustrated that the risk assessments, though
intended to advise a client on the safety of the proposed terminal, were typically
used to support a party argument. For this reason, clear incentives exist for the
analysts to present their results as persuasively as possible, which explains the
tendency on their part to omit discussions on the uncertainty of their results and
to choose presentation formats that present their case as strongly as possible.
5. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, I have attempted to give a flavor of the work of the Risk Group
by describing the decision process in the USA in the context of the MAMP framework.
The MAMP framework should be viewed as a starting point for undertaking research
which can improve the political process with respect to problems such as the siting
of facilities. We have seen that formal risk analyses, especially risk assessments,
are subjective exercises undertaken to support a specific party's arguments. Fur-
thermore, the importance of these analyses will depend on the nature of the sequen-
tial decision process, the relevant interested parties which interact, and the type
of conflicts emerging.
Given these descriptive observations, several research areas appear to be
promising avenues for the future. In a recent paper Nelkin and Polak (1979) indi-
cate the inadequacy of existing institutions to deal with problems of conflicting
evidence and polarized expert opinion with respect to questions such as risk assess-
ments. As a way of dealing with this problem, they advocate the need to establish
rules of evidence as a basis for making better decisions. Lathrop and Linnerooth
(1982) provide a suggested set of guidelines with respect to establishing rules of
evidence. In particular, they stress the importance of defining the risk being
assessed, being clear on assumptions and error bounds as well as indicating the
conditional nature of specific analyses which are undertaken.
There is a need for more field research which attempts to apply these criteria
or others to a specific set of problems. One of the difficulties which currently
exists is the lack of an institutional mechanism for evaluating the different risk
assessments produced by different parties. Ackerman et al. (1974) point out that
the traditional approaches such as legal responses, agency hearings and judicial
reviews have inherent limitations with respect to evaluating these conflicting as-
sessments. The problem is especially difficult for the siting of new technologies
where there are no objective measures of risk. Private consulting firms frequently
undertake these analyses but have a built-in bias in telling the contracting party
what they want to hear.
With respect to the more direct consequences of siting & new facility O'Hare
(1977) has proposed a compensation system to deal with opposition to proposed
sites from certain interested parties. For example, suppose residents of a commun-
ity are concerned with suffering losses in property values as well as safety and
environmental risks if the project is sited near them. O'Hare proposes that each
community determines a minimum level of per capita compensation for it to be wil-
ling to make a legal commitment to having the project in its backyard if the com-
pensation is paid.
From the above suggested topics it should be clear that there is considerable
research on risk which needs to be undertaken of a prescriptive nature. The pur-
pose of our cross-country comparisons of LEG siting decisions is to provide data
on how the political process appears to work in practice and the differences across
countries. The MAMP framework described in this paper has been found to be a use-
ful framework for making comparisons among countries. The challenge for the future
is to capitalize on our understanding of process to try and improve political
decision making.
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Science and Policy:
Their Separation and Integration in Risk Analysis
Howard Raiffa
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, USA, and
Chairman, Committee on Risk and Decision Making (CORADM)
The Committee on Risk and Decision Making (CORADM) was commissioned by the
Division of Technology Assessment and Risk Analysis (TARA) of the US National Sci-
ence Foundation to give advice on their research program in risk analysis. CORADM
is an ad hoc committee in the Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences (ABASS)
of NAS/NRC, and our report will be submitted to ABASS and TARA at the end of 1980.
The Committee members felt that if we are to report on research priorities for
TARA we should first step back and reflect on how our society generates and copes
with risk. Thus we have decided to prepare an extensive prologue to the report on
research suggestions for TARA, and I should now like to discuss the stage reached
in our deliberations on that prologue.
CORADM is primarily concerned with the adverse effects of risks to health,
safety, and the environment. The following list illustrates a set of problems,
which is far from exhaustive, that motivates our concerns:
Three Mile Island
Chemical waste
Oral contraceptives
Occupational exposure to benzene, asbestos, vinyl chloride, cotton dust,
coke-oven emissions
Alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking
Accidental or intentional nuclear war
C02 and atmospheric warming
Extinction of plant and animal species
Depletion of the ozone layer
Health effects of dietary factors
Acid rain
New passive restraint standard
Fluoridation
DC-lOs
Air pollution (sulfates and small particulates)
Decline of new prescription drugs
Natural hazards (earthquakes, floods, etc.)
Low-level radiation
Nuclear high-level wastes
I will now outline what our committee currently--and I stress currently be-
cause we are still in a state of flux--is thinking about in terms of a prologue or
a general report. After describing the structure and purpose of CORADM, the report
will outline the macro-perspectives of risk by looking at the rising tide of public
concern and document this by means of opinion polls, legislative and agency activ-
ity, public and private sector investments, media publicity, and increased litiga-
tion. Using time series of different indices such as infant mortality, premature
death (i.e., death before 65), longevity, accidents, disabilities, sick days, birth
*This paper is an edited transcript of the talk given at the sixth Symposium on
Statistics and the Environment, October 1980.
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defects, etc., the report will attempt to take stock of how our society is faring
at the present time. These studies will be concerned not only with aggregate
values, but also with the smaller-scale differences between various segments of our
society. For example, there are still inequalities between blacks and whites, and
between the US and other countries, and these represent potentials for improvement.
We will try to point out some of our greatest worries and potential problem
spots, but, as is to be expected, committee members have some disagreements on this
topic. Next we try to rationalize why public concern about risk has increased.
In the second main section of the report we discuss processes for managing and
coping with risks. The word management often evokes different responses, so per-
haps the term "risk management" should be defined more clearly. "Risk" is used dif-
ferently in various disciplines such as in finance, economics, insurance, decision
theory, engineering, etc. Risk management in its broadest sense involves the iden-
tification, estimation, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and control of risk,
including preventive, reactive ad hoc, and unorganized processes to deal with them.
Institutions for this purpose include courts, legislatures, administrative agencies,
business enterprises, labor unions, research institutions, citizen groups, and edu-
cational institutions, as well as individuals. Risk analysis itself can be sub-
divided into the assessment of uncertainties; and evaluation, i.e., policy analysis
(other than assessment) for risk management.
Before discussing ways of coping with risks we look at ways in which they are
generated in our society; i.e., self-imposed risks, co-generated risks, risks aris-
ing from productive activities or business and government, natural hazards, and
risks that arise from the very institutional framework of our society. In this
section we also discuss the slippery distinction between voluntary and involuntary
risks.
Policy instruments for coping with risks can include, for example, information,
incentives/disincentives, prohibitions, liability, transfer rights to generate risks,
mediation and arbitration, insurance policies, regulation, etc. Most of these are
self-explanatory, except perhaps for mediation and arbitration: for example, it is
possible that in certain circumstances labor unions and businesses could jointly
agree on means to control risks and then to obtain a formal stamp of approval on
these contracts by government.
We next look at the various federal agencies that have to cope with risk and
the different statutes that govern them. Statutes can be classified according to
those that look at risks only (e.g., the Delaney Clause); those that try to reduce
risks up to technological feasibility; and those that attempt to balance adverse
consequences with benefits broadly interpreted. In practice, these statutes are
not administered literally so that the distinctions are even more blurred than they
first appear.
We look at what is happening in the courts, their levels of activity and dif-
ferent philosophical approaches, and how some commentators view their role in risk
management. In addition to a discussion of public perceptions of risk and how they
are formed, we want to discuss the problematic issues such as (i) what roles do
(and should) perceptions play, and (ii) the thin line between education and indoc-
trination.
The most extensive part of our report concerns the roles of risk analysis,
which may be summarized as follows:
Should keep in mind complex, socio-economic-political interactive processes
for coping with risk
Most decisions based on common sense "ordinary" knowledge, with little
formal analysis
Analysis can help with incremental choices
Analyses are often multi-purpose for multiple audiences
Analysis cannot eliminate judgments about uncertainties and values
Analysis can raise the level of discourse
Analysis can generate creative alternatives
Poor analysis may be worse than none
Analysis should be iterative: it should improve over time
,
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Analysis can be used and misused as a political weapon
Analysis can be used and misused in the adversarial process
Need for peer review
Need for more and better analysts
Analysis can be sUbdivided into two categories, which can be called "in the
large", and "in the small". An example of the former could be the case of an in-
depth analysis done for an administrator of an agency who must decide (no action
is a decision~) on what to do about a potentially troublesome chemical. It does
not have to be an administrator or a chemical; the idea is that there is a high-
level, (relatively) unitary decision maker who has a reasonably well defined prob-
lem. Possible solution settings are:
(a) Generation of policy alternatives (a checklist of things to think about)
(b) Consequences (impacts, costs, benefits)
Health effects: how many? how much? who are they? how voluntary? how
identifiable? etc.
Non-health effects: to nature; to economic and business activity; to
sociopolitical activity; to international relations
Feedbacks of non-health effects on health effects
(c) Uncertainty analysis: assessment of uncertainties; natural science,
behavioral science
Being precise about degree of imprecision
Volatility
Disagreements
(d) Analysis for the dynamic decision process
Factors involved in the generation of policy alternatives include
Analysis can help generate creative alternatives
Sequential choices with intervening information
DM can sometimes collect information (e.g., experimentation)
Interdependence of problems (precedents)
Irreversibilities (physical, political, managerial--strict and partial)
Decisions about locus of action to be taken (e.g., level of government,
decentralization through the market, etc.)
Institutional decision network (who has to decide what and when? Who
has to be convinced, pressured, influenced, etc.)
The consequences of risk analysis can be summarized as follows:
Health effects:
1. How many people are (will be) affected?
(a) in the entire population
(b) in sensitive groups
2. How much are they affected?
(a) mortality
(b) morbidity
(c) severe pain and suffering
(d) psychological discomfort
(e) anxiety
3. Who are they?
(a) age distribution
(b) income distribution
(c) race/ethnic group
(d) sex
(e) occupation
(f) geographical location
(g) quality of life/health status
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4. When will they be affected?
(a) now
(b) with some time lag
(c) future generations
5. How voluntary/involuntary is the risk?
6. How "catastrophic" is the risk? (clustering of fatalities over time and
space)
7. How "identifiable" are the victims (ex ante and ex post) and how "accountable"
will the decision maker be?
Non-health effects:
1. Aesthetics
2. Effects on nature
3. Economic costs (and to whom)
4. Effects on economic growth, productivity, and innovation
5. Effects on business competition
6. Effects on other countries
7. Effects on distribution of incomes
8. Effects on public satisfaction with government
Secondary, tertiary, and general equilibrium considerations; net health effects:
feedback fron non-health effects on health (e.g., 3, 4, 5, 7).
Next we turn to uncertainty analysis, and this will be given more detailed at-
tention below. There next follows a category of activities which can be listed
under the heading "the dynamic decision process".
Analysis for choice
Peer review of analysis
Adversarial inputs
Commitment to first steps
Public announcements
Adversarial documents
Influencing and persuading others
Educating others
Monitoring
Evaluating
Experimenting
Accumulating information
Guiding
Re-analyzing
Commitments to second steps
Legal analysis
Another factor in the assessment of uncertainty, which we call "risk assess-
ment" can be singled out for further discussion, as follows:
Why decompose?
Linkages between assessment and evaluation
Effective reporting of uncertainties (false precision or imprecision)
Special cases of assessments:
rare catastrophic events
carcinogenicity
large systems (e.g., energy policy)
Need for judgmental synthesis in assessment of uncertainties:
separation of facts and judgments about uncertainties
separation of judgments about uncertainties and values
Criteria for effective reporting
j
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Prudence in reporting versus prudence in action
Assessments by groups:
spectrum of opinion
why experts disagree; structuring
vulnerability to external attack
Need for independent, credible assessment groups
Protection of scientific institutions; right to refuse to report
What to do if decomposition is uncomfortable
Figure 1 illustrates the decomposition of risk assessment and evaluation. Our re-
port will treat at length the difficulties involved in this decomposition of tasks,
and its advantages; if tasks are to be decomposed they still have to be linked and
there is usually a lot of dysfunctional slippage in the linkages.
The uncertainties to be assessed can be roughly divided into two categories:
those that fall within the natural science domain, and those in the behavioral or
managerial science domain. Let us now turn to natural science uncertainties. Is
a given chemical carcinogenic, for example? If so, what is its severity? What
about exposures? What about health effects?
We next consider the effective reporting of uncertainties and the use of quan-
titative probabilistic reporting. We worry a lot about the false precision that
comes with the use of numbers, and what to do about it, as well as the fal~e sense
of imprecision that comes with the use of qualitative reporting, such as with the
use of such semi-quantitative terms as rarely, not unthinkable, beyond a shadow of
doubt, not so often, sometimes, the preponderance of evidence shows, with some ex-
ceptions, etc. However, there are some advantages of probabilistic reports, as
follows:
other probabilities
losses and utilities--meshes with other
misinterpreted
be combined with
be combined with
Less likely to be
Probabilities can
Probabilities can
factors
Probabilities can be compared (comparative risks)
Probability numbers are precise enough to be attacked
After discussing some special assessment problems we arrive at the conclusion
that assessment is complex; only rarely do scientific facts speak for themselves.
These disparate facts, theories, empirical findings, etc., have to be synthesized
and made comprehensible for use in the policy making process (see Figure 2). This
synthesis is required because:
Peer review
............ /. . Public
Risk assessments Risk evaluation
-'-----1~: ---:-+ Policy
Natural science
Policy maker
Behavioral science
(descriptive, predictive)
11.....--_--+.
(prescriptive, normative)
Risk
analysis
Figure 1. The decomposition of risk assessment and risk evaluation.
32
r-------l
I
Theory ------~~I SYNTHESIS i
Controlled I I
experiments I I
I (need for
(a) In vitro -----..,~~I value-free :
(b) Animal ~I judgments I
(c) Human .1 by qualified I
EPIDEMIOLOGY ~I experts) I
I I
IL -1
RISK ASSESSMENT (natural sciences)
" REQUESTS
"
". "
."
Assessments to-----l.~ policy process
----I•• Public
•~ .... ....
....
......
lit. Peer review
Figure 2. Synthesis of information for use in the policy making process.
Information comes from several sources, often conflicting, often messy:
Information is often very indirectly relevant;
Recitation of the set of indisputable facts may not be enough; may be
useless to a nonexpert policy maker;
Judgments by experts may be indispensable for synthesis; but separation
of fact and judgment, including value-free judgment, should be clearly
demarcated.
The criteria for good reporting can be summarized as follows:
Inclusive--should synthesize relevant information (theory, experimental
data, epidemiological data, etc.)
Free from the values of policy values--report should not prejudge policy
conclusions; values appropriate to policy evaluation should not influ-
ence assessments of uncertainties
Comprehensive and meaningful to clients--informative and relevant
Useful in the decision process-use of proxy variables
Honesty and prudence
I would now like to dwell on the last criterion: honesty. This sounds nice,
but there is a tension between honesty and prudence that should be clarified (see
Figure 3), using an example from a business setting. A businessman wants to know
how much of a given item he should stock. He does not know what the demand for
that item will be~ but he does know that if he stocks too little that will be profit
foregone (a loss of underage); if he stocks too much he will have an excess and
there will be profit foregone (a loss of overage). He asks his expert(s) to assess
a probability distribution of demand, and then knowing this, and the comparative
per unit losses of overage and underage, he can balance those expected losses and
arrive at a decision. In the case where the underages are more serious than over-
ages it is prudent to stock a quantity in the right tail of the assessed distribu-
tion. If the assessors of the uncertain demand purposely translate their assessed
distribution to the right in the name of prudence, because they feel that it is
more serious to underestimate than to overestimate, and if the businessman also
compensates, then they may be overcompensating and the resulting action may be im-
prudent.
Probabilistic reports should not prejudice policy issues and purposely report
with a prudent bias. Cascading prudent reports could result in imprudent actions,
and there is a danger of double-counting competing risks. Such reporting should be
honest, and not attempt to second-guess policy choices. Probabilistic reports
about diverse consequences to health, for example, are very often slanted to be
I
I
I
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loss of
overage
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::::onditional
loss of
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Figure 3. Prudence in reporting: an illustrative example. Optimal stock level
is at a high fractile; the probabilistic assessment should not be distorted.
conservative. I believe that it is better to report honestly, and that prudence
should, more appropriately, be accounted for in the evaluation process, rather than
in the assessment process.
We will now look at assessments by groups. It is no secret that experts dis-
agree; there are reputable scientists who hold fringe opinions at both ends of the
spectrum--sometimes they are just plain wrong, and occasionally they are right. It
is important that these fringe opinions are heard, but they should not be over-
weighted just because they are different. The media seek to inform and to interest
their readers, so there is always a tendency for them to over-represent the tails
of the distributions. Theory states that experts should agree, but they often do
not, for the following reasons:
Slippage in vocabulary
Different experiences and difficulties with articulation
Imprecise overlap of information
Different paradigms
Cognitive biases (anchoring, etc.)
Elicitation biases
Effect of role
Personal interactions and reinforcements
Conscious biases:
to help mankind to compensate for adversarial purposes
to help oneself money, not to curry disfavor of peers, colleagues,
friends, children
When experts disagree it is important not to suppress their differences; and these
differences, if they are to be understood and properly reflected in the policy pro-
cess, should be structured. Do the experts agree on what they disagree about? Do
they agree on what further analyses (modeling, data collection, etc.) would be de-
sirable to bring their views into closer harmony? Attention should be given to
meaningful ways to report disagreements; an eye should be kept on ways users of re-
ports react, and should react, to such reports.
Many assessments (such as of adverse effects to health and the environment)
are clear-cut and no elaborate quantitative analyses are required because the facts
speak for themselves. When we concentrate discussions on those assessments that
present difficulties, we should not lose sight of the fact that many are routine
and that a little analysis without controversial judgments may go a long way. Some
given chemical may be clearly carcinogenic, sUbstitute chemicals may exist, and the
given chemical may not yet be on the market. That's easy. Another easy case is
where the chemical is given a clean bill of health.
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While the bulk of cases studied may be routine, there are plenty of important
ambiguous cases where the facts (about uncertainties) do not speak for themselves.
Facts, theories, ambiguous experimental findings, uncontrolled epidemiological
findings, etc., all must be synthesized by experts for policy analysis and decision
by nonexperts. Experts, when they look at a given set of facts, might disagree and
might organize their deliberations about such disagreements, but suppose that after
considerable internal discussion a risk assessment group comes to a consensus on a
synthesis of facts and judgments about uncertainties, and then reports this consen-
sus to a risk evaluation group. This risk assessment will also be made public and
reviewed by other experts, some of whom will not like the policy implications of
the report. Those external reviewers may attack the conclusions and try to find
vulnerable spots in the report; and what is more vulnerable than an only partially
supported judgment? It may be the case that some members of the risk assessment
group have consciously (and therefore inappropriately) biased their inputs, while
others might have fallen prey to subtle subconscious biases. Such weaknesses
should rightfully be adversely criticized.
External reviewers with strong policy viewpoints will often attack risk assess-
ments when the implications are not congenial to their preferred policies. To be
effective, those attacks should be concentrated on potential weaknesses of the syn-
thesis process. Even if a member of the risk assessment group has meticulously
tried to subdue his or her potential subconscious biases, this might not actually
be perceived as being the case by an outsider; and even if it is perceived to be
the case, the adversarial outsider might win debating points by casting suspicion
on the integrity of the insider.
It is not easy for a risk assessment group, in a highly charged controversial
domain, to fulfil its mission responsibly even if its assessments are to be
privileged documents only for the eyes of the policy maker and his discreet staff.
But when these assessments have to withstand the barbs of those with strong policy
convictions the task becomes doubly difficult. It takes courage and an impeccably
neutral committee member to say what he or she actually believes in a controversial
case because that member henceforth will be brande& as an exponent of a cause.
There is a tendency for individuals, who jealously want to be perceived as neutral,
to soften their true opinions and to bend over backwards to be fair to the other
side. Thus another bias enters the scene.
There are lots of idealistic, dedicated scientists who are motivated to seek
the "scientific truth", wherever that may lead them, and who are more than willing
to engage in academic interchanges to seek out collective wisdom. They may realize
that they are prey to subconscious behavioral biases and they might be consciously
eager to monitor their actions to avoid egregious conflicts of interest. It is im-
portant to encourage scientific groups to foster a tradition of openness and honesty
in reporting. Such groups would, if created, deserve acclaim, and financial support
should be properly laundered in ways to bring a minimum of external pressure. I am
not recommending anything as grandiose as the scientific court of respected elders,
but hope that many panels and committees can be founded in universities, in consult-
ing firms, in industry, in scientific academies, and in government agencies that
take pride in their scientific integrity and work hard to fulfil their responsibil-
ities. Something is wrong when the membership of prestigious committees, created
to report on some natural science uncertainties and not on policy issues, must be
structured to yield a balanced portfolio of policy viewpoints rather than a balanced
portfolio of scientific and methodological skills.
The scientific community must understand the dilemma we are in. It is impera-
tive both for the progress of science and for better decision making that scientific
reports be openly available and subject to peer review. But this puts a burden on
assessment groups that must mold together science and judgment. Science cannot
simply stand aloof from all the policy needs of our society, but when it gets in-
volved it should expect to be attacked and should carefully prepare its defenses.
There is some safety when a multiplicity of scientific institutions engage in these
controversial activities and more groups within existing institutions should be cre-
ated and suitably financed to undertake such studies. Occasionally it may be de-
sirable for some such group simply to say that it is not ready to give its opinions
on some controversial topics.
35
Even the Supreme Court prefers not to consider some legal issues because they
are currently too divisive, just as the members of a risk assessment group may do.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to delve into some issues is justified by its
grander role in society. Why should it jeopardize its mission by getting trapped
into a morass of emotional conflicts when society is not ready for reasoned argu-
ments. A similar argument can be made on behalf of science. When the scientific
facts do not speak for themselves, when judgments are suspect, or when advocates
are ready to pounce on all sides of an issue, then occasionally scientists and
methodological experts should say that they are simply not ready to make pronounce-
ments in this field under the auspices of such and such an institution. Scientists
are individuals, of course, have the right, and some would say the obligation, to
speak out. However, here I am making a distinction between scientists as individ-
uals, and scientists who speak on behalf of scientific institutions.
This leads to a final point: what should be done if the decomposition of risk
assessment from risk evaluation cannot be comfortably achieved? Analysis has to
be much less formal and presumably the principal decision maker will need to get
integrative advice that mixes facts, judgments about uncertainties, and opinions
about values.
We now come to risk analysis "in the small", which can be summarized as fol-
lows:
Analysis does not have to be "grandiose"
Analysis for individual (small) actors (within a complex system) can be
simple
Sometimes a little analysis can go a long way
Analysis may be too difficult and not worth doing
General-purpose analyses can help many users (one reason why assessments
of uncertainties should be isolated)
Analysts should understand the way society copes with risk and be pre-
pared to help "in the small" as well as "in the large"
Analysis may not only help to "solve" problems, but also to devise new
ways of thinking about old problems, and to generate new ones
The important message here is that analysis, if it is tailor-made for specific in-
dividual purposes, need not be horrendously intricate. Often a little analysis
can go a long way, because, for example, a given actor may be severely constrained
in his choices; many attributes of concern that one can think of a priori may yield
roughly equivalent outcomes; and only one or two uncertainties may be of prime im-
portance.
Next we come to value controversies, and here, as elsewhere, our intention is
to identify some key problems rather than to solve them. The following list is far
from complete.
Value controversies
Trade-offs of incommensurables:
Expenditures for life saving
Allocations with fixed budgets
Size of budget
Shadow prices of life saving by agencies
should shadow prices be uniform?
American lives versus lives of others (foreign aid)
Trade-offs within domain of health
Mortality/morbidity/psychological well being
Lives, ELYs, QUALYs, EDRAs
Temporal trade-offs
Discounting (of lives?), intergenerational trade-offs; lives of "others"
today versus lives of Americans in the far future
Efficiency equity
Project-by-project equity, cyclical equity, income redistribution
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Identifiability and accountability: probabilistic identifiability,
ex ante and ex post
Protection of most sensitive groups with self-imposed sensitivities (e.g.,
air pollution and the heavy smoker, people living in the flood plains, etc.)
Clustering of deaths over space and time (e.g., 500 deaths at once, versus
600 isolated deaths)
Paternalism: arguments for and against
Libertarian views on imposed risks
"Manu versus "nature"
Rights of the fetus
We start off with the popular controversy: dollars or lives. It is interest-
ing to estimate the marginal cost of life-saving activities in the various federal
agencies. The values range from tens of thousands to tens of millions of dollars
per life saved. Most commentators who are bothered by the idea of placing a dollar
value on anyone's life will nevertheless feel it important to examine how a given
budget would be efficiently spent on saving lives. I have parenthetically included
in the above list a remark about saving foreign versus US lives because we have the
policy option of doing something dramatic to save foreign lives (e.g., those starv-
ing in the Sahel).
But we also have problems of trade-offs within the domain of health; such as
between mortality, morbidity, and states of psychological well being. Instead of
counting only numbers of lives saved, we might want to look at expected life years
(ELYs) or quality-adjusted life years (QUALYs) saved. Various mortality states
might be commensurate in terms of equivalent days of restricted activity (EDRAs).
How these trade-offs are, and should be, made involves controversial value judg-
ments. The remaining value controversies can also not be ignored in important
policy settings.
The final sections of part III of the CORADM report (Roles of analysis) have
hardly been discussed by the committee. Section 6, entitled "Analysis in the ad-
versarial process" includes one topic that has been repeatedly pointed out to us
by environmentalists, namely, that resources for anlysis are unevenly distributed
across adversarial groups. For instance, business is most highly endowed, and en-
vironmental and public interest groups have little resources. The situation may
not be that unbalanced because a lot of academic researchers are antagonistic to
business, and many are willing to work for a cause. Nevertheless, there is a per-
ceived imbalance, and some environmentalists recommend that government agencies
should support the analytical capabilities of groups that are challenging the "sys-
tem".
For example, Wash 1400 (the Rasmussen Report) was a mammoth multi-million dol-
lar study that was comforting to the nuclear industry. Scientific groups that did
not like its findings attacked it and looked for flaws--and they found many. Should
that study, to be credible, have been undertaken at the outset by two independent
groups? Or should funds have been set aside for external peer reviews that would
not have been designed to be adversarial? I have my own opinions on these ques-
tions, but our committee has not yet debated them. The trouble is that there is
too much debate, and the more we probe, the more we find fine points on which to
disagree.
The prologue of our report to TARA can be outlined as follows--as perceived
today, but not necessarily as of tomorrow. All this comes before our research
recommendations to TARA.
PROLOGUE TO THE REPORT TO TARA
Preface
I Macro-perspectives
Rising tide of concern
Time series of risk indices
Why has public concern about risk increased
II Managing and coping with risk
Generation of risks
Policy instruments for coping
Federal agencies and statutes
Courts
Public perceptions
III Roles of analysis
Preamble
Analysis .' in the large"
Risk assessment of uncertainties
Analysis "in the small"
Value controversies
Analysis in the adversarial process
Funding of analytical efforts
Training
Research Recommendations
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Chapter 2
RISK ASSESSMENT IN A PROBLEM CONTEXT

Comparing Risk Assessments for
Liquefied Energy Gas Terminals - Some Results
Christoph Mandl and John Lathrop
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Purpose, Background and Scope
One of the most challenging problems in decisions concerning the deployment of
novel, large-scale technologies is the assessment of the risk to the surrounding
population. In particular cases, such as nuclear reactors or liquefied energy gas
(LEG) facilities, the political process involved may tend to focus on one particular
form of that risk, i.e., the risk to life from catastrophic accidents. This paper
examines several different assessments of that type of risk with two main goals in
mind:
(i) To present and compare the various procedures of risk assessment as
applied to liquefied energy gas (LEG) terminal siting, and in doing
so to clarify the limits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks.
(ii) To quantify and compare the risks at four LEG terminal sites:
Eemshaven (Netherlands), Mossmorran (UK), Point Conception (USA), and
Wilhelmshaven (West Germany) .
In the last decade a new technology for transporting and storing natural gas
has become increasingly important for the overall energy supply of industrialized
countries. The central idea of this new technology is to reduce the temperature of
natural gas below -162o C, at which point natural gas becomes a liquid with one six-
hundredth of the volume of the gas. The advantage of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
is that it can be transported and stored efficiently in tanks due to its high energy
per unit volume. Only in liquefied form can natural gas be transported via ships
at reasonable cost.
However, due to the extremely low temperatures of LNG it is necessary to build
special ships, special terminals to transfer LNG to and from the ships, and special
tanks on land to store LNG. Cost considerations have made it necessary to plan and
build LNG vessels and LNG terminals of considerable size; a typical vessel can con-
tain 125 000m 3 LNG. At LNG terminals up to 60 000m 3 LNG is transferred per day and
terminal storage tanks are planned to contain up to 500 000m 3 LNG. It is therefore
not surprising that this high concentration of LNG at the site of a terminal has
created concern that there might be potential negative effects, particularly to the
environment and to the local population.
This paper in fact covers a broader category of terminals than those handling
LNG. One of the terminals examined is to handle liquefied propane and butane. While
LNG is stored at -1630 C at very low pressure over ambient, liquefied propane and
butane are stored at much higher temperatures and pressures, leading to significant-
ly different behaviors during spills. However, all three substances iilvolve essen-
tially the same accident scenarios, though with different parameters and probabil-
ities of detonation. Consequently, propane and butane have many of the same risk
assessment features and problems as LNG. Since all of these substances, liquefied
methane, propane, and butane, are called liquefied energy gases (LEG), the terminals
examined in this study will be referred to as LEG terminals. Although there are
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many aspects involved in assessing the advantages and disadvantages of an LEG ter-
minal at a specific site, the risk to the local population has turned out to be a
crucial question. Because of the lack of historical data on accidents at LEG ter-
minals, the frequency of such accidents as well as their consequences to people
cannot be readily estimated. Therefore, over the past seven years attempts have
been made to quantify the risk to the local population for different planned LEG
terminals, using different techniques and models, with different results.
It is the purpose of this paper to review carefully the risk assessments under-
taken for four LEG terminals in four countries, to discuss their plausibilities,
explain their differences, compare their risk estimates and draw conclusions con-
cerning their usefulness and limitations. Where necessary and appropriate we also
expand some of the risk assessment reports. While this is not the first comparison
of LEG risk assessments (see, e.g., HAZEL-REV; see references for explanation of
acronyms), it is the first that we know of to compare assessments from different
countries.
Because LEG terminal risk assessment is a new technique, there is still some
disagreement among experts as to how to quantify risk, which models to use, what to
include in a risk assessment, and what to exclude. Clearly, no pretense is made
that this report provides complete or final answers concerning comparative risks
or risk assessments. Rather, it describes some initial attempts to address impor-
tant problems in the field of risk assessment.
1.2. Risk, probabilities, and Consequences
Before it is possible to quantify risk, we must define it. It will become
apparent in this section that different people mean different things when they talk
about risk. Therefore our definition (actually a set of definitions) cannot be
descriptive but rather will be prescriptive.
Ideally, if one adopts the axioms of rational choice under uncertainty, the
evaluation of any decision alternative should consider the probability distribution
over the consequences resulting from the alternative, which may be expressed in a
space of several dimensions (see, e.g., LUCE-GEN). Yet the concept of risk singles
out a subset of those dimensions for special analysis. The term is typically ap-
plied to particular uncertain costs, diverting attention from other costs and un-
certain benefits that could be just as important for evaluation. In the case of
LEG importation, for example, several dimensions are of concern for site selection
and facility design. Of those, several involve uncertain costs, such as financial
losses to the applicant if anything goes wrong (delay in application approval, loss
of source contract, ship accident); environmental losses due to accidents or even
routine disruption; fatalities and injuries due to accidents; property losses due
to accidents; and losses to consumers from natural gas supply interruption if any-
thing goes wrong (these could include unemployment and health effects in an extreme
winter). While all of these uncertain costs could be and are referred to as risks,
and all of them could be analyzed by techniques of risk assessment, in fact the
term risk assessment in the context of LEG typically refers only to assessments of
uncertain loss of life due to accidents. That is the scope for all risk assessments
reviewed in this paper.
The best way to develop a definition of risk is to start by quoting some of
the definitions from the risk assessment literature.
SAl-USA: "Risk is the expected number of fatalities per year resulting from
the consequences of an accidental event".
CREM-UK: "Risk is the probability of an injurious or destructive event,
generated by a hazard, over a specified period of time".
BATTE2-0TH: "Group risk is defined as 'the frequency at which certain numbers
of acute fatalities are expected from a single accident'. The risk
to society as a whole is defined as 'the expected total numbers
I
i
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of acute fatalities per year resulting from accidental events
in the system'''.
Surveying the set of risk assessments reviewed in this study, one can identify
two extreme definitions of risk. One extreme, given by the risk definition of
CREM-UK considers probabilities of destructive events only, and does not look at
the consequences these events can have. Such an approach only makes sense for com-
parison or evaluation in the very limited case when all destructive events have
equally valued consequences, and risk is defined as the probability that anyone
of the events will occur in a given time interval. It would be clearly meaningless
to label two facilities equally risky if they had equal probabilities of an acci-
dent, but where an accident in one facility would have much more serious consequen-
ces than an accident in the other facility.
At the other extreme, risk can be, and sometimes is, viewed as the worst pos-
sible event (with the most serious consequences). Again we would argue that com-
paring this kind of risk is not meaningful because it omits the probability of an
event and thus the relevance of such a worst possible event. We thus find that the
definitions of risk described by Keeney et al. (KEEN-OTH) are the best prescriptive
definitions:
(i) risk of multiple fatalities: probability of exceeding specific numbers
of fatalities per year;
(ii) societal risk: total expected fatalities per year;
(iii) group risk: probability of an individual in a specific exposed group
becoming a fatality per year;
(iv) individual risk: probability of an exposed individual becoming a
fatality per year.
Each of these definitions addresses a different aspect of the political perspective
of risk.
Risk of multiple fatalities is typically displayed as a complementary cumula-
tive probability distribution: the probability per year that the number of fatal-
ities will exceed x shown against x. Such a curve, sometimes called a Rasmussen
curve, contains information not available in the individual probabilities: the
effect of correlations between those probabilities. A Rasmussen curve addresses
the sensitivity to catastrophe found in the political perspective of risk. Consider
two facilities that cause equal numbers of expected fatalities per year: in one
facility those are bunched into very rare catastrophes, and in the other they are
spread over common small accidents. The former facility may encounter greater
political opposition due to sensitivity to catastrophe.
Expected fatalities per year is appropriate for particular types of analysis,
such as cost-benefit or risk-benefit analysis, where social preference is assumed
to be linear in terms of number of lives lost.
The third definition (the probability of an individual in a specific group be-
coming a fatality per year) could be used to address the sensitivity toward equity
found in a political perspective of risk. This measure enables one to determine
in some sense how much of the risk is being borne by neighbors, campers, boaters,
etc. This definition also allows separate determinations of occupational and non-
occupational risks, two risks which are often treated quite differently in politi-
cal and social processes.
Risk, according to the fourth definition (the probability of an exposed indi-
vidual becoming a fatality per year), is simply an average over the group risks
measured by the third definition. This measure is somewhat troublesome because it
is dependent on the definition of exposed population. If "exposed" is defined as
having an individual probability of fatality of greater than 10- 12 per year, the
individual risk will be averaged over a region extending not too far from the
facility. If, on the other hand, "exposed" is defined with a cut-off probability
of 10-30 per year, the individual risk will be averaged over a much larger region,
and will be much lower. In spite of this shortcoming, individual risk is a measure
that allows a convenient comparison of the measured risk and more routine risks the
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individual may face (e.g., the risk due to smoking, driving, etc.).
comparisons do not fit into a decision or choice framework, they do
understandable benchmarks for scaling the risk of a facility.
1.3. LEG Terminal Risk Assessment as a Decision Aid
While such
provide readily
Given the orientation of this paper, it is easy to forget that a risk assess-
ment is not an end unto itself, but is in fact only one element of the complex pro-
cess of LEG facility siting and design. More importantly, a risk assessment is
supposed to be a decision aid for one or more of the decisions that must be made
within that process. An understanding of where a risk assessment fits within an
LEG siting and design process is essential to the understanding of the adequacy and
worth of a risk assessment as a decision aid. One aspect of that process is of
particular importance here: risk to life is only one dimension of concern for the
decisions involved. Other dimensions include cost, land use, environmental quality,
air quality benefits of natural gas, and dependence on foreign sources. There are
also other important dimensions involving risk: supply interruption risk due to
shortage, embargo, accident, earthquake, or bad weather preventing berthing.
Given the many decisions involving risk dimensions that must be made, it would
seem that there are several roles for risk assessment in LEG facility siting and
design. Yet the processes studied in our research have narrowed that role down to
a single application: in one dimension, risk to life and limb; at one level, sit-
ing or design (depending on the country). There are several effects of this narrow-
ing. To begin with, it diverts analytical effort and political attention away from
those questions not addressed by risk assessment. For example, supply interruption
risk could be a significant factor.
A second effect of the narrow role given to risk assessment is that the level
at which it is applied affects how it is conducted. When risk assessment is part
of the site selection process, a particular facility design is assumed, and analyti-
cal effort concentrates on such things as shipping traffic and local population
density as site-specific inputs in a calculation of population risk. When risk
assessment is part of the facility design process the site is assumed to be fixed,
and the analysis considers the sizes, arrangements and specifications of components
of the facility. In that case technical variations on the design are considered in
terms of incremental reductions of risk.
There is a third effect of the narrow role assigned to risk assessment. Once
a site is selected, given the political realities of the situation, the question
of the overall acceptability of the risk is more or less settled. If a risk assess-
ment is applied at the design level, it may consider various modifications to re-
duce the risk in the most cost-effective way. However, given its scope and charter,
the assessment is highly unlikely to find that the site cannot be made acceptably
safe with current technology and so should be abandoned. On the other hand, if a
risk assessment is applied at the site selection level, it would at least be feasible
to rule that none of the sites in the current choice set is acceptable.
Risk assessment does not exist in a vacuum. It is a decision aid in a much
larger process. Any understanding of current assessment, and any suggestion for
improvement, requires an understanding of that larger process. As this section has
pointed out, that larger process controls the role and nature of risk assessment
in very basic and important ways, even though the assessments may be carried out
as strictly independent studies.
2. REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT REPORTS
Table 1 gives a comprehensive overview of the most important risk assessment
reports available to us, including not only those prepared for the four sites--
Eemshaven, Mossmorran, Point Conception, and Wilhemshaven--but alsoafew others of
particular interest. Some comments on the row headings of this table might be
helpful.
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(a) Parts of the system considered. Not all reports consider all the main
parts of an LEG terminal, namely the vessel, transfer, and storage tanks.
In particular, for Wilhelmshaven there are two types of report, one deal-
ing only with vessel operation and LEG transfer, and the other dealing
only with the storage tanks.
(b) Concept of risk. As discussed in Section 1.2, there is no unique defini-
tion of risk. Each report should therefore be quite specific on what type
of risk is analyzed.
(c) Estimation of probabilities of events. One crucial part of risk assess-
ment is the estimation of probabilities, unless only the consequences are
considered. It is therefore necessary to see how this problem is solved
in different reports. Two techniques can assist in performing this task
for fixed plants. The event tree is a technique for developing a logical
sequence of events (failures) resulting in unwanted consequences (acci-
dents), and can help to avoid overlooking possible accidents. Having
identified the possible events (failures), the goal of fault tree analysis
is to identify and determine the probability of a "top-level event" (typi-
cally a specific accident) that would be the result of a sequence of basic
events (failures) of the system. However, these techniques are not appro-
priate for estimating probabilities of accidents such as ship collisions.
Two methods for estimating those probabilities are discussed later.
(d) Estimation of consequences of events. It is necessary for the consequen-
ces to be stated in terms a decision maker is concerned with. For this
reason, and because of the definitions of risk typically assumed, most
reports estimate the consequences in terms of the number of fatalities a
certain event could cause.
(e) Estimation of risk. Different estimations are given depending on the
definition of risk employed. In some cases no estimation is given at all.
(f) Final findings. The ideal result of a risk assessment report should be
the quantification of the risk in comparison with risks from other sources
such that the decision-making process can determine whether the risk from
an LEG terminal is high or low compared with other risks. The ideal com-
parison is between risks from alternatives actually faced in the decision-
making process: site A against site B, site A against no site, risk miti-
gation I against risk mitigation II, etc. Such a risk comparison is the
risk assessment result of most direct usefulness to the decision process.
In any case, it should be kept in mind that decisions concerning the gc-
ceptability of the risk from an LEG terminal involve social value trade-
offs and perhaps political considerations that go beyond the mission of
the risk assessment and the legitimate authority of technical risk asses-
sors. It follows that the final finding of a risk assessment should im-
part information to the decision maker for him to use as a basis for his
decision without making that decision for him.
(g) Uncertainties in final findings. Due to the lack of experience with LEG
accidents there remains a substantial amount of uncertainty about the ac-
curacy of the estimations of probabilities and consequences of events.
Different reports handle this problem differently: some ignore uncertain-
ties completely, some give conservative estimations, some perform sensi-
tivity analysis, and some give error bounds on the quantified risk.
(h) Single event with highest ~isk. If mitigating measures to reduce the risk
are undertaken it is interesting to know which event bears the highest
risk, as it is often the case that the highest-risk event offers the most
cost-effective opportunities for mitigation.
When evaluating the reports one should keep in mind that the differences be-
tween the reports that become obvious from Table 1 can at least partially be ex-
plained by the fact that they were prepared and used for different decision proces-
ses and therefore each report was developed in a way suited to the particular
decision process it was to serve.
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3. ASSESSMENT AND COMPARISON OF LEG TERMINAL RISK
In this section the probabilities and consequences of different events (fail-
ures) will be discussed. The procedure follows the line of the reports SAl-USA and
BATTE2-OTH. After giving a technical description of the four LNG terminals the
rest of this section is divided into three distinct parts. First, estimations of
the probabilities of failures are considered, then the estimation of the size of a
vapor cloud and its ignition probability as a result of the failures, and finally
the consequences to the local population. The primary purpose of this section is
to present the results from risk assessment reports in a comparable manner and to
discuss important differences in estimates of probabilities and consequences be-
tween the reports in terms of the underlying assumptions of the models used and
their plausibility.
However, as we have already shown in Section 2.1, not all reports are easily
comparable. Some do not consider all the events discussed, while others do not
quantify either the probabilities or the consequences of events. Therefore, this
section cannot and will not be a complete comparison for all events.
In Table 2 we give a brief description of the planned terminals at Eemshaven,
Mossmorran, Point Conception, and Wilhelmshaven. As can be seen, Mossmorran is a
different type of terminal from the others. Not only is it an export terminal, but
the exported gases are mainly propane and butane, while LNG consists mostly (approx-
imately 90 percent) of methane. As far as one can tell from the available risk
assessment reports, the technical layouts of the different terminals are much the
same. Not only are the LEG vessels similar (except in size) or even the same, but
also the storage tanks and the transfer systems are very much alike.
3.l. Events; Their Probabilities and Resulting Spill Sizes
One of the most difficult questions in risk assessment is the identification
of possible events or failures and the estimation of their frequencies or probabil-
ities. By definition it is almost impossible to obtain enough historioal data to
estimate the probabilities of a low-probability event. Rather, one has to build
models and rely on data from other presumably similar systems. Another important
part of the problem is the identification of events that have never occurred before
that would have serious consequences. This problem was acknowledged in the Lewis
Report (LEWIS-REV), where it was stated that:
"It is conceptually impossible to be complete in a mathematical sense in
the construction of event-trees and fault-trees; what matters is the
approach to completeness and the ability to demonstrate with reasonable
assurance that only small contributions are omitted. This inherent
limitation means that any calculation using this methodology is always
subject to revision and to doubt as to its completeness."
We therefore do not and cannot claim that the events considered here are a complete
set of possible events. However, it can be said that this set of events includes
all events that were thought of in the risk assessment literature, e.g., TNOl-NL,
SAl-USA, ADL2-USA, BATTE2-OTH. The two major failures of concern are vessel acci-
dents and storage tank ruptures, both of which are discussed below.
Philipson (PHIL-GEN) describes two methods typically used to establish esti-
mates of the probabilities of vessel accidents;
(i) Statistical inference. Estimates are computed using historical data,
first for a larger class of ships, such as oil tankers, and then modifying
the estimates to account for the anticipated differences in LEG ships and
their operations at the specific harbor. This is done, for example, by
employing judgment and by assessing the proportion of past accidents that
would not have occurred if various capabilities of the system had been in
place.
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(ii) Kinemat~c modeting. In SAl-USA ship collisions are analyzed by assuming
ship motions to be random in a zone of interest corresponding to the short
interval of time preceding an accident. A kinematic model provides the
expected number of collisions per year under this assumption for a harbor
with specific characteristics of configuration and traffic. A calibration
to the actual average conditions of seven harbors is then made by scaling
the model to fit actual past collision frequencies in these harbors.
The estimation of the probabilities of various spill sizes due to the six different
types of events considered in the reports are given in Table 3. It should be men-
tioned that the estimates given in Table 3 are not always taken directly from the
reports. In some cases the estimates were adjusted to take additional data into
account. SAl-USA used more ships with larger tanks than currently planned, so the
probabilities and spill sizes were reduced accordingly. FERC-USA only considered
spill sizes of 25 000 m3 in their report, although they stated the data for smaller
sizes as well. These data were considered in generating Table 3. KRAPPl,2,3-D pro-
duced a variety of different results using different accident reduction factors,
ranging from 1.0 to 0.05. Because the latter factor was not based on any stated
reasoning, we used the factor 1.0, which was used in KRAPPI-D.
The most interesting findings from this comparison of assessments were:
(a) compared with the probability of collision, grounding and ramming, the
other events are rather unlikely (except for the internal failure in
AC'rrON-UK) ;
(b) the differences in probabilities of spills between the three reports for
Point Conception are substantial (between 10- 3 and 10- 6 for 10 000-25 000
m
3
spills);
(c) although the traffic patterns at Eemshaven, Mossmorran, and Wilhelmshaven
are quite different, they all come up with a total spill probability of
the order of lO-3, but spill sizes differ and are not defined for Wilhelms-
haven.
The event that could create the largest spill is the rupture of a storage tank.
In the literature, it is assumed that one of the following events can cause a rup-
ture: severe winds, airplane and missile crash, meteorites, earthquakes, internal
system failure, and accidents at other chemical plants nearby.
The estimate of TNOI-NL is taken from historical data of a peak-shaving LNG
plant. CREM-UK only qualify the probability as "remote", without reference to how
this qualification was produced. ADL2-USA and SAl-USA derive their estimates from
historical data on weather conditions, earthquake frequencies, and frequencies of
airplane crashes. The probabilities for internal system failure--due to matallurgi-
cal failures--were derived through a technical analysis, considering the material
and the variations of the temperature of the material causing fatigue or stress.
BROTZ-D estimates the probability of an airplane hitting one of the six tanks from
historical data from the FRG.
All storage tanks are placed within containment basins capable of holding all
the contents (in liquefied form) of the tanks. All credible failure scenarios as-
sume that these containment basins will not break and therefore all spills remain
within these basins.
Only SAl-USA considers probability of rupture of more than one tank at a time,
due to a common cause. The maximum credible spill is then considered as a rupture
of all three storage tanks (each consisting of 77 500 m3) at a time. SAl-USA adjust
their probabilities to the fact that the tanks are empty approximately 40 percent
of the time.
Major findings on storage tank rupture probabilities are:
(a) The probability of a storage tank rupture is estimated for all sites (ex-
cept Mossmorran and possibly Wilhelmshaven, where not all reports are
available for comment) of being of the order of 10- 5 per year.
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(b) As a conservative assumption the spill size is generally assumed to be at
least the complete contents of one tank. However, CREM-UK only assume 15
percent of the contents of one storage tank to be spilled.
(c) There are no major differences in the estimates, except between ADL2-USA
and SAl-USA. For example, the SAl probability of a spill due to objects
crashing into the tank is 4 x 10- 7 , while the ADL estimate is 10- 5 •
Elizabeth Drake (of ADL) has pointed out that this difference is due to
changes in missile launch plans at the nearby Vandenburg Air Force base
between the times the two reports were written (personal communication
1981) .
(d) Common-cause failures causing more than one tank to rupture are only con-
sidered by SAl-USA.
3.2. Physical Consequences of LEG Spills
We have so far discussed the probabilities of different spill sizes resulting
from failures of parts of the system. Before we can quantify the number of fatal-
ities certain spill sizes could cause, we have to discusss what happens to the
spilled LEG and how it can cause fatalities.
There seems to be agreement that only ignition and consequent rapid burning or
detonation of the spilled LEG can have consequences to life and limb, because of ther-
mal radiation and blast effects. LEG will immediately start to vaporize after a
spill, resulting in a vapor cloud. This vapor cloud will then travel downwind and
disperse. If there is no ignition, all parts of the cloud will eventually reach
the lower flammability limit of concentration, below which it cannot be ignited.
To estimate the effects it is therefore necessary to estimate the size of the vapor
cloud, the downwind travel distance of the part of the cloud that retains a concen-
tration above its lower flammability limit and the probability of ignition.
We will first discuss the size of the vapor cloud, which depends on the spill
size, on meteorological conditions, and on whether the spill is on land or on
water. We will then discuss estimates for the ignition probabilities at different
sites and for different events.
3.2.1. Vaporization and Dispersion of LEG After a Spill
Among all topics of LEG risk assessment the question of how LEG behaves after
a spill has attracted the most scientific interest. So far, empirical data include
only information for spills up to 50 m3 for an LNG spill on land, and up to 200 m3
for an LNG spill in water. The prediction of the behavior of large spills has
therefore had to rely on theoretical models, which are not easy to validate. Pre-
dictions differ for large spills but produce good estimates of the observed spills.
The predicted downwind distances after a spill at sea, taken from the different re-
ports, are listed in Table 4. It should be noted that these predictions are valid
primarily over water, where the landscape does not influence vapor cloud dispersion
in a specific way. One could expect that vapor cloud dispersion is faster over
rough landscape, except in the case of propane and butane vapor, which could accumu-
late in low areas due to their high density.
The differences between the reports are substantial. While SAl-USA and BROTZ-
D predict relatively short distances, ADL2-USA and FERC-USA are comparable in their
prediction of large distances. It is also worth noting that the distance increases
with decreasing wind speed in FERC-USA while for SAl-USA the distance decreases
with decreasing wind speed.
Although possibly larger in size, spills on land are generally considered less
dangerous than spills on water. The first reason for this assumption is that spills
on land are confined because the storage tanks are surrounded by dikes, which are
generally considered not to rupture. The second reason is that the vaporization
rate of LEG on land is slower than on water.
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Table 4. Maximum downwind distance of a flammable vapor cloud following an
instantaneous spill of LNG onto water.
LEG spill Atmospheric Wind speed Downwind
Report size (m 3 ) stability (kIn/h) distance (kIn)
BROTZ-D 20 000 A-F All wind 2.3
speeds
During night All wind 3.5
only speeds
TN01-NL 25 000 D 3.3
E,F 10.0
ADL2-USA 25 000 A 25.0 La
D 21. a 7.0
E 19.8 10.0
F 10.8 20.0
FERC-USA 30 000 A 25.0 0.5
16.0 0.5
9.0 0.6
D 25.0 4.2
16.0 4.9
9.0 5.9
E 25.0 7.8
16.0 9.2
9.0 11. 3
F 25.0 18.1
16.0 21. 6
9.0 27.1
SAl-USA 37 500 A,D,F 54.0 6.0
A,D,F 25.0 3.5
A,D,F 11.0 2.0
A,D,F 0.0 1.0
ADL2-USA 50 000 A 25.0 La
D 21.0 9.0
E 19.8 15.0
F 10.8 25.0
SAl-USA 88 000 A,D,F 11.0 2.5
3.2.2. Ignition of Vapor Clouds
Ignition probability is composed of two parts. The first is the direct igni-
tion by the eventthat.caused the spill. As can be seen from Table 5 these proba-
bilities, depending on the different events, are generally high because it is as-
sumed that an event that causes a tank to rupture could also create enough fric-
tional heat to ignite the resulting vapor cloud.
The second part is the probability that the vapor cloud is ignited by some
other source given that it is not ignited immediately. Obviously this depends on
the availability of ignition sources within the flammable bounds of the vapor
cloud. uelayed ignition will in general have larger consequences, because the
vapor cloud increases in size and travels downwind. Therefore, for most spill
locations a high immediate ignition probability will reduce the overall risk. In
this respect TN01-NL and ACTION-UK are more conservative in their estimates than
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Table 5. Probabilities of immediate ignition following different events.
Event causing the
ignition TNOI-NL ACTION-UK FERC-USA SAl-USA BATTE2-OTH KEEN-OTH
Vessel tank rupture
caused by:
collision
grounding
ramming
missile/airplane
meteorite
internal failure
0.65
0.1
0.66
0.9
the other reports. certainly, the ignition probability can be site-dependent. For
example, KEEN-OTH points out that the immediate ignition probability is estimated
at a high value because collisions at the specific site studied would generally in-
volve larger vessels carrying dangerous cargoes (such as chlorine). Because his-
torical data on LNG spills are lacking, the estimated ignition probabilities can
not be validated.
FERC-USA, SAl-USA, BATTE2-OTH, and KEEN-OTH use the same model for delayed ig-
nition probability. They assume that each source of ignition has the same probabil-
ity p of igniting the vapor cloud. Thus the probability Pn that the vapor cloud
will have been ignited within n seconds becomes Pn = 1 - (1 - p)n. Additionally,
all assessments using this model assume that each person (or that every fourth per-
son) is a source of ignition, because (s)he will use facilities (e.g., car, oven,
light) that are actual sources of ignition. The differences between the reports
are the judgmental estimates of the probability p (Table 6).
Table 6. Ignition probabilities per person in case of delayed ignition.
probability p that each
person within the vapor
cloud ignites the cloud
FERC-USA
0.0025
SAl-USA
0.1
BATTE2-OTH
0.01
KEEN-OTH
0.01-0.1
Any of the assumed values of p can be either conservative or nonconservative
depending on the number of people (and thus ignition sources) within the reach of
the vapor cloud. The estimate of FERC-USA, for example, is less conservative for
Point Conception than the estimate of SAl-USA because there are not more than 130
people living within 10 kID of the LNG facility. Thus the FERC-USA estimate implies
that there is a substantial probability that the vapor cloud will not be ignited
at all, while the estimate of SAl-USA implies that the vapor cloud will be ignited
with very high probability. On the other hand, using the model for Wilhelmshaven
with 43 000 people living within 10 kID of the LNG site, the FERC-USA estimate im-
plies that the vapor cloud will be ignited, but only after covering more populated
area than that predicted using the SAl-USA estimate.
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3.2.3. Fatalities Caused by Ignited Vapor Clouds
Effects from ignited vapor clouds can be twofold: thermal and blast effects.
There is no doubt that thermal effects exist, but it is an open question whether
blast effects due to a deflagration or detonation can occur at all with methane
and, if so, whether the peak overpressure created by a deflagration or detonation
will be significant enough to cause damage. TN01-NL considers blast effects to be
the only serious danger, and thermal effects are of comparatively minor importance.
CREM-UK considers both thermal and blast effects, as is logical since the Mossmorran
terminal handles butane, propane, and ethylene, which are known to explode in cer-
tain mixtures with air. ADL2-USA only considers thermal effects, because an ex-
plosion (either deflagration or detonation) of methane is considered very unlikely.
FERC-USA and SAl-USA again only consider thermal effects. BROTZ-D considers both
thermal and blast effects. In NMAB-REV it is concluded that the possibility of
explosions of LNG vapor clouds cannot be ruled out completely, although empirical
evidence for such a possibility does not exist.
One first step to estimate the percentage of fatalities within certain dis-
tances from the vapor cloud is to state the level of thermal radiation ana. peak
overpressure above which fatalities can be expected. Here one has to distinguish
between primary and secondary effects. Primary effects are fatalities directly
caused by thermal radiation and peak overpressure; while secondary effects are
fatalities caused by fires created from thermal radiation by collapsing buildings
as a result of peak overpressure.
All reports available to us consider only primary thermal and secondary blast
effects. BROTZ-D maintains that primary blast effects can be ruled out, because
the required peak overpressure has never been observed. Secondary thermal effects,
however, are a possibility for people sheltered from direct radiation, but are very
difficult to estimate. One way to include secondary thermal effects is to assume
a low radiation level as a threshold level for fatalities.
Blast effects do not play a significant role in the risk calculations in most
of the assessment studied. The only report relating blast effects to fatalities
is TNOl-NL, and BROTZ-D does not consider them at all. The treatment of thermal
effects varies markedly among the assessments. The distance from the center of the
fire to the lower fatality level is about twice as large in ADL2-USA as in FERC-USA
and SAl-USA. CREM-UK and BROTZ-D do not give a lower fatality level.
The major findings of a comparison of fatality calculations among the assess-
ments can be summarized as follows:
(a) The reports differ on the major cause of fatalities. While TNOl-NL assumes
all fatalities to be caused by secondary effects of vapor cloud explosions,
ADL2-USA, FERC-USA, and SAl-USA assume fatalities to be caused by thermal
radiation. CREM-UK and BROTZ-D do not consider fatalities as a result of
ignited vapor clouds.
(b) There is also some difference in the radiation levels above which there
will be fatalities. ADL2-USA adopts the most conservative assumptions on
this topic among the reports.
(c) The effects of LNG and LPG vapor clouds can be quite different. For ex-
ample, it is known that LPG vapor clouds can explode, while the possibility
of an unconfined LNG vapor explosion has not yet been determined.
(d) The ignition of an LNG vapor cloud can have effects on nearby plants with
possibly high secondary effects on the people living or working near the
plants. Except at point Conception there are chemical plants near all the
other LEG terminals. CREM-UK and BROTZ-D considered this point and con-
cluded that effects on the chemical plants nearby do not increase the over-
all risk significantly. In TN01-NL it is pointed out that in the case of
a detonation a nearby NH3 storage tank could collapse with inadmissible
consequences (the lethal dose of NH3 would reach tens of kilometers) .
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3.3. Assessment of population Risk
In many of the assessments the various numbers discussed so far are combined
to aggregate estimates of population risk. These estimates of the societal risk,
the individual risk and the risk of multiple fatalities are given in Table 7. No
estimates of the risks were given in CREM-UK and BROTZ-D.
Not surprisingly, Point Conception has the lowest risk among the three sites.
However, as discussed above, different reports consider quite different events.
The probabilities also vary for the same event and the same site between different
reports. It should also be noted that the estimate of SAl-USA was given for an LNG
terminal with more storage tanks and larger ships than the one currently planned.
Although we adjusted the estimates in earlier sections accordingly to make them
comparable with ADL2-USA and FERC-USA, this was not done in Table 7. Therefore,
the risk of the smaller LNG terminal currently planned, as estimated by the SAl-USA
analysis, would be lower than that stated in Table 7.
Table 7. Estimates of risks for the different sites.
TN01-NL ACTION-UK ADL2-USA FERC-USA SAl-USA
Societal risk
4xlO-2 7xlO-6 lxlO-5 lxlO-6(fatalities per year)
Individual risk
(probability of fatality
<7xlO-6 7xlO-4 <9xlO-8 8xlO-7 lxlO-8per year)
Number of people at risk >5000 ? >80 15 90
Risk of multiple
fatalities: probability
that number of fatalities
per year is equal to or
greater than
1 3xlO-3 lxlO-6 6xlO-7
10 lxlO-3 lxlO-8 3xlO-ll
6xlO-7
100 5xlO-6 ¢ ¢
1000 5xlO-6 ¢ 12l
5000 3xlO-7 ¢ ¢
4. CONCLUSIONS
The major findings of this report can be summarized as follows.
(a) There is no unique concept of risk that is used throughout all the risk
assessment reports examined in this study. Many of the important differ-
ences between the reports stem from the different risk concepts used.
Some reports do not even define their underlying risk concepts. However,
there is a concept of risk that involves several measures, each based on
both probabilities of failures and consequences of failures, that we judge
to be superior to other less comprehensive risk concepts, and that we have
adopted in this study.
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(b) The possible failures of the system, the probability of those failures,
and the estimation of their consequences to life and limb differ between
the reports. Not all the differences can be explained by differences be-
tween the terminals and sites; some must be viewed as resulting from the
limited knowledge and understanding of LEG risks. In this respect too
little reference is made to remaining uncertainties in the estimation of
risk in most reports.
(c) Given the differences between the reports there is no relative tendency
for each report individually to over- or underestimate the risk. Rather,
each report is more conservative on certain topics and less so on others,
as compared with the other reports. Thus no report can be singled out as
producing a more conservative estimate of the risk (with respect to all
parts of the total risk) than any of the others.
(d) On a relative risk scale it can be said that, of the four sites, Point
Conception presents the lowest societal risk (because of very low popula-
tion density), Mossmorran and Wilhelmshaven present the highest relative
risk (because of high population density and more vessel traffic) and
Eemshaven is in between.
(e) Although risk is an important dimension of the decision to import LEG and
to choose a specific site for the terminal, it should not be forgotten
that other dimensions such as reliability are important too. Any decision
regarding LEG importation and terminal siting should involve comparisons
with alternative options. As part of that process the risk of LEG should
be compared with the risk of other options.
(f) Whatever flaws the LEG risk assessments may have, they are clearly superior
to less systematic ways of identifying possible system weaknesses and in-
forming the decision-making process on the topic of risk.
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Societal Response to Three Mile Island and the
Kemeny Commission Report
Roger E. Kasperson and Arnold Gray
Centm' for Technology, Environment and Development, Clark University,
Worcester, Massachusetts 01610, USA
1. INTRODUCTION
The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant on 28 March 1979 was
by common consensus the worst to occur in the history. of commercial nuclear power
generation in the United States. It is not surprising, therefore, that the accident
provoked a series of assessments of its meaning as to the safety of nuclear power.
Prominent among these was the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile
Island, popularly known as the Kemeny Commission.
The commission labored for six months, eventually taking some 150 formal depo-
sitions, interviewing hundreds of individuals, hearing testimony under oath from
numerous witnesses, and collecting sufficient material to fill 300 feet of library
shelf space. In its work, the commission was supported by a budget of $1 million
and a substantial staff. Its final report, issued in October 1979, received un-
doubtedly more media coverage and congressional attention than any other document
on nuclear power safety.
The report is one of a genre of risk assessments. Unlike the Reactor Safety
Study (WASH 1400) or the Risk Assessment Review Group Report (the Lewis Report)
which relied heavily upon expert assessment dealing with the quantitative probabil-
istic assessment of risk, the Kemeny Commission inquired into the larger issues of
nuclear safety as indicated by a particular accident. Because of the significance
of the crisis event and the direct responsibility of the Commission to the President,
the report had a unique opportunity to contribute to the shaping of nuclear safety
in the United States.
This paper inquires into the response of various segments of society, particu-
larly the mass media, industry, and the regulators.
2. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Assessing the impact of the Kemeny Commission Report on nuclear safety policy
requires the isolation of the report from the numerous other risk assessments con-
ducted after the accident, from the accident itself, and from the ten congressional
subcommittees that had held hearings on the subject by the first anniversay of the
Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. This cannot be done. In fact, the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC) quite explicitly and systematically integrated the various
report findings in order to fashion a coordinated response. In addition, a number
of safety problems were quite evident in the accident itself, and it is futile to
determine which source stimulated a particular response.
Within these constraints, however, there are some opportunities. A substantial
part of the industry and governmental response occurred well in advance of the pub-
lication of the Kemeny Report some seven months after the accident; more of it pre-
sumably would have occurred even in the absence of the commission. Also, several
post-accident evaluations and congressional inquiries appeared prior to the report
and thus provide a benchmark from which to assess its particular contributions.
Finally, there was not a complete overlap in these reports so that some of the in-
dividual findings and recommendations of the Kemeny Report can be distinguished and
assessed as to impacts.
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3. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE KEMENY REPORT
In regard to media coverage, the Kemeny Commission Report represents a special
case among nuclear risk assessments. First, it came in the wake of the TMI acci-
dent, the top news story of the year. Consequently, the commission operated under
a spotlight of media attention from the time it was created by President Carter un-
til it published its report some seven months later. Second, unlike the Rasmussen
and Lewis Reports, the Kemeny Report was intended to investigate the problems that
led to an actual event and then to make recommendations on how best to avoid any
similar occurrences in the future.
3.1. Pre-report Coverage
Interest in the Kemeny Commission was intense well before the report actually
appeared. A total of 31 articles and three editorials on the Commission's activity
were published prior to its release on 31 October, more than the total number of
articles listed in the New York Times Index after its release. This well developed
interest in the commission's investigatory work is apparent from Figure 1. Since
further references to the Kemeny Report were included in articles on related topics,
(e.g., the Rogovin Commission) after publication, the column inch counts suggest
that pre- and post-Kemeny coverage was roughly equal.
The creation of the Kemeny Commission was first reported in the New York Times
on 6 April 1979, after President Carter's announcement that a presidential commis-
sion of experts would be convened in order to "investigate the causes of this acci-
dent and ... make recommendations on how we can improve the safety of nuclear power
plants". The first articles on the commission that tended to "paint a picture" of
the TMI accident, and nuclear power in general, appeared on 20 May. The commission
had just held its first day hearing testimony from residents of Middletown, and the
article emphasized the emotionalism of the session: "Citing estimates that a few
additional cases of cancer might develop as a result of the accident ... a resident
asked, his voice rising with emotion: 'Who'll be the ones? Myself? My son? My
wife?'" As the testimonies were given, first with the control room operators, then
with NRC officials, Babcock and Wilcox, executives, and Pennsylvania state offi-
cials, an image of mismanagement, carelessness, ineptitude, and complacency emerged.
The reader of the New York Times could not easily come away from these articles with
anything but a generally pessimistic view of nuclear power in America.
With the evidence in and the jury in deliberation, the press was left to wait
for the verdict. Following up on rumors and strategically placed leaks, the New
York Times focused much of its attention upon an anticipated moratorium of some
form. Apart from this issue, the preliminary findings alluded to in the press did,
for the most part, show up in the actual Kemeny Report. Key among them were:
(i) The NRC had a major attitudinal problem and was preoccupied with licens-
ing. It would be recommended that the NRC be reorganized as an executive
agency.
(ii) There must be an approved licensing plan.
(iii) There should be periodic relicensing of nuclear power plants.
(iv) Operator training should be upgraded with increased government regulation
and better (possibly standardized) design for control rooms.
None of these findings or recommendations, however, received the same amount of at-
tention that the moratorium issue received.
3.2. Post-report Coverage
The Kemeny Report ultimately included 81 specific findings and 44 recommenda-
tions. Of the 81 findings, only 13 were reported in the New York Times (see Table
1). Of the 44 recommendations, only eight were covered. The treatment, in short,
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Figure 1. Column lines of Kemeny Commission general coverage, findings, and
recommendations in the New York Times.
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Table 1- Findings and recommendations from the Kemeny Commission Report as
reported in the New York Times (in print lines) .
1979 1980 Total
no. of
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. Totals articles
Recommendations
Al--Reorganize NRC 70 30 119 9 212 13
A2--Establish executive
oversight committee 6 8 7 21 3
AS, Fl--Broaden utility
responsibility in
emergency 3 3 1
A7, A8, Alle, Fl-
Upgrade licensing
procedure 50 30 21 106 9
Cl--Improve operator
and operating
procedure 22 22 3
Findings
Overall conclusion 136 24 15 175 9
Al, 2, 8, 12--assess-
ment of significant
events 249 35 284 7
H4, 10--Public right
to know 159 104 263 6
G8, 12--NRC 117 12 3 4 136 9
E5--Utility and
supplier 107 20 3 130 7
B16, 4--Public health
and health effects 54 14 68 5
Fl--Operators and oper-
ating personnel 38 38 3
Attitudes: personal
and institutional 78 78 3
was highly selective, emphasizing what the Times found important. Those findings
and recommendations that were covered, however, were covered extensively. The
finding that "fundamental changes are necessary if those risks are to be kept with-
in tolerable limits", deemed the central finding by the Times, was reported no less
than nine separate times during the post-report period. Two recommendations in
particular dominated the overall coverage: the reorganization of the NRC and the
upgrading of licensing procedures. In fact, the proposal to reorganize the NRC
(not adopted) received more coverage than the remaining 40 or 50 recommendations.
Even the recommended upgrading of licensing procedures was discussed primarily in
terms of the moratorium issue--an issue, we should note, that while not a recom-
mendation, received more coverage than any of the actual Kemeny recommendations or
findings.
Coverage of the report rapidly fell off the Times reporting agenda, although
analysis of the coverage is difficult because attention shifted to specific issues
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rather than the report itself. A gleaning of the Times Index suggests that atten-
tion shifted toward transient conditions at various nuclear plants, problems sur-
rounding Indian Point, economic problems of the nuclear industry (including fines,
cost over-runs, delays), and the political struggles between pro- and anti-nuclear
forces rather than the important but less conspicuous responses within industry
and government dealing with the generic safety issues raised by TMI. Throughout
1980, for example, there was no sUbstantial discussion of the NRC's Action Plan
(NUREG 01600), the single most important governmental response to emerge from the
accident and the Kemeny Commission Report.
4. SCIENTIFIC PRESS COVERAGE
The coverage of the Kemeny Report in Science and Nature was quite different
from that of the New York Times although, in several respects Science and Nature
also differed from one another. Science carried three article~ on the Kemeny Com-
mission before the report release, treating the make-up of the committee and its
budget and constraints, the ending of the licensing moratorium, and the iodine-131
problems. Nature mentioned the Kemeny Commission only twice prior to the report
and referred to completely different issues: the California study of TMI, and a
news brief on the dissolution of the citizens' panel.
Both Science and Nature published only one article to cover the report's find-
ings and recommendations. Both provided extensive coverage of the report, although
Science was somewhat more specific and comprehensive. Neither of the two, however,
included a verbatim listing of either the findings or the recommendations. The
Science article, under the heading "Kemeny Report: Abolish the NRC", referred to
23 specific findings, nine recommendations and two criticisms of omitted recommen-
dations. The report was criticized for "not [going] the extra step and [demanding]
fundamental changes" and also for not asking for a licensing moratorium.
The reporting in Nature was less complete, treating eight findings, five rec-
ommendations, plus a section on the happenings of the accident. Nature did go on,
however, to discuss immediate reaction to the report by pro- and anti-nuclear
groups. The critics had charged that the report's "bark may ... turn out worse
than its bite". The nuclear industry interpreted the report's message as "proceed
with caution". Nature later published an article (17 January 1980) that challenged
the latter view.
In terms of post-Kemeny coverage, the two journals presented only one major
article (Science, 21 December) specifically addressing responses to the report.
Briefer treatments did appear as well. On 8 February 1980, Science dealt with the
Rogovin Report, noting the agreement of the two reports on the need to reorganize
the NRC. A second article covered the NRC's review of reactor design in view of
the Crystal River accident. While the Kemeny Report was not mentioned per se,
there was discussion of safety recommendations that had been included in the re-
port.
Nature carried three post-Kemeny articles. The first covered the congressional
debate over the moratorium issue, noting that the report did not recommend a licens-
ing moratorium, and the second included a discussion of nuclear safety, with attacks
authored by Dr Russell Peterson (a former Kemeny Commissioner). An alternative
view waspresented by Nobel prizewinner Dr Rosalyn Yalow. Finally, in an article
(19 June) entitled "What (if any) future for nuclear power?", Nature criticized the
Kemeny Report for its lack of criticism and its minimal impacts.
Overall, the scientific press, as indicated by coverage in Nature and Science,
achieved a more balanced and analytical treatment than the New York Times, but
again the follow-up coverage of responses was insufficient to provide the reader
with an informed treatment of what the report eventually meant for nuclear power.
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5. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES
To assess institutional responses to the accident and the Kemeny Report, we
can identify 12 key areas of recommendation from among the 43 specific ones made by
the commission. For each key recommendation, the major societal responses are
noted, major unresolved issues specified, and our overall assessment of the response
is provided in Table 2.
The Kemeny Commission reached a number of biting judgments concerning the pri-
mary institutions responsible for the assurance of nuclear safety, the most notable
of which were as follows.
(i) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "with its present organization, staff,
and attitudes, the NRC is unable to fulfil its responsibility for provid-
ing an acceptable level of safety for nuclear power plants" (p56).
(ii) The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Committee is the only
body independent of the NRC staff which regularly reviews safety questions,
but the Committee "has established no firm guidelines or procedures," its
members are "part-time and have a very small staff" and it relies heavily
upon the NRC staff for follow-up of concerns.
(iii) The Utility. The utility (Met Ed) failed in a number of important cases
"to acquire enough information about safety problems, failed to analyze
adequately what information they did require, or failed to act on that
information" (p43). "It did not have sufficient knowledge, expertise, and
personnel to operate the plant or maintain it adequately" (p44).
To deal with these institutional deficiencies, the commission recommended a
broad set of changes involving the NRC, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-
guards, and industry.
The Kemeny Commission found that the NRC lacked sufficient organizational and
management capability to ensure safety, a judgment supported by the Rogovin Report.
Unfortunately, the commission recommended the rather shopworn suggestion of agency
reorganization, in this case a change from an independent regulatory commission to
an executive branch agency with an administrator, as the most prominent means of
redress. The Kemeny Report was the first accident post-mortem to call for this
change, though it subsequently also found favor in the Rogovin Report. The recom-
mendation was unpopular from the start: the NRC staff opposed it, all the current
NRC commissioners save one also opposed it. Congress was lukewarm to the idea, and
the President, sniffing congressional opposition, never supported the recommenda-
tion. Instead, he called for, and congress eventually approved, a strengthening of
the chairman's role.
Two years after the accident, top leadership in the NRC remains as an outstand-
ing problem, recently described by one of the NRC commissioners as "analogous to
hitching fire horses at different points around a sled". The general weakening of
reglatory agencies in the current Reagan administration does not bode well for the
hope that the recent drift and indecision will halt and that coherent, effective
leadership committed to safeguarding public health and the environment will emerge
in the NRC. Other changes in the NRC have met with greater success and indicate
some limited improvements in regulatory performance. Central to these responses
has been a shift in commission resources and emphasis on monitoring and assessing
operating reactors. Within four months of the accident (and well in advance of the
Kemeny Report), the NRC established a new office for analysis and evaluation of
operational data aimed at the serious deficiencies in learning from past reactor
incidents and malfunctions apparent in the TMI accident. The NRC also established
a program of resident inspectors stationed at individual power plants. The sever-
ity of licensing exams for reactor operators has also been increased, producing a
rise in failure rates from 5 to 30 percent. The NRC has improved its capability
for crisis management by clarifying responsibilities and improving communication
with an analytical strength for existing reactors.
I
Table 2.
1981) .
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Societal response to key Kemeny Commission recommendations (as of March
Recommendation
Restructure/improve
NRC (AI)
Improve ACRS
(A3)
Establish new over-
sight committee
(A2)
Upgrade reactor
operator and
supervisor training
(A4, Cl, C4)
Increase safety
emphasis in licensing
(AIO)
Response
President does not accept Kemeny reorganization recom-
mendations. Congress retains collegial structure with
strengthened powers of chairman. Chairman designated as
spokesman in emergencies.
Assessment: basic problems of the commission referred to
in report remain unresolved, restructuring is not achieved,
but some improvement in emergency response and regulating
of operating reactor capabilities. In September 1980, the
Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee finds evidence of a
"business-as-usual mindset in NRC".
NRC opposes any mandatory response to ACRS recommendations.
On 11 February 1980, ACRS charges NRC "largely ignores"
its input on Kemeny Commission responses.
Assessment: no substantial action undertaken to improve
ACRS. It is unlikely that the ACRS can and/or will in-
fluence change within the NRC.
Executive Order established Nuclear Safety Oversight Com-
mittee on 18 March 1980. Committee issues three letter
reports to the President on NRC action plan, radiological
consequences of nuclear accidents, and emergency response
planning.
Assessment: Committee has provided limited but useful
function. Future is unclear.
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center establishes computerized
communication system connected to all utilities on operat-
ing incidents. NRC proP9ses upgrading in formal education:
senior reactor operators, 60 college credits in engineer-
ing; shift supervisors, a BS degree in engineering. Util-
ities improve training for emergency events. No change
proposed in formal education of reactor operators. Memphis
State University inaugurates new training program in co-
operation with utilities. Severity of licensing exams in-
creased; failure rate rises from 5 to 30 percent. NRC
declines to accredit training programs.
Assessment: upgrading becoming evident though require-
ments still lag behind those in Europe.
NRC reorganizes licensing staff to correct weaknesses in
licensing process. Increased attention to operator train-
ing, utility management, emergency planning, reactor
design features, and evaluation of plant operating experi-
ence; NRC decides against Office of Hearing Counsel. 1981
licensing plan reduces role of intervenors.
Assessment: actions to date fill a number of gaps in
safety coverage, but the degree of substantial improvement
unclear. NRC licensing of Sequoyah plant questions com-
mitment to safety. Reduced role of intervenors weakens
safety focus.
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Table 2 continued.
Recorrunendation
Improve safety
inspection and
enforcement
(All)
Improve technical
assessment and
equipment
(Dl-D3 )
Initiate new
reactor risk
assessments
(D4-5, D7, El)
Improve industry
attitudes and
performance
(BI-B3, B5)
Response
NRC establishes resident inspectors at power plants, re-
quires annual evaluation of licensees, improves reporting
requirements. A new NRC Office for Analysis and Evalua-
tion of Operational Data established (prior to Kemeny
Report) in July 1979. Fines for utilities increased.
Bingham Amendment calls for "systematic evaluation" of
all operating nuclear power plants, a possible 5-8 year
effort that has evoked opposition.
Assessment: although too early to tell, indications are
of substantial improvement in inspection and regulation
of operating reactors. But position of top leadership of
NRC during Reagan administration will be important. Bing-
ham Amendment will require significant new NRC resources.
Utilities initiate improvement in control room design and
instrumentation.
Assessment: substantial improvements implemented or on-
going in improved instrumentation, equipment, and moni-
toring.
NRC reorientates risk assessment research program with
new attention to higher probability events, accident miti-
gation, and human factors. Retrospective iodine release
study of TMI accident suggests possible past overestimate
of consequences by factor of 10. utilities establish im-
proved monitoring and dissemination system of operating
incidents. NRC establishes Division of Human Factors and
initiates effort to define level of acceptable risk.
Epidemiological studies of effects of low-level radiation
initiated. EPA recorrunends against ten-fold reduction in
occupational standard. Probabilistic risk assessment in-
itiated by utilities at eight power plants. Radiation
Policy Council established in Executive Branch.
Assessment: significant changes instituted to give new
priority to TMI-like events, to human factors, and acci-
dent mitigation. Individual plant risk assessments should
improve safety performance and enlarge accident response
capability.
Industry establishes two new institutions: Institute for
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) with power plant evalua-
tion and training as primary functions and Nuclear Safety
Analysis Center (NSAC) with analysis of operating experi-
ence and other technical assessment its primary activities.
International cooperation with NSAC makes world experience
database a possibility.
Assessment: substantial industry response: new institu-
tions are important safety vehicles. Still unresolved are
prevailing attitudes and assurance of high level of over-
all technical competence in individual utility management
structure.
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Table 2 continued.
Recommendation
More remote siting
of nuclear power
plants
(A6)
Improve emergency
response and
mitigation
(A7-A8, E3-E5,
Fl-F3, Gl-F4)
Educate the public
(F4, G5)
Response
NRC proposes (NUREG 0625) upper limits on population den-
sities around plants and making siting criteria distinct
from engineered safeguards. Estimates suggest 49 of 84
currently operating plants would fail to meet criteria.
Strong industry opposition.
Assessment: proposal currently mired in controversy; no
change to date, but new plants not currently being ordered
in any event. Since no retrospective application of cri-
teria, limited safety impact on 100-150 GWE nuclear system.
NRC issues new rule on emergency response plans, extending
5-mile zone to 10-mile and 50-mile radii. All operating
reactors required to have emergency plans approved by April
1981. NRC installs a crisis management communications
link of all power plants to NRC headquarters. New rule
mandates that state be able to notify every person within
10 miles of a nuclear power plant of accident within 15
minutes and evacuate population. proposal to distribute
potassium iodide pills mired in controversy. Nucleonics
Week survey finds confused and uncertain response by
states. No notable improvement in mass media capabilities,
despite an NRC pilot program.
Assessment: although utilities and the NRC have improved
their emergency response capabilities, the overall capacity
of society to respond to a major accident remains in doubt.
NRC plans to investigate need for literature. No program
instituted to date.
Assessment: no substantive response despite widespread
scientific belief as to need.
Beyond these useful changes, however, is the more basic and difficult problem
of attitudes and orientations throughout the professional staff of the NRC. The
Kemeny Report was quite specific about these problems:
" ... we have seen evidence that some of the old promotional philosophy still
influences the regulatory practices of the NRC" (p19)
" ... the evidence suggests that the NRC has sometimes erred on the side of
the industry's convenience rather than carrying out its primary mission of
assuring safety" (p19)
"There seems to be a persistent assumption that plants can be made suf-
ficiently safe to be 'people-proof'" (p20)
"We do not see evidence of effective managerial guidance from the top, and
we do see evidence of some of the old AEC promotional philosophy in key
officers below the top" (p20).
The Kemeny Report was hopeful that the reorganization of the NRC would begin
a change in attitudes from the top down. A coherent plan for dealing with these
difficult behavioral problems has not been forthcoming, yet obviously substantial
changes are critical to a strengthened regulatory performance. The behavior of
the NRC since the accident suggests, not surprisingly, that the pre-accident atti-
tudes are proving difficult to extirpate. A scant five months after the accident
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and on the eve of the Kemeny Report, the NRC staff advised that technical fixes
had so reduced the likelihood of a repeat of the TMI accident that new operating
licenses could be issued even though the design basis of new reactors might be in-
adequate to control the potential consequences of the estimated amount of hydrogen
released into containment at Three Mile Island. This action led the new Nuclear
Safety Oversight Committee to observe in a letter to the President that a "business-
as-usual" attitude continued to exist at the NRC. Also of concern was an NRC
licensing reform plan announced in March 1981, that would restrict the role of in-
tervenors and limit their access to information.
The response of the NRC, in summary, while probably improving its regulatory
performance in a number of limited areas, has failed to resolve the need for more
effective top leadership or the ingrained attitudes inimical to safety in the pro-
fessional staff. It continues to be preoccupied with formal, specific pro-nuclear
regulations to individual problems, leading one Kemeny Commissioner to conclude
that "the NRC shows little recognition of the fundamental flaws in its approach to
reactor safety" (Pigford 1981, p48).
The Kemeny Report also recommended that a new independent committee be insti-
tuted whose purpose would be "to examine, on a continuing basis, the performance
of the [NRC] and of the nuclear industry in addressing and resolving important pub-
lic safety issues associated with the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants, and in exploring the overall risks of nuclear power" (p62). President
Carter established the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee in March 1980, under the
chairmanship of Governor Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, and in its first year of exis-
tence the committee concentrated on post-TMI responses, issuing three letter reports
on the NRC's Action Plan, iodine release in nuclear accidents, and emergency plan-
ning and response. The committee has to date played a useful oversight function
but its future in the Reagan administration is in doubt.
Of equal or greater significance to the public institutions is the impact of
the Kemeny Report on industry itself, especially the utilities that manage the op-
eration of nuclear power plants. The report found far-reaching problems in the
role of the utilities, warning that "the nuclear industry must dramatically change
its attitudes toward safety and regulations", and that it must also "set and police
its own standards of excellence to ensure the effective management and safe opera-
tion of nuclear power plants" (p68).
In fact, the major elements of industry response were set in motion well be-
fore even the appointment of the Kemeny Commission. The structure of this response
in shown in Figure 2. Within two weeks of the accident, the four major industry
groups--the American Public Power Association, the Atomic Industrial Forum, the
Edison Electric Institute, and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association-
joined to create a policy task force (the TMI ad hoc Nuclear Oversight Committee)
to address the safety issues raised by the accident. The seven subcommittees
formed to develop policy recommendations indicated by the concerns immediately
identified were:
emergency response planning;
operations;
systems and equipment;
post-accident recovery;
safety analysis considerations;
control room design;
unresolved generic safety issues.
Most committees reported their findings in September 1979; these findings also
formed the industry's contribution to the NRC's Lessons Learned Task Force.
In a statement issued some three months after the accident, Floyd Lewis, chair-
man of the Industry ad hoc Committee, could point to three new institutions already
begun or planned, as well as a wide range of other utility responses (US Congress,
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 1979). Approximately one month
after the accident, the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center was established to conduct
technical analyses of the accident, to interpret the lessons to be learned, to
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Figure 2. Response effort to the TMI accident by the nuclear industry.
develop strategies to prevent such accidents in the future, and to address generic
safety issues. Financed by the utilities, the center has a professional staff of
50, and has so far completed a detailed technical analysis of the TMI accident, de-
veloped a priority system for needed safety changes, initiated a program on the
testing of relief valves, conducted studies of a computerized database of 22 000
reactor operating failures (licensee event reports), instituted a computerized com-
munications system linking 60 utilities for rapid dissemination of and requests for
information, and conducted case studies of specific safety problems (e.g., the loss
of electrical power to non-nuclear instrumentation at the Crystal River nuclear
plant) .
To deal with the "people problems" apparent in the TMI accident, in June 1979
the industry announced its intention to establish the Institute of Nuclear Power
operations. Chauncey Starr, with an advisory group drawn from the Navy's nuclear
power program, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and airline
safety, developed the mandate and structure of the institute. With a budget of
$11 million in 1980, a projected staff of 200, and participation by 55 utilities,
the institute will develop benchmarks for excellence in nuclear operations, conduct
evaluations of individual utilities (some six completed by January 1981) with the
goal of an annual evaluation for each plant, formulate educational and training re-
quirements for operating personnel, and accredit training organizations. The util-
ities have also cooperated to create a mutual insurance plan to apply to the extra-
ordinary costs accruing to a utility experiencing a major nuclear accident.
Taken together, these new institutions appear to represent a significant up-
grading in industry's capacity and effort to manage nuclear power plant safety. It
is noteworthy that the institutions emerged from industry's response to the accident
and preceded the recommendations of the Kemeny Report. As with the NRC, the extent
to which attitudes have changed amonq the rank-and-file of industry professionals
is unclear. Certainly, as the response to TMI becomes institutionalized there is
a temptation to believe that the outstanding problems are behind us and to declare
nuclear power safe rather than to work to make it safer.
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6. RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
An important impact of the TMI accident and the subsequent post-mortems was a
reorientation in the overall risk assessment program of both government and indus-
try. Three key changes involve new attention to a broader spectrum of reactor
accidents, to man-machine interactions in risk, and to accident consequence miti-
gation.
Since the publication of WASH 1400 in 1975 (NRC 1975), it has become clear
that most postulated accidents will come from small reactor leaks, such as occurred
at TMI, and not from large pipe breaks leading to catastrophes. Yet WASH 1400 con-
cluded that the greatest public risk is due to comparatively rare events where a
postulated melted core releases a large fraction of its contents to the atmosphere.
Only a minor portion of the public risk was assessed to result from the more fre-
quent melts leading to small releases.
The NRC has oriented its programs to this structure of reactor risks. Thus
its risk assessment program and its criteria for design analysis prior to TMI fo-
cused heavily upon large pipe breaks leading to major loss-of-coolant accidents.
Since the TMI accident, resources have been shifted substantially in the NRC's risk
research program (a $231.9 million effort in FY-198l) away from big pipe breaks
and transients toward higher-probabilityjlower-consequence events. A similar
change has also occurred in the research program of the Electric Power Research In-
stitute Nuclear Power Division (Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
1980, p338; see Bibliography).
A second major change has been the allocation of significant new attention to
human error as an ingredient in reactor accidents. WASH 1400 was quite inadequate
in its attention to this issue, largely assuming human error rates taken from in-
dustrial situations assumed to be similar to nuclear power plants. In fact, a num-
ber of analyses, several of which were available before TMI, have demonstrated the
importance of human error in reactor risks:
(i) NRC official Merrill Taylor informed the Lewis Commission in 1978 that
50-85 percent of the hypothetical safety system failures he had examined
in detail would be caused by humans (Sugarman 1979, p62).
(ii) The 1978 German reactor risk study found that human failure was respon-
sible for two-thirds of all risks.
(iii) About 20-50 percent of all licensee event reports are due to human error
(Sugarman 1979, p63).
(iv) The NRC reports that in about 1 percent of all licensee event reports
(about 25 incidents per year) there are indications that a safety feature
has been seriously compromised or made unavailable by human error
(Sugarman 1979, p63).
Despite this evident need to conceptualize reactor operations as a man-machine
system, the NRC's approach to reactor risks remained strongly equipment-centered.
Also, the NRC preoccupation with large-scale accidents ensured a neglect of human
factors since such accidents require extremely fast reaction, thereby accentuating
the role of automatic control through equipment.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a detailed post-accident review of the
NRC's regulations, regulatory guides, and standard review plan found "no examples
of criteria written with a clear intent to include human engineering considerations
in the licensing and regulatory system" (NRC Special Inquiry Group 1980, Vol. II,
Part II, p345).
The Kemeny Commission, along with the other accident post-mortems, was quite
direct as to the significance of human behavior:
" .•. as the evidence accumulated, it became clear that the fundamental prob-
lems are people-related problems and not equipment problems." (p8)
" .•. wherever we looked, we found problems with the human beings who operate
the plant, with the management that runs the key organization, and with the
agency that is charged with assuring the safety of nuclear power plants." (p8)
I
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"The most serious 'mindset' is the preoccupation of everyone with the
safety of equipment, resulting in the down-playing of the importance of
the human element in the nuclear power generation. We are tempted to say
that ... what the NRC and industry have failed to recognize sufficiently
is that the human beings who manage and operate the plants constitute an
important safety system." (plO)
since the accident and the assessments, a number of efforts have been made to
take human factors into account in nuclear risk assessment and management. The NRC
has established a new Division of Human Factors and has restructured its risk as-
sessment program to give greater emphasis to human error. The new Institute for
Nuclear Power Operations has undertaken a major effort to improve the training of
reactor operators, the single issue that most worried the Kemeny Commission. Since
the accident, all 2500 licensed reactor operators in the US have gone through the
TMI accident sequence on training simulators. Industry's new Nuclear Safety Analy-
sis Center is evaluating human response in making design and instrumentation
changes in reactor control rooms. Again, most of these issues were apparent and
the response began prior to the publication of the Kemeny Report.
Despite these encouraging changes, questions still remain as to the adequacy
of response, particularly in the NRC. In 1980 testimony before the Nuclear Safety
Committee, Saul Levine, the former director of NRC risk evaluation studies, com-
plained that " .•. the Agency is still grappling with equipment problems. Equipment
is the be-all and end-all", and that the NRC continues to give insufficient atten-
tion to research on human factors (Inside NRC 1 December 1980, p13). Also, the NRC
has decided against taking a lead role in the training of operators, unlike, for
example, the Federal Aviation Administration's example with the training of pilots.
It is questionable whether human behavior will ever become internalized into
nuclear safety regulation without the direct role of the commission in such issues
and a staff capability to allow in-depth analyses. The performance of the commis-
sion in socio-economic issues is instructive in this regard where, despite five
years of continuing criticism of its inadequate analyses, the agency has yet to de-
velop the requisite capability.
The third change in risk assessment involves a new focus on accident mitiga-
tion. Traditionally, this has also been an area badly neglected both by industry
and the NRC. In no small measure, this is due to the widespread assumption that a
serious reactor accident simply would not happen, and to the possible expenses in-
volved in retrofitting requirements.
The Kemeny Report dealt primarily with emergency response, and the changes re-
sUlting from its recommendations will be considered below. Suffice it to note here
that accident mitigation options are present and may have considerable potential
for overall risk reduction. Consider, for example:
(i) Better containment building designs with filtered release systems to
prevent containment failure due to internal over-pressure could, ac-
cording to Von Hippel (1979, p79) be installed at both new and exist-
ing reactors at less than 1 percent of their replacement costs.
(ii) Means are available for interdicting the flow of contaminated water
in the event of a melt-down from beneath reactor containment buildings
to nearby water bodies, but no appropriate preparations have been made
by the NRC.
(iii) Underground or more remote siting could substantially reduce the con-
sequences of a major accident.
(iv) Thyroid blocking by use of potassium iodide pills could reduce thyroid
tumor cases by as much as 100 000 over an area extending 200 miles
downwind from the release source (Von Hippel 1979, p79).
Belatedly, the NRC is giving new emphasis in its risk assessment program, al-
though most attention has focused to date on emergency planning. However, the
recent findings that substantially less volatile iodine may be released ina reactor
accident than was previously assumed may detract from accident mitigation analyses.
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7. SITING AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
The TMI accident elevated siting and emergency preparedness into primary areas
of nuclear safety concern. In regard to siting, the Kemeny Report concluded that
the entire concept of a "low-population zone" on which the NRC based its siting
criteria was flawed, and recommended:
"In order to provide an added contribution to safety, the agency (i.e.,
the NRC) should be required, to the maximum extent possible, to locate
new power plants in areas remote from concentrations of population.
Siting determinations should be based on technical assessments of vari-
ous classes of accidents that can take place, including those involving
releases of low doses of radiation". (p64)
The siting problems of US nuclear power plants are the result of the location
of plants progressively closer to cities over time as a means of reducing electric-
ity transmission costs. Engineered safety features were substituted for remote
siting as the primary means of risk reduction. Catastrophic (so-called class 9)
accidents were judged to be of such low probability as not to merit inclusion in
the siting criteria. As a result, power plants came to be sited very close to
major metropolitan areas.
Immediately following the TMI accident, the NRC appointed a special Siting
Policy Task Force to reconsider siting regulations. The task force reported to the
NRC commissioners in August 1979 (two months prior to the Kemeny Report), calling
for an abandonment of the principle of siting based on projections of potential
dose commitments. Instead, there should be standardized fixed boundaries for ex-
clusion areas and low-population zones. The report also recommended divorcing
reactor designs from siting, thereby re-establishing siting as a major "defense-in-
de~th" factor. Final action is yet to be taken on the proposals, but there is sub-
stantial industry resistance as well as opposition from Europe and Japan, where
such remoteness is unachievable, although west Germany is currently assessing un-
derground siting.
Unresolved in the siting proposals are the power plants currently operating
or on order. The NRC evaluation of 104 existing nuclear power plant sites found
that about 30 failed to meet the new siting criteria, with Indian Point (near New
York City) and Zion (near Chicago) being considered particularly bad (Nucleonics
Week 25 October 1979, p3). The new siting proposals recommended "grandfathering"
existing sites and compensating by emphasis upon emergency planning and additional
engineered safeguards (e.g., core ladles). In short, the changes will do little
to improve the overall siting of nuclear power reactors for the next few decades
(or for a 100-150 GWE system).
Turning to emergency planning, the TMI accident demonstrated quite conclusive-
ly that none of the responsible parties was prepared for a major nuclear accident.
The utility was unprepared to deal with the radiological aspects of the accident,
the response by the NRC was disorganized and confused, and the local governments in
the power plant region had no emergency plans to provide adequately for evacuation.
The neglect within the NRC is evident from the fact that only three full-time pro-
fessionals and one secretary out of 2500 NRC employees worked on emergency prepared-
ness issues prior to the TMI accident (Nucleonics Week 8 November 1979, plO). The
Kemeny Commission found few grounds for optimism:
"The response to the emergency was dominated by an atmosphere of almost
total confusion. There was lack of communication at all levels. Many
key recommendations were made by individuals who were not in possession
of accurate information, and those who managed the accident were slow to
realize the significance and implications of the events that had taken
place". (p17)
Although the commission noted a number of problem areas, it made no clear rec-
ommendations. Much of the response and outpouring of documents on the accident and
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the various post-mortems, including the Kemeny Report, centered nonetheless upon
improving emergency response. By the time the Kemeny Report appeared, the Atomic
Industrial Forum had developed a model plan for emergency response by the nuclear
industry, calling for four well coordinated but independent emergency centers near
the site, interconnected with reliable lines of communication. The Institute for
Nuclear Power Operations has also focused upon training reactor operators in ef-
fective emergency response. The NRC has instituted a series of changes to improve
its capabilities in this area, the most important of which are as follows:
(i) Six teams have been established to assess the emergency planning and
preparation of every operating nuclear power plant. In addition, the
new resident inspector at each plant has well defined duties during
an accident.
(ii) The chairman of the NRC has been provided with clear lead responsibil-
ity during emergencies and an emergency management cOQrdinator has
been established to work with him.
(iii) Guidelines have been provided to licensees and the states defining
classes of emergencies and outlining appropriate actions.
(iv) The NRC's operations center in Bethesda has been upgraded, and dedi-
cated reactor operations telephone lines exist to each facility, with
extensions in each control room. The NRC has also prescribed a data
link between the plant's control room and a technical support center
located somewhere on site. Consideration is under way for the data
link to extend also to the NRC's Bethesda center.
(v) The licensing of new plants has been made conditional on the develop-
ment of acceptable emergency plans.
In short, substantial improvements have been made in both industry's and the NRC's
emergency response capability, although much remains to be done.
More problematic is the role of the states and local governments. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency has lead responsibility in this area and in June 1980,
in accordance with a Presidential directive, completed a review of state emergency
plans for operating nuclear reactors (US Federal Emergency Management Agency 1980).
The agency has mandated that a state should be able to notify every person within a
10-mile radius of a nuclear power plant that a nuclear accident has occurred and in-
dicate what actions the person must take for personal safety. State governors hold
the authority, unless delegated to local government, for ordering evacuation. By
early 1981 it was apparent that, despite evident progress, many problems remained:
the ability of utility officials to notify relevant state and local authorities
promptly, is in doubt; a 1981 survey by Nucleonics Week indicated that most states
are not yet prepared for an emergency and have, in fact, taken "an uncertain series
of steps in notification procedures"; and confusion remains as to who has authority
to do what during an emergency (Nucleonics Week 29 January 1981, pp2-3).
One final unresolved issue two years after the accident is the availability of
potassium iodide pills in areas surrounding nuclear plants. The Kemeny Commission
recommended that:
"An adequate supply of the radiation protective (thyroid blocking) agent,
potassium iodide for human use should be available regionally for distri-
bution to the general population and workers affected by a radiological
emergency". (p75)
The NRC has, as yet, reached no decision on the issue. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency's position is that some $100 000 worth of potassium iodide should
be stockpiled in four locations, but that distributional decisions be left to the
states. In addition, the NRC staff paper on the issue advocates the availability
of potassium iodide for hospitals and prisons near power plant sites. The lack of
a clear policy some two years after the accident is regrettable, particularly given
the routine distribution within 10 miles of a reactor in the UK and the recent
Swedish decision in favor of dissemination.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
Although any definitive statements must await implementation of ongoing changes
and responses to future crises, the authors reach four tentative conclusions about
societal response to the TMI accident and the Kemeny Report.
(1) Media coverage of the Kemeny Report showed a better performance by the
scientific media than newspapers (at least as indicated by the New Yo~k
Times), with the latter suffering from imbalanced attention to certain
proposals to the neglect of other equally (or more) important findings,
inordinate attention to leaks and investigatory work prior to the issu-
ance of the report, and a lack of sustained analysis of the report it-
self and subsequent societal responses.
(2) The response by industry has been most timely and effective; regulatory
responses have been more delayed and uneven; and the mass media have
failed to respond to recommendations for change. The overall regulatory
response has also been heavily dependent upon the role of industry. The
long-term effect of the accident may be to further self-regulation in
nuclear power.
(3) The changes instituted by industry and government have tended to address
obvious gaps and specific problems apparent in the accident. The more
fundamental and integrative problems of capability and attitudes which
formed the primary concern of the Kemeny Commission and the need for new
initiatives and ideas remain essentially unaddressed in the TMI response.
One Kemeny Commission pro-nuclear member recently noted that "industry's
concern with meeting the formalism of NRC regulations is still inhibit-
ing and throttling new ideas and technical innovations more directly
related to safety" (Pigford 1981, p47).
(4) The continuing failure to resolve the basic institutional problems of
the NRC in the context of an anti-regulatory Reagan administration points
toward a continuing vacuum in societal leadership for nuclear safety in
the United States.
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Decision Making in Environmental Crisis Situations
James E. Dooley
Institute for Environmental Studies and Faculty of Management Studies,
University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Crisis Situations, Decisions, and Institutions
This paper discusses decision making in situations where an uncommon event
occurs that threatens the safety of the public or the environment and for which
authority structures and decision procedures are not routinely available. In order
to focus the paper, the discussion will be limited to "environmental crises". This
term, to be defined later, will include such man-made or natural situations as
fires, hurricanes, avalanches, earthquakes, burst dams, floods, hazardous material
spills, epidemics, snowstorms, large-scale food poisoning, and explosions. Excluded
will be social unrest, economic crisis, military attack, and personal or family
crises. The word crisis as used in this paper is synonymous with disaster or emer-
gency.
Decision making is part of the management of such crisis situations. These
almost always involve risk so that crisis management can be treated as a special
case of risk management. There are many decisions involved through the stages of
preparedness, crisis, and a new preparedness. This paper restricts attention pri-
marily to the decisions that have to be made during the crisis.
The paper was stimulated by an environmental crisis that occurred in Mississauga,
Ontario, in November 1979 (Burton 1981, Burton et al. 1981, Whyte et al. 1980) when
24 cars of a train became derailed, 19 of which carried hazardous materials. Three
cars carrying propane exploded, caught fire, and burned for three days. An adjacent
car carrying 90 tons of chlorine ruptured. A community of 226 000 people lived
within the area where lethal concentrations could occur if a cloud of chlorine gas
should escape and diffuse. The primary problem was to deal with the risk to human
life by various evacuation options. The second problem was to contain the fire and
chlorine gas in some way.
The research was undertaken to provide a context for examining decision proces-
ses in crisis situations and their relationship to institutional aspects of risk
management. The work involved developing a set of characteristics for the decision
process. These were developed in part from an examination of the Mississauga case.
The characteristics, which are described in Section 2, are believed to have utility
for comparative study. Some of the decision problems and their organizational set-
ting are discussed in Section 3. In the final section a number of issues are iden-
tified that deal with the relationship between decision processes, the institutional
setting, and preparedness.
1.2. Crisis Research
Results from a symposium on international crises are reported in Hermann (1972
a,b). Although international crises are not considered in the present work, the
results of that symposium make several applicable suggestions on crisis research.
Hermann suggests that the lack of theory on crisis is due to three factors: case
histories rather than comparative studies are presented, so that knowledge
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accumulation does not take place, the respective authors tend to believe that each
crisis is unique, and the concept of crisis as a phenomenon is not fully understood.
There is no general agreement on how crises should be defined and characterized.
It was found that appropriate definitions depended on the perspective and kinds of
issues to be explored. For instance, Hermann suggests two viewpoints on the defi-
nition: the systemic and the decision making. The systemic defines a system in
terms of a number of variables, and hence '~ .. a crisis is a situation that creates
an abrupt or sudden change in one or more of the basic system variables". The de-
cision making approach, using the policy makers' perceptions of the crisis as a
basis for definition is applicable when the concern is with the decision process
and authoritative structure. Hermann's decision making approach has three defining
characteristics: a threat to valued goals, restricted decision time, and surprise.
Milburn (1972) offers criteria with which to judge whether or not a situation is a
crisis: "situations become crises when (1) they concern values identified by the
threatened policy makers as significant; (2) they are unexpected so that there is
no set of plans or any existing program to handle them; and (3) they involve a
relatively short time in which to decide to act before loss to values will occur".
Robinson (1972) suggests classifying crises by two definitions: (i) substantive
crises, based on the content of a particular policy, problem or situation, and (ii)
procedural crises, based on a general class of generic characteristics.
A structure of decision making (coping) behavior in crisis situations has been
developed by Janis and Mann (1977), from a review of research on psychological
stress. They suggest that the decision making unit asks four basic questions which
leads to five types of coping behavior according to whether the answers are "no" or
"maybe" or "yes". The four questions and responses are given below.
1. Are the risks serious if I don't take protective action?
No leads to unconflicted adherence to the status quo.
Maybe or yes leads to question 2.
2. Are the risks serious if I do take the most available protective action?
No leads to taking the protective action in an unconflicted way.
Maybe or yes leads to question 3.
3. Is it realistic to hope to find a better means of escape?
No leads to pessimistically giving up the search for a better solution
and to defensive avoidance behavior.
Maybe or yes leads to question 4.
4. Is there sufficient time to make a careful search for and evaluation of
information and advice?
No leads to hypervigilant behavior resulting in taking the quickest,
seemingly safe route.
Maybe or yes leads to vigilant behavior resulting in search, appraisal
and contingency planning.
A schematic diagram from Janis and Mann (1977) illustrating the questions, behavior
and consequences is reproduced in Figure 1.
Decision making under stress can result in pathological behavior as discussed
by Smart and Vertinsky (1977). Their classes of crisis-specific pathologies thac
affect components of the decision making process are: narrowing the cognitive pro-
cess, information distortion, group pathologies (e.g., groupthink; Janis 1972),
rigidities in programming, and lack of decision readiness. Milburn (1972) discusses
decision making in the context of the management of crisis. Billings et aZ. (1980)
suggest that the way that the crisis is perceived affects the decision making be-
havior. They argue that a better understanding of perception will lead to better
decision procedures. The work of Billings et aZ. suggests that the Janis and Mann
model should treat the responses to the questions as perceived responses. The
awareness of the possible difference between the "real" and "perceived" situation
may lead to appropriate caution.
81
Antecedent conditions M'diating processes Consequences
Maybe or yes
Unconflicted
change
Unconflieted
adherence
0.2
Are the
risks serious
if I do
change?
Start
Challenging
negative
feedback or
opportunity
Information
about losses
from changing
Additional informa-
tion about losses
from continuing
unchanged
Signs of more
information avail-
able and of other
unused resources
Information
about dead-
line and time
pressures
Maybe or yes
Q.
Is it
realistic
to hope to
fi nd a better
solution?
Maybe or yes
No Defentive
avoidance
Hypervigilance
Incomplete search,
appraisal, and
contingency
planning
Maybe or yes
Vigilance
End
Thorough search
appraisal, and
contingency
planning
Figure 1. A conflict theory model of decision making applicable to all consequen-
tial decisions. From Janis and Mann (1977), Figure 3, p70.
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Turner (1976) examined three disasters that could possibly have been avoided,
and so are regarded as management failures. The work of Turner could place the
problem of crisis management in the context of an ongoing decision process of soci-
ety in which the decisions concerning the three disasters are part of the more
general time series of decisions. Turner observes some common features of the
failures: rigidities in perception and belief in organizational settings, the de-
coy problem (wrong problem dealt with), disregard of nonmembers of the organization,
information difficulties in ill structured problems, and involvement of ill prepared
people.
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
In this section a set of characteristics is suggested to define a phenomenon
that will be referred to as an "environmental crisis". The particular set of char-
acteristics was selected to facilitate the study of decision making in the manage-
ment of crisis situations. The characteristics follow from the literature referred
to in Section 1.2 and from a study of the Mississauga case. Each of the character-
istics can be treated as having magnitude on a simple scale (e.g., ordinal), but
there is no precise division between crisis and noncrisis situations.
(i) A significant, concentrated entity of value is at risk. The entity at
risk is frequently a segment of a population, but the threat could also
be to significant natural features, monuments, or works of economic value.
The notion of concentration is included because of the observation that
the degree of concentration in space, time, or societal segment seems to
be a requirement for a situation to be labeled a crisis (such as food
poisoning to a community of 1000). In contrast, heart disease, even
though it results in much greater loss, is not because it is diffused in
space and time. In the Mississauga case, 226 000 people concentrated in
a small geographic area were at risk of death from chlorine gas.
(ii) Prediction uncertainty. There are several areas of uncertainty in situa-
tions that are treated as crises such as: "Where, when, and with what
magnitude will the situation occur?" A hurricane, for instance, may be
known to be approaching but there is uncertainty about where it will
strike, when, and with what force. In other cases, such as a volcanic
eruption, a disaster may be expected to occur but when is uncertain. In
the Mississauga case both the time and location of the event were a com-
plete surprise although derailments and rupture of chlorine cars are known
to occur.
(iii) The lead time to decide (and act) is short. The potential loss discussed
in (i) and the unpredictability discussed in (ii) normally make it desir-
able to react to the situation quickly. This limits the time available
for a decision to be made. In the Mississauga case, the first zone evacu-
ation order was given within two hours of the accident. In that two hours,
the command structure had to be established, the risk assessed, and the
decision made.
(iv) Information is of uncertain completeness and reliability. In the
Mississauga case it was not known at first whether the chlorine car had
ruptured even though leakage was detected, and it was not known how much
chlorine had already escaped. These were vital questions in the evacua-
tion decisions and yet this information was lacking or of uncertain qual-
ity. It should be noted that the lack of quality information does not
make a situation a crisis for information is often lacking. The lack of
information is, however, a normal condition in a crisis which exacerbates
the decision making problem.
(v) The decision making authority is ad hoc. There are many emergency situa-
tions that might be called routine, for which there are established organ-
izations equipped to deal with them. A standard example is fire in which
there is an established fire-fighting service with equipment, organization,
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and procedures in place. If, however, the fire should be of a magnitude
or severity such that it exceeds the capability of the established service
to deal with it routinely, then an ad hoc organization will result, which
may be made up of components of the regular service. In many areas there
are emergency-coping organizations, although these cannot be regarded as
existing in a routine way for surprise disasters.
In the Mississauga case several organizations were established as part of
emergency preparedness; for example, the Transport Emergency Assistance
Plan was established in 1972 by the Canadian Chemical Producers Associa-
tion. The Chlorine Institute, an association of chlorine manufacturers
in North America, has a Chlorine Emergency Plan, which has a number of
teams on call trained, in general, to deal with unplanned chlorine escapes.
One such team was located at the Dow Chemical Plant, Sarnia, Ontario, some
270 km from the accident site. The regional government of Peel (Ontario
is divided into a number of regions) has a Peel Regional Emergency Plan.
It is interesting that in the Mississauga case, the local officials and
politicians did not declare the situation an emergency, so the regional
plan could not be invoked. Instead, the Police Disaster Plan was used and
other agencies were called in on an ad hoc basis in general conformity
with the needs and with some regard to the Peel Emergency Plan. Thus, in
spite of the high level of preparedness in the area, in the final analysis
the emergency was coped with by an ad hoc organization with little or no
prior experience. The senior authority was the solicitor general for
Ontario, Roy McMurtry, who assumed leadership and directed activities.
(vi) Decision makers are not at risk. In general the decision makers who have
to respond to the crisis are not at direct personal risk from the cause.
There may, of course, be individuals who escape the cause by evasive ac-
tion, but in this characterization it is assumed that an organization not
at risk is making the strategic decisions. In the Mississauga case a
command post was set up near the accident site from which the decision
makers operated. If chlorine had leaked, the command post would have had
to be removed very rapidly, although this could probably have been done
without loss of life. The decision makers are aware in such cases, how-
ever, that they may be at political risk in the post-crisis analysis and
are likely to behave accordingly.
(vii) The threat is nonhuman. The characterization in this paper limits the
crisis under consideration to those where the threat is from a nonhuman
agent. The risk may be due to natural causes (fire, flood, etc.), or due
to man-made works gone wrong (e.g., a chemical spill). This is the primary
characteristic that separates environmental crises from personal crises or
international incidents.
3. DECISIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
3.1. Crisis Stages
A crisis has three active stages: awareness, response, and return to a new
normality. There are two further stages: prior preparedness, and revised prepared-
ness. This view places crises in the context of a continuous process in which the
three active stages become a particular event, albeit a spectacular one, that per-
turbs the ongoing process of survival. This view suggests that the crises must be
studied in relation to the process of which crises form a part. The utility of
this view is that a general theory of crisis that is stable over time is confounded
by treating it relative to the state of theworld at the time the crisis took place.
The awareness stage is concerned with the intelligence that would classify a
situation as a crisis. The response involves establishment of the authority and the
utilization of resources to contain the cause and to avoid its consequences. The
third stage is concerned with dismantling the ad hoc authority and returning the
resources and environment to what will now be regarded as a new normal state. Prior
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preparedness includes the warning systems and the established resources of people
and materials to deal with the prior determined kinds of crises. Posterior pre-
paredness is the new systems and resources that evolve from the experience of the
last crisis. It is not claimed that the proper lessons are taken from the event;
nevertheless, some interpretation will be made and a revised state of readiness
instituted. As a case in point someone has observed that "we always prepare to
fight the last war".
The process view leads to the obvious observation that in a crisis situation
there are a large number of connected decisions. In order to study or prescribe,
it is necessary to know which set of decisions is under consideration. To illus-
trate the range of decisions that can be involved, a number of decision problems
are listed below. It will be observed that "selecting information" is classed as
a decision, and also that recycling can take place among the decision problems.
Awareness stage
will there be an emergency?
What level of crisis will be reached?
What will be the risks?
What entity (area, people, things) are at risk?
Who should be advised (emergency organizations, management, public)?
What authority should be established?
Response stage
What information should be given to the public and how should this be
communicated?
Are local resources (materials, people) adequate and if not what further
resources should be obtained and from which sources?
What containment action should be taken?
What evasive action should be taken?
What resources should be allocated to containment and evasion?
Return stage
Is it time for the ad hoc organization to turn over authority to the
normal authorities?
Can evasive provisions be terminated (e.g., evacuees return)?
3.2. Decision Processes
This section considers models and procedures applicable to the decisions need-
ed during the crisis. Robinson (1972) has examined the literature from this view-
point and has found that the decision literature rarely accommodates crisis. As a
simple check on Robinson's critique the author examined the International Abstracts
in Operations Research from 1977 to 1980. In the decision processes and decision
theory sections, out of a total of 154 articles, none had the words crisis, emer-
gency, disaster, or decision time in the title. The articles were not examined in
detail, so there may well have been content on the subject. Nevertheless, the sub-
ject was not considered to be sufficiently important to be included in the titles.
This tends to confirm Robinson's criticism.
Decision making in crisis situations appears to have been covered rather bet-
ter in behavioral science (some literature was reviewed in Section 1.2; see also
Janis 1974, George 1974). A considerable amount of work has also been done in de-
cisions about personal crisis; see for example Coelho et al. (1974).
It may be that the analytical models arising from economics, operations re-
search, or decision theory do not provide an adequate way to treat decision making
in crisis situations. Any number of these models may be applicable, however, to
decisions about preparedness to allocate resources, to locate facilities, and so
on. What seems to have been neglected to a large extent is research on models ap-
plicable during crisis.
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If the analytical model does not provide an adequate conceptual approach to
crisis decision making, then is there an alternative approach that is better? The
analytical approach has been found useful for well structured decision problems
and can in many cases "make" the decision. Analytical models have been found very
useful in providing insights into semi-structured decision problems through the
process of model development and experiments with the model. The partial lack of
structure naturally excludes some considerations from the model; if these are not
to be ignored entirely then some other means has to be found to incorporate the
other factors. One view is to construct a decision support system that provides
for the flexible use of data and models that the decision maker then combines with
judgment to decide. For a discussion of decision support systems see Dooley (1973),
McCosh and Morton (1978), Keen and Morton (1978), and Alter (1980). The combina-
tion of judgment and models was expressed by Dooley (1973) in the form of a princi-
ple.
"In the design of management information systems for decision support,
the basic objective is to establish measures of effectiveness for the
man-machine system and to seek an optimal sharing between humans and
machines with respect to these measures."
As an illustration of the decision support system concept in crisis management,
consider a nuclear power plant that has the potential to release a large amount of
radioactive material. One of the critical things to know in the event of a release
is the rate, direction, concentration, and diffusion of the radioactive material.
A decision support system would have the means (developed ahead of time) to use in-
formation on the release and the prevailing weather conditions to predict the
radiation threat. Judgment would then be used, in combination with the information
on radiation, to decide on responsive action.
A procedural view of decision making, called procedural rationality, has been
explored in a series of papers by Simon (1976, 1978a, b), in which he argues that
the focus should be on examining the procedure by which a decision is reached rather
than examining the substantively rational model (i.e., the "rational man" approach
of economics). It may well be that an analytical model is the best procedural way
to reach a decision but the focus is on the decision from a procedural viewpoint
rather than from a model viewpoint. Simon (1976) gives a description of a decision
making procedure that is procedurally rational:
"There is now a large body of data describing human behavior in other
problem situations of comparable complexity. All of the data point in
the same direction, and provide essentially the same descriptions of
the procedures men use to deal with situations where they are not able
to compute an optimum. In all these situations, they use selective
heuristics and means-end analysis to explore a small number of promis-
ing alternatives. They draw heavily upon past experience to detect the
important features of the situation before them, features which are
associated in memory with possibly relevant actions. They depend upon
aspiration-like mechanisms to terminate the search when a satisfactory
alternative has been found."
The approach described in this quotation could very well form the basis for study-
ing decision making in crisis situations.
Simon (1978a) argues that in cases where the potential number of relevant con-
siderations is great, only a few of the more salient ones are in the circle of
awareness of the decision makers and that the set of considerations changes as
learning takes place within the fluid organization. This condition is typical of
decision making in crisis situations:
"A general proposition that might be asserted about organizations is
that the number of considerations that are potentially relevant to the
effectiveness of an organization design is so large that only a few of
86
the more salient of these lie within the circle of awareness at any
given time, that the membership of this subset changes continually
as new situations (produced by external or internal events) arise,
and that "learning" in the form of reaction to perceived consequences
is the dominant way in which rationality exhibits itself."
"In a world where these kinds of adjustments are prominent, a theory
of rational behavior must be quite as much concerned with the charac-
teristics of the rational actors--the means they use to cope with
uncertainty and cognitive complexity--as with the characteristics of
the objective environment in which they make their decisions. In
such a world, we must give an account not only of substantive
rationality--the extent to which appropriate courses of action are
chosen--but also procedural rationality--the effectiveness, in light
of human cognitive powers and limitations, of the procedures used to
choose actions. As economics moves out toward situations 'of increas-
ing cognitive complexity, it becomes increasingly concerned with the
ability of actors to cope with the complexity, and hence with the
procedural aspects of rationality."
An interpretation of operations research/management science, artificial intel-
ligence, and computational complexity as a form of procedural rationality is given
in Simon (l978b). Simon refers to the three approaches as normative theories of
procedural rationality which reflect the strong attachment that these approaches
have to optimizing (or satisficing) with respect to stated criteria. He goes on to
cite the parallel development in cognitive psychology which he refers to as a posi-
tive theory of procedural rationality. The limitations on human information pro-
cessing are said to stem from low serial processing rates and the limitations of
short-term memory. Simon argues that a positive aspect is the human ability to
store large amounts of data in long-term memory and to recall this in response to
stimUli.
The similarities between decision making in crisis situations and procedural
rationality are immediate. For instance, the organization is fluid and has time
to consider only a limited number of considerations (Hermann 1972b). The decision
makers will make judgments based on past experience in similar situations. Models,
if used at all during a crisis, will be justified only if they fit within the pro-
cedure adopted by the decision maker and can be applied within the time and infor-
mation constraints.
3.3. Institutional Context of Crisis Decision Making
So far only the nature of decision problems in crisis situations have been dis-
cussed. In this section a brief discussion of a typical institutional context is
given. Clearly, the organization will be formed to meet the particular crisis and
will be affected by the existing relevant culture and emergency planning institu-
tions. The hypothetical organization in this section will illustrate the institu-
tional setting for the decision process.
In order to be effective the organization must consider both the decision and
how it is to be implemented. In fact, the potential for implementation can often
be an important consideration in choosing an alternative. Figure 2 shows a typical
organization in which a committee or person (or both) assume command to direct the
crisis response. The command group makes the major decisions on responding actions.
An advisory group supplies information consisting of an appraisal of the situation,
resources available, and so on. The command has the responsibility to arrange for
resources to be made available to the extent needed or possible. The next part of
the organization is the coordination unit which directs operations toward fulfil-
ling the strategic decisions. Next there are the operations units, typically auto-
nomous, which may have their own organization, material, personnel, and procedures
such as the police, fire department, and ambulance service. Also, responding units
Information and
advisory function
Autonomous
institutions L- _
Senior authority
person, committee
Strategic command decisions
Arrangements for resources
Instructions to specific operational units
Coordination of operational units
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Subunits
Figure 2. Typical crisis management organization.
may normally exist for the kinds of emergencies experienced locally. An example
is forest fire fighting which, in Ontario, is routine for most fires. Special
units may be formed to meet the needs of the particular crisis. A coordination
problem is to get the autonomous units to function together effectively.
4. CRISIS DECISIONS, RISK, AND INSTITUTIONS
Mankind has been coping with environmental crises (disasters, emergencies) for
centuries and has developed local coping behavior of varying quality for the clas-
ses of crises experienced. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to attempt
even a cursory examination of the various institutions and decision procedures that
they use. In raising a number of issues concerned with crisis (risk) management
it is understood that these have been dealt with very effectively in some parts of
the world and for some classes of crises. The issues are offered as topics for
research. Existing cases of crisis response and institutions can be examined for
generalizations about crisis management. This paper has focused on decision making
during crises. In the issues that follow it will be apparent that the scope for
decision making during crisis is conditioned by organization, resource, and decision
preparedness. Consequently, most of the issues concern preparation as well as re-
sponse during the crisis.
(a) Prediction and response. The issue is: "How should limited resources be
allocated to prediction and to response for a particular class of crisis?"
One extreme is to have extensive warning systems but no response capabil-
ity; the other is to be surprised at the occurrence of each crisis but to
have extensive resources to cope with them when they do occur. In Ontario
for instance, a local type of emergency is forest fire. Prediction con-
sists of surveillance of weather and forest conditions to assess the capac-
ity for fires, and reconnaissance aircraft to spot them. The amount of
reconnaissance increases as the conditions for fire become more critical.
Response consists of the mobilization of forces to fight the fire; these
can be smaller if the warning is given early enough. The mix of predic-
tion and response systems has a significant bearing on preparedness and on
the options open to decision makers when a crisis occurs.
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(b) Evasion and containment. In many crisis situations the two primary strate-
gies are evasion and containment. Often a mixture of the two is an appro-
priate strategy and the issue is the proportion of each in the mixture.
In the case of an impending flood, for instance, sandbags can be used to
contain the flood and evacuation can be used to evade it. In the
Mississauga case, 226 000 people were evacuated as an evasive action, and
fire fighting crews worked to contain the spread of chlorine gas. It was
not certain whether containment was possible, so evacuation was implemented
as a precaution.
(c) Centralization versus decentralization. An issue is the degree to which
preparation and response should be centralized or decentralized. It is
argued that centralization should be able to offer a broader spectrum of
knowledge and greater resources to cope with a crisis. Centralization of-
fers more chance for learning because, presumably, there are more crises
to deal with. Decentralization may be favored where a knowledge of local
conditions is necessary; for example, forest fire fighting responsibility
in Ontario rests with the District Lands and Forests Officer who has de-
tailed local knowledge that would be difficult to organize centrally.
(d) Personal freedom and collective good. This issue is concerned with the
amount of personal freedom that should be allowed in crisis situations
where such freedom may reduce the collective good. There are several ex-
amples of this; for instance, should a person be allowed to refuse an in-
noculation during an epidemic where refusal may result in that person
infecting others? Can an individual refuse evacuation when conditions may
put others at risk trying to rescue that individual? The issue could also
be stated as individual freedom to accept a risk when in so doing greater
risk is imposed on others. A related issue is how much individual risk
should be accepted for the common good?
(e) Ad hoc authority. For "normal emergencies" an organization is developed
over time. Through legislation and performance the organization commands
authority and respect to deal with certain situations. When the situation
exceeds the normal, an ad hoc organization is formed that may not have any
prior experience of that type of emergency. The issue is: how can such
an organization derive the authority and respect to command and coordinate
the numerous groups involved in coping with the crisis? The problem be-
comes more acute when normally autonomous, experienced organizations (e.g.,
fire, police) are asked to serve under the ad hoc authority.
(f) Deciaion making experience. It has been argued throughout this paper that
the analytical (substantively rational) approach to decision making is not
adequate for decisions to be made under crisis conditions. It has been
argued that procedures that combine judgment and experience with analysis
are the appropriate model. Regardless of which view is favored, judgment
and experience will form a large part of the decision process out of ne-
cessity. Experience will often be available within the operating units,
but is not likely to be available in the command authority. The issue is
to develop some form of decision preparedness. One observation is that
people in political authority have appropriate experience in decision mak-
ing in highly political environments; in marshaling resources, and in co-
ordinating diverse groups. It has been argued that the political decision
environment has a lot of characteristics in common with that of crisis
situations, and the Mississauga experience tends to support this view. In
Ontario there is a "lead" minister designated to head the response organ-
ization for each class of crisis (Timmerman 1980) .
(g) Return to normality. Just as procedures, and possibly organizations, must
be established to cope with a crisis, the reverse is to disband and return
to normal. The problem is to decide when the crisis is over, what the new
normal condition is, and how to return to it.
(h) Risk management responsibility for crisis avoidance. The nuclear industry
can be used to illustrate this issue. The two extreme cases are: full
government responsibility, and full industry responsibility. In the first
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case government would perform inspections and set regulations and proce-
dures effecting risk in all phases of construction and operation, so that
the industry's responsibility ends at compliance with the regulations and
procedures. The other extreme is to set risk levels and leave it to the
industry to decide how to achieve them. If the industry fails then it may
be too late to do anything to avoid a disaster; they have failed but that
does not help those who suffer. The issue is to decide on a balance be-
tween these two extremes.
(i) Communication with those at risk. Studies have shown, as reported in
Janis and Mann (1977), that the public reaction to a slow build-up of a
disaster is different from those to crises that have a more rapid onset.
The public tends to treat the slow build-up as indicating lesser risk or
less need to act promptly when advised. This is only one observation on
behavior. The issue is: how much information should be given, when
should it be given, and how should it be given? This is an important is-
sue for those cases where some form of response by those at risk is needed.
Related to this issue is the question of the public's right to know.
(j) Information and communication system. It is fundamental to effective de-
cision making in crisis situations that information and communication sys-
tems are adequate to provide sufficient data as rapidly as possible. This
obvious truism is particularly important in crisis situations where it may
not be possible to feel one's way incrementally toward a solution (incre-
mentalism). The problem for preparedness is to prepare by having informa-
tion and communications systems in place for the surprise situations.
Traditionally the established media have played a large role. More recent-
ly, the citizens' band radios have been important in rapid communication.
The early warning systems of the military are further examples.
(k) Resources. Television programs and movies about crisis situations are in-
structive. It is amazing that endless numbers of skilled people, adequate
equipment, and leaders are always available to cope with crises. What
these dramatizations explore is how well we can cope when the resources
are available and we work together. In fact, they use the absence or
failure of a resource to build tension which further illustrates theimpor-
tance of resources and their coordinated utilization. And yet, in reality,
you cannot get a taxi when it is raining in New York. This paper does not
attempt to provide a catalog of resources to cope with crisis situations.
The issue is: what is the overall availability of resources (information,
communication systems, material, human skills, and organization) to cope
effectively with crises?
(1) Crisis management preparedness. Management of crises can be treated as
consisting of an organizational structure, decision procedures, and re-
sources. The issue is to prepare so that these can be brought together
in an effective way to cope with crisis situations. Under crisis condi-
tions it may be too late to start thinking about management so that pre-
paredness requires that some thought be given to these matters ahead of
time. One way is to have crisis exercises in which participants presup-
pose a given kind of crisis and simulate ways of coping. In Ontario, for
instance, regular exercises are held to test the system for responding to
nuclear emission events.
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Main Gas Pipeline Route Selection Problems,
Taking into Consideration Risk and Uncertainty Factors
Y.S. Oseredko, 0.1. Larichev, and A.I. Mechitov
All-Union Designing Institute for the Gas Industry, Kiev, USSR
1. INTRODUCTION
At present, appreciable structural variations in the world energy situation are
taking place. Petroleum, formerly considered to be the most valuable chemical-
organic raw material and source of energy, is to a large extent being replaced by
other energy sources such as gas, nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and coal.
Natural gas is probably the next most important source after petroleum because of
the availability of substantial world resources, ease of transportation, good tech-
nical-economic utilization characteristics, etc. Natural gas is also a valuable raw
material for the chemical industry, and is widely used for obtaining important basic
materials. These factors predetermine the rapid development of world gas output and
trade. The USSR, according to the 1981-1985 five-year plan, is intending to increase
its output of gas by 38-47 percent, to 600-400 billion m3 •
The harnessing of new gas resources and the construction of complexes for trans-
portation, storage, and reprocessing of gas require large investments of capital and
long time commitments. When considering such large-scale projects it is necessary to
take into consideration economic, political, social, geological, and other factors
involved, as well as questions of population safety, environment protection, reliabil-
ity of transportation systems, etc. Thus the creation of a large gas complex is a
complicated task, where an essential role is played by risk and uncertainty factors.
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF A GAS EXPORT COMPLEX
Among European countries the USSR is the only one which exports natural gas in
significant quantities. However, the main gas producing regions in the USSR are in
the northern, sparsely developed areas of the country, and are therefore considerable
distances from the main industrial centers and potential foreign consumers. This has
necessit<.ted the construction of very long pipelines to transport the gas to con-
sumers.
At present in the USSR liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing complexes, incor-
porating gas liquefaction plants, storage, and shipping facilities, are under pre-
liminary development in the north of the European part of the USSR and on the Far
Eastern coast. Both areas, however, are considerable distances from the largest gas
deposits. For this reason a component part of any such complex must inevitably be
the main gas transportation system. Here gas pipelines, which may be several thou-
sand kilometers long, are the main factor determining the cost of the whole complex
and its effectiveness. To a great extent this is because the pipelines have to be
constructed through climatically severe, unpopulated regions, and analysis shows
that the capital outlay required for such a venture may amount to 75-80 percent of
the total cost of the complex.
The building of a gas pipeline is therefore a significant and often decisive
element in a gas transportation complex designed to provide large-scale gas supplies.
Recause of this it is expedient to point out the numerous fac~ors connected with
the rational selection of gas pipeline routes, such as environmental conditions,
socio-economic factors, the local population, and agreements between land-owners
and administrative organizations.
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When constructing a gas pipeline a guarding zone of 250-350 m from its axis
is required to regulate the minimum distance from the pipeline to residential build-
ings, highways, farms, and other installations; with a route length of about 1000
km this amounts to 50-70 thousand hectares. Thus the main pipeline route will con-
stitute a site of temendous size, the selection of which represents a very serious
problem. The task being considered is also important practically. In the USSR the
construction of 49.5 thousand km of gas pipelines for 1981-1985 is being scheduled.
Fast development of pipeline transport, particularly for gases, is also character-
istic of world economics as a whole. Thus, route selection problems for similar
installations will become much more pronounced in the course of time (Belousov 1978).
3. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN PIPELINE ROUTE SELECTION
A gas pipeline several thousand kilometers long is a complicated and expensive
technical system. Route selection depends upon natural climatic and economic-
geographic conditions including the presence of topographic, geological, hydrologi-
cal, natural, and artificial obstacles. We can classify the variety of natural
features of the terrain along the route under the following headings: plains, des-
erts, swamps, permafrost, natural water barriers, and mountains. However, these
headings do not include the whole range of factors which could affect construction
and installation work, such as large tracts of forest, high water table, rocky soils,
impassable swamps, formation of crevasses and thermokarsts in permafrost soils, deep
and also planned recutting of river beds, landslides, etc. The list of headings can
also be further subdivided into a series of categories that permit us to consider
specific features of the terrain.
It is also necessary to take into account the quantity and size of populated
areas, the effect on the route length of bypass lines, the increase in the amount
of metal required to increase the pipeline wall thickness in order to safeguard the
local population, and the rise in construction costs due to any demolition of dwel-
lings and other buildings that may be necessary. It is also necessary to consider
the prospective development of populated areas and cities in the next 25 years.
The quantity and quality of agricultural land have increased, so funds must be made
available to cover the expenses of recultivation, reimbursement of production los-
ses, restoration of irrigation systems, etc. Access to existing road and rail net-
works (to simplify the transporting of pipes, equipment, construction machinery,
etc.), as well as access to existing pipelines along the route, communications, and
power supply systems, all greatly reduce the amount of construction and installation
work required for the building of a pipeline.
We can now specify the basic factors considered in the main gas pipeline route
selection.
3.1. Presented Costs
This factor is the most common and universal estimation criterion, determined
from the expression
C=Kx+A
where K is the capital investment; x is the normative coefficient of capital invest-
ment effirit~cy ;for industrial construction it is taken to be 0.12); and A is the
annual ma_ tc lance cost. This basic criterion permits selection of a route from an
initial to a final point which will require the minimum total capital outlay (equip-
ment and labor) and maintenance expenses. However, it does not guarantee the selec-
tion of a truly optimal route because it can not take into account all environmental,
social factors, etc., because these cannot be accurately estimated in advance
(Goncharov and Oseredjko 1977).
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3.2. Construction Times
This may be one of the most decisive factors in commissioning a gas pipeline.
The duration of construction is partially dependent on the standards required, but
can also be established by means of directive instructions. In general the pre-
ferred route alternative is that where appropriate construction organizations al-
ready exist and where seasonal transport routes are available, or where pipelines
already exist, together with appropriate maintenance systems. Also, the factor of
minimum change to existing construction technology, machinery, etc., is considered,
as well as the availability of an adequate labor force.
3.3. Gas Pipeline Maintenance
In order to ensure reliable pipeline operation it is nece?sary to have access
to all sections for preventive inspections, and repair work in the case of failure.
Access is to some extent determined by environmental conditions in the pipeline
area and by the development of the transportation system.
The reliability of maintenance mainly depends on natural climatic conditions
along the route. In some cases, to ensure faultless operation of gas transporta-
tion systems in the most complicated and important sections (large areas of water
or swamps, almost inaccessible mountain regions) laying two pipelines instead of
one is standard practice, even though this means an increase in capital investment
and can require gas supply reservation by means of underground storage in natural
formations, etc,
3.4. Influence on the Environment
Construction of main gas pipelines, especially when they are three to four
thousand kilometers long, has a great impact on the environment. Working on such
a scale, partial forest clearance and agricultural production losses are inevitable,
and are often evaluated without consideration of the long-term effects on the en-
vironment.
When laying a pipeline in highlands where there is a danger of landslides, this
is not only a threat to the environment, but also affects pipeline reliability
since landslides may be caused when slopes are cut to form terraces for the move-
ment of construction machinery and for laying the pipeline. Disruptions to hydro-
logical systems may occur; for instance, the construction of underground pipelines
at insufficient depth may cause water channel deformation and drainage disruption
that can adversely affect aquatic life and prevent accident-free running of the
pipeline.
The environment is especially sensitive to human activities in the permafrost
areas of the north. The main gas producing area of the USSR is in the north, so
that the gas pipelines need to be constructed through frozen permafrost soils for
considerable distances from the deposits to the LNG processing plant. To prevent
disturbance of the permafrost and to ensure pipeline stability, gas cooling is used,
wherein a specified temperature regime is maintained by an associated gas cooling
station. However, deterioration of temperature control may occur after several
years of operation, so that the influence of this on the fauna and flora of the
area surrounding the pipeline must be evaluated when considering route alternatives.
Finally, factors associated with the installation process can have a major ef-
fect on the environment. For example, it is known that the noise of a gas turbine
unit can have a very serious influence not only on the maintenance personnel and
nearby inhabitants, but also on animals and their activities.
3.5. Connection with Regional Development Plans
The influence of gas pipeline construction on the population and economics of
a region should also be taken into consideration. The building of large LNG
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complexes requires several thousand specialists and workers, including some from
other countries, and the type of labor force required during the different construc-
tion phases may change sharply. The socio-economic influences on this influx on
the populated areas close to the construction area may be important and should be
carefully evaluated. When demolition of homes is necessary the problems of rehous-
ing and selection of new residential areas arise. A subject of serious concern
should be the provision of social and cultural facilities, services, etc., for the
maintenance personnel and their families. The creation of such an infrastructure
often involves considerable capital cost.
With balanced regard for all factors affecting the construction work and the
existing socio-economic structure of the construction area, some negative conse-
quences of construction may be compensated for by, for example, supplying gas to
the area; introducing a centralized heating system for homes and agricultural in-
stallations using the waste hot water from compressor station gas turbine cooling
systems; construction of new socio-cultural and life-enhancing facilities, communi-
cations systems, etc.
The influence of the gas pipeline on regional development plans often affects
public opinion. The attitude of the local administrative bodies and the local popu-
~ation towards the approaching construction of the pipeline and the positive mea-
sures taken by these groups when making decisions on the allocation of land, permis-
sion for the various construction processes, etc., can greatly speed up the comple-
tion of the design and surveying work, as well as the construction process itself.
Obviously this improves the economic viability of the project.
3.6. Construction Conditions
This factor is determined by geological, hydrological, topographic, and other
conditions of the gas pipeline route selected, as well as the availability of ex-
isting infrastructure, construction bases, etc., in the region. It is necessary
to consider it as an independent factor because it is important for the construc-
tion firm that also takes part in the process of route selection.
3.7. Population Safety
This is mainly ensured by keeping to the standard minimum distances from the
main gas pipeline axis to populated areas, buildings, farms, highways, etc. (the
guarding zone). However, this measure does not completely guarantee population
safety in emergency situations. There are two ways of reducing the potential risks:
(i) by increasing the reliability of technological systems and
installations;
(ii) by extending the gas pipeline guarding zone and distances from
the various systems to the nearest populated areas.
It should be noted that regulations concerning violations of the guarding zone, and
fire protection regulations in the USSR, are the most extensive in the world, but
this affects some economic factors.
3.8. Special permissions
Special permission requirements and limitations imposed by laws on the protec-
tion of nature, fish reserves, mineral resources, forestry, etc., and also regula-
tions issued by sanitation and fire protection authorities, etc., are very important
factors in pipeline route selection. Obviously when selecting a pipeline route it
is necessary to take into consideration many factors, some of which can be expressed
quantitatively, and others only in a qualitative, descriptive fashion. Initial data
on the route alternatives may be available to varying degrees of accuracy. The
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construction of a pipeline involves vast expenditure and a design stage that may
well continue for several years, yet the decision making cannot totally remove the
element of risk. It is necessary to take into account the degree of reliability
of gas pipeline maintenance, the conditions required for its safe functioning, its
influence on the environment, etc. Thus, pipeline construction represents a good
example of a multi-attribute task of decision making under conditions of risk and
uncertainty.
4. AN EXAMPLE OF ROUTE SELECTION
The selection of an optimal route for the Kutaisi-Sukhumi gas pipeline, to-
gether with its branch pipelines to Poti and Batumi for gas supply to domestic and
industrial consumers is considered here as a specific example. The basic factors
that were taken into account, and the selection procedure, were as follows.
At the preliminary stage of the study (research, field inspections, prelimi-
nary agreements) three possible routes were selected: piedmont, median, and mari-
time (see Figure 1). In addition to the main gas pipeline, prospective branch
pipeline routes to populated areas and other consumers were taken into considera-
tion.
The piedmont version was the shortest route, passing through spurs of the
Egriss ridge. The relief is heavily dissected with canyons carrying mountain
rivers, and the elevation varies by about 700 m. Small villages are located in
valleys along the route, so that demolition of homes would be inevitable. Other-
wise it would be necessary to go through quite complicated mountain conditions to
bypass them. Construction work would be fraught with the dangers of mud-laden tor-
rents with karst land forms and landslides, and would be aggravated by the need to
cut special "terraces" into steep slopes in order to move construction machinery
and for laying the pipeline. The route is quite distant from populated zones, and
the road system is not highly developed, so that pipeline surveillance and mainte-
nance would only be possible with the help of helicopters.
The median version passes ~hrough populated zones. The relief is gentle with
good geological conditions, and the road and rail systems are well developed. How-
ever, this version would require the greatest amount of building demolition and
destruction of cultivated areas; it would also be necessary to build numerous cross-
ings over artificial obstacles.
The mari~ime version was the shortest route, passing through the Kolkhida low-
land area. The relief is fairly flat with considerable areas of alder woodland,
and a well developed irrigation system. Possibly ~his route could have had to pass
through swamps, making conditions along the route difficult, especially during
rainy periods. This route would require very little building demolition or crop
destruction but the situation would be quite different along the prospective branch
pipelines. For the preliminary study the area to which the optimal route search
was to be restricted was defined on topographic maps drawn up from aerial photo-
graphs.
5. COMPARISON OF THE THREE VERSIONS
After the three basic alternatives for the pipeline route had been considered
it was possible to use correlation analysis using the criteria detailed above.
5.1. Presented Costs
The costs of construction depended upon the difficulties encountered in the
la~ing of the gas pipeline (swamps and river crossings, terrace cutting on the
mountain slopes, etc.) and its maintenance. Along with this, the costs arising
from demolition of buildings (if it was impossible to go round them) were taken into
consideration, as well as compensation payable if the route crossed cultivated land.
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Figure 1. Scheme of the alternative routes for the Kutaisi-Sukhumi gas pipeline.
Full line, maritime route; dotted line, median route; broken line, piedmont rou~e.
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These costs were determined by local administrators. According to the formula in
Section 3.1 the respective costs of the three versions were as follows (in millions
of roubles): maritime--8.9; median--9.5; and piedmont--lO.8.
The pipeline construction process can be divided into two stages. The first
stage is the construction of the main pipeline itself; the second is the laying of
branch pipelines (from the main pipe to the consumers). These stages are not sepa-
rated merely in time; they are also financed from different sources: the construc-
tion of branch pipelines is paid for by resources from the regional budgets. In
view of this, two cost criteria must be considered separately: capital costs for
the main pipeline, and those for the branch lines. Capital investment in the main
route and the construction of the branch lines were, respectively (in millions of
roubles): maritime route--31 and 9.5; median route--40 and 5; and piedmont route--
46 and 5.
5.2. Construction Times
According to existing standards for gas pipeline construction the construction
times for the different versions would not be expected to differ greatly. However,
based on experience, the piedmont version would probably take much more time because
of route laying difficulties. Along the maritime route construction delays might
occur in marshy areas and when crossing three big rivers.
5.3. Gas pipeline Maintenance
The most difficult route to maintain was recognized to be the piedmont version
since access can only be achieved with the use of helicopters. The easiest to
maintain would be the median version (good access to all sections of the pipeline) ,
and the maritime version would be more difficult to maintain than the median one
because of marshes.
Whatever the quality of the gas pipeline construction, however, the possibil-
ity of failure cannot be totally ruled out. Experience of pipeline maintenance
under other terrain conditions suggests that the maritime version would be the
least reliable, since a large section of the pipeline would run through an active
corrosion medium (swamps). Here, as the pipeline ages, the probability of failure
would increase. A similar assessment applied to the piedmont version, but for a
different reason: experience of maintenance in mountain regions shows that there
is a possibility of failure due to landslides and elimination of this is extremely
difficult.
The most reliable is the median version where laying conditions are most
favorable; it also has the best maintenance conditions which, in turn, increase
its reliability.
5.4. Influence on the Environment
Based on this criterion, the maritime route is the most preferable passing
through the marshy Kolkhida lowland area. The median route affects unique ancient
forests and, to a greater degree than the two other versions, passes through agricul-
tural land, citrus orchards, and tea plantations. Although the loss of this land
would be temporary (for the period of construction), it would still be very unde-
sirable.
The most undesirable route according to this criterion is the piedmont one.
The cutting of terraces along mountain slopes would adversely affect the environ-
ment, and landslides could occur in consequence. Besides this, the construction
of terraces would require greater amounts of land than are needed when laying pipe-
lines on flat areas.
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5.5. Connection with Regional Development Plan
The median and maritime routes would require much the same number of buildings
to be demolished (69 and 61 respectively), but the piedmont version would be con-
siderably worse (136). From the point of view of agricultural crop damage the
piedmont version was again the worst (129 hectares) followed by the median version
(102 hectares), and the maritime version (57 hectares). However, from the point of
view of regional plans for the gas supply to potential consumers the median version
was much better, so that this was the version favored by the local authorities.
5.6. Construction Conditions
According to this criterion, which is greatly dependent on the relief and
other physical characteristics of the district, the median version has the best as-
sessment. The maritime version was not so good and the piedmont version was much
worse.
5.8. Population Safety
Existing standards for gas pipeline laying define necessary minimum distances
from the pipeline to residential areas. Certainly, in the event of a pipeline fail-
ure, a gas leak resulting in fire risk can occur, but with the adopted working pres-
sures and materials used in the pipeline itself, failure is very unlikely. Never-
theless, this possibility must still be considered, and here the maritime version
is preferable, since it affects the smallest number of settlements, agricultural
lands, and highways. The other two versions are approximately equivalent.
The analysis given above allows us to e~clude the piedmont version from further
consideration. The two other versions require additional analysis and comparison.
6. SELECTION PROCEDURES
Of the parties involved in the actual pipeline selection procedures, four major
participants can be singled out. First, there is the customer organization, which
determines the design task and performs pipeline maintenance; secondly, there is
the organization that designs the pipeline; thirdly, any project has to be agreed
upon with the regional authorities, which represent the interests of the local pop-
ulation; and, finally, the route selection is influenced by the contractor who will
actually construct the pipeline.
When comparing the routes each participant in the selection process is primar-
ily concerned with a definite subset of the given criteria. For example, the project
organization draws attention to criteria C, CI, C2, IN, R, and S; regional author-
ities are concerned with criteria RP, IN, S, R, and C2; and the customer is natur-
ally interested in criteria C, M, R, and S. Finally, the contractor gives primary
consideration to criteria Tmin and S.
The selection procedures adopted are as follows. The project organization
analyzes all possible pipeline routes. Using the initial basic outlines, the route
direction in each version is then specified as that minimizing the presented costs.
Then the project organization selects a version and transfers this proposal together
with information about all the other versions to the customer and then to the re-
gional authorities for approval. The contractor's representatives also take part
in these discussions. In this example the project organization preferred the mari-
time version. When considering the various versions, the regional authorities
pointed out the comparison between the far superior evaluations of the median ver-
sion on criteria C2 , RP and R and the "best" evaluations of the maritime version on
criteria IN and S. During the analysis the regional authorities asked the customer
and the project organization to find new technical solutions to improve the evalua-
tions of the median version on criteria S and IN in order to bring them nearer to
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the maritime version evaulation. As a result of investigations towards this end
the project organization suggested the possibility of cutting down the guarding zone,
combined with an increase in reliability effected by increasing the thickness of
the pipe wall. It was found that with such an improvement the number of buildings
requiring demolition would be considerably reduced and the presented costs of the
median and maritime versions would become closer, despite the increase in the amount
of metal required and in the cost of the pipeline. In Table 1 evaluations of the
versions after incorporating this improvement are given.
with these improvements, all the participants in the selection process selected
the medium version as the most acceptable, and so this version was chosen.
The example given above is typical in gas pipeline route selection. Each ac-
tive participant in the procedure is at first guided by his own subset of criteria,
working through from the more to the less important ones. This is characteristic
of a satisfactory decision search according to Simon. we must point out that usu-
ally no single version is superior on all criteria; it is almost always necessary
to look for a compromise. A typical feature of an actual comparison process is a
series of attempts to revise some of the versions, in order to improve thier assess-
ments on particular criteria.
Table 1.
Order of preference
Item Criterion Designation Maritime Median Piedmont
(1) Presented costs
(million roubles) C 8.9 9.5 10.8
(lA) Cost of laying the main Cj
route (million roubles) 31 40 46
(4) Reliability of mainte- R
nance
(3) Convenience of mainte- M
nance
Cost of laying prospec-
tive pipeline branches
to consumers (million
roubles, minimum)
Construction time
9.5 5 5
Second best Best Worst
Inferior By far Inferior
the best
Best Inferior By far
the worst
Best Inferior By far
the worst
Second best By far Worst
the best
Second best Best By far
the worst
Best Inferior Inferior
B
s
T .
m~n
RP
INInfluence on the
environment
Construction
conditions
Population safety
Connection with re-
gional development
plans
(2)
(6)
(lB)
(8)
(5)
(7)
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7. GAS PIPELINE ROUTE SELECTION AND DECISION MAKING METHODS
From the point of view of decision theory the task considered in this paper
constitutes a decision making problem with several parties (organizations) making
dp.cisions and evaluating various decision possibilities on a number of criteria
(some criteria may be common to several versions). The number of versions consid-
ered is usually not large (2-5), but the criteria considered may be more numerous
(6-12), and these are usually qualitative. It is important to realize that each
gas pipeline is unique; therefore accurate quantitative data are not available, al-
though experienced experts can give estimates for comparison purposes.
Gas pipeline route selection also represents an example of the problem of de-
cision making involving a definite (although perhaps very insignificant) possibility
of failure. The question arises as to whether it is possible to estimate the prob-
ability of failure (small or large), and the possible number of victims and amount
of damage that would be caused by such a failure, etc.
Analysis of actual decision making procedures shows that. such estimates are
usually given in a wordy form. Naturally, these estimates are based on past expe-
rience, of breaches in normal pipeline operation as well as the conditions where
such breaches occur. When selecting a route the designers and customers try to
avoid such conditions, to take additional measures to increase reliability (e.g.,
by increasing the number of pipelines) and safety (perhaps changes in route direc-
tion) to an acceptable level by various amendments to the original plan. Usually
these estimates are lengthy descriptions of various past incidents; certainly ex-
isting information will affect the estimates.
The unique character of each route and the lack of available statistics makes
it impossible to obtain objective quantitative estimates. Subjective quantitative
estimates given by experts are unreliable for the following reasons:
(i) experts are not used to giving parameter estimates (except for cost)
in quantitative form;
(ii) it is difficult to separte the expert's past experience from his
understanding of the peculiarities of the system he is investigating.
The great expenditure involved in pipeline construction makes the problem of
perfection of the selection procedure very important. The question then arises of
what can be achieved by utilizing the various methods of decision making to obtain
a solution to the given problem and which methods are appropriate when the task
peculiarities are taken into account.
Naturally, this question may be considered at two levels: that of the indi-
vidual decision maker; and that of the decision making group. Because of the pecu-
liarities of this decision making problem involving several decision makers, it is
our opinion that the methods for determining the common utility of alternative de-
cisions are often unsuitable, e.g., expected utility (Fishburn 1970), and multi-
attribute utility theory (MacCrimmon and Sin 1974). There are two factors that
haml'er the use of these methods:
(i) the difficulty in obtaining information in a quantitative form;
(ii) the small number of decision alternatives; these make the procedure
of comparison less labor-consuming than measuring the utility of
each of them.
With a small number of alternatives, trade-off analyses are more appropriate
(Keeney and Ral£fa 1976); these enable qualitative estimates of alternatives to be
used, especially in comparisons of their "character". Sel<ection of the best ver-
sion is performed through binary comparisons of the various versions, in which es-
timates for separate criteria are compared.
Studies of such procedures have shown the possibility of intransitiveness
appearing (Tversky 1969). These studies have also shown that when using binary
comparisons of versions involving estimates for numerous criteria, people tend to
utilize simplified heuristics, of which the following should be mentioned: (a)
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consideration of criteria in turn; (b) disregarding of some criteria; (c) simple
calculation of the number of criteria for which one version is found to be superior
to another. Although such simplified heuristics are of great value, in some cases
they can lead to intransitiveness. However, with the small number of versions
considered, this possibility is not great, so that cases where nontransitiveness
appear can be detected and eliminated fairly easily. Data from descriptive studies
show which requirements have to be met by trade-off analyses in order to avoid the
distortions induced by the limits of human cognitive ability in multi-dimensional
information processing.
In order to avoid undesirable heuristics it is necessary for decision makers
to consider information in sections, for instance, by comparing conflicting data on
only two criteria at a time (Larichev and Kozhukharov 1979). Also, if the compari-
son system is biased then it is desirable for the decision makers to consider using
a different one. It is also desirable to hasten the comparison process by agreeing
quickly on the necessity of a compromise between competing aims. Comparison pro-
cedures should include methods of checking information even where there appears to
be no discrepancy.
possible methods of improvement of the procedures for perference correlation
should be investigated. The primary efforts in the elaboration of route alterna-
tives are made by the designers, who are also the first to carry out comparisons.
From the point of view of the rationality of the whole process of decision making,
it is desirable for the organization designer to take into consideration the whole
set of estimation criteria for the various alternatives, together with any ideas
put forward by other participants. In the final analysis, the decision maker (or
designer) introduces his own preferences into the comparisons even when taking into
account all the criteria. However, preliminary estimation of the viewpoints of the
other decision makers will help the designer to control better the development of
a proposed version. Anticipating objections, a decision maker can show in advance
all the negative consequences of the selection of other versions, and this improves
the selection process.
8. CONCLUSION
Many problems of decision making where risk and uncertainty are involved arise
in the world around us, where a possibility of major failure exists; particularly
problems of natural gas output, transport, liquefaction, and storage. Any possi-
bility of real improvement in the processes of decision making where risk and un-
certainty are involved should be used. In an attempt to find such a possibility,
certain methods can be applied to elaborate the decision making methods. A rational
basis for such methods is a compromise between descriptive and normative approaches.
Knowledge of information available and human limitations should form the basis of
normative decision making methods.
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Worldwide Standards and Practices for Siting
LNG and LPG Facilities: A Comparison
Elisabeth M. Drake and Marian H. Long
Risk Analysis Group, Arthur D. Little Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
1. INTRODUCTION
Some perspective on the present codes and standards used for the siting, design,
and operation of hazardous material facilities can be gained by looking at some of
the factors influencing their evolution. Industry has a basic need for some stand-
ards that will, as a minimum,
(i) ensure that the facility will operate reliably, thus protecting the
investment in the facility and the profits from its operation;
(ii) prevent less responsible members of industry from operating in a
manner that could give the industry a bad name;
(iii) provide an environment in which employees can work without fear; and
(iv) maintuin a good corporate image.
Since the trade-offs between safety and profitability are difficultto.make and
since, after a reasonable safety level is achieved, incremental safety becomes in-
creasingly expensive, members of industry sectors tend to cooperate in establishing
minimum standards. In the USA, groups such as the National Fire Protection Associ-
ation (NFPA) and the American Petroleum Association (API) formed committees com-
prised of member representatives to establish minimum industry standards. These
groups did a good job considering the difficulty of their task, and remained active
to update standards as knowledge increased and new technology developed.
For example, the oldest and most widely employed liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)-
or propane/butane mixtures--standards in the world are NFPA 58, Storage and Handling
of Liquefied Petroleum Gases, and NFPA 59, Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petro-
leum Gases at Utility Gas Plants. Standard No. 58 for LPG was first adopted by the
NFPA in 1932. Between 1932 and 1940, the rapidly growing use of LPG led to separate
NFPA standards for different LPG applications. In 1940, each of these was combined
into the single standard No. 58. The current version is the 1979 edition. Standard
No. 59, which applies to LPG at utility gas plants, was originally developed in
1949 and is the product of a cooperative effort between the American Gas Association
(AGA) and the NFPA.
However, people are imperfect and committees tend to operate in a somewhat ran-
dom manner, as all of us who have served on committees know. Thus, unfortunately,
some changes in codes, standards, and practices are due to the occurrence of unex-
pected accidents. Accidents also occur randomly, so it is not surprising that in-
dustry standards are somewhat uneven in the levels of safety provided. A further
complication is the fact that larger companies tend to control the highest level of
expertise and often have different attitudes framsmaller companies who are less
sophisticated and may bend industry standards either inadvertently or through a
desire to stay in business. The possibility also exists that larger companies can
hurt the competitive position of responsible smaller companies by enacting overly
stringent industry standards.
*The views expressed in this paper are based on personal experiences and may not be
accurate in some details, although the authors believe them to be generally valid.
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If the industry picture is not complex enough, consider the situation when
local, state, and federal governments get involved. Industry operates to protect
its various self-interests, and governmental groups do likewise. The public, which
has the least knowledge about the technology involved, is concerned about its safe-
ty and is distrustful of both industry and politicians. Finally, the press and TV
dwell on sensationalism to promote their own interests. This pot pourri of interest
groups and circumstances plays an important role in the evolution of the codes and
standards for hazardous materials.
2. USE AND PROPERTIES OF LNG AND LPG
As natural gas became an increasingly desirable fuel in the USA, a pipeline
system was developed between producing and consuming areas. However, in winter,
demand was much greater than it was in summer, and an economic design of pipeline
systems mitigated against design for peak capacity. Thus pipelines were designed
for average winter use loads and other means of obtaining supplemental fuel for
peak loads were found. These included storage of gas in large atmospheric pressure
holders or use of propane-air mixtures to the extent that could be tolerated with-
out affecting the burning characteristics of the mixture. Another option was to
store liquefied natural gas (LNG) during the summer (although not as efficient as
water, which is about 1000 times more dense in its liquid phase than vapor, LNG is
about 600 times more dense than natural gas vapor) in well insulated storage tanks
operating at slightly above atmospheric pressure and a temperature of -162o C.
At atmospheric pressure, propane liquefies around -40o C and can be held at
ambient temperature as a liquid at pressures of around 10 bars (the pressure in-
creases as ambient temperature increases). Table 1 shows typical properties of LNG,
LPG, and similar fuels. Most of us are familiar with pressurized LPG which is widely
used as a fuel by people in areas not served by natural gas distribution systems,
and for cooking and heating in recreational vehicles. LPG can also be used as an
alternative fuel for automobiles.
Table 1. Typical properties of some fuels.
Typical
light
Methane Ethylene Ethane Propane n-butane gasoline
Chemical formula CH4 C2H4 C2H6 C3H8 C4HIO c5+
Molecular weight 16 28 30 44 58 -86
Atmospheric boiling
-162 -104 -89 -42 0 47temperature (OC)
Liquid density at
atmospheric boiling 427 567 544 583 602 656
point (kgjm 3 )
Vapor density at
atmospheric boiling 1. 75 2.09 2.06 2.43 2.71 3.0
point (kgjm 3 )
Vapor pressure (atm)
-50 18 5 -1
at 500 C n.a. n.a.
Lower and upper
flammable limits in
air (mol. %) 5-15 3.1-32 3.0-12.5 2.1-9.5 1. 9-8.5 1-7
I
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Typically, "LNG" refers to mixtures of the fuels in Table 1 where methane is
the primary component; "LPG" generally refers to mixtures that are primarily pro-
pane and/or butane. Ethane and ethylene are often handled separately since ethylene
is an important chemical feedstock.
These hydrocarbon gases are often found in association with oil. Oil produc-
tion in more remote areas often involves the flaring of large quantities of associ-
ated gas. As the need for energy grew, incentives developed for utilizing this gas.
Plans for liquefaction of gas for marine transport to consuming countries developed;
large projects involving LNG shipments to Europe, Japan, and the us evolved; and
shipment of refrigerated LPG became more common. While uninsulated, pressurized
storage of LPG is feasible for relatively small quantities of fuel, quantities in
excess of a few thousand cubic meters (liquid) are more economically transported
as a low-temperature liquid at just above atmospheric pressure. Most large marine
transportation projects involve refrigerated LPG or LNG.
3. DEVELOPMENT OF LNG REGULATIONS IN THE US
In 1941, the East Ohio Gas Company tried a pioneering experiment. They built
a LNG peak-shaving facility in Cleveland, Jhio. The project was successful and ad-
ditional tanks were built--in spite of wartime shortages of nickel, a key component
in the steel alloy required for the low storage temperature. In 1944, however, one
of the newest tanks failed due to brittle metallurgical fracture. The spilling
cold liquid overflowed dikes designed for slow leaks, spread rapidly into the ad-
jacent street about 20 m away, boiled rapidly, and vaporized. The vapors mixed
with air and soon reached a source of ignition causing a fire in which 128 people
died--most of them gas company workers in a building near the storage tank. This
disaster aroused great concern, both from the public, government groups, and the
gas industry eager to try the new technology. Nearly two decades passed before
this form of natural gas system peak-shaving was tried again.
In the interim, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
the Department of Defense (DOD) became interested in cryogenic (low-temperature)
rocket fuels and oxidizers. Much research was conducted into metals capable of con-
taining liquid hydrogen (normal boiling point -253 0 C) and liquid oxygen (normal
boilding point -1840 C). This work provided information on improved cryogenic
materials and procedures for safe handling of cryogens. While the storage of liquid
oxygen required stainless steel (18 percent nickel), it was found that warmer LNG
storage required 9 percent nickel steel--the steel at Cleveland had been about 3.5
percent nickel.
The other hazardous materials industries continued to operate along the guide-
lines of industry standards. with the increase in trucking and pipelining, as well
as the deterioration of the rail system, the number of hazardous material trans-
portation accidents increased. Concern tended to shift toward public sector regu-
latory control. The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 gave the US Department
of Transportation (DOT) responsibility for natural gas pipelining and facilities
attached to the system. Thus, DOT has control over LNG facilities connected to the
natural gas pipeline networks. The US Coast Guard (USCG) was given jurisdiction
over all marine shipments including those involving a wide variety of toxic, flam-
mable, and explosive materials.
In the 1960s, the need for peak-shaving gas grew to the point where gas com-
panies again started constructing LNG facilities. For many years, LNG facilities
were designed to meet the requirements of NFPA 59A. This was periodically revised
and updated by its advisory committee, which included representatives of the gas
industry, insurance companies, federal agencies, manufacturers and consulting firms.
NFPA 59A was intended to be a minimum standard that would provide a basis for safe
design of LNG peak-shaving plants, and recently it has been amplified to include
some additional requirements for import terminals. In a number of respects, the
NFPA 59A code is more stringent than codes covering the construction of facilities
for a wide range of flammable and/or toxic hazardous materials.
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A few state and local authorities with jurisdiction over LNG facilities adop-
ted regulations which duplicated or amplified the requirements of NFPA 59A. Even
before the adoption of the first version of NFPA 59A (1967 edition), the
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities issued regulations closely following
the NFPA 59A draft code. Also, the New York City Fire Department (NYCFD) set re-
quirements for LNG facilities built in New York city which significantly exceeded
the NFPA 59A standards with regard to diking and buffer zone requirements for LNG
storage systems. The NYCFD indicated that they felt that more stringent require-
ments were appropriate for LNG facilities sited in heavily congested areas.
In the early 1970s public and regulatory concern began to be voiced about LNG
safety, but it is somewhat ironic that this concern arose in the aftermath of a
tragic accident in Staten Island, New York, in 1972. The accident involved 40 con-
struction workers who were making repairs on the inside of an empty LNG tank when
ignition of flammable insulation in the tank occurred. While the accident did not
compromise public safety, it nevertheless greatly amplified public and political
concerns about LNG.
At the time of the accident, almost all the LNG facilities in the US were de-
signed for peak-shaving purposes. The two exceptions were an export terminal in
Alaska and a relatively small-scale import terminal in Massachusetts. However,
several major import projects were in various stages of development and public
anxiety turned to large LNG ships visiting major US ports to supply baseload termi-
nals.
In response to public concern, regulatory activity began to increase. The
Office of Pipeline Safety (now part of the Materials Transportation Bureau--MTB)
in the US Department of Transportation (DOT) had responsibility for LNG facilities
under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968. In October 1972, DOT adopted
NFPA 59A (1971 edition) as an interim federal standard and started to develop their
own regulat~ons. The 1972 edition was subsequently adopted. A report summarizing
existing LNG regulations, the status of LNG safety research, issues of concern
about LNG safety, and the applicability of risk management methods to LNG facili-
ties was prepared by Arthur D. Little, Inc. for DOT in 1974. This report was in-
tended to provide DOT with a database from which they could proceed in developing
federal LNG safety standards. Probably because of the complexity and controversial
nature of the issues as well as limited internal resources, the DOT Office of Pipe-
line Safety Operations (OPSO) did not publish the Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (ANPRM) until April 1977. In the introductory material to the OPSO ANPRM,
DOT stated that the notice was a step in the developmental process to produce per-
manent federal regulations and that:
"Although this notice is not a proposal to amend the present standards,
it contains a comprehensive set of draft regulations which are intended
to serve as a basis for public comment and participation in identifica-
tion of LNG safety problems and the development of appropriate regulatory
solutions to those problems, considering all reasonable alternatives.
Comments to this notice should assure that if a new Part 193 is adopted,
it is founded on a broad source of information."
The OPSO ANPRM served its purpose in arousing comment and many groups and indi-
viduals submitted comments which in a number of cases identified technical errors
or inconsistencies. Unfortunately, many state, local, and even international regu-
latory groups without much depth of technical expertise in LNG viewed this document
as a new US federal regulation. They were further confused, on the one hand, by
some industry groups who took a strong position against the OPSO ANPRM and argued
that the existing NFPA 59A standards were completely satifactory, and on the other
hand, by groups who claimed that the NFPA 59A code was an industry code and that
did not adequately represent public concern for their own safety. This latter view
was reinforced by varying degrees in two reports, one prepared by the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) and another by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). It
was the GAO report which first publicly grouped LPG with LNG and gave these materi-
als the general name of liquefied energy gases (LEG).
III
J
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Regulatory groups at the state level started to respond to the circumstances.
California, Massachusetts, and New York are of particular interest in providing an
overview. In each of these states, a legislative action stimulated development of
further regulations governing siting criteria and safety.
New York. The New York Department of Environmental Quality (NYDEQ) was given
a lead role in establishing siting criteria, and published a draft regulation which
essentially combined the NYCFD requirements and those of the OPSO ANPRM. The re-
sult was a voluminous and confusing document. Further action is still pending.
Massachusetts. An Energy Facilities Siting Council (EFSC) was established and
was given prime responsibility for the siting of LNG facilities in the Commonwealth.
The EFSC subsequently promulgated LNG facility siting guidelines, the requirements
of which are such that it is unlikely that a new LNG facility will be built in
Massachusetts. The EFSC has stated that their guidelines are an interim measure
and that they planned to accept new federal regulations if and when such were pro-
mulgated. They have not yet done so.
California. The California Public utilities Commission (CPUC) was directed to
prepare LNG safety regulations as part of the LNG Terminal Act of 1977. A compre-
hensive set of regulations has been prepared, following the ANPRM format but differ-
ing substantially from the ANPRM in a number of aspects. These rules contain a
particularly comprehensive set of seismic design requirements.
Meanwhile, back in Washington, DC, the US Coast Guard (USCG) was working on
safety standards for waterfront LNG facilities under the authority of the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972. In February 1978, the USCG and MTB (both part of the
DOT) signed a memorandum of understanding clarifying the split in jurisdiction be-
tween the two agencies. In this agreement, MTB would have jurisdiction over the
shore-based portion of waterfront facilities with the exception of fire protection
and security systems which were to be the responsibility of the USCG.
In April 1979, MTB published a notice of proposed rulemaking and later pub-
lished final rules. The rules relating to siting, design, and construction were
promulgated on 30 January 1980 with existing facilities "grandfathered" unless they
were significantly altered by increasing the storage capacity or by relocation. On
28 August 1980, additional changes in the siting, design, and construction standards
were issued by MTB, improving and clarifying certain requirements, especially in
the area of seismic design. New rules covering operations, maintenance, and secur-
ity of LNG facilities were enacted on 23 October 1980, applicable to both new and
existing facilities. An implementation period was allowed for existing facilities.
with the new US federal LNG regulations in force, some of the states and
localities which developed their own rules are now in the process of reviewing them
and deciding whether or not to rely on the federal standard.
4. LPG STANDARDS IN THE US
In the US, LPG ranks fourth in supplying the nation's energy needs with an
annual consumption of about 70 million m3 • The consumers, who include homes, farms,
individuals, businesses, and government groups, total approximately 60 million
(1977) .
LPG is easily stored, transported, and regulated, and is employed for a variety
of tasks. The homeowner uses it to warm his home, heat water, and cook food. It
is particularly practical in rural areas: on farms, it is used in crop drying, de-
foliation, pig breeding, and frost protection. In industry, it is often used for
soldering, cutting, heat treating, and vulcanizing. It is valuable as an engine
fuel as it has minimal emissions.
The distribution of LPG throughout the US involves more than 86 000 people,
using 225 000 miles of cross-country pipelines, 25 000 transport and delivery trucks,
22 000 railroad tank cars, 250 primary storage facilities with a capacity of 7 bil-
lion gallons, a fleet of 370 barges and tankers, 8000 bulk storage and distribution
points and 25 000 retail outlets. The LPG distributed is produced by more than 200
oil and gas companies (1977)*.
*Source: Energy Information Administration.
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As indicated in the Introduction, LPG facilities in the US are currently con-
structed to meet NFPA standards which in turn reference design standards of the API
and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). In addition, requirements
of local building codes must be met.
Traditionally, design against natural disasters at facilities for handling
most flammable and toxic materials has been based on building code criteria. The
building code relies on past observations of natural phenomena in particular local-
ities. Often the observation period is in the range of 20-50 years with less pre-
cise information available for up to 100 years or so. The building codes typically
include design conditions for wind, seismic, and snow loads. Because the design
conditions based on limited historic data do occasionally occur, safety factors are
incorporated in the design codes to provide additional margins of safety for these
and other reasons. Considering the large number of hazardous material storage tanks
in the US and the rarity with which failures of these tanks occur due to natural
disasters, the building code criteria seem to be generally acceptable at present.
However, the DOT has indicated future plans for developing federal safety regula-
tions pertaining to LPG facilities.
5. COMPARISON OF LNG AND LPG STANDARDS IN THE US
At the present time, US federal LNG standards are considerably more stringent
than standards for LPG (or a wide variety of other hazardous materials). For ex-
ample, in the past decade, there has been a growing trend to characterize natural
phenomena in probabilistic terms related to an expected frequency of occurrence of
events of various levels of severity. The US Geological Survey (USGS) has issued
a draft for a new seismic design criteria map for the US which may replace current
building code seismic criteria. The USGS map presents seismic acceleration design
levels in terms of percentages of gravitational acceleration. The levels are chosen
so that at any location there is a 90 percent probability that the design level
will not be exceeded in 50 years. This is equivalent to an event with an annual
probability of about 2.1 x 10- 3 per year, or an expected return interval of 475
years. In the accompanying text, the USGS comments that a more stringent criterion
should be applied to the seismic design of critical structures like major dams or
nuclear containment vessels. USGS mentions that a criterion of a 99.5 percent
chance of not being exceeded in 50 years might be appropriate. This event has a
10- 4 per year probability and an expected return interval of 9975 years.
While most petrochemical facilities, including LPG, are designed to existing
building codes, storage tanks at LNG facilities must be designed for a 10 000 year
return interval for winds or seismic events. A minimum design wind of 200 mph is
to be used if data are not available to determine the 10 000 year wind speed. Thus,
an LNG storage tank is required to withstand at least 200 mph winds, while LPG and
other typical fuel storage tanks may be designed in accordance with a building code
for 100 mph winds. In comparison, a nuclear containment vessel must be designed
for 300 mph winds (or 360 mph in highly seismic zones) associated with an unusually
severe tornado. The DOT LNG regulations are somewhat inconsistent in that design
for flooding is only based on the worst occurrence in a 100-year period.
Another area of comparison relates to buffer zone requirements. The DOT regu-
lations require diking of all LNG storage tanks with a separation distance between
the dike edge and the property line equal to [lA, where A is the dike area and [
ranges from 0.8 (minimum) to 3 if the adjacent area is a place of outdoor public
assembly (beaches, playgrounds, theaters, etc.). The NFPA code for LNG uses a
single factor of 0.8 for the buffer zone. For LPG, several standards apply to buf-
fer zone requirements:
(i) NFPA 58 states the minimum dj.stance that an above ground or an under-
ground container may be installed from "important buildings" or an
adjoining property line, but does not consider containers larger than
455m 3 "Important buildings" are not defined.
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(ii) NFPA 59 details such distance information for nonrefrigerated and
refrigerated above ground containers, respectively. For containers
larger than 378m 3 capacity, the distance from the container to the
nearest important building not associated with the LPG plant or to
an active property line is 121m. Lesser distances are specified for
smaller quantities.
(iii) API 2510, Design and Construction of LP-Gas Installations at Marine
and Pipeline Terminals, Natural Gas Processing Plants, Refineries,
Petrochemical Plants, and Tank Farms, states the minimum distance
from an adjoining property to an LPG container for both refrigerated
and unrefrigerated tanks. For the latter with a capacity above
2000m 3 , the distance is 60m. For refrigerated tanks, the minimum
distance from adjoining property and the tanks is a distance of l~
times the tank diameter or 60m, whichever is less.
The standards for LPG do not address the question of potentially flammable vapor
clouds crossing a property line, while the DOT LNG standards do. Design accidents
are specified for which buffer zones must be provided to prevent flammable vapor
(defined as 2.5 percent methane or half the lower flammable limit) from crossing
land not under the control of the facility owner. The design accident involves the
drainage of a full storage tank contents through the largest bottom piping penetra-
tion on the tank or, for tanks with all piping through the roof, a ten-minute spill
at the maximum flow rate. A similar, but less severe, requirement is in the NFPA
59A, 1979 edition.
In the area of marine transport of LNG and refrigerated LPG, the USCG rules
treat the two materials equivalently (except for cargo design temperatures), re-
quiring double hulls and bottoms as well as special USCG controls for ships entering
US ports.
6. LNG AND LPG STANDARDS OUTSIDE THE US
Most European countries and Japan have a procedure where the owner of a pro-
posed hazardous facility (LNG, LPG, or various other flammable or toxic materials)
must apply to a local or regional group for permission to proceed with construction.
In the UK, an applicant provides information on a proposed project design and poten-
tial impacts--environmental, safety, and societal. Initially, the regional group
will give outline planning permission after public hearings if the project seems
desirable. Conditions may be attached to this planning permission which may impose
further requirements such as an independent safety audit conducted to the satisfac-
tion of the Health and Safety Executive. These conditions may also add some re-
quirements which exceed normal industry practices and codes.
Countries like New Zealand and Australia tend to follow the UK practice of ap-
plication to local authorities, public hearings, and planning permission. In Japan,
a similar system also seems to be followed, with the local authority often assem-
bling an advisory panel of experts to assist them in more complicated technical
issues.
In September 1980, West Germany passed a chemicals act with the purpose of pro-
tecting man and the environment from the harmful effects of dangerous substances
(defined as toxic, flammable, corrosive, explosive, carcinogenic, etc). A manufac-
turer of a new dangerous substance is required to notify the government at least
45 days before initial circulation of the product. (Parallel requirements are being
developed among other member countries which are of the European Communities.) The
government has the authority to prohibit or limit the use of substances creating
undue risk to human life, health, or the environment. The Bundesrat has also
authorized the development of regulations to cover occupational and public safety
with respect to dangerous sUbstances. Regulations covering marine transport do not
vary very much worldwide, since the International Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) has adopted standards which are essentially the same as those of the USCG.
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7. DETAILED REGULATIONS FOR LNG AND LPG
For LNG, most countries have followed US practice, generally adopting NFPA 59A
as the basic standard. In some countries, such as the UK, NFPA was adapted to ref-
erence British standards in lieu of API and ASME standards.
Many countries are now pondering the US DOT LNG regulations; portions of these
new regulations--notably the flammable vapor exclusion zone and seismic and wind
design--exceed past practice and present industry and regulatory practice for a
variety of other hazardous materials. For example, in Japan, LNG facilities are
now designed for flammable vapor dispersion buffer zones, but a three minute design
spill is used (as compared with 10 minutes in DOT) and vapors at the property must
be diluted to a 5 percent concentration (2.5 percent in DOT). To the authors'
knowledge, no major facility has yet been built or planned in the US which fully
meets the new DOT LNG regulations.
There are several British codes and standards which govern LPG operations. In
1973, the Department of Employment published a Health and Safety at Work (HSW) code
entitled The Storage of Liquefied Petroleum Gas at Factories which specifically ad-
dresses precautions for storage and handling, ignition source control and fire pro-
tection. In 1970, Liquefied Flammable Gases Storage and Handling--Engineering
Codes and Regulations was published by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., and the
Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (ROSPA). Addressed in these regula-
tions are safety distances for location and spacing, ignition source control,
pressure relief design, fire protection, and road, rail, and ship tanker loading
and unloading. The Liquefied Petroleum Gas safety Code, which is part 9 of the
Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry, was
jointly prepared by the Institute of Petroleum, the Institution of Gas Engineers,
and the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical Committee. First pUblished in
1967, it was last revised in 1975, and specifies storage tank design and location,
fire protection, and rail tank car design. Other UK codes and standards pertaining
to LPG include Safety Recommendation IGE/SR/ 6--Liquefied Petroleum Gases published
by the Institute of Gas Engineers, and the Code and Practice for the Storage of
Liquefied Petroleum Gas at Fixed Installations published by the Home Office.
The Standards Association of Australia has published Standard No. 1596--Rules
for the Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases. First published in 1973,
it was last reprinted in 1978, and specifies detailed regulations and requirements
for both above ground and underground storage tanks, rail tank cars, and liquid
transfer.
The New Zealand Fire Service has published an information guide, The Safe
Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Engineering Procedures, which includes in-
formation on purging and ventilation, multi-mode transportation, cooling water ap-
plication, container failures, the boiling liquid, expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE)
operational procedures, fire prevention, and fire protection.
8. FURTHER EVOLUTION OF LNG AND LPG STANDARDS
Standards will continue to evolve as analysis or occurrence of accidents indi-
cate weaknesses in the present requirements. An accident at the Cove Point, Mary-
land, LNG import terminal in October 1979 uncovered a deficiency in the design of
certain seals in electrical systems. Changes are now being made in the NFPA codes
and the National Electric Code to correct the ueficiency.
Only a few major accidents have related to the extensive worldwide operations
involving LPG energy storage and transportation--the most serious involved rail or
road transport accidents. The US Department of Transportation is now requiring the
use of head shields on LPG rail tank cars to prevent coupler punctures during de-
railments. In addition, LPG rail cars are now being coated with a fire-protective
material to reduce the likelihood of "BLEVE-type" accidents, which usually occur
after an LPG tank has been immersed in a fire for several minutes or more.
Following a refrigerated LPG tank failure in Qatar, a careful investigation
of the accident was conducted and several changes were made in the draft British
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Institute of Petroleum code specifications to which the tank was built. One of the
changes brought metallurgical testing requirements into conformance to the somewhat
more stringent US API and ASTM codes. In addition, we understand the British code
now requires 100 percent hydrostatic testing of a refrigerated LPG storage tank be-
fore it is commissioned. This latter requirement is more stringent than that of
the API code, which allows a partial hydrostatic test if the tank foundation (as
designed for normal operating stress loadings) cannot take the loadings for a 100
percent hydrostatic test. The API code is currently being revised for LPG.
In the recent past, Shell International has proposed a double-integrity con-
tainment system for refrigerated LPG and LNG storage tanks in areas where a serious
tank problem has potential to threaten pUblic safety. The secondary containment
system would be designed to withstand catastrophic failure of the primary container.
There are, however, differences of opinion within the industry as to the need for
designing the storage system to withstand a catastrophic failure of the primary
containment vessel. This controversy is centered on the ability to be assured that
the material of the primary containment vessel has crack arrest properties, which
would preclude the possibility of the vessel unzippering. Work on the metallurgical
properties of low-temperature materials is currently being conducted in order to
resolve these questions.
While it is rare that regulations are ever made less stringent, it is clear
that many of the present US regulations covering LNG are inconsistent--in terms of
actual hazards--with rules for LPG and other hazardous materials. After consider-
ing the problems and deficiencies in previous attempts to assess economic impacts
and benefits of new or proposed regulations, the question of how this may be done
better arises. This is a difficult problem and one that is properly in the province
of the regulatory agencies. It seems reasonable that new regulations should be de-
veloped with due regard to the fact that consumers are paying the costs of making
risks acceptably low to abuttors of hazardous material facilities. We cannot afford
zero risk and, in fact, do not require zero risk for a wide range of activities and
exposures which we accept routinely. The public is now becoming increasingly aware
of a whole spectrum of risks produced by our industrial sector, including problems
with pollutants, carcinogens, hazardous waste disposal, toxic and flammable materi-
als handling, etc. It will be costly to upgrade public safety, and we should spend
our money wisely. I suggest that a decision maker might attempt to assess present
levels (including ranges) of risks to which the public is exposed. Presumably the
public is concerned that these levels are not adequate in a number of areas. Thus,
as a society, we should attempt to identify risks that are currently significantly
higher than the accepted range and attempt to reduce such risks through corrective
measures which might include regulatory or industry actions, provision of incentives
or penalties, etc. In addition, our standard of living and economic status is high
enough that we can probably afford to push general levels of safety higher than
they are at present.
In our opinion, it is a mistake to attempt to develop regulations on the pre-
mise that there is some remote potential for catastrophe, if the probability of the
remote event is not also considered. Also, in focusing on the extremely rare event
the control of some lesser but more likely risks may be overlooked. We are very
aware of the large uncertainties in setting probability levels for very rate events.
Nevertheless, such estimates--along with estimates of uncertainties--are useful
tools in the decision process.
Whether they formally quantify probabilities or not, the regulatory decision
makers are already estimating risks intuitively when maximum credible or design
accidents are established. Only by comparing risks can decision makers determine
whether a need for more stringent measures exists. If the risk levels seem to be
too high, risk reduction measures and costs should be evaluated. Conversely, it is
hoped that regulatory decision makers will also have the courage to amend, or adopt
in modified form, regulations which are excessively stringent and increase consumer
costs unnecessarily.
Since the existing discrepancies in regulations are probably due mostly to per-
ceptions of risk rather than to true relative hazards, both the public and its rep-
resentatives will have to be made more knowledgeable about hazardous material risks.
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This is difficult to do without alarming people about hazards of which they might
not be aware, but probably will be rquired if society is to find a reasonable
balance between safety and costs to consumers.
Further, it seems that different localities or countries may have different
existing background risks and different attitudes toward acceptable safety. At the
most local level, there is the danger that each town may ban all hazardous facili-
ties but hope that they will be located nearby so their economic benefits may be
enjoyed. Thus, the approach of decision making in a national or regional forum
appears to be the best solution.
Chapter 3
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1. INTRODUCTION
My so far modest share in the field of risk research (which is by no means
something clearly defined and homogeneous) has been to introduce some basic and, to
my mind, essential information about political, economic, and social aspects under-
lying risk generation and risk taking, decisions, and reflections on risk (Ronge
1980). I held it necessary to remind risk researchers that these "fundamentals" of
their analyses were still mainly technical in character at that time. This intro-
duction of sociological knowldge was intended to promote risk reflections and de-
c~s~ons, i.e., to make them more realistic and effective. My present intention is
different, and at first it will appear to be more external and less helpful. I am
going to bring into risk debates--which, I suspect, have integrated some sociologi-
cal thinking meanwhile--some concrete information about society which, to my mind,
must affect risk decision making in the first instance, and risk research in the
second.
In other words, my first contact with risk research was determined by the sup-
position that, with respect to single-risk studies, it was lacking sociological
knowledge and reflection in general. My present intervention is based on the belief
that drastic changes are occurring within society (i.e., western, industrialized,
capitalist countries with a special focus on the FRG) which affect, or should affect,
risk decision making, and risk analysis as such, i.e., as a scientific undertaking
that aims to rationalize social processes.
Although this argument must appear to be negative at first sight, in fact it
is not. I admit that my arguments will not lead to immediate improvements in risk
analyses and decisions, yet they may be useful in explaining a little of what I see
currently happening to risk research, namely the experience and frustrating feeling
of being unable to promote effectively risk decision making. I shall therefore ad-
dress self-reflections and self-consciousness in risk research which in the long
run will also affect its output and impact.
To put my message more concisely, the same social developments that once led
to the need for, and the "invention" of, risk research may--it is still taking
place--function as barriers to the immediate "execution" of scientific risk know-
ledge, i.e., its transfer into political decisions with the result of improving
society's risk taking. Risk research (necessarily) aims at being, or at least sup-
porting, the master of social processes, but it is in fact their victim. Only an
external perspective can reveal this dilemma.
2. FROM TECHNICAL TO ECONOMIC RISK ANALYSIS
Let me start with some sketchy remarks on the recent development of risk re-
search. That questions of risk (or safety) are to be treated in terms of decision
making has recently become widely accepted in the field of risk research. Cost-
benefit analysis is presented as an adequate tool to reduce risk of all kinds (cf.
Conrad and Kresbach-Gnath 1980, p55). The fact that there are limited resources
that can be spent for alternative purposes thus leads us to the point where we have
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to consider and compare the marginal costs. In business administration, for example,
there are intensive discussions about how to integrate the costs of risK analysis
into the overall cost-benefit analysis of investment (Schindel 1978). This can be
expected to become a necessary consequence for every kind of risk analysis.
This development from a purely natural science perspective--with its interest
in comparative probabilities of accidents*-towards an economic view of risks I re-
gard as an essential step forward. It is, however, only one step in the right di-
rection. What is missing still is the systematic consideration of these peculiari-
ties that work in social or political decision making.** Economic rationality is
far from being a social one; on the contrary, it is adequate only for one of society's
sUbsystems (the economy)--and even this is in dispute. From a societal point of
view, economic rationality is an inadequate abstraction, since it
(i) takes certain ends (such as long-term optimization of profits) for
granted that are by no means common to everyone in society, or to
society as a whole;
(ii) presupposes one particular medium of "social exchange" (money) that
is by no means the only existing within society;
(iii) connects ends and means in a very straightforward way, thus ignoring
a lot of (empirical) social obstacles which consequently, but un-
justly, appear to be "irrational" from an economic point of view;
(iv) presupposes a coherent (normatively integrated) unit or sphere of
action (the firm) for which decisions have to be made;
(v) tacitly functions under favorable external conditions (social costs
externalized to society).
3. FROM ECONOMIC TO SOCIOLOGICAL RISK ANALYSIS
Let me demonstrate the transition from economic to sociological analysis by
quoting a statement from a recent Norwegian publication on risk research (Hovden
1980, p9):
"We can reduce the risk in any given sector provided we are prepared to
pay the cost."
I have underlined those parts of the sentence which lead considerations to cost-
benefit analysis and thus to economics. Just a small shift of emphasis is suffi-
cient to signify the next step necessary:
"We can reduce the risk in any given sector provided we are prepared to
pay the cost."
"We" is nothing but a metaphor for "SOCiety", yet to use the word "we" is at the
same time misleading insofar as it covers complex social processes that normally do
not result in unanimous opinions, interests, and decisions, but in controversies
and--possibly--compromises, with (groups of) winners and losers. Society is far
from being a homogeneous, coherent "actor"--as would implicitly be taken for granted
*"From the technical perspective, technological risk is some probability distribu-
tion over sets of negative effects" (Lathrop 1981, p4). "However, there exists a
concept of risk that considers both probability of failures and consequences of
failures, and thus seems to be superior to the other concepts used" (Mandl and Lathrop
1981, p2). See also Conrad and Krebsbach-Gnath 1980, pSO.
**I do not go into that sidestream of risk research that focuses on psychological
processes (Conrad and Krebsbach-Gnath 1980, pS7). It is obvious that these proces-
ses are severe restrictions to the model of homo economicus. Yet this is a general
problem of every kind of decision, not specific to risk decisions. Moreoever, I
restrict myself to the macro-level which has its own specific "laws"--however micro-
processes function.
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under the economic paradigm. It would therefore be misleading to look for gener-
ally "acceptable" levels of safety (or risk) Le., levels for all members/groups of
society, in all situations, or for all issues, equally.
"The problem is that risk levels cannot be universally determined, but
have to be specified for each hazardous activity and must be broken down
to apply to the various categories of people involved. Standards of
safety vary" (Hovden 1980, p26).
Put a little more rigidly: there is no acceptability of risks which could be found
out by risk research, but there are accepted risks. This is the field which socio-
logical analyses of risk have to deal with. It is the sociological approach that
prevents us from regarding social processes as irrational.
4. TWO CONCEPTS OF SOCIOLOGY IN FRONT OF RISK
To simplify, there are two diverging points of reference for approaching the
risk issue in sociological terms. The focus of analysis can be
(i) perception and activities of individuals summed up to some kind of
mass aggregate called society*, or
(ii) the complex political process of forming society's "joint" will and
action out of the individual's (or group's) perceptions, interests,
and activities--mediated by structures--which is a decision making
process implying controversies, bargaining, and (possibly) compromises.
I shall refrain from a detailed description and evaluation of these two approaches
which, after all, provoke different methods of analysis**. Nevertheless, I prefer
the latter. Sociology, to my mind, must be concerned with how perceptions and ac-
tions of individuals and groups are transformed into those of society as a whole.
This means it must focus on the procedures which form social decisions.
5. FROM RISK ACCEPTABILITY/ACCEPTANCE TO LABILE CONSENSUS
There is some indication of insufficiency lying in the mere--however progres-
sive--amplification of risk research to the issue of social acceptability or even
acceptance. The FRG Minister of the Interior, Herr G. Baum, recently stated:
"The question of acceptance has turned into the question of the scope of
consensus about values and priorities" (Baum 1981, p31, my translation)***.
I shall follow up this statement, for I believe that there is some reason and truth
in it. Before going into that in more detail, however, let me sum up the develop-
ment of the dominant interests and paradigms of risk research according to the
brief overview given up to now.
*This is the field of survey research. A critical review of surveys on nuclear
power and corresponding risks is given by Heller (1980).
**1 approve, however, of Hovden's argument (1980, p21) that "the risk perceptions
of individuals and of society as a whole must be treated separately". They are
something different, I would say.
***Roughly the Same is said by Conrad and Krebsbach-Gnath (1980, p63) in their re-
view of risk research literature: "Risk research turns into research on socio-
political mechanisms" (my translation).
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Abstract, possibly
comparative calculation
of risks; scenarios of
failure consequences
Investigation into the
acceptability/acceptance
~ of risks by individuals,
groups (of individuals),
or Homo economicus
Research on consensus
prerequisites for the
~ politics of risk taking
and distribution
The switch to the question of acceptability/acceptance was made some time ago,
but at present, risk researchers working on this question feel increasingly frus-
trated by experiencing a growing and not easily understandable resistance of people
to any kind of risk*. This leads me to go one step further into the abstract, into
the problem of social consensus. Consensus is more abstract than acceptance in
that it is directed towards (and withdrawn from) political activity in general, not
towards (and from) concrete actions, e.g., some bearing some risk. Now, what is
wrong with consensus today?
I shall start with the norms and functional prerequisites of the political
system, and then turn to factual developments. The presupposition of western demo-
cratic political procedures within society implies
fundamental consensus on the political system, i.e., institutions and
procedures,
renunciation of illegal power leaving the "monopoly of physical power"
to state institutions,
acceptance of democratic decisions, i.e., the output of the political
system, without claiming another authority (e.g., God, or truth) to be
a serious competitor.
The crucial test for the acceptance of the political system and democratic pro-
cedures, or for the existence of consensus, is whether those who are the losers in
certain political decision making processes will nevertheless accept its output.
Frustrations are then turned into "official" channels, i.e., they become new inputs
in turn.
Under these circumstances there is no need at all to talk separately of risks,
as we can assume that nearly all activities within society--and therefore politi-
cal decisions as well--entail certain tangible risks (Hovden 1980, p36). Risk is,
so to speak, something "normal"**, and its social distribution is enacted in the
ordinary course of political decision making--which may be assisted by scientific
advice, one separate branch of which may be risk analysis. The social acceptance
of certain risks is thus guaranteed by ordinary political decision making itself.
This argument from the opposite point of view leads me to suspect*** that the
separate discussion and treatment of risks which has come about during the last
*One indicator of this frustration is the increasing interest of risk researchers
in the processes and "laws" of political praxis, decision making in particular,
which (unjustly) appears to be the main barrier to the enforcement of their risk
knowledge.
**This is addressed in the report of a FRG commission on future nuclearpowerpolicy
(Enquete-Kommission Zukunftige Kernenergie-Politik, Bundestags-Orucksache 8/4341,
27 June 1980): "Risks to man and the environment are concomitant to every energy
system" (p139; my translation). The same idea is expressed by an official informa-
tion booklet of the government of Baden-Wurttemberg on the issue of defense against
catastrophes (Versorgung-Sicherheit-Katastrophenschutz, in: Sicherheit in Chemie
und Umwelt, No. 1/1981, p19): "We are all permanently living under natural as well
as technical risks. Thus all kinds of energy supply are bearing risks of different
types" (my translation).
***Another line of argument is possible, namely that the separate discussion of
risks indicates a new dimension or size of risks. The atomic energy issue could be
seen in this respect--yet only this issue, I suspect. Even this is disputed, how-
ever, by the hypothesis that the nuclear power issue is only a "symbol" of quite
different problems. This idea is particularly promoted by K.-M. Meyer-Abich (in:
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decade, and has led to the special discipline, profession, and business (!) of risk
research, must have resulted from, and indicates, a deep rift in the field of social
consensus and acceptance of, or trust in, political institutions and processes.
This supposition is in accord with a general hypothesis about the present state of
our society.
6. WANING OF COMPROMISE--BACKGROUND DEVELOPMENTS
My hypothesis is that ordinary political decision making is no longer able to
cope with and distribute social risks effectively: its "standing" within society
is rapidly declining at least*. We have to take into account several social move-
ments which have created the present situation**.
(1) The ecology movement that has been growing rapidly has shown a new point
of reference and new criteria for all human activities, and socio-political
activities (including decisions) in particular: "life", or "survival", in
the sense of adaption to nature and its "ecological" circles and cycles.
These categories are (like "truth", for example) totalitarian in the sense
that they do not allow the groups with opposed interests to search for a
pragmatic way of compromise in aiming at a certain way and organization of
life. There is no divisibility of "life"; and it follows that any calcu-
lation of lives is immoral in principle. (This militates against risk
research methods directly, of course.) Those who are able to claim that
they are acting for the defense of life, or for future generations' lives,
have a systematic advantage in every discussion and decision.
(2) "Small is beautiful" (E.F. Schumacher) has become a strong slogan in pres-
ent society, affecting technical as well as socio-political aspects. It
can be taken as an argument against the modern type of factories, against
the risks they produce, against so-called grand technologies, and against
representatative decision making institutions as well, which have been
"invented" for mass societies. There is a growing demand for smaller fac-
tories, fewer and "smaller" risks, "soft" or medium technologies, and the
delegation of decision making authority to the lowest possible level of
political representation such as communities.
(3) Hand in hand with the "small is beautiful" movement goes a vivid tendency
to ignore the (ever-growing) complexity of today's society and, corre-
spondingly,of socio-political decision making. There prevails a radical
discarding of complexity in favor of criteria that are not only simple but
coincide with the "material" points of reference mentioned above.
Bericht der Enquete-Kommission Zukunftige Kernenergie-Politik, Bundestags-Drucksache
8/4341, 27 June 1980, p86): "The political impact of the conflict about nuclear
energy is to my mind the fact that it is not only concerned with a special kind of
energy supply, but that it is an expression of a profound crisis in the judgment
about technical systems with respect to the nature context of man's life . ... The
resistance to nuclear energy is at the same time an opposition to anonymous bureau-
cracies and the loss of individual freedom. It makes sense, by all means, that it
is just nuclear energy that has been chosen as a symbol of this opposition, for
nuclear energy is a new step in quality in the technological relationship of mankind
and nature ... and thus of men themselves" (my translation). See also Baum (1981, p3) .
*It is understandable that professional politicians cannot accept this negative
view. To uphold the idea of possible consensus is a question of self-preservation
for them. FRG Minister Baum states: "Each 'party' can be expected to bear the risks
of each path (of energy supply), if it is only secured that its concept of future
energy system is given a fair change to be developed" (1981,-p13; my translation) .
I do not believe in this expectation. The promotion of solar energy, for example,
would not result in diminished efforts of social groups protesting against nuclear
energy if this was also further developed.
**"Social movement" is to be understood here in an anlytical sense, i.e., still
abstract from concrete social groups.
120
(4) According to the very influential concept of postmaterialist norms and
values, a general antipathy to social institutions is arising (Inglehart
1977, vol. 4, pIS). Their anonymous and oppressive character is regarded
with distrust. Trust is thought to be found successfully in small groups
and face-to-face interactions only.
(5) Finally, there is a growing tendency to act in one's own interests--which
are generated in the above mentioned manner--directly, immediately, and
by using physical power, thus ignoring decisions of formally legitimized
political institutions. The experience (or the feeling) of being affected
by something negative, and activities (reactions) related to this (nor-
mally) single issue, are no longer mediated by a complex political pro-
cess of issue generation, conversion and decision making by formal (politi-
cal) institutions.
7. WANING OF COMPROMISE--EFFBCTS ON POLITICS
All these pheomena are developments of individual or perhaps even collective
values, norms, aspirations, and resulting activities which stem to a considerable
degree from frustration. How far and to what extent are these relevant to politi-
cal decision making processes? From a political philosophical viewpoint democracy
can be seen as a regime in which political decisions are made in the realm of pen-
ultimate questions only (von Krockow 1979). Ultimate questions thus remain un-
decided in politics; they are left to the individual. The new social movements,
however, raise ultimate questions in the first instance, and they demand answers
that are in accord with their moral commitments as well as their interests. In
other words, there is an increasing moral fundamentalism destroying the liberal
virtue of pragmatism and tolerance.
Again from a political philosophical point of view, democratic government is
dependent on, and is ruled by, compromise*. To go into compromise is possible only
while staying in the anteroom of ethics, and respecting others' alternative princi-
ples and morals. Their deep involvement in rigid ethics, however, deprives the new
social movements of the democratic virtue of accepting compromises. Instead, there
is a growing readiness to use, and acceptance of, violence as a legitimate means of
social interaction in the pursuit of one's interests. In the course of this--
partly in contrast to the fundamental norms pursued--a breakdown of the borderline
between "right" and "wrong" in social activities occurs.
From a systems theory point of view modern societies are characterized by a
high and, in general, still growing degree of structural complexity, i.e., func-
tional differentiation and specialization. This feature of society can be regarded
as an indispensable condition of the high level of wealth and well being that we
enjoy. The degree and/or features of complexity are, in a more abstract perspec-
tive, a main object of opposition for the new social movements. "De-differentiation"
and a decrease in complexity, i.e., a return to smaller social entities, and simpler
social structures, is their demand for all dimensions: space, time, size, and
social relations.
The differentiation of a political system is an important indicator of complex
modern societies. It is only to be expected that the new social movements are op-
posed to this. Several developments are taking place with regard to the relation-
ship between society and its political system, which can be intepreted as delegiti-
mation of the political system and as defunctionalization of policy making. The
*The "systematic" importance of compromises for Western democracies is demonstrated
by Sontheimer (1970, pp24S-247): "To find and accept compromises is the most fre-
quent way of reaching a peaceful settlement of conflicts in social life. As poli-
tics is nothing but the pursuit and settlement of conflicts comprising interests
and power, compromise is the adequate means for an adjustment (permanent or tempo-
rary) of these conflicts ... In democratic and parliamentary regimes .•. compro-
mises are an indispensable means for peaceful settlements of opposing interests
and conflicts arising from them".
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delegation of power and authority to established political institutions (parlia-
ments, parties, governments) is being questioned. The unquestioning acceptance of
political decisions is decreasing. The function of, and competence for, decision
making slips over from legislature and administration to the judiciary.
Reacting to these developments, political scientists have already begun to
change their traditional view of policy making; new paradigms of politics are being
discussed (Raschke 1980).
(1) Contrary to assumptions widely held during the 1950s and 1960s that
we have approached an era without ideologies, there is a growing
awareness of (i) fundamentally and rapidly changing values towards
more ethical and moral ones (Inglehart 1977)*; (ii) a diminishing
reluctance of individuals to use physical power (illegal power,
which, however, is held to be legitimate) in order to support their
interests.
(2) The relatively sharp separation of society and the political (deci-
sion making) system which has dominated political science thinking
for a long time is being questioned. The fundamental consensus in
society which meant agreement on certain political rules, institu-
tions, and processes, and which led toanidentificiation of legality
and legitimacy, must perhaps be replaced by a concept that is sup-
posed to be more adequate for the present status of society; a
situation in which there is only a limited exchange between political
authorities and citizens. In the new concept apathy is no longer
regarded as a functional virtue, as it has been traditionally, and
citizens are being looked at as potential political actors apart from
official political procedures. The population (or certain parts of
it, at least) accept the rules of policy making--or hold consensus--
only insofar and as long as they expect them to be not unfavorable
to their interests. This does not imply that unpleasant political
outcomes are generally not accepted (even though this may occur),
but a structural deprivation by political decisions is rejected.
Therefore the political system has to face the increasing possibility
of people reacting in an "unconventional" way (Kaase 1976).
8. WANING OF COMPROMISE--SOME EMPIRICAL REMARKS
The empirical proof of the existence as well as the character of the new social
movements is still not available. My interpretation, however, cannot be very far
from the truth when even a sensible politician like FRG Minister Baum speaks of
"alarming symptoms in the present kinds of handling and settling social conflicts-
brutalities in the course of demonstrations, transgressions, riots ... " (Baum 1981,
p13; my translation). The same description of the facts is implicit in the state-
ment of FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt:
"I want to call upon the young people in our country ... to learn, and
be willing to accept social consensus, agreements and compromise. Ability
of consensus and compromise is an underrated necessity in Germany today."
(Schmidt, Lernziel: Bereitschaft zum gesellschaftlichen Konsens, in:
Bulletin des Bundespresseamts, No. 62/1981, p528; my translation.)
*According to Schissler (1979, p356) a growing "individualization" and selfishness
of individuals can be observed and, furthermore, a diminishing orientation towards
supra-individual values and social responsibility. Following Inglehart (1979, pp
283-284) a clash is likely between an increasing number of people holding post-
materialist values and socio-political "environment" which is still materialist
more or less. It seems probable that the post-materialists will attempt to intro-
duce radical and far-reaching changes within society and, in order to reach this
aim, will be prepared to use means that are destructive and provocative to the
elite too.
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As this paper is not intended to be an empirical one, I am restricting myself
to some sketchy remarks; detailed analysis, specific to single countries, would be
necessary to give more validity to my assertions*.
(i) In West Germany (and elsewhere) we are experiencing a social movement-
of young people in particular--in which all the (analytical) aspects
mentioned above are intermingled. Not by accident is the movement
called "alternative culture"--not "politics"--thus indicating the gen-
eral and total difference of these new standards and activities from
traditional behavior, including political activity, in Western soci-
eties. This (factual) movement can be nicely characterized by one of
its own slogans: "No authority to nobody". As a recent paper by the
German Social Democratic Party stated, this movement is not apolitical,
but has a different understanding of politics:
" ... from the delegation of social and also individual problem-solving
competence to large organizations the structures of which are too
fossilized, and prevent people from participation--towards self-
responsibility and personal initiative" (Thesenpapier "SPD und Jugend-
protest" der Arbeitsgruppe Jugend beim SPD-parteivorstand, in: VoruJarts
Nr. 27/1981, p19; my translation**) .
In several studies it has been estimated that about 10 to 15 percent of
the youth between 15 and 25 are cultural drop-outs (BMJFG 1981, p20)***.
The number of people who sympathize with the main normative syndromes
of this core group is much higher of course, as can be seen from the
attendance at certain demonstrations, for example. The importance of
this movement stems from its public significance and political poten-
tial which come near to something like a veto of official political
decisions--desite the fact that it comprises only a minority of citizens.
(ii) The new cultural movement is being politicized in some places already,
and then turns to violent and "non-conventional" activities. This is
not only the case with demonstrations, but also with "ambiguous" parties
and parliamentary representativest. "Youth is becoming more and more
brutal" is the simple conclusion of a recent review of empirical in-
vestigations (Ernst 1978, p28).
*Recent developments in the UK have shown that this perspective is not only a
German one. See e.g., International Herald Tribune (Paris) 7 July 1981, pI about
the Liverpool riots. These were commented on by a German journalist in the follow-
ing way: "Liverpool--there is a far-reaching agreement upon this--was no racial
confrontation in the narrow sense. It was the remonstration, animated by gloomy
anarchism, of an alienated, hopeless, bored youth living in strained relations with
their parents as well as every authority, without any direction, and regarding
every orderly organized society as an enemy" (T. Bode, Aufbegehren einer entfrem-
deten Jugend, in: Suddeutsche Zeitung, 8 July 1981, p4; my translation).
**Furthermore: "More and more young people no longer understand and accept the
traditional understanding of politics. They are indifferent to the parties; the
"grand politics" is believed to be too far away from the immediate sphere of living
that they can grasp, and cannot directly be influenced therefore. Some of the grand
political issues, such as the movement for peace are highly attractive with respect
to their moral implications; yet they become relevant to activities apart from
demonstrations only if they can be brought within the sphere of personal experience"
(T. Bode, Aufbegehren einer entfremden Jugend, in: Suddeutsche Zeitung 8 July 1981,
p4.
***In the last communal elections held in the city of Frankfurt in 1981 the propor-
tion of voters below the age of 25 who voted for an ecologist party was 25 percent
(Frankfurter Rundschau 15 May 1981, p13).
tA new parliament was elected in 1981 in West Berlin which bears the status of a
state ("La'ld") within the FRG. In this election the so-called "alternative movement"
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(iii) Another German (only?) development has to be mentioned, which does
not appear as revolutionary as the "alternative cUlture" movement,
but which is at least as influential: political decisions are more
and more frequently being over-ridden by court decisions*. "Juridi-
fication of politics" could be a suitable name for this phenomenon,
and it is particularly alive in, yet not restricted to, the field
of nuclear power, a field that risk research is traditionally very
much concerned with. People who provoke these court decisions
(which are binding on political institutions according to the FRG
system of administrative law) thus demonstrate (a) their "alterna-
tive political consciousness", and (b) their (often desparate) un-
willingness to use ordinary political channels for their exercise
of influence**.
9. RISK RESEARCH IN A SOCIETY WITH WANING CONSENSUS
Risk research, as an applied research effort, was invented to (and attempts
to) support political institutions in their job of mediating technological projects
with social needs and (deplorably dominating***) social opposition of acceptance,
respectively. Figure 1 shows the position of risk research in relation to the
political system and society. It additionally clarifies the focus of this paper as
compared with the amplification interests which can be found in risk research de-
bates at present. In view of this functional status of risk research, it is obvi-
ous that the unstable position of political institutions within society must also
affect risk research. If my hypothesis is correct, that the political institutions
are becoming less and less able to cope not only with risk distribution, but also
with society as a whole, then risk research has to suffer from this development
too. So, risk research is bound to a political game that is fundamentally opposed
as such by the new social movements. Two conclusions can be drawn from this.
succeeded in gaining parliamentary seats for the first time (there are already ecol-
ogy representatives in two other FRG states, Baden Wurttemberg and Bremen). This
entrance into parliament was near to a revolution: the "alternatives" got 7.2 per-
cent of the votes, considerably more than the proportion of the smallest (third)
established party in Germany, the FDP, which got 5.6 percent. The highest propor-
tion that the "alternatives" reached in a single electoral district (Kreuzberg) was
18.2 percent. In Berlin there was a merger of the "alternatives" and the ecology
movements. "Alternative" orientation means a certain kind of radical opposition to
representative government and parliamentarism. Those representatives who are now
members of parliament regard themselves as part of a grass-roots movement. Conse-
quently, a free mandate is not given to the "alternative" representatives; instead
they are bound to decisions of their "basis". The actions of this "basis" are often
characterized by force (cf. H. Schuster, Parlamentarische Verteidiger der Gewalt,
in: Suddeutsche Zeitung 30 July 1981, p4). An analysis of the Berlin elections came
to the conclusion that the increase in the "alternatives" can be interpreted as a
tendency to build up something like an alternative "milieu" which may lead to a
functional confrontation with established parties in the future (cf. Forschungs-
gruppe Wahlen, Wahl in Berlin, Mannheim, 14 May 1981).
*H. Riehl-Heyse, Mutmassungen uber die Wirbelschleppen, in Suddeutsche Zeitung
2-3 May 1981, plO.
**"It is after all due to a change of opinions and the loss of consensus in basic
questions, particularly in the field of environmental policy, that parties and in-
terest groups, exasperated citizens, and also grumblers, with increasing frequency
appeal to the courts as arbitrators today" (H. Schuster, Versuchung des Rechtswege-
staates, in: Suddeutsche Zeitung 27 April 1981, p4; my translation).
***It is worth mentioning that in business administration theories the term "risk"
is taken as a neutral category: "Although in modern parlance the word risk is usu-
ally associated with "hazard" or "danger of loss", economists use the term to denote
c~ance or luck, both good and bad" (Sarnat and Engelhardt 1981, pl07),
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(i) Risk research as an effort of research applied to political (decision
making) institutions will not be capable of changing a social reality
that turns against traditional political institutions,however valid
its scientific knowledge might be. It does not make up more than a
small piece of advice in policy making, i.e., it falls into the input
phase of decision making, and is thus a victim of weak political in-
stitutions.
(ii) Risk research is suffering from the fact that, as a mere applied sci-
ence, it is missing some basic research that would belp to loosen its
ambivalent connection with political institutions and could lead to
more independent, "open", and "societal" paradigms of risk. Let me
explain this idea further. Cost-benefit analysis, the field of risk
research, without any necessity of risk research, has been over-ridden
by real social developments: there is a tendency of social groups to
be divided along the cost and benefit lines; the academic calculus
has turned into a real social clash and gap. In other words, the
cost-benefit calculus is being made up more and more by social groups
promoting clear-cut interests, pros and cons.
10. RISK RESEARCH ALTERNATIVES
Two alternatives are open to future risk research in my view.
(i) Risk research transcends its narrow political insitutional perspective
and begins to integrate risk perceptions and interests important in
society-even if these are opposed to the official perspectives of
political institutions.
(ii) Risk research transcends its narrow technological projects paradigm
and begins to integrate concepts such as the one that regards politi-
cal institutions as the main risk to society today.
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Institutional Mythologies and Dual Societies
in the Management of Risk
Brian Wynne
Unive~sity of Laneaste~, Bail~igg, Laneaste~ LAl 4YN, UK
1. INTRODUCTION
The risk assessment fraternity is well aware by now of the limited role played
by various "technical", "rational", or "analytical" approaches to risks in real
decision making contexts*. Reactions to this news vary from the familiar techno-
cratic lament about the irrational ways of the world outside their rational basti-
ons, to the vigorous celebration of the political and psychological "underworlds"
which impose those limits on the technocratic perspective. Eschewing these pola-
rized extremes, however, most people in the field are still working out their re-
sponses, as are those like myself who are really marginal to it, and who came with
an already well developed experience of the sociological dimensions and instrumental
limitations of scientific rationality. Given that reactions are still in the formu-
lative stage; given the centrality of the idea of scientific rationality in risk
assessment philosophies and methodologies (and in modern policy making generally) ;
and given that appropriate responses are of practical importance in policy making;
I shall attempt in this paper to outline some reasons why the sociological analysis
of scientific rationality that has developed to some maturity in the last few years
is directly relevant to the kinds of questions now facing risk assessment when it
attempts to define where it should be heading next. In the process I shall outline
some areas of research under the general area of risk assessment of technology
politics that this different perspective suggests. There is a potentially important
though as yet unrealized correspondence between many of the insights from the psy-
chological research which has influenced risk analysis and the sociological analysis
of scientific rationality. In presenting the latter my aim is not to upstage the
former but to point out how the naturally individualistic learnings of psychology
can and must be developed into sociological and anthropological frameworks for
formulating questions and possibilities. If there is one central concern of this
paper it is the following.
Several authors have by now recognized the "pitfalls of analysis" (see Majone
and Quade 1980), whereby analysts tend to see what their tacit assumptions and
values predispose them to see, and whereby "heuristics" introduce "biases" in their
work (Tversky and Kahnemann 1974). It is of the utmost importance that these are
recognized as part and parcel of science, not as eradicable lapses from proper
rational scientific procedures. There is a pervasive myth about the nature of sci-
ence which supports this false approach to the question of "analytical bias." The
tendency in the literature is to regard bias or mistakes as individual and isolated
in origin, which suggests that ideal objective scientific knowledge can be attained
in professional practice and as an input to policy issues. As I shall argue, this
gives a fundamentally misleading and politically damaging picture of the role of
expertise, and may make us part of the problems we analyse.
There can be no doubt about the central role played by science in risk assess-
ment. Even when political factors have been recognized as relevant and legitimate
the attempt has always been made to define a clear boundary between the two realms,
*See, for example, the range of views in Conrad (1980), Otway and von Winterfeldt
(l980) and Lathrop (1980).
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such that scientific analyses of "real" risks and comparative risks could be an
"independent", objective input to the political process. However, although there
might be agreement that the role of science has been central, there would, I sug-
gest, be much less agreement as to what that role is, and indeed, how many roles
science may be playing at the same time in the processes of political communication.
Thus for example there is the obvious methodological role in systematic observation,
quantification, and calculation. This is largely instrumental in that it is em-
ployed deliberately and directly to achieve explicitly defined objectives. However
there are less obvious processes going on when such scientific methodologies are
used and displayed, and as is often the case, the less obvious these processes are
the more important they may be. Some of these less explicit roles are supported by
generally established suppositions as to the nature of science--the kind of author-
ity it can naturally provide--which need to be dug out and dispassionately examined.
There are two broad conclusions towards which I would like to direct this discus-
sion.
(i) There is a tacit symbolic role played by images of scientific rationality
and control projected in the risk assessment-policy process; this is at
least as important as its purely instrumental-analytical role. In other
words, decision making elites are creating and elaborating myths of order
and authority based in "science" that are essentially therapeutic and
legitimatory. These myths about the nature of science and thus about the
power and scope of analysis tend to justify the dominant role of profes-
sional elites whilst encouraging reassurance and quiescence amongst the
public at large: the former are not deliberately foisting those myths
upon the latter--they are themselves enmeshed in those myths.
(ii) One general consequence of the false image of science portrayed in this
kind of symbolic action is the tendency to see errors or mistakes in sci-
entific or technological systems--e.g., accidents--as sporadic individual
lapses from normal standards of objectivity and rationality, essentially
eradicable. This basis of symbolic reassurance at the political level
reflects a direct analogy with the rationalist model of science in which
the only alternative to complete objectivity is individual subjectivism.
Th~s departures from an idealized absolute scientific objectivity--be they
accidents or dogmatic outbursts from scientists advocating a particular
policy--are taken as sporadic lapses from proper standards of conduct, not
as systemat"ically generated in the very structure of organized scientific
thought or technology. The associated risks can thus be defined as essen-
tially isolatable , and the basic approach can never be falsified since
all like instances can always be defined in the same sporadic terms. The
sociology of science as developed in Europe since the early 1970s has
challenged this rationalist myth of science and in doing so has offered
insights of direct value to fields such as risk assessment which are prac-
tised in the midst of these deep symbolic political transactions about
science, rationality, and order*.
*A concise summary of this field, and a discussion of its departures from previously
dominant, rationalist models of science, is Mulkay (1980). This tradition of re-
search is best illustrated in sustained fashion in the journal Social Studies of
Science (Sage). See especially the special issues, Vol. 6, Autumn 1976, and Vol.
11, February 1981. Also highly relevant are Latour and Woolgar (1980) and Barnes
and Shapin (1979). An author sensitive to these dimensions of science who has ap-
plied them in some ways to politics of science is Ezrahi (1974); see also Ravetz
(l974). For a thorough philosophical analysis of science from this general per-
spective, see Hesse (1974).
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2. THE MYTH OF NATURAL CONSENSUS
A central element of the social image of science has been the idea that science
reaches a natural consensus by following definite, universal principles of method,
logic, and judgment. Any conflict is thus taken to be the temporary result of il-
legitrnate "pollutions" of one kind of another-ignorance, incompetence, prejudice,
ideological motivation, etc. There is one sole objective truth dictated by reality,
and all else is pathological deviation from it. Science inexorably purges these
passing deviations by continual critical self-correction, so this view goes. It
merely discovers the meanings already inherent in the facts that are waiting to be
laid bare. This image of science has dominated public and scientific discourse,
and as with most aspects of domination, it has done so by being taken for granted.
It has been entrenched in the roots of population and political culture by scien-
tists and social analysts of science (Cameron and Edge 1977; see also Mulkay 1980
and Ezrahi 1974).
Technology assessment and systems analysis lived (and have arguably died)
under the spell of this myth, and one can see how the same currents of thought ex-
ist-albeit in tandem with a healthy air of scepticism now-in the risk assessment
field*. As in all systems of myth, the response to evidence which might contradict
the basic assumption instead leads to an intensification of that founding faith by
further elaboration of it. Thus, for example, the implicit justification of the
sophisticated psychological research on attitudes to risks has been to defend the
quantitative risk-comparisonjrevealed-preference approach from the evidence that it
does not accord with reality, by defining those who persist in evading such quanti-
tative, externally imposed frameworks of meaning as chronically ignorant or malign**.
In other words, the reaction to conflict at the first level of analysis has been to
assume that some of those involved have not "seen it correctly", and that educated
by further research they would do so. That they have not done so has not led to
the accepted falsification of the myth of natural consensus, but to its escalation
in the intensified search for more and more subtle psychological factors to "explain"
the "irrationality" of resistance. Although it would be unwarranted to attribute
this assumption to all the researchers in this field, it is strongly implied in much
discussion and use of the research***. In principle this myth could be elaborated
without end if it plays a sufficiently important tacit role in supporting the status
and power of important interests, as appears to be the case.
One can see the parallels of this mythology in the general field of technology
policy making. In her pioneering study of the Cayuga Lake nuclear controversy,
Nelkin described how, contrary to the expectations of those concerned, the conflict
was not resolved by allowing the opposed experts to debate with one another outside
the hysteria of the public media (Nelkin 1971). Instead this only produced more
technical elaboration and polarization. Based upon the myth outlined above, the
predominant reaction has been to assume that the "real" natural consensus that
should have emerged had been blocked by the intrusion of illegitimate, extraneous
pollutions, such as the media, pressure groups, etc. Yet when these were removed,
no such purification and consensus took place. The further reaction to this first-
order process has been to assume that one side or the other of the experts them-
selves has introduced the pollution of proper science. Thus allegations of lack of
*For an early critique of technology assessment from this angle, see Wynne (1975)
and Winner (1977); on systems analysis, for example, see Hoos (1969), Boguslaw
(l972) and Weizenbaum (1980).
**Thus for example, the perspective is repeated endlessly in the UK nuclear indus-
try's mouthpiece Atom. See, for example, the exchanges between D. pooly of the
UKAEA and C.H. Green in Atom vol. 295, May 1981.
***See Starr and Whipple (1980) and Okrent (1980). See also the proceedings of the
1980 conference "The Assessment and Perception of Risk" (to be published by the
Royal Society of London). Starr and Whipple, for example, see political conflict
only in the mismatch between public benefits and individual risks, with apparently
no possibility of more basic conflicts about the "pUblic good" between different
publics.
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proper qualifications, downright incompetence, ignorance, or ideological motivation
have been the main currency of debate, not the facts themselves. This has been re-
peated over and over again in expert disputes on such issues (Doty 1972, Robbins
and Johnson 1976). Indeed legal cross-examination in the increasing number of for-
ums which adopt the legal framework as a method of resolution in these matters en-
shrines the belief in the justification for (scientific) amateur cross-examination
of experts. The general assertion that policy conflicts are due to residual--if
often chronic--technical uncertainties is a further manifestation of the myth in
that it implies that the full scientific facts would resolve the conflict one way
or the other. On this view it is not conceivable that the scientific positions
could themselves be permeable to different social perspectives that cause the asso-
ciated scientific positions to remain incompatible however well developed the field
might become.
In the terms of Figure 1, the absolute boundary between science and politics
or fact and value is taken for granted as a metaphysical principle*. In the terms
of the basic myth about science that I am outlining, if scientists begin with a
variety of different views, A, B, and C, then a properly conducted rational debate
will lead them to a single truth, T, which can then be fed into the (supposedly en-
tirely separate) political system, for a possible variety of different policy con-
clusions, W, X, Y, Z, according to the democratic expression of social values. When
T remains obstinately obscure, the first reaction in the natural consensus myth is
to allow the experts to debate away from the pressures and temptations to play to
the crowd, and public media; when this fails, the next step is to try to expose
which side of the expert dispute is incompetent, malign, etc.; when this fails by
scientific debate, the legal process often takes on the explicit belief that the
scientists have failed to provide consensus either because the political undercur-
rents run even deeper into the views of one or the other group of experts than pre-
viously imagined, and need the ultimate test--legal cross-examination--to expose
them, or because scientists are not clear in their expression of the truth and need
the unsurpassed precision of the legal framework to clarify for them where the truth
lies. That there exists a single truth beneath these several layers of extraneous
camouflage is never doubted, at least in the rhetoric of what is being conducted
and why. In other words, so the myth goes, if we employ rigorous enough analytical
weapons, we will eventually purify the murky waters where science and politics are
dissolved into one another, and define the clear-cut interface properly**.
SCIENCE
Figure 1.
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*Even the Kemeny Commission, so refreshingly alert to the persistence of limiting
"mindsets" in technological organizations, relayed the taken for granted idea that
technical questions could be resolved in isolation from politics, then fed into the
categorically separate "political hopper" (see Kemeny 1975) .
**1 have documented this in Wynne (1981a). Assumptions about the value of a legal
framework are embodied in the science courts proposal mooted in the USA. For a re-
view see Mazur (1977).
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This mythology has of course been reassuring to professional experts concerned
to avoid the ambiguities involved in playing a political role. It has allowed a
constant stream of such groups to define such a role artificially as unpolitical,
and thus noncontroversial. It has been equally valuable to their political patrons
in the power structure, by defining conflict as pathological deviation from a sing-
ular, objective order based in a truth which "properly controlled" experts can dis-
cover (Habermas 1975). Under this framework, legitimate political conflict over
fundamental social aspirations becomes difficult even to envisage, let alone sus-
tain, without recourse to entirely alien languages such as withdrawal or violence.
3. THE MYTH OF SPORADIC ERROR
As the argument of the previous section made clear, a central element in the
dominant mythology of rationality is the belief that conflict originates in depar-
ture from rational judgment or conduct. We can draw a direct parallel here with a
dominant attitude to risks arising from complex technologies. After an accident
there is always a process of interpretation to establish causes and responsibilities
and to learn lessons for the future. In the cases of two accidents in the nuclear
industry, even though they are separated by 22 years in time, one can see the sug-
gestion of an interesting pattern which throws up some important questions for policy
research. The Windscale fire of 1957, which released over 20 000 curies of airborne
radioactivity, began in the graphite moderator of the air-cooled nuclear pile, when
the Wigner energy release was allowed to get out of control. The Three Mile Island
accident in 1979 released a few tens of curies of radioactivity, but in these less
deferential times caused orders of magnitude more political unrest. In each case
a critical stage in the onset of the accident was the organizational neglect of im-
portant operating knowledge. In each case a central part of the post hoc interpre-
tation was the assertion that the operators had acted in an incompetent, inade-
quately trained fashion. Again in both cases, an obvious response was therefore to
improve recruitment, training, and general standards in the operational fields con-
cerned. Thus there is made to appear a clear-cut problem with a clear-cut solution.
Everyone can reassure himself that the lack of control was an arbitrary, individual
lapse from proper standards, but that such occasional occurrences can be fenced in-
side an ever-tightening circle and isolated by better training and (in the TMI case
at least) better psychological selection and conditions*. Yet a different interpre-
tation of each accident is available. In the Windscale case the interesting ques-
tion is whether the operators and their superiors knew about the Wigner release and
its significance, and how to deal with it. If they did, but just had a bad day,
then a picture of control could be portrayed, and the mistake seen as sporadic, not
systematic, On the other hand, if they did not, then a more difficult problem of
pUblic explanation and justification presents itself. For in such a case either
the organization as a whole was operating in ignorance of a central piece of tech-
nical knowledge or "it" knew, but failed to convert this into practical operating
knowledge. Either way, public reassurance about an industry based for its prestige
upon an image of scientific rigor, control, and authority, would be difficult to
retrieve. Not suprisingly perhaps, post hoc accounts differ sharply on this very
point. Some accounts said that the operators made a mistake in what should have
been a routine operation. The blame could thus be clearly laid and exorcized in
the assurance of better training and recruitment. However when it is learned from
more detailed scrutiny that their mistake was encouraged by the lack of an operat-
ing manual and by various design blunders such as control thermocouples not being
placed at the hottest part of the core, and the graphite blocks being spaced too
far apart to dissipate excess heat by conduction, the origins of the accident appear
*On the Windscale fire, see Welsh and Wynne (1981). On Three Mile Island, see
Kemeny (l979), Nelkin (l981); Journal of the Electric Power Research Institute spe-
cial issue on TMI, June 1980. An indication of how shallow-rooted the "mindset"
problem was conceived to be by the industry was that it thought it had already
solved the problem before the Kemeny Commission reported. See Zebroski (1980).
132
to be more complex, and indeed fundamental to the system (for documentation, see
Welsh and Wynne 1981).
A very similar analysis can be made of the TMI fiasco. Here, the sequence
built up due to several initially small errors. A key mistake was the decision by
the operators to turn off the emergency core cooling system when the pressurizer
water level was rising, even though core pressure was falling. They did not know
that the relief valve that had opened to release pressure, when a pump failed else-
where in the circuit, had stayed open. Their instruments said that the signal had
been relayed to re-close it. Thus the reactor core was losing its water coolant
whilst they had switched off the emergency cooling water supply. On the face of it
they acted incompetently, and later comment repeatedly asserted or implied this*.
In the post-accident period the two reactions that have overwhelmed all others have
been the fervent pursuit of better psychological control of operator reaction to
boredom, stress, and operating room instruments, and better recruitment and train-
ing. Again, however, this neglects some important factors. Prime amonst these is
that until a short time before TMI, no one had ever foreseen the possible combina-
tion of events, especially the anomalous apparently mutually contradictory indica-
tions from the core, of rising pressurizer water levels and falling pressure. When
this was seen at the Davis Besse plant 14 months before TMI, and when an engineer
asked that the possibility be widely advertized and incorporated into standard op-
erating knowledge, the information was dispatched into oblivion within the organiz-
ation, even though the key event, the relief valve's sticking open, was apparently
a relatively common occurrence.
Thus there are two main aspects of the TMI "explanation". First, the operators
are said to have acted incompetently, encouraged by bad control room design. They
lapsed from "proper" rational norms. Better training and recruitment and better
psychological "fixing" was claimed to clear up this problem. The implication is
that the scientific knowledge for control was available as an objective body of
knowledge, but that the operators failed to enact it. Control was there in princi-
ple, just lost by an individual, isolated error. This entirely conceals the fact,
as in the Windscale fire of 1957, that the scientific knowledge, the basis of sup-
posed control (and public reassurance), was not available. Second, the organiza-
tional neglect is itself virtually neglected or treated as an instance of "com-
placency" to be eradicated by more "vigilance" and associated moral disicpline. Yet
these both conceal critical points about control and its possibilities. The first
conceals the fact that within the paradigm of existing understanding, the operators
acted in exemplary rational fashion. What was significant was not their alleged
deviation from rationality or competence, but the limited scope of the prevailing
knowledge--a much more general and fundamental problem, and one (like the Windscale
example too) which, if exposed, would undermine the covert symbolic, legitimatory
role of the public image of a technology controlled by the wisdom, discipline, and
analytical power of science. Likewise the idea is concealed that a technological
organization may not be able to select, convey, and transform significant informa-
tion into practice without regularly making classification mistakes between the
trivial and the important. That scientific expertise generally does not itself
hold any formula for doing this is an insight into the limits of scientific know-
ledge and rationality that if made available in public language would undermine the
scientific myths upon which such commitments are legitimated. There is no reason
of course why the wider publication of this idea of science as incorporated in tech-
nological organizations should necessariLy engender a loss of legitimacy, and thus
opposition, except that the public has been encouraged to assimilate those myths
for some considerable time now, and amidst a pervasive network of commitments. In
any case what is significant is that the positivist myth of scientific rationality
has encouraged the assumption that really there are no such things as "organiza-
tional risks" systematically rooted in institutionalized faith, arrogance and dogma,
only sporadic risks from badly adjusted or over-provoked individuals (or from malign
elites, a version of the same scientistic myth). This profoundly unsociological
*The JournaL of the ELectric Power Research Institute special issue on TMI, June
1980, exemplified this attitude most strongly.
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perspective is consolidated by the faith that conflict and "deviation" arise in
rational institutions only when someone acts pathologically*. There is supposed to
exist a single objective route marked "truth" or "control" and sporadic deviations
can be clearly demarcated, explained, and contained.
4. THE MYTH OF INSTRUMENTAL PURITY
An alternative way of phrasing the familiar idea that science can be clearly
demarcated from politics is that facts can be categorically distinguished from emo-
tions or values. Facts lie in the objective realm of rigid logic and empirical
observation; emotions and values liein the subjective realm of nonempirical feeling.
In the first category, meanings are taken to be intrinsically given--dictated by
nature; in the second, meanings are allowed to be invested in things by active per-
sonal feeling and social influence. Thus a categorical distinction has come to be
taken for granted in this perspective, between instrumental calculative forms of
knowledge such as law and science, which have trustworthy objective authority, and
symbolic forms of knowledge such as poetry, art, and religion, which are suspect.
Scientific knowledge, so this view goes, is not constructed of symbols whose mean-
ing might be socially malleable, because it is fashioned from the cold steel of hard
empirical fact**.
One of the insights which recent sociology of science has begun to develop to
some maturity, however, is that even scientific knowledge in disciplines that
appear to have little to do with social affairs is pervaded with meanings and tacit
explanatory purposes that go far beyond any immediate purely scientific, analytical
or instrumental concerns. MacKenzie (1981), for example, has shown how modern sta-
tistics was developed with strong tacit interests in eugenics in the minds of its
pioneers. Work on modern quantum theory has argued forcefully that its pioneers
in Weimar Germany were influenced by the tacit need to protect a radically new, anti-
mechanist, anti-determinist pUblic image in a vigorously anti-scientific cultural
climate (Forman 1971). This engagement in symbolic language may therefore have en-
couraged them to think in the anti-causalist terms that the new physics reflected.
Such examples could be repeated many times from recent sociology and history of
science (Mulkay 1980 gives the best summary review).
Thus although the essence of science is regarded as the methodical purification
of all extraneous, nonempirical factors from the body of knowledge, we find that
even the exemplars of pure science are imbued with wider symbolic currents as well
as instrumental-analytical power. When one moves to scientific fields involved in
political issues, such as risk assessment, these symbolic dimensions cannot but be
even stronger. Thus for example the debates over the safety of many environmental
pollutants such as radioactivity, lead, or 245-T, are structurally conditioned by
the fact that underlying the overt technical discourse is a symbolic discourse in
which those who have previously committed themselves to a particular scientific
point of view, with particular policy implications, are attempting to defend their
long-term credibility, and the credibility and public authority of their decision
making institutions. This kind of tacit symbolic structuring of the issue may be
of greater practical importance than any purely technical-instrumental discourse
since at this latter level there are always likely to be more ambiguities and diverse
*The analogy with the positivist philosophy of science is seen most clearly in
Scheffler (1967) and Mitroff (1974). Mitroff's sociological study reflects the
typical early tradition in especially American sociology of science, which thought
that the scientific truth comes "naturally" to scientists, so that the only thing
to explain was error. For the sociological inspiration of this general perspective
see Merton (1975). For a specific critique, see Barnes (1972).
**This assumption that symbolic knowledge is entirely unempirical, whereas instru-
mental knowledge is empirical has pervaded sociological and anthropological thought
too. See Gellner (1974) and Firth (1973). For a critical view more closely aligned
to that of this paper, see Sperber (1975). The work of Mary Douglas (1970, 1975)
has been a central point of reference in this area.
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interpretive options available to the expert participants than the rationalist idea
of science can recognize. If risk assessment processes are unable to identify these
symbolic levels of political transaction with respect to scientific expertise, they
are likely to be irrelevant from the outset. Again, another general area of research
suggests itself, once the myths in which risk assessment itself is entangled are
cleared away so that this symbolic undergrowth is uncovered. The point which cannot
be strongly emphasized is that social analysis of science indicates that there is no
warrant for the general convention that instrumental-calculative and symbolic dimen-
sions of knowledge can be disentangled. We must also therefore discard the assump-
tion that the latter is an inferior language which conveys nothing of authentic
social meaning, only individualized sUbjective meanings, and that it arises only as
a nonempirical pollutant of true, authentic public knowledge.
5. THE MYTH OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM
The rationlist account of science has naturally tended to consolidate the
belief that science comprehends reality and that all other forms of knowledge are
irrelevant to issues of public policy. It is a matter of historical fact that the
economic or military pay-off in some fields of academic science such as nuclear
physics, electronics, certain chemical areas, etc., allied with the unprecedented
prestige granted to pure science in the post-war period, meant that academic research
came to be established at the most influential points of technological commitment
and policy decision making. Niblett (1979) has shown how various advanced indus-
trial companies in Britain used direct links with prestigious academic research in-
stitutions not primarily as an instrumental arrangement for better exploitation of
Rand D, but as a symbolic weapon to advance their own prestige and autonomy by
association with potent general symbols of authority and legitimacy, namely academic
science. This further example of the symbolic transactions underlying the explicit
language can be applied to the nuclear case again. One of the recurrent themes in
otherwise quite different analyses of the British nuclear program has been the mono-
poly role of the UKAEA, and the domination of policy choices by the academic sci-
entists who have been in charge at Harwell (Williams 1980, Burns 1979). The only
successful period of the Bri tish program is often treated nostalgically as a "golden
age", when the brass-tacks engineer Hinton was in charge of production in the 1950s.
It is plausible to interpret one of the central failings of the British nuclear
program as the naive lack of realism of the abstract, theoretical design-oriented
scientists when it came to scaling up parameters and implementing theoretical con-
structs and conditions in actual engineering and commerical practice, and (increas-
ingly significant) in organizational and social practice. This might not have been
such an important problem had they not dominated the policy process, but the point
is that they did so dominate it and were so divorced from these more mundane reali-
ties because of the symbolic, legitimating role that their prestigious pure science
image was playing in the public domain. In this case therefore, one can see how
the process of technological commitment and innovation was established in a socially
rarefied realm where most of the relevant questions to do with those commitments
were not conceivable, let alone answerable, because the politically insulated, aca-
demic science culture was not capable of thinking in such terms. Although the
nuclear example may be an extreme one, it does not seem to be atypical of the gen-
eral dislocation between the point of innovation and commitment where conceptually
narrow scientific world views prevail, and the points of social enactment where the
exposure of the inadequacies of those world views comes too late and is too dis-
organized to be constructive or influential. The state of innovation is protected
from wider participation by straightforward secrecy and proprietorial control of
scientific research, or by ideologies about the power and unpenetrability of sci-
ence. These are bolstered by the myths about rationality outlined here.
An example of the same insulation of technological commitment from social re-
alities that should be regarded as part of the commitment question can be taken
from the issue of the safety of 245-T. In the face of growing evidence that the
spray induces cancers in those using it, the British Advisory Committee on the
,
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Safety of Pesticides asserted that it was safe, assuming that the proper instruc-
tions for production and use were followed correctly. Yet, as the National Union
of Agricultural and Allied Workers pointed out, many workers were told to use the
sprays with no instructions, and no protective gear. Their theoretical right to
demand these would result in harrassment and dismissal on many farms. The theoreti-
cal assertion by the expert committee, of the practical safety of 245-T (and even
this theoretical assertion is contested), was thus based upon utterly unrealistic
assumptions about 245-T as socia~~y enacted*. The committee refused even to hear
evidence from the union on this matter, presumably because to have done so would
have been symbolically to confer legitimate status upon this general category of
evidence in principle. This would be to undermine the monopoly role of their com-
mittee and its definition of science in defining the risks and even the relevant
questions. Their position was bolstered by the myth that science merely uncovers
reality as it objectively exists, and does not artificially reduce issues down to
conceptually narrow and reduced problems to which answers can be given. If there
is no recognition that anything is left out of account in such conceptual struc-
tures, there can never even arise the question of whether what has been left out
is more important than what remains. There are many parallel cases to that of
245-T that call for research in terms similar to those outlined here.
6. THE MYTH OF ACTIVE CONSENSUS
Another key component of the rationalist model of science is the idea that
scientific consensus is generated and continually self-corrected because scientists
engage in unremitting "organized scepticism"-every proposition is critically scru-
tinized and vigorously tested to attempted falsification before it is granted the
status of accredited knowledge (see, e.g., Merton 1975 and the critiques referred
to by Burnes 1972 and Mulkay 1980). Consensus is therefore the product of active
critical espousal of beliefs. This image of scientific consensus has been a power-
ful if largely tacit influence upon conceptions of political consensus. Yet the
sociology of science has shown that the typical mode of scientific consensus is one
in which scientists accept on trust most of what they believe as true, via their
own established channels of social authority. Consensus is achieved, as much if
not more, by default of criticism rather than by active testing and espousal. This
immediately implies a less authoritative kind of "consensus" and entirely different
perspectives upon political processes.
One political analyst who has recognized and investigated this alternative way
of looking at political consensus is Edelman (197l)**. He has argued that political
*1 have documented this from the national press. It is a case study overdue for
research in the broad terms I am suggesting.
**See Edelman (1966, 1971, 1977). For all the genuine value of the anthropological
perspective offered by Edelman, the pervasiveness of the positivist myth of ration-
ality is illustrated by the fact that even he falls foul of it. Thus there is a
tendency to assume that whereas ordinary people live in a manipulated world of sym-
bols that have no link with empirical social reality, elites are busy doing the
manipulating with complete instrumental clarity, calculating their own interests
and the means of securing them. Thus there is a suggestion that pure rationality
can and does find concrete attainment at that rarefied level. The fact that Edel-
man does not like it is not relevant. The point is that he appears not to see that
the elites too become bound up in their own myths. Winner, for example, describes
very persuasively how modern society has woven the myth that technology is autono-
mous from social forces, so as to rationalize an unwillingness to exercise respon-
sibility. Yet this widespread deterministic outlook finds expression alongside its
opposite-the idea that modern science has provided historically unique opportuni-
ties for actually controlling our destiny, and for transcending political ideologies.
It should not be surprising if we were to find that the anti-determinist attitude
were being elaborated into a self-justifying mythology among decision making elites,
whilst this deterministic perspective was being articulated among "the masses" to
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elites regularly engage in the manipulation of the symbols of public language to
persuade people at large that their environment is being protected; that industry
is being properly regulated; that key cultural norms are being enforced; when in
reality these may not be being fulfilled. Edelman analyzes this as a process of
symbolic action to reassure people of what they want to hear, that life is secure,
and that they can sink back into a state of political quiescence and overt apathy,
even when they are being exploited under this rhetoric of "protection", etc. Far
from expressing their wants forthrightly and critically examining whether or not
they are being properly pursued, most people are typically confused, open-minded,
and inconsistent about their wants, and have only limited interest in pursuing them
steadfastly. Edelman distinguishes between two fundamentally different analytical
approaches to political processes. On the one (dominant) hand, the positivist ap-
proach takes it for granted that politics is the aggregation and realization of the
wants of many diverse people, whose values and wants are relatively clear and
stable, and who examine and judge political policies and leaders according to who
best fulfils them overall. Policy analysis then becomes a case of identifying how
best those wants can be aggregated and realized. In our field, we insert the extra
stage, of the education of those wants and processes via research into the implica-
tions of alternative choices; however this provides the ambivalent link with the
radically different, anthro-political approach advocated by Edelman. In this per-
spective people's wants are recognized as less formalizable and concrete, and
political utterances, policies and processes themselves are seen to cue these
"wants" into certain forms that are, at best, passively tolerated. These political
events are themselves to be seen as the paraphernalia of symbolic action that en-
courages quiescence and consensus-by-default, but which conceals this in the ex-
plicit language of the positivist image of consensus drawn from "activist" models
of scientific consensus.
This distinction is fundamental, and directly relevant to risk assessment re-
search. The pedigree of risk assessment lies entirely within the positivist tradi-
tion. In this it is in good company, since the same can be said of nearly all that
passes for policy analysis, and indeed most political research generally. By defi-
nition, the risk~benefit framework of analysis involves the assumption that benefits
and costs are definable against a positive yardstick of concrete social wants. The
use of the social cost-benefit framework in attempting to develop improved decision
making processes has been explicitly linked with its alleged value in admitting a
wider range of popular wants into the political calculus*. This implies that for
their own ultimate benefit people should be ready to specify their wants more and
more precisely for the benefit of the policy analyst, the psychologist, or risk as-
sessor. Yet if we stand aside from this activist or positivist framework, a differ-
ent perspective suggests itself. What if people's wants appear inconsistent and
confused to the external analyst precisely because one of their central wants is
to keep their options open and informal, to be free to revise and renegotiate their
priorities and objectives in a social context that they find meaningful and open to
their own influence? Kekes is one of the few political philosophers to have enter-
tained something approaching this possibility (Wynne 1975, 1981):
"The (dominant) assumption is a bias in favor of an activist theory of
rationality. By this I mean that it is supposed that people have some
goals which they desire in order to gain what they regard as benefits,
and rationality is what maximizes their chances (overall) of getting
express a sense of alienation and complete "otherness" to the process whereby tech-
nology is developed and implemented. As I have argued elsewhere, it is understand-
able that "the masses" should see technology in these terms, as penetrating from
outside (from a world of the technological elite) which is almost as alien as Martian
decision making. See, for example, Wynne (1980), Winner (1978), and McDermott (1977).
*See, for example, Pearce's proposals for elaboration of public inquiry procedures
in Britain (pearce 1979). Like motherhood, it is hard to criticize the wish to ac-
commodate more political wants in decision making, but the approach objectifies the
notion of wants and thereby ignores power relationships.
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the goods. This activist way of thinking about rationality is not so
much mistaken as incomplete ...
There are two sources of change in human affairs. One is the attraction
of ends to achieve, and activist theories of rationality would do justice
to this; the other is the necessity of avoiding problems, danger~, and
difficulties. Avoidance behaviour is no less rational than a goal-
directed one. But such behaviour may consist in doing nothing, or acting
so as to make sure that something will not happen, or its success may re-
side in pre-empting dangerous options, or making sure that conditions for
future performances are not removed. This passivist approach is not
directed towards the achievement of any particular end. Its function is
to guarantee that the conditions exist in which ends can be pursued".
The activist response could of course be that this only expands the list of
possible goals that could be actively sought. However, this response ignores the
fact that the more we move into the realm of such "defensive" goals, the more fluid
and ambiguous they become, and the more they evade any rationalistic requirement
of precision. Far from being a sign of irrationality, however, this very informal-
ity and inexplicitness of goals can be seen as a sign of a very robust form of
rationality, even if it is incompatible with that of professional analysts and
political elites. It may be the realm of ambiguity and vagueness of goals that is
their defense against inflexible and risky control by external professional groups
and alien elites. In this respect it is interesting that concern about the health
effects of the nuclear industry frequently focuses upon the use in principle of
cost-benefit approaches in setting discharge levels, and exposure limits. Pro-
nuclear advocates are not slow to point out the irrationality of this attitude when
implicit cost-benefit trade-offs are made by those same critics regularly in daily
life. However, seen as an attempt to defend that very freedom to make flexible
trade-offs, amenable to local, familiar, and informal social influence, this hos-
tility towards formalized, externally controlled cost-benefit balancing appears
rational enough.
Just as the rationalist model of science assumes that the principles and rea-
sons for scientific judgments can be formally, fully, and precisely specified, so
the same perspective expresses a faith in our ability and need to specify our goals
and values precisely and formally. The alternative perspective on scientific ra-
tionalityseesit as a more informal, open-ended and flexible social achievement,
leaving scientists free to revise and renegotiate judgments as they go along, in
their own familiar special cultural setting.
Once this view of scientific rationality is accepted, it is easier to accept
that people should rationally attempt to retain their freedom to hold ambiguous
goals, and to leave some goals and values unexpressed because as such they are
richer, more amenable to flexible social negotiation and development in thier own
ordinary terms, and thus less vulnerable to external appropriation and control.
External groups who attempt (with however pure democratic intent) to assist such
groups by insisting that their wants be specified more precisely for the purposes
of policy making only polarize the social bifurcation even further by consolidating
the sense amongst their own culture that people "out there" are obstinately perverse
or obscure in their attitudes whilst at the same time consolidating the sense of
social threat amongst the "analyzed" of external, alien, and inflexible control by
the formalized expropriation of more and more of their shrinking realm of autono-
mous symbols of social intercourse. As I have said elsewhere, a "dual society"
structure is consolidated on the basis of this general rationalistic mythology which
appears to be every bit as strong and as damaging as the social cleavages between
"developers" and "peasants" in Third World contexts, and where by far the most sig-
nificant risks are those social ones to do with the extent to which people should
yield up control of their existence to unknown alien groups-be they "development
experts" usually called decision making elites, or development experts in the con-
ventional sense-whose values and objectives they do not understand and cannot
therefore be expected to trust (Wynne 1975, 1981). If, as I believe, this is the
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root problem surrounding risk assessment--a problem of legitimacy in the most basic
sense--we will not begin to tackle it without examining the social structure of
technological innovation and the myths that defend it.
7. CONCLUSIONS--SOME ISSUES FOR RISK ASSESSMENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
In this paper, I have attempted to outline some of the implications of a model
of science which has dominated and pervaded political and professional discourse,
especially where scientific methods have been deliberately employed in political
decision making. I have tried to delineate an alternative account of scientific
rationality that has been developed from a wide range of detailed case studies and
analyses of science as actually practised over the last ten or more years. At least
in Europe this account has gained the status of the orthodoxy amongst sociologists,
historians, and philosophers of science. Whether it ever gains wide acknowledgment
remains in question just because it challenges myths and ideologies built around
the rationalist image of science, which are central foundations of power structures
and processes in advanced industrial sooiety. These images have the effect of cre-
ating the conditions of political consensus by default of active intervention. Of
particular relevance in the present context is that they weave an impenetrable
social barrier round the process where real commitments are made to different social
futures through technology, and present technology from this encircled, elite con-
calve as if objectively given in natural or historical law. In any case, policy
analysts who take seriously their own claims to be open always to new truths however
difficult, should recognize the force and the implications of the different account
of scientific rationality that is gaining currency. If this causes us to treat risk
assessment as an integral part of political anthropology generally, that would be
a sign of progress. In the light of this general perspective certain research is-
sues can be identified as important to pu~sue.
(i) There is a continuing need to research the social-psychological undercur-
rents of risk perceptions in various technological fields, but with two
major provisos in mind. The first is that technology has to be conceptu-
alized primarily as a social organization entity, not a physical entity--
it therefore has intrinsic political dimensions not merely external polit-
ical possibilities (Winner 1980). Thus the insight that "risk" itself may
often be a category of thought inserted artificially by risk assessors
into people's minds can be further developed to address directly the pol-
itical question of how people "on the receiving end" regard decision making
systems that develop and control technology--what factors shape their
sense of alienation or trust, why, and so on. In doing this we move away
from the focus on physical risks as a baseline, and instead take the more
realistic line of seeing attitudes to physical risk as a variable condi-
tioned by social and political contexts and perceptions. Determining ob-
jective physical risks will still be valid of course, but the lingering
tendency to start from this scientific vantage point and add social per-
ceptions as qualifications to the "objective" physical picture must be
completely reversed. A second proviso to this point is that the ethos of
research so far in this area has been psychological. This has provided
insights of great importance. But there is a need to complement this per-
spective with social anthropology, to locate the kinds of attitude revealed
in actual life situations, to understand their validity to the people con-
cerned in their social circumstances, not in those of a cossetted elite.
This being said, one can see how energy risk perception studies might be
extended into new technologies such as information and biotechnologies
since the factors affecting attitudes have been identified and could gen-
erate several interesting hypotheses for technological fields different
from energy. I have outlined some of these in a separate research proposal
(Wynne 1981b).
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(ii) Seeing technology as a social entity, and scientific rationality as intrin-
sically conditioned by social commitments, allows us to identify a new
area of possible risks. Whereas previously dominant concepts have helped
maintain the assumption that accidents have been the consequence of spo-
padic lapses of concentration, discipline, skill, etc., a more soicologi-
cal perspective requires that we examine the social-psychological and
structural-organizational features that systematically generate risky at-
titudes. Even the.terms available to describe the syndrome-dogma, arro-
gance, complacency-evoke an individualized, moral sense of responsibility
(hence sporadic failings) rather than systematically generated processes
that occur even in the most exquisitely rational of institutions*. Thus
the sociology of science has demonstrated the inevitable and positive role
of institutionalized dogma and a blind faith in eventual success in scien-
tific research. It is necessary as a means of channelling collective
intellectual effort and sustaining morale and concentration on a demanding
long-term project. But it is of course ambivalent in that it can also
lead to the neglect or arrogant dismissal of significant anomalies or
alternatives. Whereas in pure science this may not matter in the sense
that physical risks do not hang directly on the issue, in a technological
organization great physical risks may arise. (In the case of "technologi-
cal" sciences such as recombinant DNA research the same type of risk will
also prevail.) There is thus a great deal of scope for research on organ-
izations responsible for the development and control of technology, so as
to illuminate the formal and informal social processes that may systemati-
cally generate complacency, dogma, and related risky attitudes and prac-
tices. At the same time those very processes of myth elaboration which
generate risky attitudes also generate social polarization and the dual
society syndrome. Conversely, there is a need to examine the effects upon
morale and concentration (and thus upon riskiness and viability in an
opposite sense) of initiatives to establish "insider" pluralistic criticism
as a safeguard against such tendencies. There is a social-psychological
"catch-22" here that has yet to be explored either at a theoretical or a
case study level. One would require participant observation and theoreti-
cal sophisitication on a par with the Latour and Woolgar (1980) internal,
detailed anthropological study of laboratory life.
(iii) The social interpretation of uncertainty in the technology politics field
is an area overdue for rigorous and sustained treatment. The issue arises
implicitly or explicitly, in every case study or discussion of risk assess-
ment. Yet no coherent, cumulative analysis has been developed. A general
question around which such a program could be constructed would be related
to the role of tacit images of science in such processes as I have discus-
sed earlier-to what extent and in what specific ways is conflict surround-
ing the implications of technology interpreted by those involved as the
result of residual (or chronic) ignorance? An influential example is
Weinberg's idea that some issues such as low-level-radiation risks are
trans-scientific in that they can be defined in the abstract as scientific
questions, yet in practice can never be resolved**. On the sociological
*Here the perspective on scientific rationality which I am advancing parts company
with that of other theorists such as Simon and March. The latter have recognized
"bounded rationality" in organizations, but the implication is that those boundaries
can be continually enlarged in a single system of rationality. Implicit in this
model is an ideal type, perfect rationality derived from the positivist image of sci-
ence, which acts as a heuristic framework (March and Simon 1979). See also LaPorte
(1980) and Mayer (1971).
**See Weinberg (1972). Kemeny (1979) expressed the same assumption when he observed
"There was a time when if someone asked me for information on science I'd say, 'Go
and ask a scientist'. And if they said, 'Which one?' I probably would have replied
'As long as you get a good one it doesn't matter which one, because if the question
lies within the scientist's area of expertise and he or she investigates the problem
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account of science I have advanced, one can say that this is only a polar
example of what is always the case, in that there is never inescapable
empirical proof of any scientific knowledge, but social agreement amongst
scientists that things are so. The implication of Weinberg's trans-
science analysis is that if the scientific issue could be finally resolved
then there would be no more conflict. But this is almost tautological in
that science is defined in such a way as to require that conclusion. Re-
lating to the previous point for policy research, where I emphasized that
scientists were for good reason regularly incapable of defining uncertain-
ties and anomalies in their own knowledge, it would be valuable to re-
search the ways in which scientists involved in risk analyses and policy
debates interpreted the nature and degree of certainty (and relevance) of
their knowledge in different contexts of debate, and to see how others
responded. A topical example here is the recent case of the expert
Lowther Committee in the U~, which investigated the effects of environ-
mental lead. Quite apart from many other interesting aspects of the af-
fair, one expert member of the committee is widely regarded as having
expressed incompatible views on a relevant scientific matter, in the com-
mittee's account of it and his own account in a scientific paper published
at the same time. This points us towards the hitherto unrecognized extent
to which scientific knowledge is always incomplete in meaning, and open
to very different interpretations in different contexts of use. Pinch has
demonstrated this process in pure science, and the same process applies
in other areas*. This also hints at the related point that science is
always less formally defensible against scepticism than is usually acknow-
ledged (witness the endless elaboration of the fluoridation risks issue)
and what is legitimate and illegitimate interpretation and insistence on
insignificant uncertaintyisa socially conditioned matter. Whether the
relevant social conditions are within science or go beyond science is an
open question in every case, and needs case-by-case empirical investigation.
The point of the sociological perspective on rationality in this area can
be illustrated by reference to the widely cited paper on risk perception
by Slovic and Fischoff (1980) "How safe is safe enough?"**. In this paper
the authors discuss several ways in which entirely objective perceptions
and expressions of risk are not achieved. Exaggerated certainty, resis-
tance to contradictory evidence, and other items mentioned before, are also
identified by Slovic and Fischoff. The crucial difference, however, is
that they do not seem to recognize any distinction between individual psy-
chology and institutional processes, and the emphasis upon the former has
the effect of supressing any acknowledgment of the latter. This again im-
plies that the failings of objective perception are virtually confined to
the unempirical "peasantry", the errors of the decision making/analytical
elites being isolated and occasional, not structurally inevitable in the
social structure of technology and science. Slovic and Fischoff also place
their faith in the call for the experts to explicate their premises and
heuristics more clearly. Yet this is also part and parcel of the positi-
vist myth of scientific rationality which I am criticizing. In this case
their perspective is not so much dismantled as transcended into a new set
of questions.
long enough, the scientific truth will be obtained'. I still believe that, but it's
not always of practical value because some of the technology we use is at the very
frontiers of scientific knowledge." In other words, conflict only arises because
one scientist or another is unqualified, or because the research hasn't been devel-
oped enough.
*A suggestive case study, although in a science out of the political pressure of
the policy area, is Pinch (1981).
**See also Slovic et al. (1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) performed their work
with scientists, but the sociological implications of their findings were not dis-
cussed.
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(iv) A general theme that pervades the previous ideas for research and indeed
the whole paper is the assertion that a particular false image of science
has become deeply embedded in thought and debate in the policy field, as
a rhetoric of authority. The most important general research task is to
seek out those unwarranted assumptions and a priori formulations embedded
in the concrete language of such issues. This will naturally reflect upon
the role and tacit languages of risk analysts themselves, and will inevit-
ably cause us to examine the social origins of persistent perceptions of
"risk" (i.e., conflict) in power relations in society. Especially relevant
to our starting point of technology will be the question of who enjoys power
in the real processes of technological commitment, as opposed to that of
who takes part in formalized decision making processes that often appear
to be of marginal relevance to the real power structures. To analysts with
anthropological leanings like myself it is a matter of course that politi-
cal order will always rest upon myths which are effective to the degree
that they are not directly challenged. Myths about an order corresponding
to scientific rationality have played their part in sustaining social
authority, but I have suggested that the rationalistic self-delusions of
decision making elites and their policy analysts may now be inadvertently
polarizing and deepening the schisms and political instabilities of indus-
trial society.
In other words, before we attempt to decide what specific research and practi-
cal objectives should be adopted in the risk analysis field, we should perhaps de-
cide whether our own role is to perpetuate these myths or to identify and explicate
them. Is our analysis to be social research or social therapy? If the latter, are
we sure that the therapy will not be iatrogenic?
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A Proposal to Create a Cultural Theory of Risk
Michael Thompson and Aaron Wildavsky
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis3 Laxenburg3 Austria
1. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the greatest achievement of anthropology has been to show that differ-
ent people, faced with the same situation, do different things. No sooner does an
economist, a psychologist, a sociologist, or a political scientist produce his uni-
versally valid model of some aspect of human behavior than an anthropologist will
jump up and say, "Ah, but what about the Bongo-bongo?" It is probably safe to say
that there is no universalisitic proposition that is immune to Bongo-bongoism*.
Some semiologists, for instance, have suggested that there are some signs so rooted
in nature that their meaning has to be intrinsic. One such sign is the arrow: _ .
Here, surely, the meaning is intrinsic to the sign; arrows always fly through the
air point first and so the point of the sign, surely, must always indicate the di-
rection of travel. Quite so, but who said the sign was an arrow? On a remote
island in Micronesia the people spend much of their time hunting a secretive bird
whose feet are specially adapted to the marshy terrain. Each time it puts one of
its three-toed feet down on the ground, it leaves a sign: -: and every time a
hunter sees one of these signs, he knows with certainty which way to go to catch up
with his quarry. He goes in the direction indicated by the big central toe.
Anthropologists have been so carried away by their spoilsport success that they
have almost lost sight of the one really interesting question which is: given that
different people in the same sort of situation do different things why do they do
the different things that they do? This is the question that political culture
tries to answer. If it was only the people on remote Micronesian islands who did
things differently then political culture, whilst intellectually, intriguing, would
be of little practical relevance, but though we might like to pretend otherwise,
this is not the case. The simple but unpalatable fact is that the Bongo-bongo are
alive and well and living right here in our midst.
More than a century ago General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, after
describing the iniquities perpetrated by the slave traders in the unknown African
interior, suddenly brought the whole outrage uncomfortably close to home and asked:
"Is there not also a darkest England?" In much the same way, the cultural approach
brings the Bongo-bongo home to roost; the only difference is that this time it is
our rationality, not our morality, that is outraged**.
The trick with cultural contexts is to come at policy-relevant debates, such
as those that surround technological risk, from a contrary direction. Instead of
asking "What are the risks?" we ask "What would you like the risks to be?" Though
the analysis of cultural contexts has something useful to contribute to all public
policy analysis, its point of entry is that state of desperation, exasperation and
exhaustion that is reached when, after years of debate and after the expenditure of
millions of dollars, we are still no nearer agreement on what the risks out there
are.
*Credit for this fictitious tribe, for the far-from-fictitious "ism" that it high-
lights, and for much of the development of the cultural contextual approach is due
to Mary Douglas. Particularly relevant are Douglas (1972, 1979).
**Though, as we will argue presently, morality and rationality are closely related.
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1.1. An Unconventional View of Culture
Although it is commonly assumed that to reject cultural universalism is to em-
brace cultural relativity, this assumption would only be valid if the number of
different things that people could do was infinite. Political culture* starts out
from the intuitive hunch that, though people faced with the same situation do dif-
ferent things, there aren't that many different ways of doing things. This idea
that there are patterns of culture, that such patterns are accessible and describ-
able, and that there are not very many of them is not a synthesis of the universa-
listic and relativistic traditions; it is a rejection of them both. It is as well
to make this point explicit right from the beginning. Political culture is born
of the marriage of anthropology to political science, and culture is its key concept,
but the idea of culture that underpins this approach is far removed from the ideas
that have held conventional sway in anthropology.
We start to lose interest in those vague pseudo-entities like, say, American
culture or French culture; instead we start to focus on the various cultural biases
that are to be found (in varying proportions) within both American society and
French society. Nor do we persist in our sympathy for either of those contradictory
formulations that would have us believe, on the one hand, that culture is just some
kind of reflection or rationalization of social action, and on the other, that it
is some kind of rule book for the game of social life that gets handed down, largely
unchanged, from generation to generation. Culture, we begin to feel, conforms to
neither of these contradictory extremes of total fluidity and rigid concreteness.
Culture is plastic. Although it can be pushed this way and that way, it cannot be
pushed just anywhere; and just to push it into some fresh attainable configuration
(and then keep it there) requires a great deal of social effort. Instead of a lot
of social actors programmed day-in-day-out by culture and instead of some cultural
superstructure that forms like a fluffy cloud above the granite mountain of produc-
tion and consumption forces, we have mentally and physically creative individuals
for whom culture is a rather provisional thing that needs to be made afresh (or, at
the very least, patched-up and modified) each morning.
Our hypothesis is that there are only a few shareable (i.e., socially viable)
cultural biases and that (in advanced industrial societies, at any rate) it would
be most unwise to assume that any of these possible biases is "uninhabited". Each
bias is stabilized, albeit precariously, by its distinctive cosmology. By cosmology
is meant those shared beliefs and convictions about how the world is that sustain
and justify moral judgments. But, if shared beliefs and convictions are rather pro-
visional things that have to be worked at all the time, how can you be sure that
yours are in line with everyone else's? Only by engaging in the continual process
in which each individual justifies his own actions and passes judgment on those of
others can you become, and remain, a member of a moral community. "Giving a good
account of yourself" is not just a figure of speech; it is the human propensity
that makes human society possible.
The final piece of the cultural jigsaw is social context, for it is an individ-
ual's social context, so the theory runs, that determines his particular cultural
bias and leads him to give credence to one cosmology--to one set of shareable be-
liefs about how the world is--rather than to any of the contradictory alternatives.
And finally, social context, it is held, is adequately described by just two dimen-
sions: group, which has to do with the extent to which the individual is involved
in bounded social groups, and grid, which has to do with the extent to which the
individual is involved in hierarchical arrangements (either of individuals or of
bounded groups of individuals).
If you are convinced that the world is like this, and I am convinced that the
world is like that, then we are likely to act in very different ways in the one
physical world that we both inhabit. That is, people who subscribe to contradictory
*Our cultural approach adds to, rather than contradicts, that of the economist.
Where political economy looks at how people are differentiated by constraints--by
what they can't do--political culture looks at how they are differentiated by capa-
bilities--by different things that they do with what they can do.
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cosmologies will operate contradictory rationalities. Each, ensnared in his own
provincial rationality, will see the others as the Bongo-bongo (Lord Rothschild
1974, for instance, sees the Friends of the Earth as "eco-nuts" and "eco-maniacs"
and they for their part see him as something quite unprintable). Since each is
committed to the rightness of his own cosmology, neither can let go of it long
enough to concede the validity of the other's rationalities. In the acrimonious
battle between these rationalities no one can afford to stand outside it; to do
that would be to concede the validity of other rationalities and to admit that any
approach aimed at determining which rationality is right is bound to be wrong, and
the whole misguided purpose of the battle is not to live with the Bongo-bongo but
to annihilate them.
Cultural contexts constitute the systematic deprovincialization of rationality.
If individuals in different social contexts are firmly attached to contradictory
convictions about how the world is, then it is only to be expected that they will
have very different ideas of what the risks are out there. To ask "Who is right?"
is not just to ask a question that probably only history can answer; it is to en-
courage the arbitrary tyranny of one provincial rationality over all the others.
The intellectual source of this arbitrariness we call "the individualist fallacy".
1.2. The Individualist Fallacy
The decision maker, when he finally arrives at the realization that he is
faced, not with a technical problem but with one that has to do with people, tends
to reach for his psychologist. Wrong again: The individualist fallacy is a spec-
ific version of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead 1926). In the
first instance, this fallacy takes the form of assuming that risk is something in-
herent in our external world--that the risks that threaten us are determined by the
inherent physical properties of the universe. It is this assumption that leads the
decision maker to believe that the problem he faces is a technical one* and that
leads him to hire various technical experts who claim to be able to solve it. Two
difficulties result. First, the technical experts can never gain access to all the
risks that are determined by the universe. Second, public policy involves the pub-
lic, and some of its members it turns out do not revise their varied perceptions of
the risks "out there" to bring them into line with those of the experts.
Which social choice should the decision maker take; the Platonic one based on
what the real risks are (as far as the expert can see, that is) or the Benthamite
one based on some aggregation of what people believe the risks to be? If he chooses
the Benthamite alternative then he will need to hire some different experts--those
who can tell him what people think the risks are. But the psychologist still re-
tains as his datum the real risks "out there". He discovers threshold points for
low-probability/high-consequence events, he discovers persistent overestimators and
persistent underestimators, optimists and pessimists, ... ,risk-accepting and risk-
averting individuals; all plotted in against the same vast expanse of misplaced con-
crete--that totality of risks determined by the universe.
Far from being dismayed by the unattainability of what the risk assessor and
the psychologist have set their hearts on, the anthropologist will point out that
this unattainable goal is not what risk is about anyway. Of course, the universe
is not irrelevant, but it is not what determines the area of concern that we are
referring to when we talk about risk. Rather than being something that is inherent
in the external world, risk and its absence are qualities that are conferred upon
it by social processes. These social processes, as they blot out some risks that
are really there and as they set down others that have no counterpart in physical
reality, create a fluctuating pool of risks somewhere between us and the universe.
Since any debate about risk must take place within a social setting, it will inev-
itably be a debate about the properties of this fluid pool. Anyone who claims that
*Rather than one that has some technical aspects. This is not to say that the tech-
nical expert has no part to play in risk management, only that, when he insists
that the problem itself is technical he is playing the wrong part.
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it is not--that it is about the concrete expanse that lies somewhere beyond this
pool--is falsely claiming to be a "cosmic exile" (Quine 1960, p275)*.
This--the cosmic exile's impossible claim--is the fallacy of misplaced concrete
ness. It is the naive assumption of the literalist who, when he looks at the world,
believes that he is seeing it with the naked eye. It is a serious fallacy. It is
not some trivial little objection to be circumvented by conceding a touch of "sub-
jectivity" as the engineer moves from analysis to evaluation; nor is it something
that can be put right by the addition of a "social science input"--by bringing in
"the behavioral engineers" to sort out the "people problems". It is nothing less
than a total misapprehension of what risk is.
Risk, though it has some roots in nature, is inevitably subject to social pro-
cesses. Since we (being members of society) are at one end of these processes, we
can never gain access to the raw unprocessed reality. Whether we like it or not,
the risks to which we have access are processed risks. If only we concede that this
is so, and stop pretending that we can get at the risks before they have been pro-
cessed, then we can begin to understand something about them--we can begin to under-
stand the processes of which they are the end products. Also the first thing that
we must understand is that these processes have very little to do with the individ-
ual as an isolated entity; they demand very little of his innate sensory apparatus
but a great deal of his socially acquired referential apparatus. They are pre-
eminently social processes.
An individual is led to impose cut-off points, not because his eyesight is not
good enough or his nose not up to the job of sniffing beyond a certain range, but
because of the social and cultural institutions that are stabilized and made cred-
ible for him by virtue of his social context and its appropriate cosmology. As
long as those institutions remain credible--as long as he is prepared to go along
with them--they will do the risk management (the imposition of thresholds and the
setting of their levels) for him automatically. A different individual in a dif-
ferent social context is led to impose on his external world all kinds of risks
that have no physical counterpart (or at least none that is detectable), not because
he is suffering from some serious malfunction of his sensory equipment, but because
the different social and cultural institutions that he finds credible do it for him,
automatically.
Human life has transferred risk perception from the individual (as a psycho-
physiological unit) to the social fabric of which he is part (and as an adaptive
mechanism it has, up to now, proved remarkably successful). In their handling of
risk humans do not act as individuals but as social beings sensitively tuned to
social pressures and submissive to mutual coercion.
l.3. The Individual as a Social Being
The hypothesis in terms of the individual and his social context is specifi-
cally designed to handle the individual, not as an isolated entity, but as a social
being. The social units that do the risk handling come in a variety of forms--
bounded groups, hierarchical organizations, competing personal networks . .. , atomized
communities**--and they run the entire gamut from vast federal agencies to tiny
self-help arrangements organized by nothing more formal than a shared sense of
neighborliness. The two dimensions of social context allow us to go behind these
contingent differences and to categorize any individual according to the way in
which he is involved with, or free from, these various social units.
If he belongs to a bounded group that can impose severe sanctions on its mem-
bers then he will score positively on the group dimension. If he is at the center,
of an extensive personal network he will be imposing prescriptions upon those indi-
viduals who are towards its periphery and so he will score negatively on the grid
*A situation sympathetically described by an economist who himself exhibits the
bias appropriate to this context. See Friedman (1980).
**This is the one that by and large, has been missed by social scientists. See
Munch (l974) and Thompson (1981).
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dimension*. If he wishes to purchase some drug that has been banned by the Food
and Drug Administration his life will be limited (ever so slightly) by an imperson-
ally imposed prescription. If he is subject to many such prescriptions (if he is
peripheral to the personal networks of others, for instance) he will score posi-
tively on the grid dimension. On the other hand, if he is central to an extensive
network and immune from group loyalties and sanctions, he will have the resources,
the necessary information and the will to just go out and buy the forbidden drug on
the grey market**. In that case he will score negatively on both group and grid
dimensions. If he is a self-employed and largely self-sufficient farmer whose in-
volvement with his similarly situated neighbors, though convivial, is essentially
voluntary then he will score zero on both dimensions.
In this way, as we plot our individuals onto the social map, we build up a
scatter diagram that will reveal which sorts of social units predominate in that
society, and highlight where the potentially troublesome polarizations of affilia-
tion to those units are located. Individuals in one category of social context
will, as social beings, be sensitively tuned (by their cosmology and their strategy)
to the social pressures characteristic of that context and they will be disposed to
submit themselves to the kinds of mutual coercion that are characteristic of that
context.
These different kinds of social pressure and different kinds of acceptable co-
ercion manifest themselves in social and cultural institutions. The Sherpa, by and
large, avoids mentioning the names of the dead; the lower-caste Hindu, by and large,
defers to the high-caste Brahmin; the lineage member whose crops have been spoiled by
flooding goes to his kin on the higher ground and asks them to make good his loss
and they for their part, mindful that in periods of drought positions are likely
to be reversed, accede to his request. In other words, different kinds of institu-
tionsare appropriate to different social contexts. Social context is, as it were,
the soil in which institutions grow. The institutions (changing the metaphor) are
a kind of automatic pilot; the individual grants credence to them and, in return,
the institutions look after the risks for him. From this it follows that
(i) different kinds of institution will tend to flourish in different social
"soils"-that different institutionalized ways of handling risk will
evolve in different social contexts-and
(ii) that whether an institution flourishes or withers will depend on whether
individuals continue to grant credibility to it.
If an individual's social context, for some reason, changes then he will be tempted
to override the automatic pilot that previously handled his risks for him. He will
begin to question the legitimacy of the institutions, and risks of which previously
he was scarcely aware will suddenly, as they become his personal concern, loom
large and threatening.
If we looked only at the institutions, and not at the individuals who either
support or fail to support them, then we could say nothing about the appropriateness
of institutions nor could we begin to understand the dynamic social processes that
distribute credibility this way rather than that and, in so doing, uphold one insti-
tution and cause the collapse of another. For instance, perhaps the most alarming
of all the problems that have emerged from the nuclear debate has to do with the
way in which institutions that have long given sterling service have become para-
lyzed. Our institutions are designed to provide us with decisions (and with good
decisions, to boot) yet everywhere we see policies stymied and nuclear indus-
tries declining into bankruptcy, not because our institutions have decided that all
things considered that is what should be happening, but because they simply can no
*There are good theoretical reasons why the contradictory situations in which he
is both included and excluded by groups and in which he is central to one powerful
network and peripheral to others are unlikely to occur. Nor do they seem to occur
in practice. See Thompson (1981).
**A stituation sympathetically described by an economist who himself exhibits the
bias appropriate to this context. See Friedman (1980).
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longer come up with any decisions--even bad ones: Any approach that concerns it-
self only with the institutions and not with the social dynamics of their support
will be powerless to explain why hitherto healthy institutions have suddenly become
paralyzed in this distressing way. And, if it cannot diagnose the disease, what
hope is there that it will be able to come up with prescriptions that will effect
a recovery?
2. SOCIAL CONTEXT
In the social sciences, psychologists have traditionally focused on the indi-
vidual while sociologists and anthropologists have concentrated on the larger-scale
individuals--clans, classes, lineages, hierarchies, age-grades, ... ,corporations.
Both these--the individual and the various relationships that make him into a member
of society--can be handled by the concept of social context. It is a concept that,
crossing these customary disciplinary boundaries, allows us to-move smoothly back
and forth between the micro-concerns of the psychologist and the macro-concerns of
the sociologist and anthropologist. The totality is described in terms of each of
its constituent elements (individuals) and their various social contexts (their
myriad relationships with other individuals)*.
But the usefulness of this social context concept will depend on the extent to
which it can make some generalizations about the differences between individuals.
If at the end of our scrutiny each individual emerges with a unique social context
that distinguishes and sets him apart from every other individual, then little
theoretical or practical progress will have been made. The same is true for those
other extremes of outcome: that in which every individual (being related to every
other individual) emerges with an identical social context, and that in which we
cannot distinguish any criteria for deciding whether one individual's social con-
text is the same as or different from that of some other individual. On the posi-
tive side, if these obstacles can be avoided then social context will provide us
with a concept applicable to any human being, anywhere ... anytime--it is not subject
to cultural**, historical, technological, ecological or social qualifications.
Whether it is of any use or not will depend entirely on whether it can avoid being
so particularistic that every individual has to be seen as a special case without,
at the same time, being so universalistic that everyone ends up the same.
Our hypothesis, in fact, maps distinct cultural categories into our two dimen-
sions of social context (see Figure 1). This mapping in which the two dimensions
of social context permit us to distinguish five distinct categories into which in-
dividuals must fall, each distinct conjunction of individual and social context
being stabilized by a distinctive cultural bias (or cosmology), most certainly
avoids these twin pitfalls: particularism and universalism. Five not only lies
somewhere between one and infinity, it is an eminently handleable number as well.
If we only need take five biases--five kinds of social individual, five cosmologies,
*The individual, it should be stressed, is handled as a social being, not as a
unique psycho-physiological entity. But it is not being argued that individuals
are indistinguishable empty vessels until they are filled with the breath of social
life, only that the manner of their involvement in social life will superimpose a
distinctive bias upon whatever was there to begin with. Once an individual has
become a social being it is often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to say where
this line between original content (nature) and social overlay (nurture) lies. A
consequence of this is that, to the extent that this line is blurred, the concerns
of the psychologist and the anthropologist overlap. Anthropology has often tended
to pull back from this fuzzy region; the present approach does the opposite.
**Though we have spoken of it as a cultural approach it is, properly speaking, an
approach in terms of cultural bias. We are interested in patterns of culture
rather than in culture itself and so, in this sense, the concept of social context
is free from cultural qualification.
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Figure 1. Social context and cultural categories.
five kinds of perceptions of risk, ... , five risk-handling strategies--into account
then an anthropological theory of risk is not just possible, it is usable as well*.
2.1. The Two Dimensions of social context
The group dimension can be visualized as running from "individualized" to
"collectivized", but the way in which it varies independently of the grid dimension
(which can be visualized as running from "egalitarian" to "hierarchical") is not
so obvious. Grid has to do with the extent to which an individual is sUbject to
(or free from) socially imposed prescriptions. For example, the member of a high
caste is clearly a member of a bounded social group, but the dietary and pollution-
avoiding prescriptions that he has to observe are not the consequences of his mem-
bership of the group itself but of that group's relationships with other groups--of
its rigorously defined and energetically maintained position within a hierarchical
arrangement of groups. By contrast, a member of an egalitarian group--one with no
internal differentiation and with no defined relationships with other groups--would
score high on the group dimension but low on the grid dimension.
But this idea of high and low scores on the two dimensions is still not enough
to capture the full complexity of what is going on. The social context of an indi-
vidual who is not a member of any group, because there are no groups around for him
to be a member of, is very different from that of the individual who finds himself
expelled from the group to which he looks in vain for his support. The first has
*We should stress here that the commitment is not to the number five but to inter-
mediate sociology; to the existence of some handleable and cross-culturally valid
basis for the disaggregation of individuals into a number of categories, that num-
ber lying somewhere between one (universalism) and infinity (particularism). For
reasons of practicality and application, we would prefer the number to be small
rather than large. But we would have no objections to this intermediate number
being, say, three or six or eight if such a categorization gave better results in
practice and could be predicted theoretically by making certain specified changes
in the initial assumptions (and provided those changes were more realistic than
those used to generate the fivefold categorization. Where Merton (1968) advanced
sociology by directing it to middle-level propositions, we would like to shift
sociology and anthropology onto a modest number of cultural contexts.
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zero group; the second, negative group. The same sort of thing applies to the grid
dimension. The prescriptions that this dimension reflects are imposed by hierarchy-
either the hierarchies that result from competitive personal network building or
the hierarchical arrangements, not of individuals, but of groupings of individuals.
Again, the context of the individual who, withdrawing into autonomy, is able to
avoid any coercive involvement in personal networks and that of the individual who,
try as he may, can neither withdraw from such involvement nor fight his way into
any central positions within the networks that he is involved with are not at all
the same. The first has zero grid; the second, positive grid. So it is not simply
a matter of high and low scores; each dimension has a zero point from which scores
may be high or low in two directions: positive and negative. Since it turns out
that it is only possible to measure social context on ordinal scales, the maximum
number of categories that we can distinguish with two dimensions is five*.
2.2. The Five Contexts
The two strongly grouped contexts, one hierarchical and the other egalitarian,
are well known to anthropologists. They correspond to castes and sects, respec-
tively. We free these terms from the settings to which they are usually restricted
(the anthropology of the Indian subcontinent and the sociology of religion, respec-
tively) and use them to describe two distinct cultural biases that we observe in
Western secular society--caste-ist and sectist**.
A sect erects a wall of virtue between itself and the nasty outside world from
which it wishes to set itself apart. The members collectively reject the outside
world--they do not negotiate any sort of relationship with it. The result is that,
though the collectivity may exercise almost total control over its members, it can
do nothing to the rest of the society.
A caste separates itself off, not with a wall of virtue, but by means of
clearly defined distinctions between it and those other groupings that exist out-
side it. The result, as each caste defines itself by its distinction from (yet
clearly specified interrelation with) other castes, is a complex hierarchical frame-
work of status distinction, prescriptions, restrictive practices, correct channels,
and proper procedures. The members of a caste, therefore, do not reject the out-
side world; they collectively take up a clearly specified position within it. A
caste, as a result, can come to exercise a high level of control over its own mem-
bers and over those outside its boundary.
The top left context is where we find the social condition that, intuitively,
we associate with poverty. Very alone and everywhere hedged about by externally
imposed prescriptions, the individual in this context has little control over events
in time and space and his (or her, since women tend to predominate in this context)
cosmology tends to be cobbled together from such ill assorted bits and pieces as he
can lay his hands on. This is the social context of kitsch, of millenarianism, of
inconsistent eclecticism and, above all, of Lady Luck as the provider and withholder
of all resources. Engels, in his account of the condition of the un-unionized work-
ing classes in Victorian Britain, is describing this context and so too (though with
a slightly different set of prescriptions in mind) is Mrs Gaskell when she speaks
of those for whom "life is like a lottery" (see Engels 1845, Gaskell 1958, 1971).
The bottom left context is where we find the entrepreneur--the individual who
is often blamed for the sorry predicament of the "life is like a lottery" man. Un-
like the sectist and the caste-ist, the entrepreneur has no interest in the mainte-
nance of transactional boundaries; he profits from their demolition. Free from
group obligations and sitting at the center of an extensive personal network of his
own creation, he is not just free from prescriptions--he is, as a result of his
*Strictly speaking, the maximum number is nine, but it turns out that when the
third dimension (manipulation) is introduced, only five out of these nine have
stabilizable equilibria associated with them (see Figure 2).
**This distinction has been operationalized in terms of 13 criteria for caste-ist
and sectist groups. See Thompson (1980a).
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economies of scale and his willingness to treat anything (even his grandmother) as
negotiable, actively imposing prescriptions on those less forceful individuals who
form the periphery of his network. He is a pragmatic materialist.
The fifth context is the one that is often missed by occidental social scien-
tists; it is the distinctive context occupied by the individual who has deliberately
chosen to keep his involvement in socially binding relationships (be they network
or group relationships) to a minimum. This is the social context of the hermit--
the still center of the social hurricane (but not the raucous North American pseudo
hermits like Thoreau, who are really sect leaders in search of followers). Nor are
such individuals always outside society. Though they may choose to withdraw from
all social involvement, it is only coercive involvement that they have to avoid to
stabilize themselves in this context. Whole convivial societies can be stabilized
around this context with the help of its "live and let live", "sufficient unto the
day is the evil thereof" cosmology (see Thompson 198Gb, 1981a,b).
2.3. Power and Control
Each conjunction of social context and cosmology will generate its own dis-
tinctive strategy. That strategy will result either in the individual manipulating
others or being himself manipulated. The members of a sect end up manipulated
(collectively); the members of a caste (collectively) manipulate. Entrepreneurs
clearly are (individualistic) manipulators while those whose lives are "like a lot-
tery" are equally clearly being manipu'lated (individually). Only those individuals
who operate the autonomous strategy appropriate to the hermit, and who successfully
avoid all coercive involvement with their fellow men, will end up neither manipu-
lating nor manipulated*.
If we add this third dimension, manipulation, to the two social context dimen-
sions and join these five equilibrium states together in the simplest possible way
we obtain a graph like Figure 2. Topologically, if you have two basins and two
hilltops arranged in this way then the landscape must contain a fifth equilibrium
Manipulation
Grid
+
+
Figure 2. Relationship between social context and manipulation.
*For some, the word "manipulate" may be value-laden. No such judgment is intended
here. The simple fact is that social life often involves manipulation--a fact that
some will deny and others will acknowledge. The present argument is that these dj.-
vergent responses (and the further distinctions between those who, in acknowledging
this fact, regard manipulation as inevitable, regrettable, avoidable . .. , desirable)
are not uninfluenced by social context.
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state--a saddle point. It may, of course, contain other equilibrium points as well
but this is its simplest possible configuration. The five equilibrium states (the
five "flat bits") are now clearly separated from each other by means of disequilib-
rium states (the intervening slopes). This diagram (or simple variations of it)
constitutes the form of our hypothesis. Its content follows.
2.4. The Five Strategies
with each social context there goes a distinct rationality--a world view, a
cosmology, a cultural bias ... , a particular way of seeing the world and man's place
within it--that provides a moral justification for certain kinds of actions and a
basis for moral disapprobation of other kinds of actions. The idea is that social
context and world view will tend to stabilize one another and that, as people in a
shared context come to share a particular world view, they acquire and sustain a
particular morality that enables thenl continually to make judgments on human actions:
rewarding some and punishing others. The hypothesis states that such shareability-
such stabilization of moral community--can only occur at or near these five equi-
librium states. Each cUltural context requires a distinct personal strategy for
the individuals in it to maintain its stability. Individuals in different social
context will tend to home in onto distinctive strategies that will enable them to
steer an optimal personal course through all these socially generated rewards and
penalties. If you observe an individual as he follows one of these strategies, you
will discover whether he ends up manipulating others or being himself manipulated
(see Figure 3).
2.5. The Social Bases of Perception
The combination of world view and strategy that is appropriate to each social
context results in an individual in that context perceiving his external world in
a distinctive way. Thus our hypothesis forms the basis for an anthropological
theory of perception*--not of how we perceive (physiology) nor of what we all per-
ceive (psychology) but of the pattcY'nings that are socially imposed in order to
support certain moral commitments.
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Figure 3. Thumbnail sketch of the strategies, the cosmologies, and the justifications.
*"Perception" is being used here in the lay sense of gut convictions about how
things are rather than in the narrower meanings of the word as it is defined by
psycholo~i its and physiologists. See Otway (1979).
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Risk is very much a moral question (and never more so than when it is being
asserted that it is not). As the history of risk assessment clearly demonstrates,
widely divergent convictions as to what the risks "out there" are can often coexist
within the same society. Our hypothesis, we argue, is capable of handling these
cultural biases both as to how risks are perceived and as to how they are evaluated.
The current state of this theory, which we wish to develop further, is discussed
next.
3. THE CULTURAL THEORY OF RISK
Are risks perceived in the short or long run? Making just the simple division
of time into the short term and the long term is sufficient to separate three con-
texts--those in which we will find experts--from the other two--those in which ex-
perts are absent. Expertise and perception of the long term go hand in hand; so,
if you only perceive the short term, there is no chance of your becoming an expert.
But your inability to perceive the long term may be by choice or it may be by com-
pulsion, and this distinction provides a second criterion that enables us to sepa-
rate these two expert-less contexts--that of the hermit (by choice) and that of the
"life is like a lottery" man (by compulsion). Turning to the three categories in
which the long term is perceived, we meet three different kinds of expert and the
problem is to explain why each kind of expert is appropriate to his particular
category.
Both the entrepreneur and the sect member are able to perceive both the short
and the long terms but they evaluate them very differently. For the entrepreneur,
the short term dominates the long term, he is in the business of manipulation but
he is realistic enough to know that his manipulation, being the product of his own
energy (rather than of the authority of an institutionalized office that he, for a
time, fills), does not extend too far into the future. Being an expansive optimist,
he allays his fears that his short-term successes may not continue indefinitely by
insisting that the long term will turn out to be a prolongation of the short term.
He is predisposed to give credence to the "business as usual" scenario.
The sect member's evaluations of the short and long terms are the reverse of
the entrepreneur's. Collectivized within his wall of virtue, and with little con-
trol over the short term, his main concern is just to survive; he sees himself as
one of the meek who, in the long term, will inherit the earth*. In this way, the
o~timistically perceived long term comes to dominate the gloomy short term. If
there is to be a long term at all then the short term will have to be radically
changed now. He is, in consequence, predisposed to grant credence to the "no
growth" (the "radical change now") scenario.
Where both the entrepreneur's and the sect member's evaluations of the long
and short terms are unbalanced (with the short term dominant for the entrepreneur
and the long term dominant for the sect member) the evaluations of the caste member
are quite nicely balanced. This is the context occupied by the planner and the
bureaucrat. Insulated from the pressing daily concerns of the entrepreneur by the
institutionalized framework that guarantees the continued existence of the office
that he fills, he is able to give adequate attention to the long term. What is
more, he sees events in that long term as being controllable, not by him personally,
but by the complex collectivity of which he is a self-effacing part. Being part of
an elaborate hierarchy he is predisposed to be sensitive to fine distinctions and,
in consequence, is unlikely to see the long term as a mere extension of the short
term or vice Jersa (and, of course, he would be out of a job if he conceded that
there was no such distinction). Each is seen in a balanced and discriminating way
and, since collective control over events is seen as extending far beyond the short
term, the long term is viewed with cautious optimism. The result is a willingness
to grant credence to the "middle of the road" scenario**.
*Not surprisingly, this friend of the earth often joins with others to become a
Friend of the Earth and together they draw up "Blueprints for Survival" designed to
ensure that the earth does not disappear before their inheritance falls due.
**For instance, see Schanz (1979). For further evidence of the separation of these
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We can summarize these criteria--long- versus short-sightedness, choice versus
compulsion, short-term versus long-term dominance, and balanced versus unbalanced
evaluation--for separating the five categories with the help of the basic diagram,
Figure 4.
3.1. Acceptable Risk
How does the acceptability of risks vary with social context? There are some
philosophical problems here because, as we have just argued, the perception of
risks also varies with social context. Just because an individual cannot see a
risk it does not follow that he is not exposed to it (and an individual in a differ-
ent social context may well be able to see that he is exposed to it). But, if he
does not even know that the risk that he is exposed to is there, is it valid to
speak of him "accepting" that risk? On top of this there are the risks that, though
they are not actually there, are believed to be there (and an -individual in another
social context may well be able to see that they are not there). Such nonexistent
risks may, in some contexts, constitute a major proportion of the risks that are
perceived in those contexts and they may be managed by all sorts of socially imposed
rewards and penalties which, in turn, provide the incentives for their acceptance
or avoidance.
The hypothesis is designed to cope with these sorts of problems but, before we
talk about "the acceptability of risk", we should bear in mind the fact that the
pool of risks to which our acceptance/avoidance criteria will be applied is itself
highly fluid. It may fill up or empty according to whether our perception extends
to the long term or is restricted to the short term, and it may fill up with all
sorts of risks that aren't there but are believed to be there. For instance, there
is no real physical risk involved in eating cooked rice on which the shadow of an
untouchable has fallen (or, at least, no more risk than if the shadow had not fallen
on it), yet such a risk is believed to be there, and a great deal of trouble is
taken to avoid it, in the strongly positive group and strongly positive grid context
of the high-caste Hindu. The risk, of course, is to the intricate and highly dis-
criminating social fabric but it is externalized and given expression in terms of the
physical world of light and shadow, nutrition and bodily processes.
Grid
Short term
(::~~~o~~~~~~J
Involuntary myopia
only is
I'~~fflc~~~t2.tEej;:1
-----....;;, Voluntary myopia
perceived
I"Business as usual"
Short term
dominates
long term
Credible scenarios: Expert
are perceived
ahort and long terms
"Middle of the road"
"No growth" I
Long term
dominates
short term
N<Jnexpert C:::::J
Balanced
discrimination
between long
and short terms
Unbalanced
discrimination
between long
and short terms
Figure 4. Criteria for separating the five categories.
three scenarios, in the form of a matrix showing how the other incredible scenarios
are perceived from each credible scenario, see Reuyl et al. (1977).
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Pollution concepts develop rather differently in the social context of the sect
member because his group is internally undifferentiated and rejects, rather than
negotiates relationships with, the rest of society. Here there is only one crucial
boundary to be defended-that which separates and protects the good vulnerable "us"
on the inside from the nasty predatory "them" on the outside. Only by ceaselessly
patrolling and maintaining this boundary can the sect retain its cohesion and sur-
vive through time. So the risks are real enough and the institutionalized steps
that are taken to minimize them--the witchcraft accusations, the denunciations, the
confessions, and the explusions-do serve a vital purpose but, though they are ex-
pressed as such, they are not risks inherent in the physical world*. And, even when
the risk is there in the physical world, the concern that surrounds it may well de-
rive from some physically nonexistent social risk that overlies it. Let there be
no doubt that many of the most feared risks in modern technology are of this social
kind. The cultural contextual approach provides us with a means of identifying them
and of taking them seriously.
The way in which all these factors-(l) the perception of risks, (2) their ac-
ceptability, (3) the overlying of social (physically nonexistent) risks, and (4)
the rewards and penalties for different kinds of risks-vary with social context
can be summarized as in Figure 5.
3.2. Styles of Risk Management
What sorts of cultural contexts lead to different styles of risk management?
In the "life is like a lottery" context, individuals are alone and powerless to in-
fluence events. Such institutions as are able to emerge here furnish the occupants,
not with a style for managing risks, but rather for just absorbing them. They make
something of a virtue out of necessity. Since the occupants have ignorance imposed
upon them, they might as well see it as blissful and, since they have no way of
mitigating whatever the risks out there are, they might as well comfort themselves
by the tough minded and slightly braggardly assertion that "what you don't know
can't harm you". To have to search for and identify the cause of every harm that
befell the members of this context would divert their meager resources away from
their number one concern: survival.
Yet this seeking of an explanation for every ill is precisely what those in
the other survival context--that of the sect member-insist on. In this context a
person dies, not because "his number is up", but because someone somewhere has
caused him to die. It may be his own transgression or it may be the work of some
other agent and the whole institutionalized framework of social risks and their
causality is invoked in order to find the culprit and to exact the appropriate pen-
alty. The easy give-and-take that concepts of chance and probability bring to the
interplay between harm and its causation is not to be found here. No "background"
risk is acceptable, all harm has to be accounted for ... partial models full of
slippage, tolerance and expediency and incorporating the idea that some risk is in-
evitable, and that particular deaths are its statistically inevitable outcome, are
rejected. Instead, we have a holistic style of risk management--a total system
model in which causal links can be (and are) traced until the blame for every par-
ticular misfortune can be laid at some particular door. The anthropological liter-
ature on witchcraft accusations (the classic work being Evans-Pritchard 1937)
clearly reveals that these linkages are always traced in such a way as to minimize,
not the physical risks, but the social risks.
Why should these "home-made" theories of causation and blame be so very differ-
ent between these two survival contexts? The answer is that elaborate theories of
causation and blame can only be constructed within a scaffolding of social risks
and social risks can only exist if there is some social structure there for them to
threaten. For the sect, its wall of virtue is its ~aison d'etre; in the atomized
setting of indivualist survival there is no social structure.
*The reason why they have to be expressed in the medium of real physical risks is
that, under the strict regime of collectivized control that tends to be generated
by this context, this is just about the only permissible medium. See Owen (1981).
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(1) Only short-term risks perceived
with any clarity.
(2) No options as to acceptance or
rejection. Risk acceptance a "fact
of life".
(3) No social boundaries to maintain so
Iittle concern for pollution and
therefore few, if any, nonexistent
risks.
(4) Personal rewards seen as resulting
from luck not personal risk taking
and they are not resented.
(1) Short- and long-term risks perceived.
Long term seen as different from
short term but controllable.
(2) Risk averting. If risks cannot be
avoided completely they are spread.
(3) Many boundaries and distinctions
to be maintained so elaborate pollu-
tion concepts and high incidence of
nonexistent risks.
(4) Personal risk for personal gain penal-
ized. Personal risk for totality's
gain rewarded.
(1) Only short-term risks perceived
with any clarity.
(2) If their avoidance would require
social involvement (e.g., risk spread-
ing through reciprocity and social
obligations) then acceptance is lesser
of the two evils.
(3) Little concern for pollution so few,
if any, nonexistent risks.
(4) Personal risk taking for personal
reward approved of as long as it
does not involve coercion of others.
(1) Long and short terms perceived.
Dominance of short term over long
term maintains expansive optimism.
(2) Risk as opportunity.
(3) Little concern for pollution (entre-
preneurs profit from removal of
social boundaries).
(4) Personal risk for personal reward
approved (even if it causes coer-
cion). Personal risk for benefit of
totality less popular.
(1) Short and long terms perceived.
Concern for survival causes long
term to dominate short term.
(2) Strong aversion to all risks except
those involved in the defense of
wall of virtue.
(3) Pollution concerns all clustered
around a single social boundary and
give rise to many nonexistent risks.
(4) Zero-sum mentality penalizes the
personal risk for personal gain.
Only risks taken for the totality are
rewarded (often posthumously).
Figure 5. Risk and social context.
The styles of risk management that emerge in the context of the hermit and the
entrepreneur have a number of features in cornmon. Since both contexts are individ-
ualized, and sinc~ both focus optimistically on the short term, there is a tendency
to regard risk management as a personal business and to emphasize the importance of
individual skill and judgment. Where there exists a choice between handling risks
individualistically (by the market, for instance) and handling them collectively
(by regulation, for instance) both hermit and entrepreneur will favor the former.
Both will be biased against institutions that collectivize risks, or convert volun-
tary into involuntary ones. They will instead tend to give their support to those
more diffuse institutions that, directly or indirectly (but more likely indirectly),
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increase the areas of risk that are left to individual values and decrease the
areas that are handled by social choice.
However, despite these similarities, there is some divergence in risk handling
style which derives from the different levels of manipulation that go with these
two contexts. The hermit neither coerces others nor is himself coerced and this
means that, when he supports institutions that individualize risks, those risks re-
main closely attached to the individual who chooses to take them. But, when the
entrepreneur supports similar institutions, his risks are, to some extent, exported
to those individuals who he is successfully manipulating. This is undoubtedly a
very effective, if inequitable, way to manage risk and much of our present worries
about risk are attributable to the fact that many risks that used to be exported in
this way are now bearing down upon individuals in other, less impotent, contexts.
As has often been pointed out, the difference between the risks involved in coal-
mining and in nuclear power is that in the former they kill only coalminers while
in the latter they may kill you and me as well.
In the two contexts with strongly positive group--castes and sects--there will
be a bias toward institutions that take risk handling away from the individual and
give it to the whole, or to some agency charged with the responsibility for handling
it on behalf of the whole. The internally undifferentiated (and therefore egalitar-
ian) sect will favor holistic risk management; the internally differentiated (and
therefore hierarchical) caste will favor management by specialized and profesionally
staffed agencies.
Such hierarchical systems are based on many fine yet clearly defined distinc-
tions and they build up into complex social structures that are all too easily
threatened. This means that social risks--anything that threatens to diminish the
clarity of these distinctions--are particularly to be feared, and the result is that
risks come to be handled not holistically but in a compartmentalized way. It is
this chopping up of risks (and everything else) in order to minimize the social
risks that justifies the cruel definition of bureaucracies as systems incapable of
learning from their mistakes. Yet their record for handling social risks, albeit
of their own making, is vastly superior to that of the sects. Sects are always
falling apart but bureaucracies seem to know intuitively how to ensure their own
existence--they do it so instinctively that they scarcely make any mistakes to learn
from. Nor, when it comes to the real physical risks, is any purpose served by urg-
ing bureaucracies to abandon their chopped-up models in favor of holistic ones--it
is not in their nature to do this. What is possible is to reorganize some of the
dividing lines, even making some new ones where appropriate, sO that as the social
risks are managed the physical ones get looked after as well. And, of course, it
is always possible (it has just been done for energy in the United States) to create
a new high-status agency specially charged with the task of cutting through the
boundaries created by other lower-status agencies within the framework.
It is significant that the study of risk (which has largely been developed in
and for this sort of context) has itself been compartmentalized. Risk assessment
has been restricted to the real (physical world) risks while social scientists have
been careful to restrict themselves to the social (the physically nonexistent) risks.
Both are reluctant to step outside their spheres of competence and put the two kinds
of risk together.
3.3. The Efficacy of the Five Styles
Having tentatively described these different styles of risk management, how
effective are they?
A first temptation might be to assume that, since the whole debate is conducted
in the idiom of real physical risks, those styles that concern themselves only with
those risks will be more effective than those that concern themselves with risks
that are, in fact, nonexistent physically. But who is to say which are the more
potentially damaging: the physical risks "out there" or the real physical conse-
quences of the collapse of a large part of our social order and its stabilizing in-
stitutions? Rather than rush to such hasty and simple minded evaluations of these
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different styles of risk management, we should concede that in social systems where
such threatenable social structures exist (and that includes all advanced industria-
lized nations) social risks are among the most serious of the risks that have, some-
how or other, to be managed. It is no good crying that physical scientists cannot
be expected to give their attention to social risks, nor can the social scientists
justify their remaining inside their disciplinary stockade. Experts may divide the
world up into areas of expertise, responsibility may be chopped up between govern-
ment departments, and select committees may be limited by their terms of reference
but the fact remains that the risks we face and the risks we have to manage are not
neatly compartmentalized; like it or not, they spill across from technology to tech-
nology* and from the physical world into the social world.
In adopting a style of risk management based on the assessment of the external
(real physical world) risks, we come more and more to resemble the members of W.H.
Auden's expedition:
... sound on Expectation
Had there been situations to be in;
Unluckily they were their situation ...
(From The Quest.)
How can we modify our risk management so that it becomes reponsive both to the ex-
ternal and the internal risks?
A first step is the recognition that both kinds of risk are there, and the
second step is the development of some sort of theory that casts its net wide enough
to catch them both. This is what the cultural approach is aimed at. It generates
sets of hypotheses that predict how and when such risks will be present and which
allow us to recognize them for what they are. From the debate we can disentangle
the external and the internal risks--the physical and the social--and we can take
each kind seriously. When we recognize that we have caught a social--a physically
nonexistent--risk in our methodological net, we do not say, "Oh, it's just a social
risk" and throw it back into the ocean. We recognize that it is a risk--a particu-
lar kind of risk--and we can refer it to our conceptual scheme to obtain some esti-
mation of how serious a risk it is and of how it might best be handled.
4. RELEVANCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
With the development of a cultural contextual theory of risk, policy makers
will know three things they do not now know:
(i) why there are profound disagreements over risk;
(ii) why disagreements between certain groups in specific contexts cannot be
reconciled; and
(iii) with what kinds of groups in which contexts it is possible to come to an
accommodation.
Risk is always a social product and the cultural theory of risk will help the policy
maker to handle it as such.
*For instance, from nuclear weapons into nuclear power. There are two kinds of ratio-
active material in the United States--military and civilian. This is not a physical
distinction--it is an administrative one--and it is a distinction that is probably
not shared by anyone wishing to steal such material in order to make a nuclear de-
vice of his own. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently funding a research
project (at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory) to consider systematically all the pos-
sibilities of such diversion but, because its terms of reference do not extend to
the military material, the crucial calculation of the point at which as the security
system is improved the adversary will decide that it is easier to steal a ready-made
bomb rather than all that civilian material that has been completely overlooked.
I
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Evaluating Technological Risk:
Prescriptive and Descriptive Perspectives
John W. Lathrop
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis~ Laxenburg~ Austria
1. INTRODUCTION
Decisions concerning the deployment and managemen~ of novel or hazardous tech-
nologies raise several issues involving the evaluation of their impacts on society.
Examples of such decisions include the siting of a liquefied natural gas facility,
the regulation of nuclear energy production, and the screening and regulation of
toxic chemicals. Each of these kinds of decisions results in uncertain benefits
and costs to society. It would seem reasonable, then, that such decisions could be
aided by any of several analytic techniques, including cost-benefit analysis, or
perhaps decision analysis, which could include in the evaluation attitudes toward
uncertainty and value trade-offs between conflicting objectives. However, there
are often special aspects involved in such decisions that can make standard techni-
calor economic analyses not very useful for aiding political decision making pro-
cesses. These aspects include outcomes of the decision having very serious negative
consequences with very low probability, inequitable distribution of burden, large
scale, novelty, and others to be discussed below. Decisions involving such aspects
sometimes come to be known as problems in managing social risk. Even though the
word risk is currently in wide use in the media, it is often defined or applied in
different ways by different parties for the decision at hand. In spite of this
serious problem, to be discussed at some length below, the need to appraise the
risks presented by a new or hazardous technology has led to the development of sev-
eral analytic techniques often referred to collectively as risk assessment. Yet
those techniques generally assume, either implicitly or explicitly certain prescrip-
tive objective functions that are not sensitive to important societal concerns about
potentially hazardous technologies. As a result, such techniques may be useful as
inputs to a political decision making process, but are not as helpful as they could
be if they used objective functions more descriptive of the relevant social concerns.
This point is illustrated by cases where a member of the technical risk assessment
community assumes a simple objective function, such as minimizing expected lives
lost or life expectancy lost, observes individual or government behavior that does
not minimize that objective function, then suggests that therefore something is
wrong with the decision makers involved (see, e.g., Rothschild 1979). That deduc-
tion is not the only one that could be made from the evidence. It could equally
well be deduced that the objective function is inadequate.
The technical risk assessment community is not the only set of people addres-
sing problems of social risk management. There is a growing body of research that
is developing descriptions and explanations of human behavior that does not minimize
narrow technical objective functions (Kunreuther 1980). Yet the descriptions and
explanations most sensitive to individual attitudes are not oriented toward develop-
ing broader social objective functions that can be directly used to aid the politi-
cal decision making process in managing social risk. The development of evaluation
*The research reported in this paper is supported by the Bundesministerium fur
Forschung und Technologie, FRG, Contract No. 321/7591/RGB 8001. While support for
this work is gratefully acknowledged, the views expressed are the author's own and
not necessarily shared by the sponsor.
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models and techniques by the technical and psychological research communities forms
a rough spectrum from the narrow but readily applied technical objective function
to the broad set of social and psychological considerations that are not readily
applied to aiding the decision process. This paper seeks to identify the part of
that spectrum that, if further developed, may be the most useful in that it may pro-
vide usable decision aids that are also sensitive to the important societal concerns
involved.
2. THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM: TWO PERSPECTIVES OF RISK
While the previous section referred to the range of approaches to risk evalua-
tion as a spectrum, it has underlying it two poles of thought which, in turn, under-
ly the theme of this paper. The basis of the problem of managing technological risk
is that it is not a single concept, but is viewed from two distinct perspectives:
the technical and the psychological.
2.1. Technical Perspective
From the technical perspective, technological risk is some probability distri-
bution over sets of negative effects. Those effects are often limited to health
effects, or casualties. For example, Keeney (1980b) defines the risk of an action
as the probability distribution over sets of individual probabilities of dying
(Pi, i = l, ... ,N), where Pi is the probability that the ith individual will die be-
fore the end of the next time period due to the action taken. 'fhe probability dis-
tribution over those sets is required to represent dependencies between the fatali-
ties. Other analysts use summary measures of that distribution. In the Rasmussen
report (Reactor Safety Study) the risk of a nuclear reactor is represented by a re-
verse cumulative probability distribution over numbers of fatalities per year per
reference reactor (USNRC 1975). That distribution is sometimes referred to as a
Rasmussen curve. Other risk assessments have used the same measure (Hazelwood and
Philipson 1977). Other analysts go one step further and reduce the distribution to
the expected number of health effects (e.g., Pate 1978). While it would be perhaps
unfair to say that such analysts define risk as expected number of health effects,
the fact remains that the negative consequences of a technological option are mea-
sured by that index.
There is one definition of risk not discussed here, and that is "risk is prob-
ability times consequence". This is because this discussion is limited to repre-
sentations of the risk of decision alternatives. probability times consequence
may describe the risk of an event, but could not in general describe the risk of
any decision alternative with more than two possible outcomes.
2.2. Psychological perspective
In contrast to the fairly straightforward risk definitions listed above, exten-
sive psychological research in the field of risk perception has suggested many more
dimensions to be included in a definition of risk (Slovic et al. 1980, Linnerooth
1978, Kunreuther 1980). While these dimensions are covered in some detail in a
later section, they are listed and briefly discussed here as a way of describing
technological risk from a psychological perspective. They are listed roughly in
order from the most easily adapted to a simple technical measure to the most diffi-
cult considerations to measure. While this discussion limits itself to health ef-
fects for brevity, there is no particular reason not to include other effects:
financial, quality of environment, etc.
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2.2.1. Expected NwnbeI' of Health Effects
While this aspect was listed above as part of the technical perspective, that
does not mean that it cannot be a part of a psychological perspective also.
2.2.2. Possibility of Catastrophe
Effects can be spread out over time and space, such as car fatalities, or they
can be "bunched" into a catastrophe at one place and time, such as a possible major
nuclear accident. That bunching can be very important for how society views the
risk. Effects can also be bunched by cause, by identifiable population group, or
by state of nature, as will be explained later.
2.2.3. t'quity
There are actually two related aspects of equity that are important in the per-
ception of risk. The first is the amount of overlap between the populations at risk
and at benefit. Clearly if a technology benefits none of those at risk, that is a
case of inequity. But there is another, more subtle aspect of inequity that has to
do with the ease of identifying the population at risk. If a technology can be
identified as negatively affecting 100 people in the US, while benefiting all citi-
zens, that may be seen as a necessary evil. But what if those 100 are all poor, or
all asbestos workers? That is a matter of greater concern.
2.2.4. Degree of Control
This aspect is a more general version of the voluntary/involuntary distinction
made by Starr (l969). The central concept here is the level of participation of
each potential impactee in each of two decisions: to expose himself to the risk,
and to deploy the technology in the first place.
2.2.5. Attributability
This is an important aspect of social reaction to a risk that is often over-
looked because of the cause-specific way risk analyses are done. It could be that
generally incompetent engineering in cars kills far more people than a particular
gas tank design. Yet the more easily identified cause of accidents, the gas tank,
may give risk to a much stronger public reaction.
2.2.6. Nonprobabilistic Factors
Perhaps the most serious mismatch between technical and psychological perspec-
tives lies in the evaluation of risk related to severe outcomes with no regard for
the estimated probability of those outcomes. While there may be good reasons for
that sort of evaluation, it can cause serious problems in developing consistent de-
cision aids.
2.2.7. Nondecision Comparisons
The search for criteria for acceptable risk often falls back on comparisons
not involved in actual decisions. For example, comparisons are often made between
some technological risk and moving to Denver, or smoking an extra cigarette, or
driving an extra mile. Yet very few people choose between living near a nuclear
reactor or living in Denver. Perhaps even fewer choose between living near a
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liquefied natural gas terminal and smoking an extra cigarette, though that decision
involves some complicating factors.
2.2.8. Nontechnological Factors
Some aspects of a technology having little to do with possible health effects
may have a great deal to do with perceived risk. Those aspects include the degree
of centralization, the extent to which deploying a technology would infringe on
civil liberties, how closely a new technology is linked with a high-consumption
lifestyle, etc. While these aspects seem far removed from evaluating the health
effect risk of a technology, they should be included in any effort to understand
possible opposition to a technology. Such aspects may be as important or more so
than any of the other aspects listed above in determining differences in what levels
of risk are held to be acceptable.
2.3. Results of the Two Perspectives
The differences between the two perspectives presented above are very relevant
to many problems in technological risk management. Technological risks are typi-
cally evaluated using analyses that assume the technical perspective on risk. Yet
very often the political process in which the decisions actually get made is respon-
sive to the psychological perspective. As an example of this problem consider the
case of the selection of a site for a liquefied natural gas import terminal in
California. A technical risk analysis by a competent technical consulting firm
found a proposed site at Oxnard, California, to be very safe, with very low risk to
the community. Yet that analysis stated that a maximum credible accident (MCA)
could involve up to 70 000 fatalities, though only by a seemingly incredible series
of events that could only occur with an extremely low probability. In the political
process, however, consideration of such large numbers of fatalities led to a re-
quirement that the terminal be sited remotely, away from any city, precluding the
Oxnard site (Ahern 1980). The applicant made plans according to a technical risk
analysis, then had to change plans as a result of the political process.
As the example just presented illustrates, one result of the gap between the
technical and psychological perspectives of risk is that technical risk analyses
are often not effective in the political process. Conversely, another result is
that the political process often does not receive the help it could from the scien-
tific and engineering community.
Another result of the two perspectives on risk is that the community of risk
analysis scientists and engineers work with analysis tools spanning a broad spectrum.
One end of that spectrum involves prescriptive evaluation models that offer very
clear guidance to decision makers, but that are not sensitive to psychological con-
cerns. The other end of the spectrum involves psychologists and other social scien-
tists identifying societal concerns very well, but not in a manner that results in
clear guidance to the decision making process. Clearly, what is called for is more
development of risk evaluation models that are sensitive to social and psychological
concerns, yet are meaningful and useful aids to the political decision making pro-
cess. Section 4 below spells out several considerations for that model development.
Before that, however, the next section briefly reviews two existing approaches to
risk evaluation that bracket the part of the analysis spectrum proposed for develop-
ment in Section 4.
3. TWO APPROACHES TO RISK EVALUATION
3.1. Multi-attribute Utility Functions
Within the framework of decision analysis, multi-attribute utility theory can
be used to develop essentially prescriptive risk evaluation models that take into
account more than the expected number of health effects. As one example, Keeney
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(1980b) sets up a notation where "risk" ex ante is represented as a probability dis-
tribution over sets of probabilities {Pi}, where each Pi is the probability that
the ith individual will die due to the action being evaluated before the end of some
time period. He represents "risk" ex post as a set of status indicators {xi}, where
xi = 1 if the ith individual has died due to the evaluated action in the time period
and xi = 0 otherwise. He goes on to postulate von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions UR on {Pi}, UF on {xi},and u on x, where
x = Lx. = the total number of fatalities.
• 'L
'L
He defines a desire for equity as a preference for more equal Pis, sets up a consis-
tency condition between UR and UF, and shows that these conditions lead to his no-
tation to a risk evaluation function as simply u(x) and even shows that it must be
convex downward, representing preferences that would prefer a technology character-
ized by a low-probability-high-loss over one with high-probability-low-loss and the
same expected loss. This seems at odds with the general aversion to catastrophe
that seems to be found in some public attitudes toward risk. Keeney goes on to add
another condition that is consistent with a slightly more complex functional form.
While Keeney's evaluation functions incorporate a particular form of equity prefer-
ence and an attitude toward uncertainty, the form of the evaluation model follows
from more of a prescriptive than descriptive set of assumptions.
Bodily (1980) develops another sort of utility function that accounts for sev-
eral more descriptive aspects than does Keeney's models. Bodily's model accounts
for the number of people sharing the risk, the number of casualties per incident,
the initial and final states of health involved, changes in individual probabilities
of harm or benefit, how voluntary the risk is, and whether lives are being saved or
lost. In a set of different examples of risk management alternatives, his calcula-
tions show the effective value of life varying by 170 percent due to differences in
factors just listed. The key to Bodily's model is the combination of summed wil-
lingness to pay to avoid individual risk and a utility measure of attitude toward
group risks in a single measure of social risk. While Bodily's model captures an
admirable number of factors, it does not involve some other factors that are impor-
tant, especially equity considerations. That is more or less an artifact of his
particular presentation, however. The model framework that Bodily proposes could
be extended to include other factors of risk.
The evaluation models proposed by Bodily and Keeney represent promising attempts
to model preferences concerning social risk that are not simply linear in numbers
of health effects. Their models are basically applications of multi-attribute util-
ity theory, with the value elicitation questions effectively designed by the model.
That is, the model is developed, with some consideration for what is important, then
the elicitation questions are derived by what is necessary to derive the values of
the parameters used in the model. This process leads to elicitation questions that
are very relevant to the issues involved, but that are quite unusual and do not occur
to people in their normal experience. Approaches for improving this situation are
discussed in the next section.
3.2. Psychological Considerations
Research on risk evaluation does not always entail a quantitative model that
yields a scalar index of risk. In this section we will discuss psychological re-
search that simply identifies and lists the considerations to be kept in mind in
evaluating risk. The research selected as an example is the work of Slovic, Fisch-
hoss, and Lichtenstein (Slovic et aZ. 1980, Slovic and Fischhoff 1981, Fischhoff
et aZ. 1978, 1980, Lichtenstein et aZ. 1978). They draw on a large body of experi-
mental work of their own and others to enumerate the ways in which people are bad
at probabilistic thinking, including the several biases and heuristics people have
been found to use in choosing among alternatives with uncertain outcomes. They
then develop implications of those biases and heuristics for problems in managing
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social risk. As they have done much of their work in problems with acceptance of
nuclear power, they list the qualitative aspects of that technology that help to
explain the lack of acceptance, as derived from experimental work. Those aspects
include lack of control over the technology, dread, lethality of effects, potential
for catastrophe, potential for unknown effects, and novelty of the technology. Each
of these aspects is defined more precisely in their papers. It should be clear
from this list that the work of Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein was a primary
source for tr.e list of aspects of the psychological perspective on risk presented
in this paper. They go on to list problems in evaluating social risk and recommen-
dations for paths to acceptance of technological risk. They do a remarkable job of
listing considerations to be kept in mind in evaluating and managing social risk,
but do not develop any equations for an evaluation index for risk. In the broadest
sense, it could be maintained that they do present a model of social preference con-
cerning risk, in that their lists of biases and considerations explain observed
phenomena of societal acceptance and rejection of certain risks. It could also be
maintained that their work results in decision aids, in that they list recommenda-
tions for decision makers involved in managing social risk. However, they do not
develop an evaluation model, if such a model is defined in the narrow sense as a
set of equations resulting in a single evaluation index.
3.3. Limitations of the Approaches
The multi-attribute utility approach does not provide the actual utility func-
tion to be used, but only the parametrized form of the function along with a proto-
col of questions to ask somebody whose answers can be used to calculate those param-
eter values. In other words, the utility function approach does not actually pro-
vide any answers, but only rephrases the questions into simpler, more understandable
forms that are nevertheless just as difficult to answer. But this approach has even
greater difficulties in that there is seldom such a consensus on value trade-offs
that it does not matter from whom you elicit the values. That gives rise to a whole
host of problems concerning whose values to elicit and how to aggregate different
values into a single risk evaluation model (see Arrow 1977 for a review of social
choice theory). The second approach discussed, labeled psychological considerations
is the most sensitive to the social value aspects of risk evaluation. However, be-
cause it does not provide a risk evaluation index, it is not directly useful as a
decision aid.
There are two limitations shared by both of the approaches discussed. The
first of these is that equity considerations may simply not be appropriate incorpor-
ated into any evaluation approach. Such aspects may only be approachable within
the bargaining procedure of the political decision making process. An evaluation
approach may hope to aid one or more parties in that bargaining, but any attempts to
replace that bargaining with a model could be considered inappropriate.
The second shared limitation is perhaps the most serious. That is that the
institutional structures making the risk management decision may not be compatible
with the decision structure assumed by the evaluation approach. For example, the
most basic assumption made by the utili~y approach is that there is some single self-
aware process somewhere where the risks and benefits of the actual decision alter-
natives are compared. In fact, it is often the case that a regUlatory agency, such
as the Nuclear RegUlatory Commission (NRC), is faced with what appear to be "yes/no"
decisions on a single alternative that involves social risk. Of course, the NRC is
actually participating in an unorganized way with several other government agencies
and private companies in a set of actions which results in a selection of one of the
risky alternatives. But where in that set of actions is the single self-aware pro-
cess that weighs the risks and benefits of the different alternatives? Whose value
assumptions and trade-offs should be used in the risk evaluation? Where should the
results of the risk evaluation be delivered? It is entirely possible that the big-
gest limitation in the usefulness of a risk evaluation is the decision making pro-
cess it is intended to serve (Kunreuther 1980). It could be that any improvement
to be made in risk evaluation models would not be as important as it would be to
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organize the decision making process so that the risks of the actual decision alter-
natives are compared directly. That type of organization will be referred to in
this paper as decision focused. Yet a development of a risk evaluation model that
is demonstrably sensitive to the aspects of risk management decisions that the po-
litical process is sensitive to could go a long way toward encouraging the political
process to adopt that desirable decision-focused organization. The development of
a risk evaluation model that could achieve that end would be an ambitious undertak-
ing. The next section explores the initial considerations to be kept in mind as one
embarks on such a venture.
4. TOWARD A MORE BROAD APPROACH
4.l. General perspective
The previous sections have discussed research resulting in catalogs of social
and psychological considerations, and contrasted that with multi-attribute utility
risk evaluation models, which provide a risk evaluation index. The previous sec-
tions have also explained the need for a risk evaluation model that li€s between
the index-producing models and the catalog approach. Such a model would provide a
risk evaluation index, and so be more directly useful a decision aid than the cata-
log approach, yet it would also be more sensitive to societal concerns regarding
risk than the index-producing models reviewed above. This section will outline the
fundamental considerations necessary to the development of such a model.
The discussion in this section will be based upon two major themes. The first
is that a risk evaluation model should not be limited to providing only one of many
inputs into a decision making process, but should be a direct aid to that process.
That is, the model should not leave entirely to the decision makers the difficult
job of putting together a large set of seemingly incommensurate pieces of data.
Rather, it should deliver results in a form that aids the members of the process to
integrate those results with the other considerations that enter in. The model
should be designed to elevate the level of debate by providing a structured frame-
work of reasoned evaluation within which the decision can be made.
The second theme which forms the basis of the following discussion is that the
risk evaluation model should be built around risk considerations that drive the po-
litical decision making process. The order of development of the model should be
from the primary concerns of the process to the value elicitations that would cap-
ture those concerns to the form of the model that would be logically fitted to those
elicitations. This is a subtle theme, at best, and one not incompatible with the
models of Keeney and Bodily. The basic idea is to start from the observables that
people react to in a risk management problem, and build the model around those.
4.2. General Methodology
The general methodology adopted here is based on multi-attribute utility theory.
That discipline is only briefly described here. The reader is referred to a basic
text for a complete description (e.g., Keeney and Raiffa 1976). The methodology is
based on the fitting of a multi-attribute utility function (i.e., a multi-argument
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function), to the answers a person gives to a struc-
tured set of questions. The basic aspects of preference captured by the function
are trade-offs between conflicting objectives (i.e., slopes of indifference curves)
and attitudes toward uncertainty. The key development of the methodology is a set
of theorems relating various plausible and testable assumptions about preferences
to corresponding simple forms of multi-attribute utility functions (MAUF). The fit-
ting of the MAUF in a value elicitation interview then amounts to a set of assump-
tion tests to identify the most simple acceptable form of the function, followed by
the set of judgments necessary to fit the parameters of that functional form. Those
judgments include indifference map comparisons and preference comparisons of simple
uncertain alternatives. The fundamental concept underlying the methodology is that
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individuals are not good at choices between complex alternatives (such as actions
involving multidimensional and uncertain outcomes), but can make choices between
simple alternatives in a manner consistent with their underlying preferences. The
methodology provides a mathematical system which can take alternatives too complex
for consistent intuitive judgment, and evaluate them in a manner consistent with a
person's judgments concerning simple alternatives, where his judgments are more apt
to reflect accurately his underlying preferences.
In typical expositions of the decision analysis methodology, the first steps
in building the evaluation function are to identify the objectives of the decision
maker, and describe an observable measure for each objective that represents the
degree to which each alternative satisfies that objective. This section identifie~
typical objectives of the decision making process concerned with social risk manage-
ment, taking the psychological perspective of risk described earlier. Each objec-
tive is identified and characterized in a way that suggests possible observable
measures that could be used to develop the evaluation function itself and its cor-
responding elicitation procedure. As this section represents ~nly a first effort
at the development of a comprehensive risk evaluation model; further steps in model
development are left to future research.
4.3. Objectives of Risk Management from a Psychological Perspective
In the objectives listed below, it is assumed that some single-dimensional mea-
sure of social cost has been decided upon that evaluates all the heatlth and environ-
mental effects upon an individual in some standard unit. There is no intention to
suggest that such a measure would be easily derived, as it would require answers to
such questions as: How many colds is a cancer worth? However, as the objectives
listed involve considerations above and beyond the measure of the severity of a de-
leterious effect upon an individual, it clarifies the discussion considerably to
assume that such a measure exists.
As a second concession to clarity, the following discussions focus on the eval-
uation model itself, and so do not consider such frequently dominant problems as
disagreements on the probabilities to be used in calcualting the evaluation measure.
4.3.1. Led N7~mZ,er of Health f:ffeeLc
While the expected number of health effects is a common measure of risk from a
technological perspective, it can also be considered relevant to the psychological
perspective. It is most relevant when the health effects are lives lost or saved,
and expected lives lost or saved are considered equivalent to actual lives lost or
saved. In that sense the expected fatalities measure has an ethical basis that
leads to a troubling dilemma concerning the addition of other objectives to an eval-
uation function. A risk management strategy using simply expected fatalities as an
evaluation function will, if successful, minimize expected lives lost. Any strategy
using a more comprehensive evaluation function will allow more expected lives lost
in any nondegenerate case. Thus that comprehensiveness in evaluation has "cost"
some increment in expected lives lost (or decrement in expected lives saved). While
that increment would not actually be a cost in terms of the social welfare repre-
sented by the evaluation function, it would nevertheless be the case that any attempt
to use a more comprehensive evaluation model would be open to the attack that its
use would cost human lives, expectationally.
This first objective is exceptional in that the measure of the objective to be
used in the evaluation model is the objective itself. The major measurement prob-
lems involved in this objective are hidden in the clarifving conventions presented
at the beginning of Section 4.3. The remaining objectives listed below do not have
such obvious measures associated with them.
II
I
I
I
I
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While the idea of possibility of catastrophe may be intuitively clear, closer
examination reveals a complex concept. As has often been mentioned in comparisons
of coal and nuclear power as sources of electricity, while expected fatalities per
megawatt-year (electric) may be estimated as less for nuclear than for coal, the
fact that the nuclear fatalities occur in high-fatality, low-probability accidents
explains public resistance to nuclear power (Barrager ct al. 1976). This compari-
son will be mentioned again below, since in fact there are a number of reasons that
could explain that resistance apart from the possibility of catastrophe. However,
for this discussion the example is useful in considering just what catastrophe
means. It seems clear that a catastrophe is a "bunching" together of fatalities,
but on what dimension does that bunching occur? Fatalities can be bunched together
in one place, or at one time, or in one state of nature, or by one identified cause,
or in one previously identifiable group of people. These various types of bunching
may correspond to different types of preference mechanisms.
The risk of a nuclear reactor involves bunching on all five of the dimensions
listed: fatalities are concentrated in states of nature that correspond to an acci-
dent, are grouped downwind of the facility at the time of the accident, are bunched
by single cause, and impact the neighbors of the reactor. A coal plant induces
fatalities that occur with some degree of certainty and so are distributed over many
states of nature, and are distributed in space, time, and groups of people. Coal
plant fatalities are not even bunched by identifiable cause, in that respiratory
ailments caused by the coal plant cannot be distinguished from ailments from other
causes. For example, fatalities due to nuclear waste may be bunched by state of
nature (failure of casings, misunderstanding of physical processes), and bunched by
location, but not bunched by identifiable cause, and distributed over very long
periods of time and groups of people (generations). Risk due to train derailments
of toxic chemicals may be concentrated in the poor segments of the population who
live near railroad tracks, although it is distributed over several accidents (in
different states of nature, places, times), each with very few fatalities.
Bunching by identifiable cause is evaluated in the attributability objective
discussed later. Bunching by identifiable group is evaluated as part of the concept
of equity also discussed below. That leaves catastrophe defined here as a bunching
in space, time, or state of nature. Another way of defining a catastrophe is as a
number of fatalities linked in any way. By either definition, the problem remains
to evaluate attitude toward catastrophe. The measure could be a set of probability
distributions over numbers of health effects in each different type of catastrophe,
if more than one type is possible.
Efforts thus far in the evaluation of potential for catastrophe have taken
three paths. First, a nonlinear value function over number of fatalities has been
suggested, either as an ad hoc function or as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function (Keeney 1980a). Keeney speculates that such a curve would be convex down-
ward due to riskless preference effects (diminishing marginal disutility for health
effects). That convexity represents a preference for bunched over distributed fatal-
ities. Second, a multi-attribute utility function has been suggested, where the
health status of each person is an attribute (Bodily 1980). With such a function,
the interaction terms represent attitudes toward catastrophe. with both of these
evaluation strategies, if only the suggested utility function is used the evaluation
is only sensitive to bunching in states of nature, and does not account for differ-
ences in bunching in space and time. Neither model has the required argument struc-
ture or elicitation protocol to be sensitive to bunching in space and time that is
not bunched by state of nature. While the required extension of the model's nota-
tion would be relatively straightforward, attempts to extend the elicitation proto-
cols as necessary reveal some fundamental problems to be discussed in a subsequent
paper.
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4.3.3. Equity
Just as discussions concerning risk often suffer from lack of a definition of
risk, discussions concerning equity may involve as many as three distinctly differ-
ent concepts going by the same name. Each concept is discussed in turn here.
(a) Correspondence between populations at risk and at benefit. Strip mining
may involve risk externalities imposed on people of the mining region so
that people in a distant metropolis can run air condi tioners. This form of
equity problem has been addressed at great length in the social choice
literature, and so will not be discussed at any depth here. It should be
noted, however, that no consensus exists as to the best method for evalu-
ating a situation that is inequitable in this sense (Arrow 1977). After
risk evaluations for each of the populations whose members are roughly
equally affected, the use of those measures in a decision may be one as-
pect of risk evaluation best left to the political process.
(b) Ease of identifying people at risk: size of individual probabilities.
While the size of an individual's probability for a health effect is of
interest for willingness-to-pay calculations, in this discussion that num-
ber is used to represent a different concern: how much society knows
about who and how many will be victims. Suppose a technology is estimated
to cause one expected fatality (EF). The size of the population bear-
ing that risk would be of great importance to its evaluation. Consider
that 1 EF risk to one person is very different from 1 EF risk equally
shared by 100 people, or 1 EF risk equally shared by 10 8 people. The dif-
ference to society between these cases is in its level of knowledge as to
who and how many may die. At a fixed number of expected fatalities, the
variance over numbers of fatalities rises with the number of people equally
sharing the risk, though only very slightly once there are more than 20
people. While this sensitivity to the size of the group sharing one EF of
risk could be confounded with sensitivity toward attributability, discus-
sed below, it could not be confounded with sensitivity toward catastrophe,
as there is no consideration for intercorrelation of the occurence of the
fatalities.
The relationship between differences in individual probabilities and vari-
ance in number of fatalities is that for a given level of expected fatali-
ties, the less different the individual probabilities, the greater the
variance in number of fatalities. This relationship is interesting in that
it explains a problem presented by Keeney (1980b). Keeney establishes an
evaluation of numbers of fatalities by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function over that number. He points out that an aversion to catastrophe
would correspond to a concave downward, or uncertainty averse, utility. He
then defines a desire for equity as a desire to make any two individual
probabilities of dying less different. Finally, he shows that such a des-
ire for equity corresponds to a convex downward utility function, and so
is incompatible, in his model, with aversion to catastrophe. The signifi-
cance of this conclusion becomes more clear when one realizes that any
change to increase equity (his definition) also increases the variance in
number of fatalities. That is, Keeney has basically made the statement
that "equity is uncertainty". It is from that statement that his conclu-
sion flows most directly. This matter is an excellent example of how sur-
prising conclusions can be drawn from simple evaluation models and simple
definitions of measures of social concerns, such as equity and potential
for catastrophe.
(c) Ease of identifying people at risk: ease of defining the impacted group.
As with the previous concept, the key to this concept of equity is know-
ledge, but in this case in a more subtle way. Suppose some evidence in
science enables the certain identification of a victim before he is killed
by a technology. Even though society now has perfect knowledge as to who
the victim will be, there may not be a perception of inequity if the victim
I
175
cannot be easily described. If there is nothing in common among the vic-
tims except that they are American, say, then the impact of the technology
may be seen as equitable. If, however, all victims are black, or all as-
bestos workers, or all live downwind of a nuclear reactor, or all are poor,
the impacts would be seen as inequitable, regardless of how large or small
the group sharing the risk is.
The three general considerations described so far (txpected number of effects,
catastrophe, and equity) are three distinct measures of social risk. A three-
dimensional table could be laid out, with each cell filled with an example repre-
senting a different combination of levels of the three measures of social risk.
Each of those examples could be described by a probability distribution over various
dimensions, such as numbers of health effects, classes of people, space, and time.
The remaining considerations, discussed below, are not so amenable to quantification.
4. S. 4. l)egl'ce oj' Contl'o l
The concept of degree of control has two different aspects: an impacted indi-
vidual's participation in the decision to expose himself to the risk, and an indi-
vidual's participation in the decision to deploy the technology. The former aspect
coincides with the voluntary vel'DUS involuntary risk distinction made by Starr (1969)
and discussed by others (otway and Cohen 1975). Starr presented evidence which he
interpreted as indicating that society has a much higher threshold of acceptability
for risks involving voluntary exposure than for risks incurred involuntarily. Argu-
ments against that hypothesis have appeared in the literature, most recently in the
paper by Slovic and Fischhoff (1981), which concludes that apparent aversion to in-
voluntary risk can be better explained by the higher potential for catastrophe and
inequity that often accompany that type of risk. However, another paper involving
the same two authors stresses the importance of public participation in the second
of the two deci5ions listed above, concerning the deployment of the technology
(Fischhoff et al. 1980). That second decision involves an aspect that is basically
different from any consideration mentioned so far, in that it has little to do with
the physical source or impactee, but addresses the process which generated that
source and impactee. As some have pointed out (Green 1981) one determinant of that
elusive concept called acceptable risk is the acceptability of the process that
generated the risk.
4.3.5. Attl'ibutability
Attributability of cause is the first in a series of considerations that in-
volve very large steps away from a model that could be easily defended on prescrip-
tive grounds, steps toward a descriptive model. In some ways, this consideration
is related to equity: while some aspects of equity have to do with ease of identi-
fying an impactee, attributability concerns the ease of identifying the source of
the effect. Attributability is also highly correlated with catastrophe, while it
would be much harder to identify the cause of a more distributed set of effects.
If a set of effects is clearly attributable to a single cause, that cause is more
apt to be discovered and to give rise to societal corrective mechanisms than is a
cause with more subtly distributed effects. A gas tank design feature that makes
a car go up like a torch when hit is much more apt to be reacted against than a
steering design flaw that leads to crashes erroneously attributed to driver error.
The last example suggests that attributability, like equity, is an aspect very
dependent on level of information. As epidemiological studies and national medical
reporting systems become more effective, diseases that would have gone unnoticed
and unfeared a few years ago become centers of attention and concern. Effects of
pesticides, defoliants, and other widely dlspersed chemicals cause concern only
when they are recognized as coming from controllable chemicals, yet those effects
may only be able to be detected by very sophisticated techniques, if at all.
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Attributability has more than the two levels: recognized and unrecognized. It
concerns how easily the cause can be identified. Of course, a society will only
react to risks that are recognized, but beyond that, the ease with which the cause
can be described will affect the ease of ideation of the risk as a menace. To re-
turn to the car gas tank design example, the image of an engineering staff making
a fairly well defined decision not to incorporate a safety feature is a very clear
target for public reaction. It could be that a general lack of competence of an
automotive engineering staff could contribute much more to driving risk than any
single decision about gas tanks, but general lack of competence is much harder to
identify, and even if identified, forms a much more diffuse image for public reac-
tion to try to focus on. While these aspects are part of a descriptive basis for
attributability as a dimension of risk, they also suggest a prescriptive basis, in
that the ease of identification of a cause is apt to reflect very closely the ease
of management of the risk.
4.3.6. Nonprobabilistic Factors
Perhaps the most important dimension of social risk from the psychological
perspective is the size of the maximum potential catastrophe, considered without
any weighting by its probability. The idea of evaluating an alternative by a pos-
sible outcome without considering its probability is a very large step away from a
prescriptive evaluation model and toward a descriptive one. It can be extremely
troublesome for the analyst, not only because it doesn't seem to make sense to some-
one used to probabilistic models, but also because the description of a maximum po-
tential catastrophe is dependent on the imagination of the analyst, and on an ill
defined notion of what "potential" is. Yet the political process typically does
not share the probabilistic perspective that is so fundamental to risk assessment.
One example involves the attempt to site a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at
Oxnard, California. While risk analyses found the site to be safe, maximum cred-
ible accident (MCA) scenarios involving very large numbers of fatalities formed a
large part of the political debate which led to the effective rejection of the site.
That debate did not seem very sensitive to the extremely low probabilities that
could be assigned to the MCAs (Ahern 1980) .
There are a number of explanations that could be invoked for this nonprobabil-
istic evaluation. First, it could be that members of the political process do not
know how to think probabilistically, or do not have a feel for what a very low prob-
ability means. Second, members of the political process may simply doubt the low
probabilities. That doubt may be well founded, as it is impossible in any actual
case to guarantee the completeness of any risk analysis, and major accidents can be
identified that were pronounced impossible before their occurrence (e.g., the
Titanic), or that were not effectively described by a preceding risk analysis. In
a particularly strict sense, no absolute probabilities are ever calculated by a
risk analysis. The probabilities reported by such analyses are conditional on the
validity of the assumptions of the analysis, including those concerning its com-
pleteness and descriptive validity. It may be very reasonable for members of the
political process to doubt that an extremely low probability is in fact that low,
given its conditional nature.
A third reason for nonprobabilistic evaluation is a desire for resilient social
support systems. Given the extreme uncertainty in what future demands will be made
on, for example, an energy supply system, and the uncertainty in the behavior of
that system, it may make sense to design it to be as resilient as possible. One way
to promote resilience is to limit the maximum potential catastrophe or MCA.
A fourth reason for nonprobabilistic evaluation is a sensitivity to the concept
of dread as a social cost. If a large plant is erected that has an MCA involving
the deaths of 40 000 people living downwind, those people are going to live their
lives with a sense of dread that is not very directly related to the very low prob-
ability a risk analysis might assign to the MCA. That sense of dread may be a very
real decrement in their quality of life, regardless of how safe the plant is as
measured by any risk analysis.
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It may be helpful to give some meaning to the idea of limiting the MCA of an
option with a brief example. The most dramatic MCAs involve accidents at large-
scale facilities that send poisons or flammable gases into the air that can cause
large numbers of fatalities downwind. Examples include nuclear reactors, LNG ter-
minals, and chemical plants. In any of these cases, the MCA can be limited by re-
quiring that the facility be sited remotely, but only at a financial and perhaps
environmental cost.
4.3.7. Nondecision Comparisons
All the facts discussed above could at least be fitted into a decision analytic
framework, in that each could be involved in a comparative evaluation of at least
two alternatives in a decision. However, there are comparisons made in some risk
analyses that have nothing directly to do with the decision being considered (Cohen
and Lee 1979). It makes immediate sense to compare the risks of a coal electricity
generating plant with a nuclear one, as those are two realistic alternatives consid-
ered by a utility in expanding its capacity. It makes much less immediate sense to
compare the risks of living near a nuclear reactor with the risk of moving to Denver,
driving a car an extra three miles, or smoking an extra pack of cigarettes. The
last three comparisons do not relate very directly to any decision, as few people
actually do choose between a reactor neighborhood and Denver, or between living near
a reactor and smoking more.
The intent of the nondecision comparions listed above is to fit some technolog-
ical risk into the same scale with risks people normally accept, then go on to draw
conclusions regarding the acceptability of the technological risk. There are a num-
ber of problems with this approach as a way to establish the acceptability of a
risk. However, nondecision comparisons are based on an idea that could be incorpor-
ated in a risk evaluation model: people make choices every day that involve risk,
and those typical risks may form benchmarks on an individual's scale of perceived
risk. There are problems in that the various risks considered are evaluated differ-
ently (nuclear power, background radiation, driving, smoking), but once those dif-
ferences are accounted for within an evaluation function, routine decisions involv-
ing risk could be used as meaningful points of reference on the scale of the risk
evaluation index (see Lichtenstein et al. 1978).
4.3.8. Nontechnological Factors
While the set of factors described so far has spanned a wide range of charac-
teristics, all of them have been concerned with the deleterious health and environ-
mental effects of the evaluated technology. In this final step in the progression
of factors, even that one common thread is abandoned as nontechnological factors,
factors other than health and environmental effects, are considered. A number of
analysts have observed that resistance to nuclear power may be based in part on a
resistance to the political side effects of the technology: the centralization of
power that might accompany a centralized generation of electricity; the loss of
civil liberties that might result from efforts to prevent diversion of nuclear ma-
terial, etc. There might also be resistance to perceived effects on lifestyle: the
more materialistic, growth based, exploitative society made possible by nuclear
power; the less natural, less simple, less human society associated with the high
technology of nuclear power. While the attribution of such far-ranging effects to
nuclear power is certaintly arguable, the fact remains that there is a body of sur-
vey evidence establishing that segments of the population do ascribe these effects
to nuclear power (Otway and Pahner 1976).
It is one thing to establish that nontechnological effects are important to
some people's evaluation of a technological alternative. It is quite another prob-
lem to decide how that fact would be used in developing a risk evaluation model.
The incorporation of nontechnological effects would be required in a risk evaluation
model intended to predict political resistance to the deployment of a technology.
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Yet that incorporation would expand such a model beyond the role of evaluating risk.
It seems that the decision whether or not to attempt to include nontechnological
effects in the model is a decision on model scope. Is the model to be a risk eval-
uation model or is it to be a resistance prediction model? The discussions in this
paper are aimed at the development of a risk evaluation model sensitive to societal
concerns. That model does not have to be a resistance prediction model in order to
aid the political decision making process in evaluating social risk. It follows,
then, that while nontechnological factors are a useful end point in a progression
of social concerns, they are not necessarily to be included in a risk evaluation
model. Perhaps the most useful role such factors play in the discussions of this
paper is in defining the limits to which a risk evaluation model should go in the
progression from technical risk evaluation to aiding the political decision making
process.
4.4. Incorporating Risk Evaluation Factors into a Risk Evaluation Function
The previous section listed eight factors involved in the evaluation of social
risk from a psychological perspective. While it has been argued that the eighth
factor is not appropriate for inclusion in a risk evaluation model, the other seven
are. The development of a risk evaluation model is then defined as the development
of measures of each of the seven f~ctors, then the combination of those measures
into a single index. While these two tasks are the subject of future research, this
section briefly comments on some aspects of the two tasks apparent from an examina-
tion of current risk evaluation work.
The first thing to note about the problem of incorporating the different fac-
tors into a single evaluation model is that each of the existing measures incorpor-
ates only a few of the various factors. Rasmussen curves, for example, measure the
potential for catastrophe, could be used to define a maximum credible accident as a
nonprobabilistic measure, and have been used for nondecision comparisons of social
risk (e.g., reactor risk Versus meteorite risk). However, such curves do not re-
flect any of the other factors. Descriptions of risk involving the setof individual
probabilities of health effects {Pi}, lend themselves to reflecting concerns about
equity, and are appropriate for nondecision comparisons at an individual level, but
do not reflect the other factors. Of course, Rasmussen curves could be calculated
for each of several subgroups of the population to address concerns about equity,
and the work of Keeney (1980b) and Bodily (1980) extends evaluations of } to in-
clude concerns about catastrophe, but the fact remains that no existing evaluation
measure or model addresses all seven of the factors described.
Sometimes the assumptions involved in a risk evaluation model can restrict in
a very subtle way which factors are addressed. For example, Keeney (1980b) sets up
a notation and a basic model in such a way that assumptions about treating everyone
equally and correspondence between ex ante and ex post utilities lead to a single-
attribute utility function on number of fatalities as a risk evaluation measure.
While his notation, basic model, and assumptions are intuitively compelling, the
resulting measure is sensitive only to expected numbers of fatalities, to bunching
by state of nature and to equity in an equally shared Pi sense. The other factors
are missed not because of obvious features of the model, but because of a lack of
dimensionality in the original situation to be evaluated.
The example of Keeney's model is given because it illustrates the importance
of the first step in developing a comprehensive risk evaluation model: the descrip-
tion of the effect space to be evaluated. Keeney's description of the effect space
as a probability distribution over {P.i} accounts in large part for the nature of
his resulting risk evaluation measure. The same information cast into a catastrophe-
by-equity-by-expected fatality space could lead to a very different risk evaluation
measure, but one still limited in the factors it could address. In order to address
all factors, an evaluation model must begin with an effect space in which all fac-
tors are represented. Because the seven factors involve such different aspects as
bunching of effects and the participatory nature of the process, there are several
different ways to set up the effect space. Clearly, the first step in future
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research on the development of risk evaluation models is an examination of those
different effect spaces to select the one most appropriate for a meaningful value
representation and elicitation procedure.
5. SUMMARY
This paper has discussed the problem of developing better risk evaluation
models. After an examination of the central problem of risk evaluation, defining
what risk is, two risk evaluation approaches were presented that bracket a particu-
lar part of the analysis spectrum in need of development. That approach involves
the expansion of multi-attribute utility risk evaluation functions to be more sensi-
tive to social and political concerns regarding risk management. Initial consider-
ations for research in that direction were laid down. That approach appears to be
feasible, and promises a more useful role for analyses in the process of social risk
management.
The most unusual feature of the broad approach proposed in this paper is that
it seeks to recognize explicitly some of the political realities involved in the
social risk management process. An attempt is proposed to develop an evaluation
model that deviates from prescriptive considerations to account for preferences ex-
pressed in the political decision making process. This attempt is marked by several
difficulties, perhaps the most notable among them being the ethically troublesome
result mentioned earlier: evaluation models sensitive to any feature in addition
to or other than expected fatalities will generally advise the selection of policies
which do not maximize expected number of lives saved. Policy makers using such
models could be accused of "sacrificing lives, expectationally" for the sake of be-
ing responsive to other societal concerns. Of course, expected lives are allowed
to be lost to gain on other dimensions all the time in public policy decisions, but
it may be difficult to do so deliberately, as an explicit step in the policy making
process.
The main potential benefit of the proposed broad evaluation model is that it
seeks to avoid the problem of a technically correct risk analysis advising the pro-
motion of a project that is eventually rejected due to popular opposition. Another
benefit is its general decision aid orientation, an improvement over standard risk
analyses which are intended only as inputs into the decision making process.
There are two major limitations to the broad approach proposed. First, the
more explicit use of sUbjective judgments involved in the value elicitations can cause
problems with the defensibility of the approach. This is in turn a problem with the
political decision making process, since those subjective judgments generally must
be made somewhere in the decision making. They are either hidden in the assumptions
of the model, or they are explicit. But the fact remains that a government agency
may have more trouble defending a decision based on an analysis with explicitly sub-
jective judgments than one based on an apparently objective analysis.
The second problem is more basic, but less specific to the broader approach pro-
proposed. That problem is that better evaluation models may not help social risk
management as much as would better consideration of actual decision alternatives.
As was mentioned in an earlier section, risk analyses are typically not part of a
political decision making process that recognizes the choice between several risky
alternatives. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission seems to be faced con-
tinually with decisions that have the appearance of being "yes/no" decisions on a
risky option, when it is actually participating in an unorganized way with several
other government agencies and private companies in a process that makes "which" de-
cisions, choosing one of several risky alternatives. A political process that ex-
plicitly faced such "which" decisions would be able to make better use of compara-
tive risk analyses (Ahern 1980). But perhaps this identifies another potential
advantage of the proposed approach. A risk evaluation model that is oriented to-
ward dimensions of concern to the political process could be designed in such a way
that comparison with the actual alternative is an intrinsic part of the evaluation.
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Group Decision Making Methods for Evaluating Social and
Technological Risks
Paul R. Kleindorfer
Decision Sciences Department, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, USA
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses group choice processes in evaluating social and technologi-
cal risks. We first outline the rationale for government involvement in regulating
certain classes of risks. This discussion highlights the social roots of policy
making in the risk area. In particular, if one takes the normative perspective of
trying to make policy choices in the name of certain stakeholders (e.g., the public
at large), then the problem naturally arises of identifying and incorporating the
possibly conflicting values and perceptions of such stakeholders into evaluation and
choice procedures. Direct participation (e.g., through referenda) is one mechanism
for accomplishing this. Other mechanisms include public opinion surveys and the use
of panels and committees composed of community leaders or other role players repre-
senting the interests of stakeholders. These latter mechanisms, as well as the
policy making process itself, lead to a discussion of controlled group processes as
a means of accomplishing certain evaluation and information gathering tasks in the
policy formation process. After structuring various forms of group activity (e.g.,
forecasting, scenario generation, and choice), an overview of recent research on
group processes as it relates to these issues is presented.
2. REGULATING RISKS AS A PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEM
Government involvement in assessing and regulating social and technological
risks has been justified on the grounds that market based solutions will probably
fail to provide either efficient or equitable insurance against relief from the con-
sequences of such risks (see Lowe 1972, Kunreuther et al. 1978, Zerbe and Urban 1980).
The reasons for such market failure are classic. First, many risks entail involun-
tary exposure on a broad scale, and thus, individuals may find it impossible to take
effective preventive precautions or, alternatively, they may not be able to appro-
priate all of the benefits of such protective activity to themselves. These exclud-
ability problems allow one to classify many social and technological risks as public
"bads" for which market solutions have well known deliberating features (see Arrow
1970). Secondly even if the liabilities for and consequences of such events could
be identified and meted out in some acceptable manner ex post, the costs for indi-
viduals to obtain and process the information necessary for them to make rational
protective and avoidance decisions ex ante may be prohibitive. In addition to these
problems, the magnitude of the financial risks involved may make the government the
only reliable insurer.
These possible reasons for market failure suggest that several basic dimensions
of risks are important in determining when the benefits of governmental regulation
of risks will exceed the costs of such intervention. First, the nonexcludability
(or involuntary) nature of the risk; secondly, the magnitude of possible losses in-
volved; and third, the complexity of the evaluation task in assessing the risk and
choosing appropriate protective measures*. When these three factors are all strongly
*See Fischhoff et al. (1980), Starr and Whipple (1980), and Kleindorfer and Kunreuther
(1981) for a discussion of these dimensions indicating their relevance in assessing
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evident, as in new drugs and nuclear power, one has a prime facie case of govern-
mental regulation of the risk in question. Unfortunately, as we have learned, these
same factors lead to severe difficulties in the regulatory process.
To clarify some of the difficulties involved, let us begin with a simple but
formal statement of the problem which might confront a public agency charged with
designing and evaluating policy options for dealing with a given risk*. Suppose
that the agency is concerned with a set of welfare measures W = (Wl, ... ,Wk). These
measures would typically be indicators of the economic, social, and public health
and safety consequences of agency activities and policies.
Let us denote the stakeholders in this analysis by the set N = {1,2, ... ,n}.
(We assume the agency knows who they are and how to classify them.) These stake-
holders would be the various segments of the public, individually and as organiza-
tional entities, whose values and welfare are deemed important for policy purposes.
We shall consider each stakeholder group to be homogeneous, so that we will speak
of the preferences, behavior, etc., of stakeholder (group) i. Let us suppose that
the welfare (or felicity) of the ith stakeholder group may be represented through
a set of indices or attributes (such as economic, psychological, and risk exposure
indicators), which we denote by Ai = (Ali, .. ' ,Ami). Thus, we will assume that the
attributes Ai are sufficient for policy purposes to evaluate the impact of policy
alternatives on group i. The relationship between stakeholder welfare (Ai) and
agency objectives (W) will be clarified below. For the moment we note that we gen-
erally have in mind a social utilitarian paradigm for which the agency's welfare in-
dicators depend on policy options through their implied consequences for stakeholder
welfare, i.e., Iv' = W(A l ,A2"" ,An)'
The welfare indicators W and {Ai Ii E::N} may be expected to depend on variables
such as stakeholder wealth, goods bought and sold in the economy, the policy option
chosen by the agency, and the output of the (risky) regulated sector as measured by
cost and risk exposure indicators. In addition, one would expect such welfare in-
dicators to depend on a set of expectations (of "relevant states of the world")
over the planning horizon of the stakeholders. In the terminology of strategic
planning, we may characterize all of these variables collectively as a "scenario".
Such scenarios will condition the preferences and behavior of group i and different
groups may have different preferred scenarios because of differences in values and
in expectations.
The relationships between the quantities defined above are shown in Figure 1.
The agency chooses policy options in the face of political and social processes
which determine controls on the agency and filter information on stakeholder wel-
fare. The policy choices have two effects. First, they affect the well being of
stakeholders and therefore they may also affect stakeholder behavior in response to
the policies chosen. Secondly, of course, the policy chosen may affect the output
of the risky sector.
This discussion suggests the following procedure as a guide to policy analy-
sis**. First, the agency predicts technological consequences and stakeholder re-
sponses to each of the policy options (the descriptive phase of policy analysis) .
The results of this descriptive phase are the primary input to the prescriptive
phase of the analysis, where conflicts of values and facts must be resolved in
reaching a policy choice. In slightly more detail, the design components of pre-
scriptive policy analysis are the following:
(1) the operational specification of agency goals Wand their relationship to
stakeholder welfare {Aij} and technology;
political acceptability and the proba.ble benefits of governmental regulation. See
also Lawless (1977) for interesting case studies corroborating the importance of
these dimensions.
*Following the seminal work done at IIASA and IAEA (see e.g., Greer-Wooten 1980),
risk analysis may be thought of as consisting of risk identification, risk evalua-
tion, policy choice, and risk management. We are concerned here with evaluation of
already identified risks.
**See Lasswell (1971), Luft (1976) and Kleindorfer and Kunreuther (1981) for an ex-
panded discussion.
Ij
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Regulated sector
Cost
Risk exposure
Technology
Information
concerning
policy choices
Agency
Welfare measures
W= W."",Wk
Stakeholder
Welfare {Ai)
Perceptions and beliefs
Behavior
POliticall
and social
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Figure 1. Illustraing policy analysis for risk.
(2) the process by which W, Aij' and technology are measured and evaluated in
the descriptive phase;
(3) the process by which agency policy is reviewed and legitimated.
The problem of linking prescriptive and descriptive anlaysis should now be
clear. In very simple terms, what one can properly prescribe and defend depends on
what underlying behavioral and technological assumptions one is willing to make in
evaluating the consequences of various policy options. The sources of conflict in
evaluating technological risks are therefore of two types: conflicts of value, and
conflicts of "fact". Concerning conflicts of values, these can be irremediable or
they may be removable by stilling the woes of injured parties through monetary
transfer payments (e.g., O'Hare 1977). Concerning the facts, the question is: Whose
scenario will be used as a backdrop against which policy options will be evaluated?
Should these be the scenarios entertained by group i (representing its ex ante per-
ceptions and beliefs about uncertain states of the world) or should these be some-
how "corrected" to represent the possibly better information available to the policy
maker? These are issues about which we will have more to say shortly. For the
moment, let us summarize the above discussion by noting that there may be many pos-
sible (i.e., defensible) descriptive models delineating the impacts of policy choice.
Such differences may arise from*:
(i) errors and imprecision in defining the indicators Aij;
(ii) differences in assumptions about how to describe the relevant future against
which to evaluate policy alternatives (these differences may have deep
social and cultural roots; see, e.g., Wynne 1980, Thompson 1980);
(iii) differences in assumptions about the technological consequences of policy;
(iv) differences in assumptions about the decision processes and resulting
(predicted) behavior of stakeholders.
*Indeed, one may argue that the major accomplishment of the recent literature on
risk assessment has been to document the tremendous variability in values, percep-
tions, and decision processes of the public in response to technological r'isks and
natural hazards. See e.g., Conrad (1980), Fiddle (1980), Fischhoff et aL (1980),
Kunreuther et aL (1978).
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Now one suspects immediately that which of the possible forms of descriptive
models our agency would use (or ought to use) in policy analysis must depend on
the prescriptive design variables given above, i.e., on the purpose of such analy-
sis and on the nature of the political controls exercised on the agency. If, for
example, the agency has well defined objectives (e.g., ban all food additives which
fail an easy to administer test) and is relatively immune to political pressure groups,
then only the agency's views on stakeholder impacts would be considered. Such a
"clean" situation would naturally be greeted with pleasure in a bureaucratic envi-
ronment. On the other hand, if the agency operates with hazy or incommensurable
objectives, and is subjected to a public, adversarial review of its decisions, then
it would (and should) be concerned about the values and beliefs (misinformed or not)
of political powerful stakeholders.
This discussion leads us to the investigation of the proper synthesis of the
above mentioned prescriptive design components (whose values are used, whose informa-
tion is used, and which political controls regulate the first two). One may imagine
a spectrum for each of these components with the agency as king on one end, and
various stakeholders ruling the other end. Just where the policy process should be
located on each of these dimensions is problematical since the process of obtaining
stakeholder values and information may be socially divisive and politically hazar-
dous for agency officials.
To develop this idea further, let us simply note here that the history of pub-
lic participation in technology assessment and other areas of social policy is moot
on how best to organize such participation for prescriptive purposes*. The problems
with predicting the benefits of participation have been legion. Simply put, the
areas where one would most like to have a direct and interactive assessment of pub-
lic perceptions and values through participation are usually those plagued by the
complexity and uncertainty which confound consensus and lead to conflict**.
Against this background, what I propose to do in the remainder of this paper
is to review some results of controlled group research on various well defined
group tasks. My rationale in undertaking this is to highlight the delicate balance
which group researchers have found to exist between effectiveness and group process
and thereby shed some light on the general question of participative mechanisms for
problem solving. My second reason is that one direct way of accounting for stake-
holder values and perceptions is through controlled group processes directed at
role playing of various stakeholder groups.
3. GROUP DECISION PROCESSES AND PLANNING
Throughout this paper we will assume that a group (of either stakeholders or
policy makers) has been assembled in response to some problem situation. One may
discern three major research traditions that would be helpful in understanding the
problems confronting such a group. The first has its roots in psychology and soci-
ology and is experimental in method. The second has its roots in economics and
collective choice and is mathematical and normative in method. The third arises
from research on strategic planning in management and the policy sciences and has
relied on case studies and the emerging field of systems science for its theoreti-
cal underpinnings. In this section, we begin with this last-named research area
*See Nelkin (1977) for a survey of research in the technology area. See also Dodge
(~978) for an interesting case history of participation in economic policy formation
in Canada. See Ducsik (1981) for an empirically based discussion of citizen par-
ticipation in electric power system planning.
**For example, Carl Belgie comments in the work by Dodge (1978, p41) that citizen
participation is 80t likely to succeed unless: (i) a crisis is perceived to be im-
minent; (ii) no subgroup can be blamed for the crisis; (iii) policy makers have
plenty of time to devote to the process and have not so committed themselves as to
be inflexible to public input; and (iv) the pUblic and policy makers believe that
consultation will lead somewhere. Fulfilling all of these conditions in an uncer-
tain and complex environment is clearly a tall order.
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since it has the most direct bearing on the issue at hand. The contributions of
the other schools of group research are considered in the next section, providing
thereafter some concluding comments on open research guest ions raised by this dis-
cussion. Given the widespread interest in groups f~om various disciplinary per-
spectives, the issue treated here will necessarily be very selective.
We now turn to the systems theoretic literature on strategic planning and to
the work of the two main proponents of this approach, C. West Churchman and Russell
Ackoff. First, building on systems theorists such as Ross ,\shby, we may note that
given the finiteness of any organization's human and technical resources (that is,
the finiteness of its potential "variety"), purposeful decision is required as to
which aspects of environmental complexity will be monitored 2nd which, perforce,
will be left unattended. This gives rise to the definition ot strategic plannins
as the evaluation and choice processes that structure, first, "lOW the world will be
viewed (i.e., which of the many possible environmental substruc' "res will be
nitively elevated to recognizable subsystems), and, secondly, the goals that the
controlling organization will pursue relative to these subsystems. It is th~ inter-
action between this conscious cutting up of the world into subS'/stems and the spec-
ification of goals in terms of these particular SUbsystems that prrn'lde tile tension
and the substance of strategic planning. Thus the tension between competing inter-
ests in strategic planning arises not just because of the goal setting, but also
because the subsystems defining the basic background of planning affect what can and
cannot be discussed in the planning effort. For this reason, these issues must be
solved conjointly. To this end, Ackoff (1974) synthesized a powerf"-,l framework for
planning which has since been operationalized by Mitroff and Kilman" (1978) using
the work of Churchman (1971) on inquiring systems. We now consider i~he bare out-
lines of this approach.
Figure 2 illustrates such an approach, following Ackoff (1974). The general
idea is that planning is a future oriented activity that requi"es two essential
steps:
(1) specifying an ideal future state (or target) that will serve as a refer-
ence point for planning;
(2) determining scenarios that are intended to move the socio-technical sys-
tem in question from the stut{iS quo to the desired state.
Performing these two steps requires an explicit analysis of assumptions, viz.,
(3) under what assumptions (on stakeholders, on technology, on the world at
large, etc.) are various possible "ideals" actually desirar]Le, and under
what conditions will these various ideals be achievable under given
scenarios?
Assumptions
On stakeholders' perceptions
and values on technology
On the social and economic
environment
Figure 2. On strategic planning.
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Ackoff attaches particular lmportance to the process by which the above steps are
carried out. He argiles that most planning methods, especially those rooted in the
positivistic analytical tradition, ara pcac-t'Lu, in the sense that they becJin with
the U7;<l1;)A:, _jIA;, al,d simply extrapolato this in a locally desirable direction (l'ccwt-
, as it were, to local problems and using only local search). He contrasts this
with teleological or purposeful planning, which he refers to as rroactive, which
first dctccnnines an "ldeal state" in a fairly unconstrained way and then determines
scenarios for approaching this ideal state as closely as possible (thus act to
att.ain a !'l'O.3[1c.:ecz:ve good). Ackoff's normative assertion is that planning groups
are best served by proceeding in the order of steps (1) to (3) above, determining
alternatives and feasibility restrictions only after a delineation of possible
"ideal states" lwve clarif ied what possible directions planning might take. Of
course, gOillq throuCjh all the bother of designing ideal states may not bring any
improvement over, say, standard decision analysis when (as is usually assumed in
normative theories of problem solving) all feasible alternatives are known to begin
with and stakeholders' preferences over consequences of policy actions are stable.
However, when they are not*, the presence of an ideal state can strongly affect
search, evaluation, and choice.
Concerning search, there is a large amount of literature indicat.ing that indi-
vidual and organizational search is local and problematic**, i.e., there is a
strong tendency for decision makers to consider only a limited number of alterna-
tives and these are usually dictated as an extrapolation of history and the status
quo rather than the result of a logical analysis of possibilities. Ackoff's tele-
ological approach to planning is directed explicitly at ameliorating this temporal
and technical myopia of planning processes by projecting the perceptions and values
of planning participants against an idealized perspective.
Concerning evaluation and choice, research on cognitive dissonance (see, e.g.,
Festinger 1964) indicates that the presence of an ideal point may strongly influence
choice and ex post felicity (even when the ideal is not achievable). In commenting
on this work, Zeleny (1981) has pointed out*** that ideal states may Lllso be useful
reference points for discussion and compromise among conflicting stakeholders.
Ideal points may also serve as a useful reference for understanding the values
and decision processes of stakeholders and relating these to external reference
groups (as in Thompson 1980). From an ontological Viewpoint, the process of defin-
ing various ideals as functions of alternative assumptions on stakeholder values is
responsive to objections raised by Marcuse (1964) and, in a risk context, by Wynne
(1980), that modern technological planning should cool its one-sided ardor for de-
termining the "facts" associated with various policy alternatives and expend some
effort in defining the alternative futures against which individual values and tech-
nical data become socially meaningfult.
*The fact that the generation of alternatives is crucial, and yet rarely studied
in normative theories of problem solving, is becoming increasingly embarrassing to
decision scientists (see e.g., Zeleny 1981). The question of changing values is of
somewhat more recent origin, see, e.g., Fischhoff et aZ. (1980), March (1978). One
may view the descriptive rationale for Ackoff's normative insistence on teleology
as a basis of planning as being that individuals and groups find alternatives gener-
ation and value analysis can best be done in terms of ideal states (rather than, in
terms of abstract preferences). Besides this justification in terms of ease of use
and understandability, Ackoff presents several philosophical justifications for his
proposal as well.
**See, e.g., Cyert and March (1963), Braybrooke and Lindlbom (1970), Janis and Mann
(1977) .
***Zeleny also discusses anti-ideal states, those which are highly negative in the
value system of one or another stakeholder, as interesting antipodal reference
points, which together with ideal points can serve as a basis for understanding in-
dividual differences and possible compromise solutions.
tOf course, the processes of defining such ideal states and the stance planners
and philosophers might take towards their meaning are difficult issues, which de-
serve a fuller treatment by decision scientists than they have received to date. In
this paper, I will take a purely pragmatic point of view that the process described
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Although there is little empirical research contrasting Ackoff's method and
variants thereof with other methods, there is nonetheless a growing consensus
amongst strategic planners and futurologists that scenario construction and idealiz-
ation offer a viable framework for generating creative alternatives and understanding
their assumptional and value referents*. Testing this and other planning methodol-
ogies, both in the field and experimentally, appears trJ be a very fruitful area for
future research.
Pursuing the above approach, we can delineate two classes of problems which
our planning group may address.
EstabZ-isrdng the FrC1JTiciJJork
Problem identification and clarification
Design of ideal states
Identification of stakeholders
Scenario generation
EvaZuat-ion and Cho-icc
Forecasting: behavioral, factual, and political
Impact and value analysis
Responsibility and accountability analysis
All of the above tasks should be intui tively clear, save possibly the last on respon-
sibility. The issue here is to trace consequences of policy options back through
stakeholder impacts and values to determine for various scenarios (e.g., the worst
case) who will likely be held responsible for negative outcomes. The purpose of
this is not to amplify "anticipatory regret" in Janis and Hann's terminology, but
to evaluate the planning process in the light of the incentives it provides through
its accountability features for strategic behavior**.
Concerning the above problems, my view is that the systems theoretic tradition
has made its most important contributions to the first category of problems: set-
ting the stage for planning. Detailed evaluation and forecasting have been the
province of more analytical traditions of decision science, such as theories of
collective choice and decision analysis. One may argue that this division of labor
is, in fact, appropriate. That is, the broad sweep of human imagination and will
should be unleashed in setting the stage for planning, but scenarios and value con-
flicts generated by this creative process should then be evaluated in a detailed
and analytical form to provide realistic feedback on the consequences of alterna-
tive plans.
In more detail, the use of groups for forecasting, using Delphi methods or
qualitative controlled feedback, is well researched***. Similarly, the methods and
problems of dealing with multiple criteria, value trade-offs are reasonably well
above may be a useful and understandable way of discussing complex group choice
situations with value and perceptual conflicts.
*See, e.g., Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) for an extensive analysis of the various
currents that Ackoff and Churchman (1971) have spawned. See also Saaty (1980) for
a discussion of a number of case studies using Ackoff's approach within the context
of Saaty's hierarchical planning procedure.
**Williamson (1979) provides an interesting discussion of the consequences of re-
sponsibility assessment in a regulatory environment (the regulation of food addi-
tives). He argues that the interaction between political controls and responsibil-
ity assessment are a crucial determinant of agency behavior and suggests, in the
light of this, that a formal decision process be agreed upon to allow both intelli-
gent trade-offs to be made as well as to anticipate who will be responsible for
legal and stakeholder grievances. In this regard, see also Coppock (1981), and
Fincham and Jaspars (1980).
***See Einhorn ct az' (1977) and Press ct az' (1979) for a discussion and review
of the basic research here. See also the recent survey of the use of such tech-
niques in planning by Hogarth and Madridakis (1981).
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understood from an analytic point of view*. However, both forecasting and value
analysis require a stage within which these analyses take place. In forecasting,
for example, one must begin with a well formulated question. Similarly, for value
trade-off analysis among conflicting attributes or stakeholder values, solutions
can only be interpreted against the history, the political and social processes,
and the assumptions underlying the impact analysis in question. From this perspec-
tive, then, the development of scenarios, testing of assumptions, and contrasting
of possible ideals is a necessary precondition for applying the more analytic tech-
niques that traditional decision science have provided.
In this regard it is important to note the important contributions of Richard
Mason and Ian Mitroff**, who proposed a synthesis of Ackoff's work on teleological
planning with the pathbreaking work of Churchman (1971) on inquiring systems. The
nature of their proposal was to abstract the methods of argument and evidence gen-
eration from various philosophical traditions and use these contrasting methods for
various elements of the above tasks of generating ideal states, and evaluating
scenarios and assumptions. For example, following Hegel, one can imagine a "dialec-
tical method" of assumptional analysis. By generating two antithetical sets of
assumptions (e.g., assuming that the development of some protective device will be
fast or slow), one can generate contrasting scenarios, which can be used to eluci-
date both the scope of feasible scenarios, and the implications of the antithetical
assumptions at issue. In a similar manner, an analytical (Leibnitzian) approach
would properly be used to explore the implications of an interrelated set of tech-
nical assumptions in a field whose technical scope was well understood. By using
various approaches to generate and measure the scope of assumptions and associated
scenarios against ideal states, the Mason-Mitroff framework provides an interesting
operational extension of the Ackoff-Churchman approach.
As a final point on the systems theoretic tradition, the recent work of Saaty
(l980) is important in that it integrates the Ackoff ideal-scenario-assumption per-
spective with more analytical (multicriteria) methods of scenario evaluation and
choice. Saaty argues that there is usually a wide gap between traditional analytic
methods of evaluation and the problem representations which human planners find
natural (i.e., easily comprehensible). He suggests that to narrow this gap, one
should use a problem representation which relates easily to the underlying scenarios
and assumptions in terms of what human planners think. For this purpose, Saaty pro-
poses what is really a variant of decision trees, with the consequences of various
decisions represented in mUlticriteria fashion. He then proposes an operational
method, with nice analytical and empirical properties, that uses the hierarchical
(or, if you prefer, tree-like) scenario and value structures as a basis for elicit-
ing the preferences of individuals and groups for desired scenarios in terms of
their multicriteria consequences. A general critique of the appropriateness of
Saaty's methods and its comparative strengths and weaknesses awaits future research.
Its basic point of linking the underlying framework (of scenarios and ideal states)
of planning to analytical processes for evaluating specific options is clearly an
important step in the right direction.
4. OTHER RELEVANT GROUP RESEARCH
We now turn to traditional group research and to analytical methods in the
collective choice area as these relate to the problem of group planning. Concern-
ing both of these, the discussion will be quite brief, pointing only to their im-
plications for planning in the risk area.
The roots of experimental group research go back to Lewin's research on group
dynamics in the late 1940s***. The primary concern of Lewin and his co-workers was
*See, e.g., Lasswell (1971), Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Saaty (1980) and Zeleny
(1981) fora representative sampling of the literature on multicriteria problems in
theory and practice.
**See Mason and Mitroff (1973) and the sUbsequent developments in this area des-
cribed in Mitroff and Kilmann (1978).
***See Shaw (1971) and Cooper (1975) for overviews of Lewin's original research and
the issues it spawned.
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the process by which group structures were formed and how these contributed to learn-
ing and to individuals' relations to groups. These ideas were taken up immediately
by psychiatrists and clinical therapists as basis of group therapy. Out of this
and the sociological tradition of referent groups grew several inter-related strands
of group research, which we now briefly consider*.
4.1. phenomenology
The concern here has been to identify existential characteristics of groups
(cohesion, trust) and to relate these to subjective perceptions of group members
(belongingness, communion). The reason phenomenological theories are important to
planning is in shedding light on the relationship between group level variables and
member perceptions and motives**.
4.2. Group structure
This research has attempted to clarify the relationship between group task, com-
munications structure (who can talk to whom and how easily), group size and compo-
sition (e.g., male, female, or mixed), and group performance. MacKenzie (1976) and
Steiner (1972) provide extensive discussions of the research in this area. MacKenzie
verifies experimentally that something like a "fit" equation obtains amongst these
variables in the sense that if one is changed (e.g., task structure) by the experi-
menter, then other aspects of group structure and environment under the control of
the group (e.g., the communications structure) will change in predictable ways. It
appears that there is something like a natural or ideal structural condition, dic-
tated by the needs of the group and the task structure confronting them, towards
which group structure tends when left free to vary. The point of this from a plan-
ning perspective is that information processing and the communication resources of
a group should be compatible with this natural fit point to avoid internal struc-
tural pressures.
4.3. Group Process and Learning
This area has been concerned with decision processes, norms, and communication
patterns within groups as a function of group size and structure, and procedural
interventions. The general literature here is covered by cathcart and Samovar (1979)
and by Argyris and Schon (1974). We may envisage the general point of these studies
as attempting to understand how variables, such as communication, trust, and cooper-
ation, interact. One may view the major prediction of this research as being that
(ease of and level of) communication, trust, and cooperation are mutually reinforc-
ing. For example, Marwell and Schmitt (1975) and Dawes (1980) provide interesting
predictions of when cooperation and trust may be expected. This research corrobo-
rates the idea that certain objective characteristics of the problem situation (e.g.,
the ability of an individual to profit at the expense of the group) in their inter-
action with the ability of the group to exercise sanctions for "deviant" behavior
act as fundamental determinants of trust and cooperation. Communication tends to
reinforce both cooperation and the ability to design creative compromise solutions
(see Steinfatt and Miller 1974, Dawes 1980). This literature has also emphasized
the consequence of lack of trust on individual processes as these interact with
group processes. For example, the research of Argyris and Schon (1974) points out
that the natural consequence of lack of trust is defensive behavior, relying on de-
fensible and accepted theories, with a consequent lack of openness to creative prob-
lem solving. A further consequence of lack of trust is unwillingness to accept the
*See the editorial introduction to Cooper (1975) for a brief history of the roots
of modern group research. We follow here the taxonomy given by Shadish (1981).
**See Shaw (1971) for a research summary of this area.
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responsibili ty for the action~; of the group even when one's own (explicitly espoused)
policy alterlla t ives are ldop [-,'J ,,< • This research clearly indica tes the frug i le nil-
ture of trust, communication, and creative problem solving. One direct implication
for group problem soJ.'/inq, which Zeleny (1981) suggests but which has not yet been
tested experimentillly to my ~illwledge, is that trust and cooperation ure promoted
in a plilnning environment by providing appropriate decision-aid.i. ng technoloqy (eas-
ing communication, as it were) to allow eilsy e::ploration of crW,pY omise solnt ions"
4.4. Leadership Research
Finally, a good deal of group dynamics and social psychological research has
been devoted to stUdying the role of the group leader on group performance and Silt-
isfaction experienced by group members. Knowledgeable and caring leaders who exer-
cise a strong, but not manipulative role, have had a significant impact on group
performance in experimental and clinical settings (see Steiner 1972).
Now let us turn our attention briefly to the analytical tradition of group
choice that has been studied under the heading of collective or social choice (see,
e.g., Sen 1970, Pattanaik 1978). The collective choice literature generally starts
with a set of agents, a set of alternatives, and, for each agent, a well defined
preference order over the alternatives. The object of this theory is to determine
some general procedure for determining a "socially superior" subset of the givep
initial set of alternatives. For example, one such procedure would be to order the
alternatives in some Eashion and then to use a majority rule voting procedure as a
pairwise elimination procedure, until only one alternative remained. Unfortunately
as Arrow showed in his famous paradox, the alternative selected by this procedure
will depend on the order (or agenda) in which alternatives are compared. Moreover,
if one restricts one's attention to procedures which satisfy certain reasonable
properties, this defect is not remediable. Indeed, there is a disappointingly large
and growing list of negative results on the possibility of constructing social
choice mechanisms satisfying reasonable criteria, at least if we take preferences
and illternatives as given and seek a semi-automatic procedure for accomplishing
choice.
The above noted problems only get worse when we introduce elements of uncer-·
taintyasin Bachilrach (1975). Under these conditions, it takes very strong assump-
tions to ensure even that J reasonable consensus on subjective beliefs can be ob-
tained, let illone t.he definition of a group choice function based on such beliefs.
Essentially, to obtain the existence of such a group choice function, one must a,sSIi!(!"
that it exists (in which case it turns out to be nicely representable ilS a linear
sum of the utility function representations of individual preferences**). Now, such
a procedure is not necessarily inappropriate, that is, if one is looking for a col-
lective decision, assuming that one can in fact reach consensus mLlY be a construc-
tive beginning. The problem, at least for the risk area, is that such consensus is
not likely to be promoted by taking alternative preferences and beliefs as given
and mechanically seilrching Ear an optimum within these given details using a fixed
procedure. Even if we had such a notion in mind, the literature on collective
choice is quite clear that the search for a reasonable procedure would be in vain.
Rather, consensus would seem better served through planning and participiltive group
process to allow conflicting beliefs and value structures to be woven into construc-
tive compromise.
*For a review of recent research responsibility and attribution theory, see Fincham
and Jaspars (1980).
**See Dyer and Sarin (1979) for a recent discussion and extension of Harsanyi's
original results in this regard.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The questions raised by the above discussion seem t.o fall in three areas.
(1) Linking policy planning groups and stakeholders to the broader sacral con-
text of their planning (the political desiqn question). Ive have had little
new to say about this. However accomplished, this s1:ep has to be under-
stood as a major link between planning groups and "reality".
(2) Improving the performance of policy planning groups in accomplishing spec-
ific planning tasks. Research on group problem solving suggests that such
matters as group structure, communication and decision aids, and the abil-
ity to generate easily compromise solutions, all contribute to this process.
It has also been argued that the systems thecretic approach provides an
often missing ingredient to this normative process by helping to delineate
the assumptional and value background against which policy analysis is done.
(3) Finally, the major challenge for future research seems to be in linking the
unstructured processes of ideal state design and scenario generation with
the analytical evaluation of such scenarios. While we wish to unleash the
powers of group imagination, we also wish to res1:rain our flights of fancy
by the real constraints which technology and social processes impose. An
argument can be made that this linking of unstructured design with struc-
tured evaluation can be significantly improved using computer based decision
support systems*. In any case, this linking process is, in my opinion, the
key to effective group planning and policy analysis.
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Market Risk Assessment of Catastrophic Risks
William B. Fairley
I1naly,cn:s and Inj'eY'ence Inc., Boston, Massachusetts, USA
l. INTRODUCTION
This paper is intended to encourage interest in two different and separable
conjectures about the roles that properly established markets might play in improved
social management of catastrophic risk. First, the accuracy, credibility, and use-
fulness of risk assessments for catastrophes could be improved if they were made
the tools of risk producers with a direct financial stake in their accuracy.
Second, although not the main theme of this paper, a variety of advantages--
some economic, some broadly political, and some perhaps philosophical--accrue in a
risk system in which risk producers are accountable to the fullest practical extent
financially for the risk liabilities they impose on others. Financial accountabil-
ity can be required with more or less governmental involvement in the mechanics of
compensatinQ victims and for property losses. A variety of proposals have come be-
fore the US Congress and state legislatures that would mandate financial responsi-
bility requirements for corporations (e.g., HR 1414 (1980), Massachusetts S 742
(l980) for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) hazards
HR 6390 (1980), HR 789 (1980) for nuclear power hazards). Some types of public in-
volvement appear to help to establish a well functioning market and have a coherent
rationale under a market approach. Others, however, appear to constitute an inco-
herent intervention into a market mechanism without substitution of adequate public
institutions for control. Considerably more analysis of these kinds of proposals
is required before conclusions about their likely effects can be made.
Financial responsibility requirements can take a variety of forms, including
self-insurance, commercial insurance, industry risk-pooling associations, and
government-run compensation funds with subrogation rights to risk producers. The
choice of the form of finance can be vital to the performance of a risk system
along all dimensions of public interest including the degree to which control of
risk is achieved, the acceptability of risk, the efficiency with which safety is
produced (or risk avoided), the extent to which individuals' preferences about risk
are taken into account in decision making, and administrative feasibility and costs.
In particular, the role of private insurance markets vis a vis that of government
requires scrutiny in the light of current literature (for example, see Kunreuther
and Pauly 1981, and references therein).
The point of view taken here is not to recommend specific roles for markets in
controlling catastrophic risks and in providing accurate assessments of such risks,
but rather to suggest possibilities. Decision making in a market context has at
least superficially attractive possibilities. A deeper study of the potential role
of markets would rest on a general theme developed by others (see, for example,
Schultze 1977) that even a "market failure" does not in and of itself create a pre-
sumption of favoring government enterprise or detailed regulation, since there is
certain knowledge that the latter will be better. Market frameworks, however, which
are appropriately maintained by government, with adequate responsibility clearly
and adequately assigned to risk producers, may turn out to perform well.
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2. CATASTROPHIC RISKS AS COSTS OF PRODUCTION
Accidents occurring in the course of industrial activity are considered by
economists tobecosts of production. Under standard assumptions of economic theory,
and under widely shared presumptions, good things happen in the economic world when
costs of production are borne by the producers. In particular, if they bear the
costs, producers have financial incentives to reduce them. Further, if producers
bear the costs initially, then final consumers who purchase and enjoy the use of
the product bear this burden (since it is included in the price), rather than per-
sons who did not choose to purchase and enjoy it.
Most accidents are counted routinely in the costs of production--things like
normal breakage, unfortunate occupational accidents, etc. Accidents on the scale
of chemical plant explosions, while exceptional, are viewed as part of the general
cost of being in business. Commercial insurance may cover the financial costs of
such events. In all of these cases producers can generally be assumed to have the
usual financial incentives to cut costs--either of the accidents themselves or the
insurance premiums that cover the costs incurred in the event of an accident. In
cutting costs producers of course cut accidents. Further, producers are generally
presumed to know best how to cut costs. They may choose more careful organization
under existing technology or sponsor innovations that will enhance safety and re-
duce risk.
Parenthetically, let me add that in relating these standard presumptions I am
deliberately sliding over numerous caveats and potential research areas for econ-
omic specialists such as questions of informational perfection in the market for
insurance and questions relating to perfect markets for innovations (for these dis-
cussions see the survey by Hirshleifer and Riley 1979). Rather, I rely only on
whatever support is obtained under simple certainty models plus the general assump-
tions that are employed in industrial organization economics and in business policy
about the good results of markets in which costs of production are borne by produc-
ers.
When we come to catastrophic accidents, however, we find that a very different
situation exists in business practice and in public policy towards business. Cata-
strophic accidents on the scale of a huge fire generated in downtown Boston from
an LNG tanker accident, or a meltdown in a nuclear power plant, are not currently
treated in the same way as most smaller accidents. The main difference is that
catastrophic risk is a cost of production that is typically borne only in part--and
sometimes this is a small part--by producers. Risk (variously described as a spill-
over or an externality of production) is typically largely borne by persons or enti-
ties other than the risk producer. Exposed persons in the geographic vicinity
absorb part of the costs of production and provide what might be called a risk sub-
sidy towards the production in question.
The full costs of catastrophic risks are not generally borne by producers be-
cause their assets and insurance coverage are not sufficient to cover the potential
costs of credible accidents. Even large corporations might be bankrupted by these
liabilities. However, the ownership structure for potential catastrophic activities
(as detailed, for example, for LNG in the US General Accounting Office (1978) study
of LNG risks) shields the larger parent corporations from financial responsibility
for catastrophic liabilities through the use of subsidiaries. In the case of nuclear
power, the US congress has expressly limited total public and private liability for
a nuclear accident to $560 million through the Price-Anderson Act of 1957 (amended
twice since 1957 with ten-year extensions, but with no change to the upper limit of
recoverable damages) .
Regulatory authorities (e.g., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for LNG
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for nuclear power) review site applications
and grant licenses for the construction of new facilities with a catastrophic risk
potential. Through this avenue producers may be enabled to build facilities at
lower cost than they otherwise would--with risk subsidies provided by persons ex-
posed to the risks.
On the other hand, since the present system does not guarantee that anyone has
a responsibility for making a comparison between what are probably the most important
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alternatives with respect to risk costs-namely site regulation-is likely to be in-
efficient in its choice of safety technology. An example would be not trading off
more remote site locations against hardware fixes at sites near population centers.
Producers will choose sites that public authorities permit and that minimize
their costs. Since these costs include only a part of the catastrophic risk costs
they may not minimize these risks. They will have no direct incentive to search
for the least-cost site solution that takes catastrophic risks into account.
The mixed public-private nature of the present system, in failing to assign
clear responsibility for financial liabilities and for risk management, may exemp-
lify the concern of Nelson (1981) about a system of economic organization that com-
bines the worst features of public and private systems for responsibility. Failure
to assign responsibilities may be viewed as a failure of public authority to estab-
lish properly the framework required for private markets to operate well. It is
perhaps difficult to say whether what is involved is "market failure" or "nonmarket
failure" to use the phrase of Wolf (1979). The issue is therefore not simply be-
tween more or less regulation; rather it is between a good pUblic foundation for
well functioning private systems and a poor public foundation. Nor is the issue
between public and private interests. Private interests stand to gain something
in either case, but it would be preferable if certain private interests, such as
persons living near hazardous facilities, were not sacrified.
In summary, all the legal, statutory, and regulatory frameworks for assigning
responsibility for the costs of catastrophic risks in the USA today permit or even
endorse the concept that those costs need not be borne by the risk producer and can
properly be absorbed by the persons exposed to those risks.
The current system violates the norm of standard economic principle and prac-
tice in the assignment of costs. It follows that we should not expect the advan-
tages such as least-cost incentives for risk control, and the equitable allocation
of costs onto persons who purchase and enjoy products, that are generally believed
to follow from adherence to that norm. But our main theme is assessments of cata-
strophic risks. How does the current system affect these?
3. MARKET RISK ASSESSMENT: CREDIBILITY, USEFULNESS, AND ACCURACY
First, the credibility of risk assessments is a casualty of the process by
which some parties stand to gain (and others stand to lose) very substantial sums
depending upon the influence they can exert on regulatory bodies. Risk assessments
are usually sponsored by parties with financial interests clearly identified with
findings of low or high risk. Applicants before regulatory authorities who seek
construction licenses for hazardous facilities clearly have a financial interest in
low-risk determinations that would speed licensing approval, while resident groups
near proposed sites just as clearly have financial interests in high-risk determi-
nations that would send the facility off to another location. Under the circum-
stances in the present system, participants in regulatory hearings routinely dis-
count the accuracy and credibility of risk assessment done for the other parties.
Besides spawning a substantial amount of cynicism about the reliability of political
processes, the outcome leaves responsible decision makers without as sound a basis
for making a decision as might be possible.
We can imagine improving the situation with an injection of disinterested ob-
jective risk assessment. However, while possibly better than nothing, the availa-
bility of objective, accurate and credible assessment would not in any way change
the underlying problem of misassignment of effective financial responsibility of
risk, reduced incentives for risk control, and an inequitable burden of risk. Risk
assessments introduced after a site has been selected are of extremely limited use-
fulness because a decisive variable influencing risk--the location-has been pre-
viously determined (see Mandl and Lathrop 1981). There are some tremendous incen-
tives to find estimated probabilities within a range of acceptable risk of alterna-
tively acceptable risk within the range of probabilities estimated:
If he is financially responsible for the risk, the risk producer will have a
greater interest in accurately estimating the probabilities and costs of accidents
198
and in least-cost choices of methods to reduce them. For example, if an expected
liability from an accident or the insurance premium to cover the liability could be
reduced sufficiently by moving the site of a hazardous facility to a less densely
populated location, a direct financial interest will come into play to aid the ad-
option of that less risky alternative. The costs of liability to the risk producer
can be viewed as part of the demand for safety on the part of potential hazard vic-
tims. Accurate demand estimation, like accurate cost estimation for risk reducing
technology or design, is in the risk producer's interest.
Risk assessments by risk producers that are too optimistic lead to losses or
expected losses to themselves. Assessments that are too pessimistic lead to pro-
fitable opportunities foregone or, in workably competitive markets, to noncompeti-
tive cost estimates. In either case the risk producer stands to lose--but only if
the costs of risks are really made part of his production costs. Risk assessments
made by assessors in workably competitive markets who are responsible for risk
costs can be called "market risk assessments". Further, it is useful to refer to
a "responsibility-based" risk system as one in which risk producers are financially
responsible for risk costs and therefore make market risk assessments.
4. MARKET RISK ASSESSMENT: OTHER FEATURES
Consideration of market risk assessments throws light on some other issues.
Consider, for example, the "nebulosity problem". Probabilities of rare events often
appear nebulous. The conditions under which the events could occur are difficult
to specify with any precision or completeness so that a probability is difficult to
envisage even conceptually (see Fairley 1981). Estimates of probabilities seem
nebulous for the same reason and also because neither a record of experience nor a
good model is available. Such nebulosity creates difficult problems for public de-
cision makers because their decisions, which are written and issued under an offic-
ial imprimatur, will inevitably seem to be built on sand. There is a great demand
for certainty on the part of the public--a demand that cannot honestly be met under
the circumstances. Responsibility-based risk systems would appear to deal with
numerous other business risks, a large number of which are nebulous, such as market
demand shifts, and the productivity of research and development programs. with
lower visibility the hunches and intuitive reasoning that can be every bit as im-
portant as more formally gathered information and analysis in market assessments
are not subject to unfair public comparison against unrealistic standards for ac-
curacy. The risk of financial loss for mistaken assessments provides a direct
financial stake in achieving achievable levels of accuracy at a reasonable cost,
regardless of the nebulosity of the event being estimated.
Consider the "politics versus rationality" problem. Risk assessments based on
"objective" outcome measures such as number of fatalities, or on the rational choice
paradigm for decision making, are often contrasted with assessments that take into
account a variety of psychological or subjective factors such as--in Lathrop (1981),
for example--dread of catastrophes or the worst possible consequence. Political
decision making is seen as responsive to psychological or subjective factors in a
way that is not handled within rational prescriptive models for decision making.
Responsibility-based systems appear to be less based on a dichotomy between an
individual's "rational" and, by implication, what are often viewed as "irrational"
sources of preference about risk: insofar as individual's preferences about risk
playa role in the compensation they demand or receive for risk liabilities, then
these preferences will influence decision making about risks in these systems re-
gardless of whether others view them as rational, irrational, or something else.
Consider the "commensurability" problem. Actual decision making, about hazard-
ous activities involves the consideration of a large number of factors besides
threats to life, limb, and property, and yet risk assessments under the present sys-
tem deal almost exclusively with risks to life alone, excluding injuries, property
loss, etc. Risk assessment as practised to date has trouble incorporating all these
seemingly incommensurable considerations in a single decision making framework, and
yet the interdependencies of all these various decisions are widely recognized.
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In a responsibility-based system a risk producer confronts the financial cost
of compensation for risk liabilities and incorporates this money cost into all the
other considerations that go into the business decision. In this customary process
of business decision making, a variety of ends are valued commensurately. Aiding
the customary process by supplying, as one input, new and better risk assessments--
whether limited to a focus on fatalities or not-can generally be expected to im-
prove it. However, using risk asses@nents limited to a consideration of fatalities
in a system that lacks financial incentives to take other factors into account ap-
pears to be less likely to improve the system overall.
5. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to advance some speculative reasons why risk
assessments made by risk producers who are financially responsible for costs of
catastrophic risk might be more credible, useful, and accurate and enjoy certain
other advantaqes over present risk assessments presented in regulatory hearings and
other public decision contexts. No firm conclusions are possible, if only because
important issues of institutional design and of practical functioning of the mar-
kets discussed have not been addressed. However, the advantages in theory of what
are called herein "market risk assessments" in "responsibility-based" systems of
risk assignment and control seem attractive enough to warrant further exploration.
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Chapter 5
GENERAL DISCUSSIONS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS

General Discussions
The afternoon sessions of the Summer Study were devoted to discussions of a
more general nature. The participants were divided into four groups and were given
a set of questions for discussion that had been presented on the first day as part
of the general IIASA overview.
The material that follows comprises transcripts of two plenary session discus-
sions that took place after the small group meetings. We have listed some of the
questions which we feel stimulated interaction among participants. We hope that the
ideas which emerged from these open interactions will set a tone for future research
on institutional and decision process aspects of risk.
Session I
o How can analysis, given its limits, be more useful in generating and evaluating
alternatives?
o How are analysts currently involved in the policy process?
o How can analysts play a more constructive role in interactive ongoing decision
processes?
o In the absence of formal risk assessment how have societies in the past handled
risk successfully?
o Why is risk treated as a separate entity in the decision process?
Schoemaker: One thing I noticed is an interest in the sociology of risk assessment;
specifically, where do experts who propose to help society to make decisions come
from? It seems that we do not fully understand, at least from a cross-cultural
viewpoint, how those sociologies differ. Initially, there seemed to have been a
vacuum and suddenly experts come into existence because a technology imposes itself
on us. It seems that various people in the discussion groups are interested in what
one may call the sociology of the risk assessment experts, i.e., its subculture.
Kasperson; A quite striking issue in this general discussion is how to get a legit-
imate authoritative credible risk assessment, i.e., one that will be accepted as
that by a variety of different parties. Obviously there is concern that the present
process does not achieve that.
Douglas: In our group we tried to quiz the German representatives as to how people
cope without this kind of analysis. There must have been some vacuum in certain
countries but not in others, which caused this type of analysis to come forth where
it did. One question that we might look at, apart from ones already on board, is
the macro-national structures in which risk analysis as distinct from decision analy-
sis has been utilized.
Kunreuther; You are saying that if you look at these different cultures you per-
ceive that some of them may have felt that risk analysis was an appropriate tool to
use, while others avoided it, until later on in the process.
Douglas: That is interesting because the IIASA representative in our group, Joanne
Linnerooth, was saying that of course everyone needs to work out how to make these
risk decisions, but we also heard that people did not always have to do that.
Kunreuther; We heard a story connected with that at our LEG workshop. One of the
people from the California Coastal Commission actually raised the question himself:
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"Should I ever hire a consultant to do a decision analysis for me?" He himself had
been trained in this technique and said they made some calculations on the back of
an envelope but kept the figures in a drawer in case they had to justify their ac-
tions. He would never want to make the analysis pUblic or have a consultant under-
take them because they would be looked at in an entirely different way. So some of
this may actually take place even though it is not made explicit. Suppose we looked
at a country where risk analysis was not used. What are the characteristics of the
cultural and the historical background which created an atmosphere where no explicit
quantitative assessment was undertaken?
Douglas: English history seems to have been one of ups and downs in this respect,
with an initial resistance. In 1972 the Roskill Commission caused public and offi-
cial confusion by inserting fictional costs into the calculations in the report on
the decision of where to locate a third London airport. Volumes have been written
to say that after this no one ~an possibly use cost-benefit analysis except in very
narrow technical engineering situations. Yet ten years have gone by and Joanne
Linnerooth tells me it is still in good repair so that people are still using it.
There must be some political needs which it meets which are absent in West Germany,
where it is not used.
Schutz: We do not use it very much and it should be noted that there can be no ex-
plicit trade-off between human lives and economics. I think it is quite accepted
that normally no one would want that kind of trade-off because it is unethical.
Kleindorfer: What about cost effectiveness, i.e., considering not the trade-off
between dollars and lives, but rather the dollar cost of the last life saved--per-
haps you cannot do that either?
Schutz: You can do it if, for example, you consider nuclear power plants where you
will have some technical differences between the power plants. You could investi-
gate, for example, whether a different emergency cooling system would be more or
less effective for the same amount of money, but you will not explicitly calculate
lives saved or not saved.
Wynne: In answer to Howard Kunreuther's question, and perhaps you could correct me
if I am wrong, I have the impression that nobody is conducting any formal risk as-
sessment of information technology.
Kasperson: The Swedes have done a big risk assessment on computers and privacy.
Stoto: There have been studies and similar investigations in the United States,
but not formal in the sense of setting out quantitative risk.
Wynne: I would not equate formal with quantitative, but I would suggest that it is
for the same reason that it was not done for nuclear power in the 1950s.
Lathrop: I think this is a very interesting line of discussion. I would suggest
that there are two reasons why we have not yet seen formal risk assessment for in-
formation technology. One is that risk assessment is part of a process especially
sensitive to the image or ideation of hazard. Hazard in the nuclear industry or
the space program involves a very visible or identifiable menance, i.e., you cannot
describe in one or two words or images the hazards of information technology. You
might say one of them is privacy--or loss of privacy--but in fact the set of hazards
is much more complicated. Lacking an easily visualized hazard, there is no dispo-
sition toward risk assessment with information technology. The second reason is
related to the first: there is no easily characterized single dimension that cap-
tures very much of people's concerns about information technology. Nuclear safety
is amenable to risk assessment because there is a natural format for risk. People
naturally see that risk in terms of lives lost.
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D~ake: I think if you look at the roots of risk analysis it started with reliabil-
ity analyses for the space program and then became a tool in the design of control
systems for complicated facilities,i.e., chemical plants, nuclear plants. It evolved
as a design tool rather than a tool for analyzing potential for major catastrophes.
For systems where somebody had to sit down and design them and feel comfortable that
they would work adequately, risk analysis provided a methodology for systematic
evaluation of safety and operability. When risk analysis started to be used for
looking at the rare event, it changed character. Then it was no longer a matter of
just putting in statistical data, but also of fitting subjective judgments, biases,
etc., into the same matrix. Like a computer, if you put garbage in, you will get
garbage out. But, if you come out with a stack of computer output, people tend to
believe somehow that this is blessed because it looks official and scientific. Cer-
tainly it can be misused. I think when you get into the softer areas there is an
important question as to how useful risk analysis is, i.e., whether it masks the
fact that there is a lot of judgment and consequent uncertainty involved.
Nelkin: I do not agree that it is natural. I was involved in a risk assessment
with the Cambridge City Council on recombinant DNA research and they, as a citizens'
group, wanted to define risk in very broad terms--in terms of dangers to values and
various other things--but they were told that the limits of their mandate was to
find risks only in terms of human health. They could not deal with technical as-
pects because they were not well enough equipped. The definition in these narrow
terms is performed by those who have control of the technology. I think that is
clear.
Wynne: In answer to John Lathrop, perhaps there is too much at stake to conduct a
risk assessment on information technology in the same way that there was in the
1950s for nuclear power. The risks of risk assessment then might have been that
people might have chosen to do without it. Risk assessment then perhaps becomes
politically possible when it was a case of adaptation in design, etc., within the
framework of an established commitment to the overall technology.
Thompson: If risk analysis is broadened to include a cultural analysis of risk then
there are such studies on information technology--in fact there is one here in Vienna.
The interesting thing about that technology is that it is a bit like solar technol-
ogy in that it can be all things to all men. That is the reason for looking at it
in this sort of cultural framework which can handle different futures and different
societies.
What kind of information technology will we have in each future? will it be
a future in which small-scale decentralized computers accompany a developed, decen-
tralized pattern of decision making, or will we have a few large-scale installations
and a very centralized form of decision making? The invasion of privacy is seen as
a big risk (Big Brother) in the sorts of social contexts that favor decentralization,
but as rather less of a risk in the contexts that favor centralization--provided
access is constrained by "proper" procedures so that information does not spill out
of the "correct" channels.
It is interesting that these are two technologies that share a high degree of
cultural flexibility. They can come out very differently depending on the cultural
bias they are subjected to. In contrast, nuclear power tends towards just one tech-
nology. If you could have a little nuclear reactor at the end of the garden and a
man from down the road to come and dispose of the waste from time to time, there
would be more flexibility. But, since that is not possible, nuclear power only
works for one of those futures and I think that this is a partial explanation, i.e.,
whether tl , technology has the flexibility to change cultural direction.
Linne~ooth: There are many explanations why risk assessments are currently carried
out in the nuclear industry but were not in the 1950s. One explanation concerns the
paternalism on the part of the engineers concerned with the technology. They felt
they were in control of the risk, and it could be settled by "best engineering judg-
ment". Experts were not asked to make judgments whether a technology was safe,
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since it was designed to be safe. Many official statements at that time reported
that there were no risks from nuclear power. I think there is a similar thing going
on in West Germany today.
Douglas: I would like to suggest a sort of quasi-Marxist explanation inspired by
Brian Wynne's remark that the risks inherent in information technology were never
discussed. This might be because there are few physical risks there. Or it might
be that some major interest in protecting that industry from additional harrassment.
There is a lot of correspondence in political journals in the USA about a new
class. This new class shows on Alec Lee's diagrams on the distribution of the dif-
ferent sectors in the labor market as part of the shift towards the tertiary or in-
formation sector. This sector certainly contains a class often referred to as the
knowledge class. The knowledge class is directly involved in telecommunications
and information. There is part of its traditional role in teaching and the develop-
ment of bureaucracy and in the oral communications industry. Then there is the
media industry itself, which is large and thriving in most industrial countries.
A Marxist type of explanation would be that the selection of risks for concern
corresponded to the class struggle for power. The USA is the supreme case where
people are more involved in risk analysis than elsewhere. The argument about risk
could be seen as part of a power struggle between the two upper classes in the USA
(this is, of course, entirely speculative). One of the two upper classes is the
big industrial complex, plus affiliations to it through various occupational links;
the other class is the knowledge people who are purveying knowledge in different
ways, through universities and through the media. We in the knowledge class are not
dependent for our careers or professions on any physical capital so much as upon
human capital. This knowledge class is either making a bid for hegemony or trying
to maintain an advantage.
On this analysis, risks would be treated as one of the chosen instruments of
the knowledge class for attacking the industrialists. It is an effective choice
because the media industries, in order to expand, need to reach a larger public, and
the largest public is not interested in straightforward information of the encyclo-
pedic kind. It is very interested in scandal and horror, which are well provided
by propagating information produced by risk analysis because explosions are horrible
and generate plenty of scandal. Thus, following Brian Wynne, the risks of the tele-
communications industry itself would come in for some incidental protection.
The class struggle argument would be that risk analysis is our tool (us here
today) against others who are much richer and more powerful than us (but who also
have to employ some of us as risk analysts on their side in order to counter the
attack). Here we are offering our services in this class struggle, which we hardly
notice because it is not the classic conflict between the lowest and the middle
classes. The argument would be more interesting if the telecommunications industry
involved large physical risks, of which I have not heard.
Kasperson: With reference to Brian Wynne's question, I have just finished an article
on the social risk of television. I started trying to answer the question of how
this technology, which on the face of it appears to be quite hazardous compared with
other kinds of technologies, had elicited so little response in the USA. It turns
out that there is no shortage of risk assessments, there is a surgeon general's re-
port and a number of other major risk assessments. Most of them, however, turn out
to be cultural criticism rather than risk assessment.
Kleindorfer: Are you talking about hazards to mental health or what?
Kasperson: You can look at it as a form of pollution which is essentially hazardous
information--there are a variety of social hazards. We include things like violence,
stereotyping of various kinds, and just the passivity that is created in individuals.
Simply identifying the hazards is interesting; that includes risks to values and in-
stitutions, dental cavities, etc. Another interesting point is that culturally
these risks are handled very differently. It has a lot to do with how different
cultures think about the role and value of television in the society. In the USA
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there have been many risk assessments but little risk management. This has partly
to do with the First Amendment, but it is also very much connected with the politi-
cal economy, and I think that is the main reason. This does have links with nuclear
power in the early stages of the hazard.
Wynne: That would support Mary Douglas' hypothesis.
Kleindorfer: I would like to take up the issue that Mary Douglas raised regarding
the institutional aspects of power and the knowledge class. It seems to me a very
interesting descriptive task to determine in various policy areas the relative num-
bers of economists, lawyers and other professions employed in governmental agencies
responsible for policy formation. I know something about west Germany and the USA,
and there really are very different notions in the ministries in those countries as
to what qualifications one should bring as an organization to areas such as health,
education and welfare, or transportation.
As a broad generalization, I believe one would find relatively more economists
and problem analysts in the USA and relatively more lawyers in West Germany. In
the USA, for example, when you look at the people who were involved in the Transpor-
tation Department from its inception, there were a lot of economists and cost-
benefiters. They probably got there as a part of the surge of belief in the bene-
fits of analysis during the "Great Society" programs in the 1960s. If you look at
a number of other governing agencies you will see the same thing, relatively speak-
ing: a very high percentage of policy analysts and economists. If you look at West
Germany, there is a very different composition of skills in the corresponding minis-
tries, with relatively more lawyers than in the USA. One of the reasons for this,
I suspect, is that in West Germany one looks for the answer to the evaluation pro-
cess below ministerial level, i.e., one looks for a process solution.
In the USA, we seem to have opted for a more technological Marcusian solution
to policy formation. The facts are assumed to be external. One then turns the
knowledge class loose on the problem and they come up with the answer. Since they
have the best methodology, the answer is indisputable. In West Germany, there seems
to be a very different sense of what constitutes the policy formation process and
this may be reflected in the very different composition of agency skills there. It
would be interesting cross-culturally to consider whether relative composition of
skills in ministeries that are focused on risk analysis would reflect cultural dif-
ferences within a general framework such as that advanced by Mary Douglas and Mike
Thompson.
Schutz: I would like to follow what Paul Kleindorfer said on information technology.
As I perceive the state of the art in West Germany, there have been analyses on the
future consequences of development of information technology and the media. I think
this process is not so important. At the moment we have a broad process of discus-
sion on how we should manage future developments on the governmental level as well
as on the party level. There are very opposed views between the parties on future
media policy and information technology policy and even on the level of the supreme
court, which last week rejected a decision on that. I think we are not so much in
need of further assessments but more discussions, including the unions who play an
important role.
Ronge: The supreme court decision is a very typical and very specific problem. It
went around the question of whether we should have private TV or not. This is no
problem in the USA, for instance, but it is typical of the German situation. We
have public corporations, and TV is looked at as a public entity and a pUblic author-
ity. That raises the question as to whether we should have private corporations and
TV programs in addition to that. This is a very specific example. Of course, we
have other studies on various aspects of informational problems, such as cable TV
problems, and human social problems connected with the computer industry. There are
lots of such studies, and we even have a new agency which was established to promote
studies of this nature.
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Yet, apart from this there is a real cultural difference between West Germany
and the USA. In Germany, there is no strong need for this type of study to be inte-
grated into the decision making process. There is a great belief that the experts
and the scientists are experts. There is rather a severe line between this expertise
and the decision making process. I do not know whether this is a problem of the
civil service which is quite different in Germany. The mixture between scientific
expertise and administrative competence is not so easy in Germany as it is in the
USA. Another point, which is again a cultural question, is the belief in formaliz-
ation and quantification which is much higher in the USA. We do not have that in
any field except for nuclear energy, and we imported that from the USA.
Kunreuther: I would like to raise another question. Does anyone know of a case
where a risk analysis was undertaken without the particular party feeling that it
has to justify its actions? The reason I have raised this question is that in our
previous discussions at IIASA of the French system, it was not clear where risk
analysis came in. There appears to be an elite group making decisions, many of whom
were trained at the ecoles polytechniques, have engineering backgrounds, and have
been very capable of dealing with detailed risk analysis. But it did not appear as
if they were in any way interested in it, or if they were, we really did not obtain
any feedback on how it was utilized.
When you mention the case of nuclear power back in the 1950s where risk analy-
sis was not utilized, it was never clear to me if it had to be utilized at that time.
There was never anyone who was specifically asking that a risk analysis or risk as-
sessment be done. One of the things which seems to be emerging from our discussion
is that recent institutional arrangements request that people are hired as cost-
benefit analysts because questions are raised as to whether particular hazards are
dangerous.
The question that I am raising here was part of the focal point of our previous
discussions when we talked about the idea of an acceptable risk level, what is the
probability of something happening or not happening. In all of these areas that
have been mentioned I am not aware that there has been any explicit consideration
of some of these ideas. The interested parties have somehow come together and have
made decisions. If decisions are being made in one context where it is not neces-
sary to justify or defend one's actions except to the parties within one's own group,
there does not seem to be a great deal of pressure for having any kind of risk analy-
sis.
As a technology emerges, the general public and special interest groups demand
certain requirements. The mass media is usually pushing in one direction by saying:
"Why are we building these power plants?" The engineers or the people directly con-
cerned with the technology say "We are building them because they are safe and we
have figures to prove that they are safe enough." There does not seem to be any-
thing similar for information technology. There is no one asking for an acceptable
risk level. That is not part of the agenda defending that technology. There is a
different set of questions and they do not appear to be related to risk.
Schoemaker: If you consider risk analysis to be one element of decision analysis,
then it seems that people are commonly engaged in risk assessments in order to make
choices. However, they may do it solely for the purpose of making a choice them-
selves. Maybe we should distinguish this sort of individual decision analysis from
organizational or societal decision analysis. In answer to your questions, yes, I
think it is quite common for risk assessments to be conducted as part of decision
analysis.
Wynne: I think there is a distinction to be made there. You are talking about con-
flicts of interests and what we are talking about are risk assessments that are car-
ried out in order to defend or justify commitments which have sometimes existed for
a very long time. My probings around information technology were intended to raise
the point about the social role of risk assessment: that either it is performed
after a conflict has emerged, for whatever reason, in which case it will never re-
place political negotiation as a fit response; or it is performed to try to pre-empt
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conflict and to avoid the need to negotiate. When the stakes are as large as in a
big issue like nuclear energy or information technology, no one is going to initiate
political and technical debate via risk assessment, until it is too late to be con-
structive. Risk analysis has, I think, to see itself as encouraging such debate
even if so-called decision making "clients" do not want it.
Kasperson: I think that is one path but I think we should not neglect the fact that
there is a great deal of routine risk assessment going on, e.g., if a chemical in-
dustry develops a new type of pesticide, a risk assessment will have been carried
out many years beforehand, and the same if a new automobile enters the market. These
are not formal risk assessments, but an enormous amount of quantitative risk assess-
ment has gone into that new product. There is an awful lot of built-in risk assess-
ment that goes on that is largely invisible.
I
Session II
o What heuristics do interested parties utilize?
Uncertainty avoidance
Resolution of conflict
o What impact do systematic biases have on decision processes of interested
parties?
Importance of concrete data--salience
-- probability biases
o What impact do different policy instruments have on decision processes and
welfare?
Market mechanisms
Information
Incentive systems
Regulations
o What is the role of the political process in shaping these arrangements?
o What is the impact of different cultural settings in shaping attitudes and
perceptions?
o What are the advantages and limitations of different arrangements as they
affect:
Power of interested parties?
Responsibility of parties?
Knowledge and information?
Credibility of institutions?
Lathrop: Just what isit that we are trying to address here? Is it designing better
negotiation procedures or designing better analyses to feed into those procedures?
There seems to be strong disagreement on this point that requires clarification. The
point of my talk was that the'-e ought to be a role for utility functions and analy-
ses. But then Howard Raiffa commented that the essence of the problem is resolution
of social conflict. Should we talk about how analyses should be shaped to serve
best the resolution of social conflict, or should we talk about how procedures should
be shaped to be conducive to the resolution of conflict?
Raiffa: I feel very strongly that conflict is at the heart of many resolution prob-
lems and I am a firm believer in very strong democratic political processes to re-
solve these problems. I happen to believe that we do a miserable job in conflict
resolution and I believe that analysis could be instrumental in helping individual
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negotiators and the process itself in arriving at better resolutions; better in the
sense of squeezing joint gains and making all parties happier. I think on the whole
we have a very adversarial society, not only in the USA, but also from nation to
nation, and there are many possibilities for both sides to win. We do a miserable
job and analysis has a role to partially help all the individuals and interveners
in this process.
Kunreuther: I would like to pursue two aspects of Howard Raiffa's point. First,
why is it we do not do a good job and second how can we deal with it? I would like
to leave it fairly open at the moment in terms of the whys as I think that relates
to different problem types, different cultures and international settings--in fact,
a number of these themes have been instrumental in bringing this group here today.
Schoemaker: The issue of conflict, being very real and present, might be dissected
into dimensions along which people have conflicts. Value conflicts could be one,
perceptional conflicts about how the world really functions co~ld be another. what
are the different roles of analyses along these different dimensions?
Raiffa: I have a feeling that they are both present, and its good that they are,
because as a rule of thumb the more dimensions of conflict there are, and the more
people with widely different points of view, the more these differences can be ex-
ploited in obtaining compromises. The secret of obtaining compromises is diversity
of opinions and that is where analysis has to playa role. I think a large part of
the role of analysis is to seek out differences in value trade-offs in issues in
order to come to agreement.
Nelkin: Let me add something that I think may clarify: The role of analysis is
not necessarily to achieve consensus, but to achieve a means of compromise--there
is a difference here which I think is important.
Raiffa: Absolutely, I agree with you.
Nelkin: Often analysis is thought of as a means of consensus because it is expert
opinion.
Raiffa: That is more of a semantic question; what you really want to do is to get
society to adopt different solutions or different choices.
Nelkin: To make a choice.
Raiffa: And that is compromise. The point is that you make one choice now, but if
you could find other choices that are different, that are more creative and will
improve the lot for everyone, then that is what we want.
Kleindorfer: Research on small group behavior suggests certain aspects of choice
situations which inhibit consensus and compromise solutions. Such research would
certainly suggest that one of these inhibiting factors is complexity. For example,
the reason people select fixed alternatives in the first place is because they at
least know what they are and what they are about. The problems of actually genera-
ting additional ones and evaluating them with the same amount of certainty that one
has about scenarios one already knows is a troublesome process. I hear this issue
of the complexity side and the generation side being brought up continually and it
seems that it might be very fruitful to consider it as a possible area where deci-
sion support, scenario generation, or other process-oriented approaches can help
sort out the issues.
Schoemaker: I would like to ask a question, possibly to Howard Raiffa, which fol-
lows from that. Let me just take an extreme position in order to make the point.
On the value side it is hard to say that some values are right and others are wrong,
so compromise seems the way to go. On the perception side, however, I am not con-
vinced that this is the right approach. Although we should allow participation by
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all sciences on the fact side, there is, in an ideal sense, only one reality. Why
should we follow a compromise strategy when we are dealing with perceptions about
the world itself. For instance, one group may have one set of predictions as to
what will happen in the future and another group has another set. If we assume both
to be equally correct, or simply acknowledge their right to disagree, then compro-
mise is the result. Would it not be better to strive not for compromise, but syn-
thesis, in the sense that we seek one science and not multiple sciences. How should
conflicts along the science dimension be resolved?
Kunreuther: Let us open that question to a broader section of people because I
think there may be some debate on the point about one reality. I am sure there are
people who have some feelings about how we deal with the perception side, where each
of the groups may have their own view of the world. We heard from Elizabeth Drake
who was looking at the risk analysis part, and showed us that this might be a prob-
lem; Chris Mandl also brought that up in our LEG study on very specific kinds of
data where there were different views of the world. How do we deal with this type
of problem?
Fairley: Just a quick comment on compromise and synthesis in adversarial situations
in response to Paul Schoemaker's remarks. It is sometimes suggested that the quan-
titative results of two opposing analyses presented in a hearing testimony be averaged
together. Such an average often represents a compromise that represents no coherent
estimate of any well defined, unknown quantity and is therefore literally nonsensi-
cal. A synthesis by contrast might use insights from two analyses as appropriate
to determine a third estimate of a well defined quantity. The numerical result
might, however, be in between the results from the initial opposing analyses.
Schoemaker: If you have an adversarial system in science you must recognize that
it is dialectical. One should not be happy, in my view, with having contradictory
sciences. Consequently, one should not be happy with compromises, where theory A
is deemed legitimate as well as theory B and then bargain, but instead one should
search for a synthesis.
Douglas: If parties in conflict try to discuss their different perceptions of the
world, surely Paul Schoemaker must be right, there will never be satisfactory com-
promise. It is possible to find a common position by avoiding the assumptions each
party makes about the world; they could insist on coming to agreement about proce-
dures for establishing common values.
Schoemaker: The rules of evidence and the process of judgment.
Douglas: Yes.
Kleindorfer: Well, I do not know because sometimes the rules of evidence are very
different according to the situation. If you are arguing for something where rele-
vant data is available, the rules of evidence might be argued within one school of
thought, whereas if you are arguing in a situation where you do not have enough
data for this purpose, then other rules of evidence might apply.
Kasperson: What does one do about the problem that not everyone who comes to the
bargaining table comes with the same resources? There is an enormous disparity in
technical and financial resources, etc., and how should that problem be dealt with
in what we are talking about?
Kunreuther: In terms of looking for compromise, you have different starting posi-
tions, as it were. What does compromise mean in that context when you are trying
to reach a solution where there are a number of interested parties?
Ka&person: Even how they develop conversation in that context.
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Nelkin: Or expertise.
Raiffa: I think it would be nice if there could be a group of analysts at univer-
sities, etc., not only supporting the needs of the industrialists but also serving
the public need. How do you get groups that will do work for environmentalists,
consumer interest groups, etc.? There are industrialists who believe that their
cause can be best served if there was better analysis by environmentalists and con-
sumer interest groups and they have offered to subsidize analysis by those groups
but those offers have been rejected because the position would not be credible.
That is one of the questions: How do you get funding for analysis that is credible
for these types of groups? In the USA we are very bad in this respect.
Nelkin: There are a number of models around the world that have been developed.
The Science Shops in Holland are one of the most interesting. They are designed
explicitly to distribute expertise to groups involved in negotiations of various
sorts who do not have access to it normally. There are a lot of similar efforts
elsehwere as it is an area of ongoing experimentation, particularly, in risk dis-
putes.
Kunreuther: How well has it worked in terms of its ability to resolve conflict or
perhaps cause more conflict?
Nelkin: In many cases it causes more conflict because the issues are basically not
technical but rather are concerned with resolution of conflicting values. Public
interest expert groups, in the course of their discussions, often reveal or high-
light value conflicts. But they may also help resolve disputes by making people
feel more comfortable with bureaucracy. If they have some sense of equity in de-
cision making, this gives them a sense of participation in the decision making pro-
cess. In a statistical way I cannot attest to the extent of the success of such
groups. There have been lots of experiments in other countries--the Burgerdialogue
in Germany, the Berger Commission of Canada, and various experiments in Swedish
circles which are designed parimarily to obtain a better distribution of expertise.
Salz: My view of the Dutch Science Shops is that they have been rather successful.
Kunreuther: How have they done it? Could you give us an idea of how that has
worked? Are they in the spirit of the question which Howard Raiffa carved out, i.e.,
we want to get analysis into the process so that we can do things better. Should we
provide resources to give each of the different groups some opportunity to do analy-
ses as Roger Kasperson asked? Have these groups done analyses or what actually
happens?
Nelkin: They do analyses, they do it free. Basically it works on a volunteer basis
with some money provided by the government which pays for xeroxing, etc. I think
they now have some foundation support basically from the science council via the
ministry, but this has been controversial as some of the Science Shops are quite
radical. It is a decentralized movement organized in six or seven university cen-
ters throughout the country. They are separate and distinct centers, often with
different ideological biases. Some are reluctant to take money from the science
councils or the ministry of science and just have university funds, but mostly sup-
port comes from "release time" of faculty members from the universities. Their
biggest problem is alerting the public to their availability. They have more trouble
getting users--and they will not supply information to just anybody. Essentially
what they do is research for unions, environmentalists, or neighborhood groups who
need to support their positions, i.e., they do a lot of work for people who do not
have access to other kinds of funds. For example, a common neighborhhod problem is
flooded basements because the level of dykes is not regulated properly. This in-
volves technical arguments that are not terribly complicated, but there are some
engineers who specialize in this and they will act as liaison officers in various
negotiations.
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Schoemaker: They have them in the US now too.
Nelkin: Yet, but they have been defunded.
Schoemaker: There seems to have been an increase in organized student participation
on such issues. What is the level of participation in Holland?
Nelkin: The most active are very young, but they do have a number of older people-
I do not know the exact age structure in the Science Shops. It partly goes along
with political predilection; generally people with a somewhat radical bent are in-
volved.
Schoemaker: But they engage in more than "objective" analysis; they also take on
value issues. They do not always make a clear distinction between values and sci-
ence.
Nelkin: A lot of work is synthesis, not scientific research. It involves somebody
who will volunteer to bring together the existing state of knowledge in a given area
to bear on a particular problem. In other cases people do mini-experiments. They
will then advise on tactics, on how to use expertise in a negotiating process, and
also on factual material.
Douglas: Do they go home in the winter?
who used to go home in the winter and had
and generally keeping warfare in bounds.
They sound like mercenary armies in Europe
various conventions for reducing bloodshed
Nelkin: The Science for the Citizens program of the National Science Foundation was
in part modeled after that.
Schoemaker: Which is also now defunded.
Nelkin: It is an interesting example of a possible way to distribute expertise, but
there are others around dedicated to the same purpose.
Kunreuther: I have a sense that what you are saying is that it would be nice to see
analysis brought in. We see an example in the Dutch scene where it has worked well.
There may also be examples in other countries which might be useful for us to try and
explore because if we can begin to get some prototype models where this has worked
well and find out why, we may be able to get to a point where we can think about how
we can resolve some of the questions.
Nelkin: Let me start with a warning because I have been looking at examples com-
paratively. I agree with Mary Douglas when she suggests that these models are not
necessarily transferable from one country to another; that they are really cultural-
ly based. If you look carefully at the Dutch case and the kind of assumptions that
underlie it, there are reasons why it assumes that form there but not in other coun-
tries. You have really to look at the cultural and political expectations of the
Dutch, based on historical circumstances, to understand the shape of its participa-
tory experiments. So too in other countries.
Kunreuther: Would you talk for a minute about why you think the Dutch experiment
worked well there? We can then maybe turn to some other experiences where it has
or has not worked well so that we can begin to get a spectrum of thoughts on that.
Kleindorfer: While you are responding to that, what does it mean to work well?
Nelkin: Why has this experiment developed and persisted in Holland and even obtained
governmental support? This might sound very simplistic, but Holland is a country
which has traditionally experienced conflict because of its religious splits and
also historical fragmentation. Conflict resolution has been terribly important in
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Holland for a long time and there is a tolerant acceptance of conflict; it is not
rejected as necessarily negative. Consensus is somehow not talked about in the
same terms in Holland as elsewhere. As a country it is interesting to study with
respect to conflict and conflict resolution because this is so fundamental to its
own history.
Schoemaker: That is my impression too. Moreover, in Holland students are heavily
subsidized by the government. With tuition fees very low, some may feel a real
obligation to repay society. I do not see such an attitude in the USA, where some-
one may pay $7000 per year for tuition. This contextual difference maybe of signifi-
cance in understanding differences in student attitudes across cultures.
Douglas: This leads me to a crucial question. The fact that the government feels
disposed to subsidize students is not sufficient to settle the nagging worry that
we have had in several papers that risk analysis, when there are very deep differ-
ences among the stakeholders in conflict, only serves as a form of massage to the
most powerful--who are going to win anyway. Therefore, the real question is whether
risk analysis really works well or whether it is just decorative, as Volker Ronge
was suggesting, by standing outside the real issues, or, according to Kasperson's
law, not standing outside them, but simply making no difference.
Nelkin: I am disturbed because working well can mean a million things. Risk analy-
sis could work well because it involves a short-term dispute but it allows people
to accept a technology that is not necessarily positive, but that could be a defini-
tion of working well.
Douglas: If risk analysis enabled a decision to be reached, that could be a good
criteria for working well.
Schoemaker: The difficult question here is what criteria to use in assessing
whether decision analysis has worked well?
Kleindorfer: Working well might be understood in some logical ex ante expected
pay-off sense. But equally important in the political arena is who is accepting
responsibility for the results of planning, whether analytical or not. In the Three
Mile Island situation described by Roger Kasperson, there was something like ongoing
social consensus about the utility, etc., of nuclear power. But when things blew,
everyone brought up the fact that a warning had been issued ex ante and nobody was
willing to take the responsibility ex post. Thus, both ex ante and ex post felicity
seem to be important. Ex ante one wishes informed consensus, so that there is some-
thing linking the outcome and responsibility for it to a common understanding that
the people have for the problem. Perhaps, as Howard Raiffa suggests, analysis can
contribute here. But there are also many problems in balancing consensus and re-
sponsibility. If one opens a sensitive public issue up to public participation and
analysis, there is a high probability that you are not going to get consensus ex
ante, nor any sense of social responsibility ex post if something goes wrong. Thus
public participation and analysis may promote ex post felicity, but it may also hin-
der ex ante consensus and feelings of collective responsibility ex post.
Nelkin: Most people who study participation get around that dilemma by saying that
there are other virtues in participation besides the actual decision, and that there
are real costs in nonparticipation in terms of declining trust in government, and
in the feeling of being a citizen.
Kunreuther: There is one question I would like to put, in the light of this. One
says that this works well, that all the parties go home and say that they are de-
lighted to have been part of the process. We may not agree with the outcome but we
can live with it. That is one kind of a solution where one can say there is a good
feeling at the end of all this. Then there is the other issue that Paul Kleindorfer
raises that may be more difficult. Even if we are not delighted with the outcome,
we now all feel part of the process and we are going to share in the consequences.
I
217
I heard Paul Schoemaker suggesting that in Dutch society there may actually be this
feeling of responsibility for one's actions afterwards and a willingness to accept
the solution as part of their life--in a different way perhaps than one would have
had in other societies.
Kasperson: I should like to suggest a second process; there are some people here
who know far better than myself so I will be brief. The remiss system in Sweden is
a very intricate system and when risk analysis has been done for some particular
subject it is then systematically farmed out to a number of large organized inter-
ests in that country, all of whom do their own fairly careful analyses of the issues
associated with that document. There are mechanisms for ensuring that subsequent
analysis which is adopted when a decision is made by a minister, or whoever, that
the decision is made on the basis of the original document and the remiss process.
The remiss process is very valuable because it not only brings in the diversity of
analysis that we were so worried about, but there is also a very strong consensus-
building aspect. Once a decision has heen made, of course, it could be rp.jected.
But you feel that you have had a fair try, and there is then some responsibility
for making the policy work.
Ne~kin: It is very interesting to compare the remiss system with another system in
Holland where "policy intentions" are circulated. The Swedish system is based on a
sort of cultural monolithic consensus whereas the Dutch system is based on a lot of
expected conflict. This provides a very good contrast because the kinds of struc-
tures that have been developed to resolve conflict come out quite differently in
those two countries, since they are based on two different cultural models.
Kunreuther: Do they use analysis in very different ways in terms of defending their
positions, in terms of presenting their arguments when they know that consensus is
what they are striving for? Do we know much about that--is this a research issue
for the future or is this something we know? If you were going to write a compara-
tive paper about the Swedish and Dutch systems would you be able to say something
about where analysis came into the picture and how it was actually used as part of
the decision process?
Ne~kin: I would be able to say something about how analysis is conveyed to the pub-
lic, but I would not be able to say much about the technical process of analysis.
I think that the key variable is not what the experts do, but who the experts com-
municate with, and how they use that as an input into the decision-making process.
Drake: As somebody who has done both worthwhile and useless risk analyses and has
seen them influence or not influence decisions, I sort of cast this discussion into
a research need. It seems to me that we have probably too broad a spectrum of cul-
tures and issues to be able to come up with one approach that will be universally
applicable. I think each country is gradually interested in improving its own situ-
ation, whatever the societal goals are. It might be useful to do some fairly de-
tailed case studies across technologies and cultures to look at controversies in
which risk is apparently one of the decision factors, and then look at whether risk
analysis was used, whether it was overkill for the problem, whether it was useful,
whether it was used to se~d up a smoke screen for the real issues, or whether it
was just totally irrelevant. I think it might be useful to understand where analy-
sis might be better used in the future.
Ne~kin: I was too embarrassed to ask before, but it turns out that many of us have
the same problem--was is meant here by formal analysis?
Kunreuther: One assumes we all have our definitions straight and although I think
Howard Raiffa started off by saying that analysis could be defined in many different
ways, we could probably do the same for formal analysis. I am not going to try and
answer this question and would like Howard Raiffa to have the initial say as to what
he thinks formal analysis entails.
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Raiffa: I define it in a very broad sense. It involves systematic, conscious
thinking. It involves the art of taking a complex problem and decomposing it into
different parts. It does not necessarily have to involve quantification or mathe-
matics. I think that as analysis becomes more intricate, one has to use more tools,
and mathematics is a natural tool. But I also think that "a little analysis goes
a long way".
Schoemaker: What is formal about it?
Raiffa: Conscious, systematic--it is an attempt to document thinking so that others
can understand the process, peers can review it, and contributions can come from
different experts. That is the nature of formal analysis.
Nelkin: But in this discussion it has taken on more of the formal role. I started
out with that kind of assumption but in the course of discussions over the last few
days the word "formal" has become more important and it has taken on some kind of
a structure which appears to be much more rigid, at least in the discussions here.
Kunreuther: Incidentally, we had a difficult time in phrasing this question. We
were not sure whether we should say risk analysis, quantitative analysis or formal
analysis. We finally focused on formal analysis because we wanted people to think
of the process as being structured. Perhaps we could have used the word "structured"
instead of "formal".
Kleindorfer: I think that formal has the connotation that Howard Raiffa properly
underlines, namely that formal analysis is transferable within a particular disci-
pline so that one really has to understand the sociology of that particular disci-
pline to know what would be acceptable as formal analysis.
Raiffa: As an aside, this Institute is called the International Institute for Ap-
plied Systems Analysis. But people asked what this means. The reason why this
title was accepted by 12 nations in 1973 was because nobody could pinpoint its mean-
ing. When people ask what I mean by systems analysis I prefer merely to change the
word "systems" to "systematic". The question then becomes: What do we mean by
systematic analysis?
Kunreuther: But what I have heard both Roger Kasperson and Dorothy Nelkin saying
without defining their terms is that analysis is used in these countries. This
suggests that there is some kind of systematic analysis or some kind or procedure
that is used. What Elizabeth Drake is saying is that maybe we had better do some
research to find out and define in a little more detail what we mean by the word
analysis. It tends to be a little confusing when you begin to look at the insti-
tutional structures in different countries and the way each of these different
groups look at a particular problem. You cannot necessarily transfer an analysis
from Holland and bring it into the USA because there are too many differences be-
tween the two countries.
Nelkin: Why did you not use systematic in phrasing the question?
Kunreuther: We could have. But I do not think we would have changed the tone of
this discussion. Do other people think it would have changed the question?
Larichev: It would really change. I think if you put the word systematic instead
of formal analysis, it would be very different.
Linnerooth: In our discussions, we thought of having "risk" in the terminology,
but that was too narrow because of the different prOblems "risk" encompasses. We
decided to change the term to quantitative, but that was also too restrictive, so
we changed it to formal. If we had carried on we might have decided on systematic
or even something else.
I
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Nelkin: I have nothing against quantitative analysis, but I think that there are
other forms of analysis that are useful in these areas. There are areas where you
cannot use quantitative analysis so you really want to incorporate both of them into
your question.
Latrwop: Coming from a physics background I would like to see us characterize the
ideal form of the analyses we are talking about: not as systematic, quantitative
or formal, but as objective analyses. I do not mean objective in the narrow sense,
but in the broad sense as defined by repeatability. That is, the analyses we are
talking about are those parts of the process that should not vary as a function of
the agencies or consulting firms performing them.
Schoemaker: I would like to raise an issue that is related to this. with formal
analysis one has to make the rules of the game explicit to oneself as well as to
others. The approach is reductionistic in that one separates values from beliefs
(i.e., predictions). You allow other people to challenge you in certain domains.
For example, you might be willing to change your beliefs without affecting the rules
of evidence as you laid them down. Now there may be people who object to this ap-
proach precisely because you allow yourself to be open to scrutiny. The moment you
commit yourself to an explicit decision procedure, you open yourself up to the pos-
sibility of being challenged and having to change within your own world of consis-
tency. For example, I have encountered people who prefer not to get into a formal-
ized thinking mode because they are afraid of where it might lead them. Specifi-
cally, when new information is introduced, the formal mode may force a revision of
opinion, which may be disliked or not preferred.
Kunreuther: I think Brian Wynne made that point in our earlier discussion; i.e.,
the fact that only certain people would want or get into the process. I would like
to see a little elaboration on that because I think we got into this discussion
with Paul Schoemaker's comments on various types of procedures. The point raised
as to how one can get into that if some groups refuse to follow the rules of the
game and hence would not put their cards on the table. We have found that to be
the case in our LEG case studies; it is very difficult to find out explicity what
is happening.
Wynne: I would like to go back to previous comments about the specification of
goals as part of the process of eliciting utility functions. I used an example
where people rejected cost-benefit analysis of an explicit and systematic kind,
i.e., where we say: You are making decisions implicitly every day, why do you not
let us do it for you systematically? We could point out the consistencies of its
use in one place in comparison with others. My interpretation of that rejection,
and this is a sociological interpretation, is that they want to retain control of
the situation and want autonomy. They do not know who you are, out there with your
systematic approaches and your rationalities and your demand to separate values
from facts--you are like people from Mars. If they specify their goals or utili-
ties too precisely for you the analyst, they have enough sense to fear that those
expressions of themselves and their hopes and values will be used too simplisti-
cally and too rigidly. They lose the chance to revise their values and objectives
in their own "social space". They are being asked to give up even more of their
lives to alien beings--why shOUld they? I do not mean that rhetorically; you as
analysts and "decision makers" are a different society, and these things are coming
down through the cloud of the unknown and depositing themselves like meteorites or
something. We have to take this seriously. It is not just something we can moral-
istically dismiss or treat rhetorically.
Kunreuther: I want to push Brian Wynne a little on this point because I think that
we are all looking for ways of doing things better. Groups may come into the pro-
cess with hidden agendas and it may very well be that these groups are saying:
"You are a foreigner, we do not understand where you come from." Alternatively,
they may simply be saying that because they do not want to be part of the process,
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even though they fully understand exactly where the other groups come from. There
is a real difference at this point in terms of how you begin to prescribe. In other
words, we have to have some understanding of what the role of these groups is.
Consider the scenario where people understand where you come from but refuse
to play the game. In other words, they say they do not want to do formal analysis
because, as Paul Kleindorfer was suggesting, they do not want to lose control of the
situation. Is that something we just accept as part of the decision process, or is
there some way in which we can move in the direction of what Roger Kasperson and
Dorothy Nelkin were pointing out for Sweden and Holland?
Wynne: That is a question firstly about whether those cases were successful, and
secondly whether you see the role of risk assessment as eliciting the underlying
motivations, interests, values, etc., that people possess, and thus expanding the
terms of social debate. Is the process of risk assessment of a formalized kind,
helping to elicit those authentic commitments underlying whatever is said in politi-
calor technical vocabulary, or is it suppressing them? We then get into the prob-
lem of ambiguity and the extent to which we feel we should retain our ambiguous con-
cepts or should systematise them into absolutely locked-in precise meanings. It may
be that keeping hidden agendas hidden is a good idea, in that it is perhaps helping
us to avoid deeper conflicts which might even be quite destructive if they were ex-
plicitly laid out. I do not see any ways of producing some generalized statements
about that. You can only go from one empirical case to another in the hope of in-
sights that allow generalization. The problem is to know how we do or should move
from one level of conflict to another in the political and social process, because
I do not think you can intrinsically define the issues as belonging to one level or
another. In other words, how does explicit conflict arise and change in connection
with societal issues, whether it is LEG or some other issue, and how, if ever, does
it go away? I have never seen it go away. what we use as criteria for successful
risk assessment depends upon what we think is the proper social role for risk assess-
ment. Let us discuss that too.
Kunreuther: But what we are coming up with are examples of success in one form or
another. I feel that the group is saying that we have to do things better. We can
pose these dilemmas but we know that somehow we have to come up with solutions. We
have heard some cases where things seem to have worked well.
Kasperson: Let me try to answer this. A good example which was successful in pro-
viding useful analysis, and maybe Jim Dooley can comment on this, was the Berger
report in Canada*, where researchers went out into villages and listened very care-
fully to the kinds of concerns that people had and the different ways that the new
technological development could affect their villages. Nobody forced them to do an
analysis but someone had to do an analysis to cut through all the information to see
what it all meant. That seems to me an example of a process that aided the policy
process in a productive way. People were not forced to do an analysis but still ob-
tained the kind of information that was extraordinarily valuable for the policy pro-
cess.
Douglas: I would like to have some guidance as to how much this form of analysis
is normally geared to the less-privileged members of the community. There are large
numbers of people exposed to hazards, but they are mostly the underprivileged who
are actually more vulnerable to dangers and also less able to move away from them or
to get compensation. When I was listening to Dorothy Nelkin talking about the Dutch
Science Shops, I was trying to imagine what they were really like. In a sense I can
guess fairly well who comes to them and who are the people who are being served by
them. I can well imagine that the people we should be concerned about are not actu-
ally part of the debate.
*Berger, Thomas R. (1977) Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry. Vol. 1. ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services.
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Nelkin: That is a problem that the people in the Science Shops worry about. They
do not reach a lot of people they want to reach because the people who usually seek
such information tend to be middle class, that is, those who know how to get it.
Douglas: But they might be proposing themselves as representatives of the inarticu-
late people who might have very different cultural perspectives.
Nelkin: They do not want to go
cern about manipulating people.
groups and how far do you go in
are in that kind of a dilemma.
out and openly solicit because they have this con-
To what extent do you serve as a spokesman for
transferring your own values to these groups? They
Thompson: In Cowdenbeath, a city involved in the Mossmorran Bay siting situation,
there were some people who were in a poverty-stricken situation because of high un-
employment. There was a recent television program where the interviewer asked the
townspeople what they felt about the new installation. They ail wanted the instal-
lation because they were used to working as miners and were not worried by risks:
they simply wanted to work. Apparently, the misinformation there is once the in-
stallation is built, they will find that there is no work. They were very keen to
accept risks and did not agree that the risks were as high as what people were say-
ing, and even if they were that high, they were still prepared to accept them.
Raiffa: When our committee [CORADM] was first formed, we each introduced ourselves
and we tried to be a little searching about our hidden biases. I admitted to a
bias of using the method of an analyst, which is one of the statements I have heard
mentioned here. I am personally concerned about how the analyst can protect the
interests of unorganized, statistically anonymous individuals. Those people who
are readily identifiable and are harmed or helped by policies can usually organize
themselves. Those who do not organize themselves are the people who are affected
indirectly by the effects of the decision. Policy workers are not accountable for
the secondary or tertiary indirect effects of their actions. That is where the
analyst is in a position to help.
Kunreuther: One aspect which we have not explored fully is the equity/efficiency
trade-off. From an efficiency viewpoint one could argue that anyone who was really
in a position to be harmed will either get their resources together, or will think
the situation is not important enough to worry about. The equity that Mary Douglas
and Howard Raiffa are bringing up is related to how you transfer resources to some
of these groups who are being hurt because they do not have resources to fight for
their cause. Another aspect of the problem which cuts across both the efficiency/
equity trade-offs is the information processing ability of individuals and groups
to process information. We found, from our LEG studies and in reading Lee Davies'
book Frozen Fire (published by Friends of the Earth), that many groups of people
who were at a disadvantage and who were directly affected by an LNG tank or termi-
nal, were not aware of the hazards they were facing. Therefore you have this real
problem of whether the experts or people who are informationally rich should make
other groups aware of the situation.
Wynne: The people who build the plants are not always aWdre either, and in any
case they will not get others interested except by telling them there is a risk,
which is a risk they do not like.
Kunreuther: The reason I am pointing it out is because they are often made aware of
it after an accident occurs. They have not been made aware at the time the plant is
being built. In fact there is no incentive for interest groups to do anything that
might rock the boat if they want to get things through in a reasonable period of
time. The dilemma appears to me to be between whether to provide all the interested
parties with detailed information and perhaps not build new plants, or not to give
everyone this information because it might hinder "progress". How do you deal with
this problem?
222
Thompson: But do people want information? Some people do, some people do not.
Some people are forced to have information they do not want and yet get cannot get
the information they do want. The first question is, do they want it?
Wynne: To support Mike Thompson, I would surmize that you might be able to get a
group to make an abstract statement of the risk involved in the proposed installa-
tion of, say, a power plant which means that the information is there available to
everyone. I imagine the result would be that nobody would take any notice at all.
I think the only way of getting the information to stick is when it becomes meaning-
ful: when you are actually going to open the plant.
Kunreuther: But it is too late then.
Wynne: Of course it is, and that is the problem; but it should be recognized as a
fundamental point about the social nature of knowledge.
Kunreuther: I would like to refer to Mary Douglas' question of helping the down-
trodden. I would put downtrodden into the category of those who are informationally
poor. When you are information poor you are downtrodden as well as poverty-sticken
because you do not know what to do. The question Mike Thompson is raising is, do
they want to be helped? what types of value judgments are implied by the actions
one takes?
Kasperson: I think it is really an ethical question. It concerns the ethics of
risk imposition and what kinds of responsibilities you take on when you impose risks
on people. I agree with what Michael Thompson says and I think that many people do
not want that kind of information. That is fine because that person has made his
own judgment and the moment you start making that judgment for that person then it
seems to me that you are really violating his freedom. Moreover, if you are serious
about achieving consensus to the maximum extent possible, it is an idealized state
in itself, then anyone who is involved in imposing risks on individuals or communi-
ties has the obligation to obtain the maximum degree feasible. It is not only pro-
vision of information, but it is also an attempt to make sure that the person has
understood the issue.
Schoemaker: Would that not be the role and responsibility of the government?
Kasperson: If you are serious about doing it then the developer should get someone
independently to provide that information. It is a very difficult problem and there
are all the difficulties of different levels of understanding. We know a lot about
public participation and the difficulties involved, but you need to begin with a
clear definition from the start of what the ultimate responsibilities are and try
to build from that a respectable process.
Drake: I think Mary Douglas has raised an important issue and I do not think that
we are going to solve it here. If you look historically at the past siting of in-
dustrial facilities, you will find that usually they are clustered in one area and
in an area that is surrounded by working-class houses, or light industry. That is
the way society used to function. People with money did not want to live near one
of the industrial areas. It is only recently that people have become concerned
with the risks associated with technologies and that the issue of remote siting has
emerged. Suddenly, industrial facilities are being installed in remote areas and
these are the areas where the wealthy live and play. I think Michael Thompson's
example of Mossmorran is good because the people in Cowdenbeath perceive the risk
to be low. They have lived with higher risks, they perceive that they may have some
some jobs directly or indirectly as a result of that project. On the other hand,
the people in Dalgetty Bay, which is primarily a nice suburb of Edinburgh, are very
upset and are taking a lead in opposing the project.
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Thompson: The risks today are also much greater.
Drake: To some extent yes, but what we are really saying is that things are more
risky for the middle class who traditionally avoided industrialized areas.
Douglas: But I suspect the risk analysts and decision analysts are taking on the
responsibilities of governments. This function of actually knowing what locals
feel was a kind of collective responsibility in the old days.
Kleindorfer: what has changed from the old days is that we now have such an array
of risks that the government is talking in the name of the public, so that the pro-
cess of informing the public is a costly one, not just from the government's point
of view but from that of the public too. This raises a difficult cost-benefit is-
sue--how much money is one willing to spend to inform the public?
Wynne: I think we are in danger of doing what many participants do at such meet-
ings, which is to trade symbols across the heads of the working classes without
really getting to grips with the real issue. On the one harld we are praising their
rationality, and on the other we are damning their irrationality. There is a con-
stant lament that people will only get up off their seats and take an interest and
get stuck in when it is too late, which is when the siting question arises, and in-
evitably debate then tends to be destructive. We ought not to forget, and it has
been a repeated analysis, that educational systems such as the British one, are
organized on the basis of stratification. Elites are at the top of the system and
are trained and encouraged to think in abstract, general, universalistic terms,
whereas the masses are churned out at the bottom, turn back into their folds, and
are encouraged to think in informalized, concrete, particularistic ways. Then, we
go along and blame them when they will not think in universalistic, abstract terms
so we start throwing universalistic information at them about risks to site a facil-
ity at one place or another.
On the one hand, the system that we actually profit from, live comfortably
within, and act at ease with is telling them to do one thing via their education
and socialization, and then every time there is an issue, a big road show comes
along and tells them to do something else. It might be a shrewd means of keeping
the vast majority of people silent and disoriented, but I do not think risk assess-
ment should be part of that. Why should we allow ourselves to get away with that
anyway? I think that this relates to the point that Roger Kasperson mentioned about
the Berger Inquiry, and I think it is one of the interesting things about that in-
quiry that Berger did go along deliberately and ask the Indians about their identi-
fiable social and cultural aspirations, not just about a national technological risk
associated with the pipeline. The whole of the Indian economy and their ideas about
nature, their view of their destiny in the most spiritual sense was incorporated
into the agenda, to be elaborated in a serious manner, and not just as a matter of
exotic entertainment.
Nelkin: It was specifically stated that this kind of information was to carry equal
weight with technical information.
Dooley: I have one comment on the Berger Commission. First of all it was an in~
qiry that really did look at native rights of people who were not technical people,
in effect, nomads. In this instance, what we are calling analysis was completely
discredited. To illustrate, a pipeline company went up into the permaforst region,
which is a very difficult, ecologically sensitive substance. In permafrost, if you
drive a truck over it you can start off a series of thaws which each year thaw more,
and you end up with vast gulleys of marshland in no time at all. A good deal of
the land where the pipeline was to run was through permafrost. The pipeline organ-
ization said they would experiment, and did so, but excluded the public from observ-
ing the site. The site was dismantled and it was claimed that pipelines do not harm
permafrost. If that is analysis then it is the kind that can really discredit. In
the Berger Commission, analysis played a very small part.
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Another point which is related to other points mentioned here is that one of
the leading reporters of the GLobal Mail, one of Canada's most influential papers,
went to the inquiry with a typical establishment point of view to report on the in-
quiry. The reporter returned and wrote an impassioned book supporting native rights
and went on to say that when he heard the native people talking about how they per-
ceived this project, and their position on it, it had changed his entire view*. I
point this out becuase it has been said that people tend to stick rigidly to a
framework but I think this is a very unique inquiry and it broke new ground in de-
monstrating sincere concern for minority issues.
Kasperson: Before we become too carried away with the possibilities of the alter-
natives, we should recognize that the kinds of problems we are talking about only
work with certain institutions. I really believe that the outcome must be kept open
yet most institutions are not ready to believe this. It requires a high level of
commitment to the values associated with the democratic processes. What it says
essentially is that if the values that you desire for democratic process are suffi-
ciently important you may forego the best location or it may take you five years
longer to get your LEG sited. So it is very difficult. We are all aware that we
cannot just pass these problems off to the existing institutional structure because
that institutional structure itself is a political outcome and we are talking about
changing that political outcome. So incorporating the analysis we are talking
about is really not possible without institutional change.
Drake: I think we are being very elitist in talking about representing the true
information to the informationally downtrodden. Who is going to decide what is true?
You have a complex set of issues and there is no unbiased advisory committee. The
government agencies have advisory committees, but, for example, the US Department
of Energy is developing coal gasification technology but they do not let EPA make
environmental studies of their pilot plant effluents because they do not want to
know about potential environmental problems until the technology is proven. Our
whole society is riddled with biased interest groups. The Berger Inquiry was an
exception where we have one well intentioned individual and something good came out
of it. But I do not think that that is assurance that we are going to find many
such people.
Kunreuther: I would like to bring the discussion to a close. At the beginning of
the meeting we asked ourselves if there would be a chance for some synthesis and
we have tomorrow for that. After this discussion I would certainly say we are not
information poor, but information rich. I will briefly summarize the ideas that
have come up during the course of the discussions without trying to make any attempt
to synthesize these issues.
One of the points we started with was the fact that conflict resolution was a
critical aspect since we had many different parties who had different views of the
problem. Conflict resolution could have been at the value end or the perceptual
end but there was a feeling that it would be good to find a compromise but not nec-
essarily consensus. One way to begin to do this is to focus on the rules of evi-
dence and in some way judge low-probability events, but this is difficult because
low-probability events do not have a detailed statistical database on which to make
these judgments. It is also difficult because we have many interested parties some
of whom have access to financial resources; others of whom do not. This immediately
provoked a discussion as to whether or not we should give the "have nots" access to
resources and if so, how much.
The next part of the discussion involved examples of the Dutch Science Shops
and how they work. We also had examples of how the remiss system worked well in
Sweden and we also heard about the Berger Commission and how that worked well in
Canada. What emerged was a feeling that we do have examples where analysis has
been part of the process. We have not fully defined what analysis is, although we
*O'Malley, Martin (1976) The Past and Future Land: An Account of the Berger Inquiry
into the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Ltd.
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came up with a definition of conscious, systematic thinking which could begin to
help us think about where this could help playa role.
We ended up with a dilemma of how we were going to judge where analysis could
be useful. In particular, there was a question of equity issues: equity not just
in terms of the resource base in an income or wealth sense, but also in the infor-
mation sense. It never became clear to me whether it would be a good thing to pro-
vide people with a lot of information because that might produce more conflict.
Whether that is good or bad depends on the outcome, i.e., whether or not compromise
may actually be enriched by the extra conflict produced. I therefore turn to one
of the research needs that Elizabeth Drake suggested: to try and deal with some
case studies so one can see whether formal analysis has been useful, where it has
been useful, where it may need improvement. In this way we can begin to learn from
different cultures and see ways in which we can pick up some interesting strands.
However, we should not expect to emerge from these case studies with a grand synthe-
sis. Rather, we should recognize that each problem, each situation, each culture,
differs in certain specific ways that are extremely important in terms of where
analysis comes into the picture. On that note I would like to suggest that we think
about key research needs for IIASA which we can discuss further tomorrow.
Future Research Needs
The following question was put to the participants: What future research
should IIASA undertake, bearing in mind IIASA's comparative advantages?:
o problem-oriented research
o international, comparative research
o multidisciplinary backgrounds.
We have attempted below to categorize under broad headings the suggestions made by
each of the four groups. We make no attempt to comment on the suggestions; they
do provide food for thought regarding future directions that risk research might
take, both at IIASA and at networking institutions. Finally, some of the sugges-
tions may serve as a basis for future summer studies at IIASA.
1. Risk Analysis Issues
o What is the role of social processes in the categorization of an issue?
o What is the role of risk assessment?
o How can methods for formal risk assessment be improved?
o Develop simplified measures of risk for use in initial siting decisions
(e.g., potential hazard zone for "credible" and "maximUI:l" accident events
in a fair/consistent manner) .
Action-~iented Risk Research
Seed project for action research:
Criteria: apolitical; multidisciplinary team of experts; far-reaching social/
environmental/technical consequences.
Areus of application: Severn barrage tidal energy scheme (UK); LNG pipeline
transportation (USSR); coal gasification (USA).
2. Institutional/Process Issues
o Empirical validation criteria for decision analysis
o Obstacles in moving to rational mode
o Financial incentives in risk disputes (cross-national)
o Legal/ethical aspects (cultural perspectives)
o Adaptiveness of technology to changes in acceptance criteria
o Comparative analysis of regulatory processes.
Areas of application: Drugs, DNA, medical technology, seat belts, acid rain,
smoking, nuclear weapons, defense.
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3. Issues Concerning International Comparative Risks
o Different modes for incorporating risk analysis into the political process
o Develop structure to facilitate comparison
o What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of analysis?
o Seek generic properties that cut across national/cultural differences
o Styles of risk management appropriate for different politico-cultural sys-
tems
o Comparison of methods already implemented (Berger Inquiry in Canada,
Swedish remiss system, Dutch Science Shops)
4. Perceptions of Risk
o Inadequacy of individual perception approach (imposed categories)
o Focus on shared beliefs and goals and ideas about liability and equity
o Sources of variance/extent of agreement between experts
5. Changing Attitudes of Society Towards Risk
o Why are societies becoming increasingly more risk averse over time?
o How do they decide what risks to be averse about?
o What role does risk play in mental health?
o Are we overconcerned with some risks and should we pay more attention to
others (e.g., child abuse, deprived nations)?
6. Risks of War
o What is the relationship between current defense, armaments and the risk
of war?
as involved with accumulating nuclear weapons
as involved with sell-off of old arm stocks
the functioning of threat systems
o What is the impact of defense spending on national structure of other
risks?
7. Issues in Conflict Resolution
o Comparative studies of procedures f~r dispute resolution over technologies
o Design of experimental studies on the group decision making process
o Industrial labor relations practices in hazardous industries
o Sociology of active impacted groups (cultural theory of risk)
o Media and representation of images of risk
o Sociology of experts and expertise
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